Risk Management
Supervisory Review
ICAAP
SAMA'S Guideline Document on the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Plan (ICAAP)
No: 291000000581 Date(g): 22/9/2008 | Date(h): 23/9/1429 Status: Modified This document should be read in conjunction with SAMA's Circular No. 321000027835 entitled "Enhancements to the ICAAP", dated 10/11/2011 G.I. Process of Constructing an ICAAP
1. Introduction and Overview
Basel II's structure is built upon three pillars. Under Pillar 1, minimum capital requirements are calculated based on explicit calculation rules in respect of credit, market and operational risks. However, in Pillar 2, other risks are to be identified and risk management processes and mitigation assessed from a wider perspective, to supplement the capital requirements calculated within the scope of Pillar 1. Pillar 2 involves a proactive assessment of unexpected losses and a methodology to set aside sufficient capital. Effectively, Pillar 2 is the creation of a wider, flexible and risk-sensitive system, and this imposes a major challenge on banks in meeting such requirements. In many respects it involves a new approach to risk assessment and risk management.
One of the cornerstones of the Basel II framework, which very specifically and tangibly affect banks, is the requirement that, within the scope of Pillar 2, they develop their own Internal Credit Adequacy Assessment Plan – ICAAP. This is a tool which ensures that the banks must possess risk capital which is commensurate with their selected risk profile and risk appetite, as well as appropriate governance and control functions, and business strategies. Essentially, an ICAAP is derived from a formal internal process whereby a bank estimates its capital requirements in relation to its risk profile, strategy, business plans, governance structures, internal risk management systems, dividend policies, etc. Consequently, the ICAAP process includes a strategic review of a bank's capital needs and as to how these capital requirements are to be funded, i.e. through internal profits, IPOS, Sukuks, right issues, other debt issues, etc.
It is essential that the ICAAP process involves an assessment of a bank capital needs beyond its minimum capital requirements. Accordingly, it assesses risk beyond the Pillar I risks and, therefore, addresses both additional Pillar I and Pillar II risks. Pillar 2 risks include financial and nonfinancial risks such as strategic, reputational, liquidity, concentrations, interest rate, etc. Consequently, ICAAP allows a bank to attribute and measure capital to cover the economic effects of all risk taking activities by aggregating Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 risks.
While SAMA has formulated these guidelines with which banks must comply within the scope of their internal capital adequacy assessment process, it is the banks themselves that are to select and design the manner in which these requirements are met. Consequently, SAMA will not prescribe any standard methodology but a set of minimum requirements with respect to the process and disclosure requirements.
2. Objective
The main purpose of the ICAAP is for the Bank's senior managers to proactively make a strategic assessment of its capital requirements considering its strategies, business plans, all risks, acquisitions, dividend policies. Further, the ICAAP also establishes the capital required for economic, regulatory and accounting purposes and helps identify planned sources of capital to meet these objectives. Also, an ICAAP benefits include greater corporate governance and improved risk assessment in banks, and thereby increases the stability of the financial system. It also help to maintain regulatory capital levels in accordance with its strategy, economic capital, risk profile, governance structures and internal risk management systems.
Another important purpose of the ICAAP document is for senior management to inform the Board of Directors and subsequently SAMA on the ongoing assessment of the bank's risk profile, risk appetite, strategic plan and capital adequacy. It also includes the documentation as to how the bank intends to manage these risks, and how much current and future capital is necessary for its future plan.
3. Major Building Blocs of the ICAAP
3.1 Bank's Role and Responsibility for the ICAAP
Banks have to convince SAMA that their ICAAP process is comprehensive, rigorous and includes capital commensurate with their risk profile as well as strategic and operational planning. The banks must compose and assemble the specific ICAAP process and methodology based on the objective and requirements imposed by SAMA and on the specific strategic and operational plans set by their Board of Directors. Consequently, banks must have a clear understanding on SAMA's expectations in terms of the definitions, concepts and benchmarks in order for an effective assessment and follow-up by it. An important and obvious example is the manner in which both the risks and the capital are defined.
3.2 SAMA's Role and Responsibility in the ICAAP Process
SAMA is responsible for establishing the frequency and nature of the review, while the Banks are to establish their actual implementation processes and methodology as per SAMA's guidelines.
Thus, while the two processes involved are closely integrated through the Supervisory Review Process, at the same time there is an express division of responsibilities. SAMA's role has the final word in this process as it makes its risk assessment of the banks and, where reason exists, imposes additional requirements on the banks or requires enhanced risk management systems, additional stress testing, etc.
One of the alternative courses of action available to SAMA is to establish a higher capital requirement than that calculated by the bank itself. The level of capital needed is based on the calculation of the capital requirement with respect to credit, market and operational risks based on the explicitly established calculation rules which are laid down within the scope of Pillar 1. However, a supplement could be required as additional capital which, in light of other types of risks (Pillar 2), which may arise within the scope of the internal capital adequacy assessment process. Consequently, this is not the only tool (to set a higher capital requirement) and it will not necessarily be the first choice, in that capital should not be a substitute for adequate risk management. On the other hand, a demand for more capital may be justified even for those banks with high, but well-managed risk exposures.
3.3 ICAAP as a Part of Pillar 2
The basic idea is that banks shall, within the framework of Pillar 2, identify all of the risks to which they are exposed. This involves a wider spectrum of risks than those that form the basis for the minimum capital adequacy calculation within Pillar 1, i.e. These include any additional Pillar 1 risks, i.e. credit risks, market risks and operational risks. It involves, among other things, at least the following*:
■ Strategic risk - arising from a bank's strategies and changes in fundamental market conditions which may occur;
■ Reputational risk - the risk of adverse perception of image in the market or the media, etc.
■ Liquidity risk - the risks of difficulties in raising liquidity or capital in certain situations;
■ Concentration risk - exposures concentrated on a limited number of customers, industries, certain sectors or geographic area, etc. entailing vulnerability; and
■ Macro Economic and Business cycle risk - through lending or otherwise a bank may be vulnerable to business cycle risks or environmental changes
■ Interest Rate risk - relevant to the banking book.
These risks, as well as the risks that are addressed within the scope of Pillar 1 are, of course, to a certain degree inter-dependent and to a certain extent, capture various aspects of the same risk classification. For example, a bank, which incurs major credit losses, is probably more exposed to the risk of damage to its reputation and, can be also more easily affected by problems in raising capital.
Consequently, there can be no doubt that Pillar 2 is one of the most important new features in Basel II, and within its scope, banks and SAMA must work together to achieve a comprehensive assessment of risks, risk management, and capital requirements.
Interest rate risk in the banking book:
The measurement process should include all material interest rate positions of the bank and consider all relevant repricing and maturity data. Such information will generally include current balance and contractual rate of interest associated with the instruments and portfolios, principal payments, interest reset dates, maturities, the rate index used for repricing, and contractual interest rate ceilings or floors for adjustable-rate items. The system should also have well-documented assumptions and techniques.
Regardless of the type and level of complexity of the measurement system used, bank management should ensure the adequacy and completeness of the system. Because the quality and reliability of the measurement system is largely dependent on the quality of the data and various assumptions used in the model, management should give particular attention to these items.
Liquidity risk: Liquidity is crucial to the ongoing viability of any banking organization. Banks’ capital positions can have an effect on their ability to obtain liquidity, especially in a crisis. Each bank must have adequate systems for measuring, monitoring and controlling liquidity risk. Banks should evaluate the adequacy of capital given their own liquidity profile and the liquidity of the markets in which they operate.
(Refer to Paragraph 741 of International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards – June 2006)
* Other risks not specifically covered here are described in component 2 of the Document under item #4.3.
4. Major Challenges in Building an ICAAP
The major challenge in the internal capital adequacy assessment is to identify and accurately assess the significance of all of the risks faced by a bank and which may have consequences as regards to its financial situation. Subsequently, the risks identified, must be quantified by translating these into a capital requirement.
In all of these stages there are both conceptual difficulties and measurement problems. These include:
1. What constitutes a relevant risk?
2. What is the reasonable possibility that such a risk will actually happen?
3. If such a risk occurs, how large is the damage that it might lead to?
4. Do various risks arise independently or are they co-related with each other?
5. How is the assessed risk to be priced in terms of capital requirements?
While there have been developments for analyzing and measuring risks, assessment and risk management are not an exact science in which models and systems automatically provide quantified answers. Analysis, assumptions, methods and models are important tools in order to obtain reasonable answers. However, ultimately, a comprehensive and prudent assessment is required which includes experiences, expert judgment and views other than those that can be formulated in figures. Sound common sense can never be replaced by statistics and model calculations.
There is also a strong linkage between the degree of sophistication with respect to risk measurement and management and the scope and nature of the bank's operations. For example, an international banking group with a large number of business areas and thus a complex risk structure has a need and the resources for a more advanced risk measurement methodology. However, for a small bank this may not be the case. Also, from a systemic risk perspective, more stringent requirements are obviously imposed on a large financial group since deficient risk management in such a bank may have detrimental impact on the entire financial system.
Given that banks are different is an important reason why SAMA will not prescribe any standard arrangement as to how the internal capital adequacy assessment process is to be carried out. It is up to each bank, based on its own operations, its scope of business and risks to formulate an internal capital adequacy assessment process which is suitably adapted and which meets the requirements of SAMA. This means also that the size of the operations is not the sole criterion; rather, it is the complexity and risk level of the operations which should be the main driver.
5. The ICAAP Process
5.1 Board Responsibility in the ICAAP Process
It is important that an internal capital adequacy assessment process, as an activity, remains the responsibility of senior management and the Board.
In this regard, the board of directors and senior management must be clearly involved in its development, the process itself, and its integration into the ongoing operations and planning. The Board should ensure that the ICAAP is embedded in the bank's business and organizational processes. The Board's responsibility in the ICAAP process must be documented and clarified throughout the organisation.
5.2 Strategic and Capital Planning in the ICAAP Process
As a part of the ICAAP process, the board of directors and senior management must also establish clear goals with respect to the long-term level and composition of capital and integrate it as an element in the bank's strategic planning. There must also be a preparedness to handle unforeseen events that may detrimentally affect the capital adequacy situation.
Consequently, bank's senior management as a significant responsibility must have a process for assessing its capital adequacy relative to its risk profile. In this regard, the ICAAP’s design should be in congruence with a bank's capital policy and strategy. Further, it should be fully documented.
The initial point for a bank's capital requirement and strategic plans must be to identify all of the risks to which it is exposed and which may be of significance. Also, the object is that a well thought-out and a clear decision emerges as to how these risks are to be managed. This requires an approach which includes an assessment of the following:
■ The various markets in which the bank operates;
■ The products it offers;
■ The organizational structure;
■ Its financial position;
■ Its experience from various disruptions and problems previously experienced, and assessments of what might happen to the banks if risk materializes;
■ Strategies, plans and ideas about entering new markets or product areas must also be considered.
■ Reviews and analyses of data as well as qualitative assessments.
■ For the complex banks, this entails extensive reviews of the risks to which it is exposed on a continuing basis. Stress tests/sensitivity analyses are required in order to be able to measure the effects of a particular disruption. Regular analysis and assessments are required of the manner in which risks are managed, controlled and quantified and how they should be managed in the future. It is also important to identify the connections and links such as co-relations, which may exist between various types of risks. This should lead to a bank's capital requirements including any additional control measures.
■ For a bank with more straight forward operations, the analysis work is obviously simpler as there are fewer and less significant factors. On the other hand, this does not mean that a more limited operation with respect to breadth or range or the total turnover of the business is automatically less risky.
A complex operation with many branches of business may involve difficulties in achieving a comprehensive grasp of the total risk structure, as well as of all the factors that affect it. In a more limited operation, the negative aspect is the risks arise from being more dependent on one or a small number of products, perhaps on a limited number of customers and perhaps within a limited geographical area. For such operations, it may also be more difficult to raise capital rapidly at a reasonable cost.
5.3 Documentation and Corporate Governance in the ICAAP Process
The requirement regarding documentation is very significant. This is because in order to be able to evaluate the process it must be verifiable and it is possible for both the banks and SAMA to do a follow-up. Further, the manner in which the process is conducted as well as the decisions to which it leads to must be set forth in business plans, the board's rules of procedure, the minutes, as well as in various strategy and policy documents.
5.4 Frequency of ICAAP Review
The ICAAP should form an integral part of the management process and of a decision-making culture, and it should be reviewed regularly by a bank's board or the board's executive committee. SAMA requires that this must take place at least once a year. Additionally, the internal capital adequacy assessment process must be reviewed and a document submitted when significant changes have taken place, whether in relation to the bank's own decisions or external changes. The fist formal ICAAP should be for the year 31.12.2008 and should be submitted to SAMA by 31 January 2009.
Also, in this regard, for a bank which operates in a number of financial sectors and perhaps also in various national markets, it may require a review of the ICAAP more frequently than once a year. SAMA will inform these Banks where a submission other than the annual submission is required. Consequently, for banks that operate within a single and simpler market segments, and where no dramatic changes take place in the market structure, a yearly review may represent an acceptable frequency.
5.5 Risk Based and Comprehensive
The ICAAP should be risk based, comprehensive, forward-looking and take into consideration a bank's strategic plans and external changes. Further, it should also be based on an adequate measurement and assessment processes.
The basis of the internal capital adequacy assessment process lies in the measurement of a bank's minimum capital requirements which is the product of the calculated assessment of credit risks, market risks and operational risks which take place within the scope of Pillar 1 and all relevant Pillar 2 risks. Additional capital may also be required as a result of stress testing results, additional infrastructure expenditures and human resource, i.e. hiring of senior level executives. The internal capital adequacy assessment process challenges banks that they must take a broader approach and perspective of assessing other risks. Also, included are circumstances which affect the bank's total risk profile and which the management must analyze and form conclusions on their effects on the total capital requirements.
In this respect materiality is an aspect, i.e. large risk exposure - large risk management requirement - large capital requirement, and vice versa. However, it is important to understand that all banks - large as well as small, complex and non-complex - must comply with SAMA requirements.
5.6 Models and Stress Testing
Assessments of risks may be made both by using very sophisticated methods, models and also using perhaps simpler measures, and methods. What is appropriate and relevant is determined by the banks operations in question. In case of a large bank, it might be natural to use extensive stress tests which provide quantitative measurements of the impact due to a specified disruption. Generally, larger banks have external analyses with respect to economic and business cycles and financial market trends, including the use of economic capital models and measurements. This type of approach can constitute an important element of the internal capital adequacy assessment process. However, it is limited by the fact that generally it only deals with risks that are quantifiable.
It follows, therefore, it is not necessary for a bank with less complex operations to employ complicated model involving advanced analysis leading to economic capital requirements. However, for a small bank, the most important issue is to assess the effect of, for example, loosing its three largest customers, or an economic sector where the bank has considerable exposure having major problems, as well as consequence of the closure of a large customer.
Should a Bank utilize models relevant and appropriate disclosure of the model such as its generic name, application or use within the risk management process, validation results, internal logic, should be provided.
5.7 Reasonable Results
The ICAAP should produce a reasonable outcome vis-à-vis capital requirements. The process involves weighing together the importance of the risks which a bank encounters, the extent to which it exposes itself to these risks, and how it organizes itself and works in order to address them. This "bottom line" can crystallize into a minimum amount of capital after discussion with SAMA, as well as additional control systems necessary to cover the risks the bank is exposed to.
While capital requirements constitute a minimum requirement, banks in their interest operate above this minimum level as a consequence of their strategic objectives. The reason for this includes higher rating and thereby lower funding costs. It also provides a freedom of action in connection with corporate acquisitions, as well as in the event of losses which may arise due to a rapid and serious downturn in the economy. Consequently, banks, as well as SAMA, expect that bank capital stays above the minimum level.
Generally, if a bank's internal capital adequacy assessment process result in an assessed level of required capital which is the same, or below, the minimum as determined under the Pillar 1, this is an indication that the internal capital adequacy assessment process has not functioned in a satisfactory manner.
II. Reporting Format and Contents
1. Overview of the Reporting Format and Contents
The ultimate end product of the ICAAP process is the ICAAP document. This section on reporting format and contents is to provide guidance to banks to describe in a logical format the main assumptions and results of the ICAAP process. Consequently, the ICAAP document should bring into one place an assessment of the capital requirements in relation to a bank's risk profile, strategies, business plans, major risks, acquisitions, governance and internal risk management systems, etc. It also must establish the capital required for economic, regulatory and accounting purposes and help identify planned sources of capital to meet its objectives. Further, all relevant assessments and information should be covered and documented in the ICAAP.
Specifically, the objectives of the ICAAP and the related entities of the bank that are included by it should be specified. The main results of the ICAAP effort may be presented in a tabular format indicating the major components of capital requirements, capital available, capital buffers and proposed funding plans. Furthermore, the adequacy of the governance and bank's internal control and risk management processes should be included.
It is also important to document the strategic position of the bank, its balance sheet strength, planned growth in the major assets based on its Business plans for the next 12 to 18 months indicating the likely consumption in capital for this growth by major category.
Further, the results of major stress tests on capital requirements and capital supply for additional risks deterioration in the economic environment, recessionary periods, or other economic/political downturns are important aspects to be covered.
2. Executive Summary
The major purpose of the Executive Summary is to describe in a summary form the main results of the ICAAP effort which is to bring into one place objectives of the ICAAP, the assessment of the capital requirements for strategies, business plans, all risks, acquisitions, etc. Also presented and described should be the capital required for economic, regulatory and accounting purposes and identification of planned sources of capital to meet these objectives. The following information should be briefly described and where appropriate, relevant amounts are quantified and presented in a tabular format:
A. 1. Capital Required
■ Pillar 1 Capital Requirements
■ Pillar 2 Capital Requirements
■ Business Plans (Summarized)
■ Growth Rate and amounts by business lines
■ Capital requirements by business lines
■ Strategic Initiatives
■ Capital Expenses
■ Stress testing
■ Other capital requirements
■ Total capital requirements
2. Capital Available
■ Current Availability
■ IPOS
■ Qualifying Sukuks
■ Qualifying Debt issues
■ Rights issue
■ Other capital sources
■ Total capital sources
3. Buffer Available (1-2)
B. Dividends Proposed
C. Funding plans over the Time Horizon
D. Capital requirement for each subsidiary or affiliate
Other information that may be included in the Executive Summary are comments on significant matters on any of the items above.
3. Objective of an ICAAP
A description of the bank's specific objectives is desirable. In this regard, the differing purposes that capital serves: shareholder returns, rating objectives for the bank as a whole or for certain securities being issued, avoidance of regulatory intervention, protection against uncertain events, depositor protection, working capital, capital held for strategic acquisitions, etc.
4. Summary of Bank's Strategies Including its Current and Projected Financial and Capital Positions
This section would be the major elements of a bank's strategic and operational plans. It would include the present financial position of the bank and expected changes to the current business profile, the environment in which it expects to operate, its projected business plans (by appropriate lines of business), projected financial position, and future planned sources of capital.
Major aspects to be considered is formulating a business plan and the bank's strategies and initiative including aspects such as the political, economic, legal, components, etc. of the environment their likely profile and impact over the planning period of the Bank. This may consider aspects such as oil prices, legislation related to the Bank, i.e. foreign investments, consumer banking, capital markets, mortgages, leasing and installment companies, etc.
The starting balance sheet and the date over which the assessment is carried out should be disclosed.
The projected balance sheet should clearly indicate the major lines of business which are going to be inspected by the Bank's strategic initiatives, environmental changes and assumption over the planning period and the impact on capital requirements by major lines of business.
Also included would be the projected financial position, the projected capital available and projected capital resource requirements based on expected plans. These might then provide a baseline against which adverse scenarios might be compared.
5. Capital Adequacy and ICAAP
This section should include the following:
Disclosure of various types of Capital
An ICAAP establishes a framework for economic, legal, regulatory and accounting capital purposes and helps identify planned sources of capital to meet these needs. Consequently, this section should provide a distinction from the bank's perspective of the following capital classification indicating their purpose, minimum requirements and other attributes.
1. Regulatory Capital
2. Accounting Capital
3. Legal Capital
4. Economic Capital (if relevant)
Additionally, a bank will need to describe its position with respect to its definition, assimilation and usage within the bank's risk and performance assessment framework.
Consequently, this section should elaborate on the bank's view of the amount of capital it requires to meet its minimum regulatory needs and disclosure requirements under International Accounting Standards, or whether what is being presented is the amount of capital that a bank believes it needs to meet its strategic business objectives, external ratings, and a support for a dividend policy from a shareholders perspective, etc. For example, whether the capital required is based on a particular desired credit rating or includes buffers for strategic purposes or to minimize the charge for breaching regulatory requirements. Where economic capital models are used this would include the time horizon, economic description, scenario analyses, etc. including a description of how the severity of scenarios have been chosen.
Timing of the ICAAP
Generally, the ICAAP is prepared on an annual basis as at the end of each calendar year, i.e. 31 December 2008 (and is due in SAMA as at 31 January of the following year). However, should there be any variation to this timing, additional details will need to be provided. This will include the reasons for the effective date of the ICAAP. Other information to be provided will also include an analysis and consideration for any events between the effective date and the date of submission which could materially impact the ICAAP and the rationale for the time period over which ICAAP has been assessed.
Risk Covered in the ICAAP
An identification and appropriate description of the major risks faced in each of the following categories:
■ Credit Risk (Additional to Pillar 1)
■ Market Risk (Additional to Pillar 1)
■ Operational Risk (Additional to Pillar 1)
■ Liquidity Risk
■ Concentration Risk
■ Securitization Risk
■ Strategic Risk
■ Interest Rate Risk
SAMA recognizes banks’ internal systems as the principal tool for the measurement of interest rate risk in the banking book and the supervisory response. To facilitate SAMA’s monitoring of interest rate risk exposures across institutions, banks would have to provide the results of their internal measurement systems, expressed in terms of economic value relative to capital, using a standardized interest rate shock.
Further to the above, as per SAMA circular dated 10 November 2011, banks need to provide the following details:
- Provisions: The Bank should enhance the section on this topic by providing the following end of year information, for the past five years (including the current year).
- Specific, general and total provisions
- Provision expense charged to the income statement (net of recoveries)
- Default rates by major portfolios (Retail, Credit Card, Corporate, SME's, etc.)
- Total Non-performing Loans
- Coverage Ratio
2. Concentration Risk: The Banks should under the section on concentration risk include the following information for the past 3 years (including the current year).
- On and Off Balance Sheet Credit exposure to top ten customers as a percentage of total on and off balance sheet credit.
- On and Off Balance Sheet Credit exposure to top ten customers as a percentage of Bank's regulatory capital.
- Number of loans extended to connected parties and the total value of such loans as a percentage of total credit.
- Total value of loans to connected parties as a percentage of total regulatory capital.
- The banks could add comments on the concentration risk and how it affects their assessment of additional capital requirements, if any.
3. Liquidity Risk: The Banks should provide the following information as at the end of year.
- Liquidity Coverage Ratio
- Net Stable Funding Ratio
- In addition, the following information should be provided for the past three years (as at end of the year):
- Deposits from top (10) ten customer as a percentage of total customer deposits.
- Deposits from Wholesale markets (interbank, others) as a percentage of total liabilities.
4. Off Balance Sheet Activities: The following year-end information on Derivatives Activity should be provided for past 3 years with breakdown in Saudi Riyal, USD and other currencies.
- Interest rate Derivatives
- FX Derivatives
5.Capital Leverage Ratio: Banks should include information on the following:
- Basle Capital Leverage Ratio (current year)
- Legal Leverage Ratio under the Banking Control Law (for past 3 years)
(Refer to Paragraph 763 of International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards – June 2006)
■ Macro Economic and Business Cycle Risk
■ Reputational Risk
■ Global Risk
■ Any other Risks identified
■ An explanation of how each of the risk has been identified, assessed, measured and the methodology and or models currently or to be employed in the future, and the quantitative results of that assessment;
■ where relevant, a comparison of that assessment with the results of the pillar 1 calculations;
■ a clear articulation of the bank's risk appetite by risk category; and
■ where relevant, an explanation of method used to mitigate these risks.
6. Approach and Methodology
Current Methodology
A description of how models and assessments for each of the major risks have been approached and the main assumptions made.
For instance, banks may choose to base their ICAAP on the results of Pillar 1 risks calculation with additional risks (e.g. concentration risk, interest rate risk in the banking book, etc.) assessed separately and added to Pillar 1. Alternatively, a bank may decide to base their ICAAP on internal models for all risks, including those covered under Pillar 1 (i.e. Credit, Market and Operational Risks) as additional risks.
The description would make clear which risks are covered by which modeling calculation or approach. This would include details of the models, methodology and process used to calculate risks in each of the categories identified and reason for choosing the models and method used in each case.
Future Approach and Methodology
Banks may provide a summary on the future models and methodologies being considered and developed including their strengths and weaknesses.
Internal Models: Pillar 1 and ICAAP comparisons
Should the internal models vary from any regulatory models approved for pillar 1 purposes, this section would provide a detailed comparison explaining both the methodological and parameterization differences between the internal models and the regulatory models and how those affect the capital measures for ICAAP purposes.
7. Details on Models Employed
A list of models utilized in the formulation of the ICAAP should be provided giving relevant and appropriate details as given below:
■ The key assumptions and parameters within the capital modeling work and background information on the derivation of any key assumptions.
■ How parameters have been chosen including the historical period used and the calibration process.
■ The limitations of the model.
■ The sensitivity of the model to changes in the key assumptions or parameters chosen.
■ The validation work undertaken to ensure the continuing adequacy of the model.
■ Whether the model is internally or externally developed. If externally acquired its generic name and details on the model developer.
■ Details should also be provided as to the extent of its acceptance by other regulatory bodies, users in the international financial community, overall reputation and market acceptance.
■ Specific details on the applications within the Bank, i.e. measurement of risks such as credit, liquidity, market, concentration, etc. or for the purpose of establishing internal credit risk classification ratings, risk estimates, PDs, LGDs, EADs, etc.
■ Major merits and demerits of the chosen models.
■ Results of the model validation obtained through
■ Back testing / Scenario testing
■ Analysis of the internal logic
■ Major methodologies or statistical technique used, i.e. value at risk models employing methods such as variance/co-variance; historical simulation, Monte Carlo method, etc.
■ Confidence levels embedded for regulatory capital, economic capital, or for external rating purposes.
Further, the explanation of the differences between results of the internal model for Pillar 1 would be set out at the level at which the ICAAP is applied. Therefore, if the firm's ICAAP document breaks downs the calculation by major legal regulated entities, an explanation for each of those individual entities would be appropriate.
SAMA would expect the explanation to be sufficiently granular to show the differences at the level of each of the Pillar 1 risks.
Data definition, i.e. whether the source is external or internal and if any data, manipulation of external data has been done for it to conform with internal data.
8. Stress and Scenario Tests Applied
Where stress tests or scenario analyses have been used to validate the results of modeling approaches, the following should be provided:
■ information on the quantitative results of stress tests and scenario analyses the bank carried out and the confidence levels and key assumptions behind those analyses, including, the distribution of outcomes;
■ information on the range of adverse scenarios which have been applied, how these were derived and the resulting capital requirements; and
■ where applicable, details of any additional business-unit specific or business plan specific stress tests selected.
Details on Stress and Scenario Testing:
This section should explain how a bank would be affected by an economic recession or downswings in the business or market relevant to its activities. SAMA is interested in how a bank would manage its business and capital so as to survive for example a recession whilst meeting minimum regulatory standards. The analysis would include financial projections for two to three years based on business plans and solvency calculations.
The severity of recession may typically be one that occurs only once in a 15 year period. The time horizon would be from the present day to at least the deepest part of the recession.
Typical scenarios would include:
■ how an economic downturn would affect
■ the bank's capital resources and future earnings; and
■ the bank's strategy takes into account future changes in its projected balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, impact on its financial assets, etc.
■ In both cases, it would be helpful if these projections showed separately the effects of management actions to changes in a bank's business strategy and the implementation of any contingency plans.
■ an assessment by the bank of any other capital planning actions to enable it to continue to meet its regulatory capital requirements through a recession. These actions may include new capital injections from related companies, new share issues through existing shareholders, IPO's, floatation of long term debt, Sukuks, etc.
■ For further details, refer to Attachment 1.
9. Capital Transferability Between Legal Entities
Details of any restrictions on the management's ability to transfer capital during stressed conditions into or out of the business(es) covered. These restrictions, for example, may include contractual, commercial, regulatory or statutory nature. A statutory restriction could be, for example, a restriction on the maximum dividend that could be declared and paid. A regulatory restriction could be the minimum regulatory capital ratio acceptable to SAMA.
10. Aggregation and Diversification
This section would describe how the results of the various risk assessments are brought together and an overall view taken on capital adequacy. This requires an acceptable methodology to combine risks using quantitative techniques. At the general level, the overall reasonableness or the detailed quantification approaches might be compared with the results of an analysis of capital planning and a view taken by senior management as to the overall level of capital that is appropriate.
■ Dealing with the technical aggregation, the following may be described:
i. any allowance made for diversification, including any assumed correlations within risks and between risks and how such correlations have been assessed including in stressed conditions;
ii. the justification for diversification benefits between and within legal entities, and the justification for the free movement of capital between legal entities in times of financial stress.
11. Challenge and Adoption of the ICAAP
This section would describe the extent of challenge and testing of the ICAAP. Accordingly, it would include the testing and control processes applied to the ICAAP models or calculations, and the senior management or board review and sign off procedures.
In making an overall assessment of a bank's capital needs, matters described below should be addressed:
i. the inherent uncertainty in any modeling approach;
ii. weaknesses in bank's risk management procedures, systems or controls;
iii. the differences between regulatory capital and available capital;
iv. the reliance placed on external consultants.
v. An assessment made by an external reviewer or internal audit.
Internal control review
The bank should conduct periodic reviews of its risk management process to ensure its integrity, accuracy, and reasonableness. Areas that should be reviewed include:
• Appropriateness of the bank’s capital assessment process given the nature, scope and complexity of its activities;
• Identification of large exposures and risk concentrations;
• Accuracy and completeness of data inputs into the bank’s assessment process;
• Reasonableness and validity of scenarios used in the assessment process; and
• Stress testing and analysis of assumptions and inputs.
• (Refer to Paragraph 745 of International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards – June 2006)
12. Use of the ICAAP within the Bank
This area should demonstrate the extent to which capital management is embedded within the bank's operational and strategic planning. This would include the extent and use of ICAAP results and recommendation in the strategic, operational and capital planning process. Important elements of ICAAP including growth and profitability targets, scenario analysis, and stress testing may be used in setting of business plans, management policy, dividend policy and in pricing decisions.
This could also include a statement of the actual operating philosophy and strategy on capital management and how this links to the ICAAP submitted.
13. Future Refinements of ICAAP
A bank should detail any anticipated future refinements within the ICAAP (highlighting those aspects which are work-in-progress) and provide any other information that will help SAMA review a bank's ICAAP.
Attachment 1 Details on Stress Testing
Please Refer to SAMA's Rules on stress testing for the updated requirements on stress testing.Stress Testing is a generic term for the assessment of vulnerability of individual financial institutions and the financial system to internal and external shocks. Typically, it applies ‘What if’ scenarios and attempts to estimate expected losses from shocks, including capturing the impact of ‘large, but plausible events’. Stress testing methods include scenario tests based on historical events and information on hypothetical future events. They may also include sensitivity tests. A good stress test should have attributes of plausibility and consistency and ease of reporting for managerial decisions.
*Stress Testing Under Pillar 1:
*The Basel II document has several references for banks to develop and use stress testing methodology to support their work on credit, market and operational risks. There are several reference to stress testing under Pillar 1 which are summarized hereunder:
Para 434 An IRB Bank must have in place sound stress testing processes for use in the assessment of capital adequacy. Examples of scenarios that could be used are (i) economic or industry downturn (b) market-risk events (c) liquidity conditions.** Para 435 The bank must perform a credit risk stress test to assess the effect of certain specific conditions on its IRB regulatory capital requirements. The bank’s stress test in this context should consider at least the effect of a mild recession scenario e.g. two consecutive quarters of zero growth to assess the impact on its PD’s, LGD’s and EAD’s.** Para 436 The bank’s method should consider the following sources of information: bank’s own data should allow estimation of the ratings migration; impact of a small deterioration in credit environment on a bank’s rating; evaluate evidence of rating migration in external ratings.** Para 437 National discretion with supervisors to issue guidance on design of stress tests.** Additional Pillar 1 Guidance on Stress Testing:
Para 527(j) For calculation of capital charge for equity exposures where internal models are used there are some minimum quantitative standards to be applied. One of these standards requires that a rigorous and comprehensive stress testing program must be in place.** In addition, under *the Basel Market Risk Amendment document of 1996 there are stress testing requirements for banks using the internal models. These are contained in Section B.5 of the (1996) Amendment and are as follows:
■ Among more qualitative criteria that banks would have to meet before they are permitted to use a models based approach are the following:
■ Rigorous and comprehensive stress testing program should be in place.
■ Cover a range of factors that can create extraordinary losses or gains in trading portfolios.
■ Major goals of stress testing are to evaluate the capacity of the bank’s capital to absorb potential large losses and to identify steps the bank can take to reduce its risk and conserve capital.
■ Results of stress testing should be routinely communicated to senior management and periodically, to the bank’s board of directors.
■ Results of stress tests should be reflected in the policies and limits set by the management.
■ Prompt steps are expected for managing revealed risks appropriately, e.g.
■ Hedging
■ Reducing size of exposures
■ Scenarios to be employed:
■ Historical without simulation (largest losses experienced)
■ Historical with simulation (assessing effects of crisis scenarios or changes in underlying parameters on current portfolios)
■ Mostly for adverse events, based on individual portfolio characteristics of institutions
Stress testing under Pillar 2:
Under the Supervisory Review Process SAMA will initially review the Pillar 1 stress testing requirement for credit and market risks. How-ever, the Basle II document also covers stress testing under Pillar 2 and the relevant references are included in the following paragraphs:.
Para 726 In assessing capital adequacy, bank management needs to be mindful of the particular stage of the business cycle in which the bank is operating. Rigorous, forward looking stress testing that identifies possible events or changes in market conditions that could adversely impact the bank should be performed. Bank management clearly bears primary responsibility for ensuring that the bank has adequate capital to support its risks.** Para 738 For market risk this assessment is based largely on the bank’s own measure of value-at-risk or the standardised approach for market risk. Emphasis should also be placed on the institution performing stress testing in evaluating the adequacy of capital to support the trading function.** Para 775 For credit concentration risk a bank’s management should conduct periodic stress tests of its major credit risk concentrations and review the results of those tests to identify and respond to potential changes in market conditions that could adversely impact the bank’s performance.** Para 777 In the course of their activities, supervisors should assess the extent of a bank’s credit risk concentrations, how they are managed, and the extent to which the bank considers them in its internal assessment of capital adequacy under Pillar 2. Such assessments should include reviews of the results of a bank’s stress tests.** Para 804 Under Securitization banks should use techniques such as static pool cash collections analyses and stress tests to better understand pool performance. These techniques can highlight adverse trends or potential adverse impacts. Banks should have policies in place to respond promptly to adverse or unanticipated changes. Supervisors will take appropriate action where they do not consider these policies adequate. Such action may include, but is not limited to, directing a bank to obtain a dedicated liquidity line or raising the early amortisation credit conversion factor, thus, increasing the bank’s capital requirements.** Other aspects related to stress testing:
■ There are no specific or explicit requirements in the Basel II document on stress testing for liquidity risk although some banks may wish to develop ‘What if’ scenarios for liquidity under stress conditions.
■ SAMA expects all banks to closely review the above Basel III recommendations on stress testing and develop specific strategies and methodologies to implement those that are relevant and appropriate for their operations. SAMA in its evaluation of banks method and systems under Pillar I will examine the implementation of these stress test requirements. It will also review the stress test methodologies and systems as part of its Supervisory Review Process.
■ As a minimum bank should carryout stress tests at least on an annual basis.
*SAMA 3 reforms supersedes any conflicting requirements in that section. Refer to the following sections to read the last updated requirements:
1- Credit Risk Capital Requirements - 16.50 until 16.52 (Stress tests used in assessment of capital adequacy)
2- Market Risk Capital Requirements - 10.19 until 10.23 (Stress Testing)
3- Capital Requirements for CCR and CVA - 7.45 until 7.46 (Stress Testing)
Enhancements to the ICAAP Document
This refers to the ICAAP document issued by Saudi Central Bank on 22 September 2008 which documents the ICAAP Process and provides guidance to the Banks on the form and contents of the ICAAP Report to be submitted to SAMA.
In the past years, the ICAAP submissions by the Banks have continued to improve both in terms of contents and form and as a result they have become an increasingly important supervisory tool for meaningful discussions related to Banks' risk profiles, their business plans and their projected levels of capital adequacy.
The Saudi Central Bank would like the 2011 ICAAP document to be further strengthened in the following areas:
1. Provisions: The Bank should enhance the section on this topic by providing the following end of year information, for the past five years (including the current year).
■ Specific, general and total provisions ■ Provision expense charged to the income statement (net of recoveries) ■ Default rates by major portfolios (Retail, Credit Card, Corporate, SME's, etc.) ■ Total Non-performing Loans ■ Coverage Ratio
2. Concentration Risk: The Banks should under the section on concentration risk include the following information for the past 3 years (including the current year).
■ On and Off Balance Sheet Credit exposure to top ten customers as a percentage of total on and off balance sheet credit. ■ On and Off Balance Sheet Credit exposure to top ten customers as a percentage of Bank's regulatory capital. ■ Number of loans extended to connected parties and the total value of such loans as a percentage of total credit. ■ Total value of loans to connected parties as a percentage of total regulatory capital. ■ The banks could add comments on the concentration risk and how it affects their assessment of additional capital requirements, if any.
3. Liquidity Risk: The Banks should provide the following information as at the end of year 2011.
■ Liquidity Coverage Ratio ■ Net Stable Funding Ratio
In addition, the following information should be provided for the past three years (as at end of the year):
■ Deposits from top (10) ten customer as a percentage of total customer deposits. ■ Deposits from Wholesale markets (interbank, others) as a percentage of total liabilities.
4. Off Balance Sheet Activities: The following year-end information on Derivatives Activity should be provided for past 3 years with breakdown in Saudi Riyal, USD and other currencies.
■ Interest rate Derivatives ■ FX Derivatives ■ Total
5. Capital Leverage Ratio: Banks should include information on the following:
■ Basle Capital Leverage Ratio (current year) ■ Legal Leverage Ratio under the Banking Control Law (for past 3 years)
The Saudi Central Bank will continue to enhance the ICAAP process to make it more comprehensive and meaningful.
Suggest removing this whole section and incorporate it within ICAAP. ILAAP
Guidelines on the Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Plan (ILAAP)
No: 42012157 Date(g): 17/10/2020 | Date(h): 1/3/1442 Status: In-Force A. Introduction
These guidelines shall supersede the existing SAMA Guidelines on the Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Plan (ILAAP) issued vide SAMA circular no. 381000120488 dated 3/12/1438H.
The updated guidelines “these guidelines” shall be effective starting from the ILAAP submission for 2021G.
B. ILAAP Construction
1. General Definition of the ILAAP
The Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP) is defined as “the processes for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of liquidity implemented by the bank pursuant to SAMA liquidity risk management regulations”. It thus contains all the qualitative and quantitative information necessary to underpin the risk appetite, including the description of the systems, processes and methodology to measure and manage liquidity and funding risks.
These ILAAP guidelines shall only serve as a starting point in supervisory dialogues with banks. Therefore, they should not be understood as comprehensively covering all aspects necessary to implement a sound, effective and comprehensive ILAAP. It is the responsibility of the bank to ensure that its ILAAP is sound, effective and comprehensive duly taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of its activities.
2. Objectives of the ILAAP
The main objectives of the ILAAP are as follows:
i. Enhances corporate governance and risk management processes in banks and the financial system in general.
ii. Establishes the minimum liquidity required for regulatory purposes and helps identify planned sources of liquidity to meet these objectives.
iii. For a bank's Board of Directors to proactively assess its liquidity requirements in line with its strategies, business plans and risks.
In additions, the ILAAP document should be for Senior Management to inform the Board of Directors and SAMA on the ongoing assessment of the bank's liquidity risk profile, liquidity risk appetite, strategic plan and liquidity adequacy. It also documents how the bank intends to manage these risks, and how much liquidity is necessary for its future plans.
3. Scope and Proportionality
i. These guidelines shall be applicable to all locally incorporated banks licensed and operating in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
ii. The ILAAP is, above all, an internal process, and it remains the responsibility of individual banks to implement it in a proportionate and credible manner. The bank’s ILAAPs has to be proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the bank.
4. Major Building Blocks of the ILAAP
4.1 Banks’ Roles and Responsibilities for the ILAAP
i. A Bank should produce, at least once per year, an ILAAP approved and signed by the Board of Directors.
ii. A bank is required to demonstrate to SAMA that its ILAAP processes are comprehensive, rigorous and ensures that it has liquidity that is commensurate with its risk profile.
iii. A bank is required to put in place ILAAP processes and methodologies based on SAMA requirements and on its strategic and operational plans as set by its Board of Directors.
4.2 ILAAP as Part of Pillar 2
The Pillar 2 liquidity framework should focus on liquidity risks not captured, or not fully captured, under Pillar 1 requirements. It is incumbent on banks to undertake their own assessment of liquidity risks, including Pillar 2 risks, and take appropriate measures to reduce or manage these risks.
5. The ILAAP Process
5.1 ILAAP Governance
The ILAAP process should remain the responsibility of the Board of Directors and Senior Management of the bank. The ILAAP should be well integrated into the bank’s processes and decision-making culture. In this regard, banks are required to ensure the following:
i. The Board of Directors has the ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the ILAAP, and the Board of Directors or its delegated authority is required to approve an ILAAP governance framework with a clear and transparent assignment of responsibilities, adhering to the segregation of functions. The governance framework should include a clear approach to the regular internal review and validation of the ILAAP.
ii. All of the key elements of the ILAAP should be approved by the Board of Directors or its delegated authority, and be consistent with the risk appetite set by the Board of Directors, and with the bank’s approach for measuring and managing liquidity and funding risks.
iii. The Board of Directors or its delegated authority, Senior Management and relevant committees are required to discuss and challenge the ILAAP effectively.
iv. Each year, the Board of Directors or its delegated authority is required to provide its assessment of the liquidity adequacy of the bank, supported by ILAAP outcomes and any other relevant information, by reviewing and approving the bank’s ILAAP.
5.2 Strategic and Liquidity Planning
i. The ILAAP should support strategic decision-making and, at the same time, be operationally aimed at ensuring that the bank maintains adequate liquidity on an ongoing basis, thereby promoting an appropriate relationship between risks and rewards. All methods and processes used by the bank to steer its liquidity as part of the strategic or operational liquidity management process are expected to be approved, thoroughly reviewed, and properly included in the ILAAP and its documentation. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the ILAAP should be consistent with each other and with the bank’s business strategy and risk appetite.
ii. The ILAAP should be aligned with the business, decision-making and risk management processes of the bank. It should also be consistent and coherent throughout the group.
5.3 Documentation
Banks are required to maintain sound and effective overall ILAAP architecture and documentation of the interplay between the ILAAP elements and the integration of the ILAAP into the bank’s overall governance and management framework.
5.4 Comprehensive Risk Quantification
The ILAAP should ensure that risks, that a bank is or may be exposed to, are adequately quantified. The bank is required to do the following:
i. Implement risk quantification methodologies that are tailored to its individual circumstances, i.e. they are expected to be in line with the bank’s risk appetite, market expectations, business model, risk profile, size and complexity.
ii. Determine sufficiently conservative risk figures, taking into consideration all relevant information.
iii. Ensure adequacy and consistency in its choice of risk quantification methodologies.
iv. Ensure that key parameters and assumptions cover, among other things, confidence levels and scenario generation assumptions.
5.5 Stress-Testing
Banks should conduct a comprehensive, robust stress-testing that is consistent with SAMA Stress-testing Rules, taking into consideration the following:
i. The impact of a range of severe but plausible stress scenarios on the bank’s cash flows, liquidity resources, profitability, solvency, asset encumbrance and survival horizon.
ii. Selecting stress scenarios that reveal the vulnerabilities of the bank’s funding. In addition to performing a tailored and in-depth review of the bank’s vulnerabilities, capturing all material risks on an institution-wide basis that result from the bank’s business model and operating environment in the context of stressed macroeconomic and financial conditions. The review should be conducted on a yearly basis and more frequently, when necessary, depending on individual circumstances. On the basis of this review, the bank is required to define an adequate stress-testing programme for both normative and economic perspectives. As part of the stress-testing programme, the bank is required to determine adverse scenarios to be used under both perspectives, taking into account other stress-tests it conducts.
iii. Conducting reverse stress-testing in a proportionate manner.
iv. Continuously monitoring and identifying new threats, vulnerabilities and changes in its environment to assess whether its stress-testing scenarios remain appropriate and, if not, adapt them to the new circumstances.
v. Regularly updating the impact of the scenarios. In the case of material changes, the bank should assess its potential impact on its liquidity adequacy.
The degree of conservatism of the stress-testing scenarios adopted and assumptions made by the bank should be discussed in the ILAAP document.
5.6 Review and Independent Validations
The ILAAP shall be subject to a regular internal review, at least once a year, taking into consideration the following:
i. Both qualitative and quantitative aspects, including, for example the use of ILAAP outcomes, the stress-testing framework, risk capture, and the data aggregation process.
ii. Establishing a defined process to ensure proactive adjustment of the ILAAP to any material changes that occur, such as entering new markets, providing new services, offering new products, or changes in the structure of the bank.
iii. Adequately back-testing and measuring the performance of the ILAAP outcomes and assumptions, covering, for example, liquidity planning, scenarios, and risk quantification.
iv. Conducting a regular independent validation of the ILAAP risk quantification methodologies, taking into account the materiality of the risks quantified and the complexity of the risk quantification methodology. The overall conclusions of the validation process should be reported to Senior Management and the Board of Directors, used in the regular review and adjustment of the quantification methodologies, and taken into account when assessing liquidity adequacy.
5.7 ILAAP Reporting to SAMA
i. The ILAAP shall be submitted to SAMA by 31st of August each year using 30th of June as a reference date.
ii. Banks are required to provide, at minimum, details on all items mentioned in these guidelines or explain why any item is not relevant for their respective banks, taking into account the size, complexity and business model of the bank.
C. Reporting Format and Content
The ILAAP document should include, at minimum, the following sections:
1. Background
This section is for introductory text describing the following:
i. Business model, Bank/Group structure, balance sheet risks, relevant financial data, the reach and systemic presence of the bank. ii. Internal and external changes since the last ILAAP. iii. Changes in the scope of the document since the last review by the Board of Directors. iv. Justifications of the comprehensiveness and proportionality of the bank’s process. 2. Executive Summary
This section should present an overview of the ILAAP methodology and results. This overview should include:
i. The purpose and coverage of the ILAAP.
ii. The main findings of the ILAAP analysis:
- How much and what composition of liquidity the bank considers it should hold as compared with the liquidity resource requirement ‘pillar 1’ calculation.
- The adequacy of the bank’s liquidity risk management processes.
iii. A summary of the financial projections, including the strategic position of the bank, its balance sheet strength, and future profitability.
iv. Brief descriptions of liquidity plans; how the bank intends to manage liquidity going forward and for what purposes.
v. Commentary on the most material liquidity risks, why the level of risk is acceptable or, if it is not, what mitigating actions are planned.
vi. Commentary on major issues where further analysis and decisions are required.
vii. Who has carried out the assessment, how it has been challenged, and who approved it.
3. Objectives of an ILAAP
This section should present a description of the bank's specific objectives relating to liquidity, such as shareholder returns, rating objectives for the bank as a whole or for certain securities being issued, avoidance of regulatory intervention, protection against uncertain events, depositor protection, working liquidity and liquidity held for strategic acquisitions etc., along with sufficient liquidity resources to cover the nature and level of the liquidity risk to which it is or might be exposed, the risk that the bank cannot meet its liabilities as they fall due, and the risk that its liquidity resources might in the future fall below the level, or differ from the quality and funding profile from those considered as appropriate by SAMA.
4. Governance and Risk Management
This section should describe the governance and management arrangements around the ILAAP including the involvement of the Board of Director, in addition to the risk management framework. At least the following areas should be covered:
i. Description of the process for the preparation and updating of the ILAAP.
ii. Description of the process for reviewing the ILAAP.
iii. Definition of the role and functions assigned to the Board of Directors and Senior Management for the purposes of the ILAAP.
iv. Definition of the role and functions assigned to various corporate functions for the purposes of the ILAAP (for example, internal audit, compliance, finance, risk management, branches and other units).
v. Indication of internal regulations relevant to the ILAAP.
vi. The overall risk management framework and how it pertains to liquidity and funding risks.
vii. Bank’s internal limits and control framework, including the limits and controls around liquid asset buffers, and the appropriateness of the limit structure to the risk appetite.
5. Summary of Bank's Strategies
This section would be a major component of a bank's strategic and operational plans. It should include the following:
i. The present financial position of the bank and expected changes to the current business profile, the environment in which it expects to operate, its projected business plans (by appropriate lines of business), projected financial position and cash flow positions, projected liquidity available and projected liquidity resource required based on future plans.
ii. The starting balance sheet, cash flow statement and the date over which the assessment was carried out.
iii. The projected balance sheet and cash flow statement (for at least one year horizon), which should clearly indicate the major lines of business which are going to be attested by the bank's strategic initiatives, environmental changes and assumption over the planning period and the impact on liquidity requirements by major lines of business.
6. Liquidity Adequacy and ILAAP
This section should, at minimum, cover the following:
6.1 Liquidity Risk Appetite
In this section, banks should describe their liquidity risk appetite, how it was devised, approved, monitored and reported, and how it is communicated throughout the bank. Banks should, at a minimum, cover the following key areas:
i. A full and clear articulation of the bank’s liquidity risk appetite and a discussion of why the risk appetite is appropriate.
ii. A discussion on how the bank’s liquidity risk appetite is used to define and assess liquidity levels and limits, including, at minimum, the following:
- An outline of all relevant liquidity risk management limits as derived from the risk appetite and a discussion of how the limits support the risk appetite.
- Limits for each of the liquidity risk drivers the bank assesses. Given that not all limits will necessarily be quantitative; some may be qualitative and describe subjective risk metrics.
- A brief outlining the bank’s risk appetite and liquidity risk limits, I.e. monitoring limits on periodic dates used for reporting of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) and SAMA Liquidity Ratio and a demonstration of how the liquidity limits are reflected in SAMA’s returns.
- A brief outlining the limits and positions against limits under “normal” and “stressed” liquidity environments, with a full and complete discussion of positions against limits.
6.2 Disclosure of Liquidity Requirements
This section should provide a distinction from the bank's perspective of the following liquidity measures indicating their purpose, minimum requirements and other attributes:
i. Regulatory Liquidity requirements under LCR, NSFR, LDR, and SAMA Liquidity Ratio.
ii. Liquidity requirements internally specified by Treasurer based on limits.
6.3 Funding Strategy
This section should provide full details of a bank’s three-year funding strategy, with more detail on the first 12-18 months of the funding strategy. The following requirements should be met:
i. The strategy should be approved by the Board Directors or its delegated authority.
ii. The strategy should demonstrate how it will support the projected business activities in both business as usual and stress, implementing any required improvements in the funding profile and evidencing that the risk appetite and key metrics will not be breached by the planned changes.
iii. Risks to the plan should be discussed.
iv. Where a funding strategy is new, implementation procedures should be detailed.
v. The funding risk strategy and appetite, and the profile, both the sources and uses should be described.
Banks should analyse the stability of the liabilities within the funding profile and the circumstances in which they could become unstable. This could include market shifts such as changes in collateral values, excessive maturity mismatch, inappropriate levels of asset encumbrance, concentrations (including single or connected counterparties, or currencies).
Banks are also required to analyse market access and current or future threats to this access, including the impact of any short-term liquidity stresses or negative news.
6.4 Risks Covered and Assessed in the ILAAP
In this section, banks are required to identify, measure and provide mitigation strategies for the most significant liquidity risks they are exposed to. At a minimum, the ILAAP should describe, assess and analyse the following pillar 2 liquidity risk drivers:
i. Wholesale secured and unsecured funding risk
a. Identification of risk, and behavior under normal and stress conditions
b. Deposit concentration risk – exposures concentrated on a limited number of customers, industries, certain sectors or geographic area, etc. entailing vulnerability.
ii. Retail funding risk
a. Gross retail outflows under liquidity stresses.
b. Higher than average likelihood of withdrawal.
iii. Intra-day liquidity risk
c. Net amount of collateral and cash requirement under stresses.
iv. Intra-group liquidity risk
d. Access to other groups, Central Bank funding, Parent Company and other commitments.
v. Cross-currency liquidity risk
e. Significant outflows and inflows with respect to maturities under stress.
f. Foreign Exchange (FX) mismatch risks – banks typically assume that currencies are fungible given the depth of liquidity in the spot FX and FX swap markets, particularly in reserve currencies. However, a bank may not be able to access FX markets as normal in times of stress
vi. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk.
g. Impact on cash flows arising from derivatives, contingent liabilities, commitments and liquidity facilities.
vii. Franchise-viability risk.
h. Stresses where the bank does not have sufficient liquidity resources to maintain its core business and reputation.
viii. Marketable assets risk (under normal and stressed forced sale conditions).
a. High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) monetisation risk – a bank may not be able to monetise sufficient non-cash HQLA to cover cumulative net outflows under the LCR stress on a daily basis, because of limitations to the speed with which cash can be raised in the repo market or through outright sales.
ix. Non-marketable assets risk (under normal and stressed forced sale conditions).
x. Funding concentration risk e.g. Flexible funding strategy according to instrument type, currency, counterparty, liability term structure and market for their realization.
xi. Other risks e.g.
a. Liquidity correlation factors associated with other risks i.e. reputational risk, asset concentration risk, Profit Rate Risk in the Banking Book (PRRBB), strategic risks etc. which have a bearing on Bank’s overall liquidity position.
b. Balance sheet mismatch risk - assess whether a bank would have sufficient cash from the monetisation of liquid assets and other inflows to cover outflows on a daily basis, under a defined stress scenario.
c. Macroeconomic and Business cycle risks – risks relating to changes in macroeconomic country specific variables such as oil prices, government spending and GDP.
d. Initial margin on derivatives contracts, where during a period of stress counterparties may, for a number of reasons, increase a bank’s initial margin requirements.
e. Securities margin financing liquidity risks.
The quantification of liquidity risk should fully incorporate the following:
i. Product pricing – it should include significant business activities and both on and off balance sheet products.
ii. Performance measurement and pricing incentives.
iii. Clear and transparent attribution to business lines.
iv. Management of collateral – clearly distinguishing between pledged and unencumbered assets.
v. Management of liquidity risks between intra-day, overnight keeping in view uncertainty or potential disruption.
vi. Managing liquidity across legal entities, business lines and currencies.
vii. Funding diversification and market access keeping in view:
- Business planning process.
- Correlations between market conditions and ability to access funds.
- Adequate diversification keeping in view limits according to maturity, nature of depositor, level of secured and unsecured funding, instrument type, currency and geographic market.
viii. Regular testing the capacity to raise funds quickly from choosing funding sources to provide short, medium and long term liquidity.
ix. An explanation of how each of the above risks have been identified, assessed, measured and the methodology and models currently or to be employed in the future, and the quantitative results of that assessment.
x. Where relevant, a comparison of that assessment with the results of the LCR and NSFR calculations.
xi. A clear articulation of the bank's risk appetite by risk category.
xii. Where relevant, an explanation of method used to mitigate these risks
6.5 Intraday Liquidity Risk
In this section, banks should describe the following:
i. How intraday risk is created within their business, whether part of the payments system or not, their appetite for and approach to managing intraday liquidity risk of both cash and securities accounts and in both business as usual and stress conditions.
ii. Details of how the bank assesses the adequacy of the process of measuring intraday liquidity risks, especially that resulting from the participation in the payment, settlement and clearing systems.
iii. Details of how the bank adequately monitors measures to control cash flows and liquid resources available to meet intraday requirements and forecasts when cash flows will occur during the day.
iv. How the bank carries out adequate specific stress-testing for intraday operations.
7. Approach and Methodology
7.1 Current Methodology
In this section, banks should describe the framework and IT systems for identifying, measuring, managing and monitoring and both internal and external reporting of liquidity and funding risks, including intraday risk. The assumptions and methodologies adopted should be described, key indicators should be evidenced, and the internal information flows described.
7.2 Future Approach and Methodology
Banks may provide a summary on the future models and methodologies being considered and developed including their strengths and weaknesses.
7.3 Internal Models: Pillar 1 and ILAAP Comparisons
Should the internal models vary from any regulatory methodologies approved for LCR and NSFR purposes, this section would provide a detailed comparison explaining both the methodological and parameterization differences between the internal models and the regulatory models and how those affect the liquidity measures for ILAAP purposes.
Further, the explanation of the differences between results of the internal models for LCR, NSFR would be set out at the level at which the ILAAP is applied. SAMA would expect the explanation to be sufficiently granular to show the differences at the level of each of the Pillar 1 risks.
8. Details on Models Employed
In this section, banks should present the list of models utilized in the formulation of the ILAAP, giving relevant and appropriate details as given below:
i. The key assumptions and parameters within the liquidity modeling work and background information on the derivation of any key assumptions.
ii. How parameters have been chosen including the historical period used and the calibration process.
iii. The limitations of the model.
iv. The sensitivity of the model to changes in the key assumptions or parameters chosen.
v. The validation work undertaken to ensure the continuing adequacy of the model.
vi. Whether the model is internally or externally developed. If externally acquired, its generic name and details on the model developer.
vii. The extent of its acceptance by other regulatory bodies, users in the international treasurers’ community, overall reputation and market acceptance.
viii. Specific details on the applications within the bank.
ix. Major merits and demerits of the chosen models.
x. Results of the model validation obtained through:
- Back testing / Scenario testing.
- Analysis of the internal logic.
xi. Major methodologies or statistical technique used, i.e. Value at risk models, employing methods such as variance/co-variance, historical simulation and Monte Carlo method.
xii. Confidence levels embedded for regulatory liquidity or economic liquidity purposes.
xiii. Data definition, i.e. whether the source is external or internal and if any data, manipulation of external data has been done for it to conform to the internal data.
9. Liquidity Specific Stress-Testing
In this section, banks should undertake, at least, the following:
i. Analyse the internal liquidity risk stress-testing framework, including the process and governance of and challenge to scenario design, derivation of assumptions and design of sensitivity analysis, and the process of review and challenge and relevance to the risk appetite.
ii. Scrutinise the process by which the stress results are produced, and incorporated into the risk framework and strategic planning, and the liquidity recovery process.
iii. Analyse the results and conclusions, with breakdown by each relevant risk driver.
Details of further stress-testing requirements are in Annexure (1).
10. Liquidity Transferability Between Legal Entities
In this section, banks should provide details of any restrictions on the management's ability to transfer liquidity during stressed conditions into or out of the businesses covered. These restrictions, for example, may include contractual, commercial, regulatory or statutory nature. A regulatory restriction could be the minimum liquidity ratio acceptable to SAMA.
11. Aggregation and Diversification
This section should describe how the results of the various risk assessments are brought together and an overall view taken on liquidity adequacy. At the general level, the overall reasonableness or the detailed quantification approaches might be compared with the results of an analysis of liquidity planning and a view taken by senior management as to the overall level of liquidity that is appropriate.
In aggregating the risks, the following aspects of the aggregation process should be described:
i. Any allowance made for diversification, including any assumed correlations within risks and between risks and how such correlations have been assessed including in stressed conditions.
ii. The justification for diversification benefits between and within legal entities , and the justification for the free movement of liquidity between legal entities in times of financial stress.
12. Challenge and Adoption of the ILAAP
This section should describe the extent of challenge and testing of the ILAAP. Accordingly, it would include the testing and control processes applied to the ILAAP models or calculations, and the senior management and Board of Directors review and sign off procedures.
In making an overall assessment of a bank's liquidity needs, matters described below should be addressed:
i. The inherent uncertainty in any modeling approach.
ii. Weaknesses in bank's risk management procedures, systems or controls.
iii. The differences between regulatory liquidity and available liquidity.
iv. The reliance placed on external consultants.
v. An assessment made by an external reviewer or internal audit.
13. Use of the ILAAP within the Bank
In this section, banks should demonstrate the extent to which liquidity management is embedded within the bank's operational and strategic planning. This would include the extent and use of ILAAP results and recommendations in the ongoing reviews and assessment of liquidity, day to day decision making, Contingency Funding Plan (CFP) and overall strategic, operational and liquidity planning process.
Important elements of ILAAP including growth and profitability targets, scenario analysis, and stress-testing may be used in setting of business plans, management policy and in pricing decisions. This could also include a statement of the actual operating philosophy and strategy on liquidity management and how this links to the ILAAP submitted.
14. Future Refinements of ILAAP
A bank should detail any anticipated future refinements within the ILAAP, highlighting those aspects which are work-in-progress, and provide any other information that will help SAMA review a bank's ILAAP.
Annexure (1): Stress-Testing and Contingency Funding Plan (CFP)
A. Stress-Testing
Stress-testing is a generic term for the assessment of vulnerability of individual financial institutions and the financial system to internal and external shocks. Typically, it applies ‘What if’ scenarios and attempts to estimate expected losses from shocks, including capturing the impact of ‘large, but plausible events’. Stresstesting methods include scenario tests based on historical events and information on hypothetical future events. They may also include sensitivity tests. A good stress-test should have attributes of plausibility and consistency and ease of reporting for managerial decisions.
1. Stress-Testing Under Pillar 1
i. A Bank must conduct on a regular basis appropriate stress-tests so as to:
a) Identify sources of potential liquidity strain:
- Loss of confidence – justified/unjustified.
- Contagion – financial sector weakness, corporate failures, etc.
- External factors – market disruption, risk aversion, flight to quality, etc.
- Uncorrelated events – operational disruptions, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, etc.
b) Ensure that current liquidity exposures continue to conform to the liquidity risk tolerance established by that bank's governing body.
c) Identify the effects on that bank's assumptions about pricing.
d) Analyse the separate and combined impact of possible future liquidity stresses on its:
- Cash flows.
- Liquidity position.
- Profitability.
- Solvency.
ii. A bank must consider the potential impact of institution-specific, market-wide and combined alternative scenarios.
iii. In conducting its stress-testing, a bank should also, where relevant, consider the impact of its chosen stresses on the appropriateness of its assumptions relating to:
- Correlations between funding markets.
- The effectiveness of diversification across its chosen sources of funding.
- Additional margin calls and collateral requirements.
- Contingent claims, including potential draws on committed lines extended to third parties or to other entities in that bank's group.
- Liquidity absorbed by off-balance sheet activities.
- The transferability of liquidity resources.
- Access to central bank market operations and liquidity facilities.
- Estimates of future balance sheet growth.
- The continued availability of market liquidity in a number of currently highly liquid markets.
- Ability to access secured and unsecured funding (including retail deposits).
- Currency convertibility.
- Access to payment or settlement systems on which the bank relies.
iv. A Bank should ensure that the results of its stress-tests are:
- Reviewed by its senior management.
- Reported to the bank's Board of Directors or its deleted authority, specifically highlighting any vulnerabilities identified and proposing appropriate remedial action.
- Reflected in the processes, strategies and systems.
- Used to develop effective contingency funding plans.
- Integrated into that bank's business planning process and day-today risk management.
- Taken into account when setting internal limits for the management of that bank's liquidity risk exposure.
v. Among more qualitative criteria that banks would have to meet before they are permitted to use a models based approach are the followings:
- Rigorous and comprehensive stress-testing program should be in place.
- Cover a range of factors that can create extraordinary losses or gains in trading portfolios.
- Major goals of stress-testing are to evaluate the capacity of the bank’s liquidity to absorb potential large losses and to identify steps the bank can take to reduce its risk and conserve liquidity.
- Results of stress-testing should be routinely communicated to senior management and periodically, to the bank’s board of directors.
vi. Results of stress-tests should be reflected in the policies and limits set by the management.
vii. Scenarios to be employed:
- Historical without simulation.
- Historical with simulation – this means relating to specific profile and idiosyncratic nature of the bank. e.g. if deposits are highly concentrated with top three customers, if one customer goes for an early withdrawal or partial withdrawal, how this simulation would affect historical analysis?
- Adverse events, based on individual portfolio characteristics of institutions.
2. Stress-Testing Under Pillar 2
Under the Supervisory Review Process, SAMA will initially review the Pillar 1 stress-testing requirement for LCR and NSFR. SAMA will also assess stress-testing under Pillar 2 with specific reference to detailed Contingency Funding Plan (CFP). Some of the scenarios which can be used are:
i. Example of First Liquidity Stress
An unforeseen, name-specific, liquidity stress in which:
- Financial market participants and retail depositors consider that in the short-term the bank will be or is likely to be unable to meet its liabilities as they fall due.
- The bank's counterparties reduce the amount of intra-day credit which they are willing to extend to it.
- The bank ceases to have access to foreign currency spot and swap markets.
- Over the longer-term, the bank's obligations linked to its credit rating crystallize as a result of a reduction in that credit rating. For the purpose, a bank must assume that the initial, short-term, period of stress lasts for at least two weeks.
ii. Example of Second Liquidity Stress
An unforeseen, market-wide liquidity stress of three months duration. A bank must assume that the second liquidity stress is characterised by:
- Uncertainty as to the accuracy of the valuation attributed to that bank's assets and those of its counterparties.
- Inability to realise, or ability to realise only at excessive cost, particular classes of assets, including those which represent claims on other participants in the financial markets or which were originated by them.
- Uncertainty as to the ability of a significant number of banks to ensure that they can meet their liabilities as they fall due.
- Risk aversion among participants in the markets on which the bank relies for funding.
3. Other Aspects Related to Stress-Testing
i. SAMA expects all banks to closely review the above recommendations on stress-testing and develop specific strategies and methodologies to implement those that are relevant and appropriate for their operations.
ii. SAMA in its evaluation of banks method and systems under Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 will examine the implementation of these stress-test requirements. It will also review the stress-test methodologies and systems as part of its Supervisory Review Process.
iii. As a minimum, a bank should carryout stress-tests at least on an annual basis.
B. Early Warning Indicators
An important component of liquidity risk management and the contingency funding plan is the early warning indicators including:
- Growing concentrations in assets or liabilities.
- Increases in currency mismatches.
- Repeated incidents of positions approaching or breaching internal or regulatory limits.
- Decrease of weighted average maturity of liabilities.
- Significant deterioration in the bank’s earnings, asset quality, and overall financial condition.
- Credit rating downgrade.
- Widening debt or credit-default-swap spreads.
- Rising wholesale or retail funding costs compared to other banks.
- Counterparties requesting or increasing request for collateral for credit exposures or resisting to enter into new transactions.
- Increasing retail deposit outflows.
- Difficulty accessing longer-term funding.
C. Contingency Funding Plan (CFP)
i. Banks should detail the policies, procedures and action plans for responding to severe disruptions in the bank's ability to fund itself. The plan should be that which is contained within their Contingency Funding Plan (CFP) and it should be prepared as a standalone document and attached to the ILAAP document.
ii. At a minimum, a bank should ensure that its Contingency Funding Plan (CFP) meets the followings:
a) Outlines strategies, policies and plans to manage a range of stresses.
b) Establishes a clear allocation of roles and clear lines of management responsibility.
c) Formally documented.
d) Includes clear invocation and escalation procedures.
e) Regularly tested and updated to ensure that it remains operationally robust; this testing is mainly qualitative in nature which tests process, procedures, and appropriate governance to undertaken action on timely basis. This should test the following:
- Composition of liquidity crisis management team (LCMT).
- Roles and responsibilities of LCMT.
- Early warning signals using benchmark indicators i.e. Availability of credit lines, collection efficiency, positive cumulative outflow. These signals should have triggers based on 30% or 50% decline in collections for continuous three months.
- Liquidity stress-test consisting of four early warning signals.
- Minimum logistics and contact information.
- Communication strategy with SAMA.
- Undertaking only two transactions in interbank market or with SAMA to demonstrate it is working effectively.
f) Outlines how the bank will meet time-critical payments on an intraday basis in circumstances where intra-day liquidity resources become scarce.
g) Outlines the bank's operational arrangements for managing a retail funding run-off.
h) In relation to each of the sources of funding identified for use in emergency situations, is based on a sufficiently accurate assessment of the amount of funding that can be raised from that source; and the time needed to raise funding from that source.
i) Sufficiently robust to withstand simultaneous disruptions in a range of payment and settlement systems.
j) Outlines how the bank will manage both internal communications and those with its external stakeholders.
k) Establishes mechanisms to ensure that the bank's Board of Directors and senior management receive information that is both relevant and timely.
l) Clear escalation/prioritization procedures detailing when and how each of the actions can and should be activated.
m) Lead time needed to tap additional funds from each of the contingency sources.
iii. In designing a contingency funding plan, a bank should ensure that it takes into account:
- The impact of stressed market conditions on its ability to sell or securities assets.
- The impact of extensive or complete loss of typically available market funding options.
- The financial, reputational and any other additional consequences for that bank arising from the execution of the contingency funding plan itself.
- Its ability to transfer liquid assets having regard to any legal, regulatory or operational constraints.
- Its ability to raise additional funding from central bank market operations and liquidity facilities.
IRRBB
Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book (IRRBB)
No: 381000040243 Date(g): 10/1/2017 | Date(h): 12/4/1438 Status: In-Force Background
These standards revise the Basel Committee's 2004 Principles for the management and supervision of interest rate risk, which set out supervisory expectations for banks' identification, measurement, monitoring and control of IRRBB as well as guidance for its supervision. The key enhancements to the 2004 Principles include:
• More extensive guidance on the expectations for a bank's IRRBB management process in areas such as the development of interest rate shock scenarios, as well as key behavioural and modelling assumptions; • Enhanced disclosure requirements to promote greater consistency, transparency and comparability in the measurement and management of IRRBB. This includes quantitative disclosure requirements based on common interest rate shock scenarios, • An updated standardised framework; and • A stricter threshold for identifying outlier banks, which has been reduced from 20% of a bank's total capital to 15% of a bank's Tier 1 capital.
The standard reflects changes in market and supervisory practices, which are particularly pertinent in light of the current exceptionally low interest rates in many jurisdictions.
SAMA has conducted a consultation process with the Saudi Banks in the development of this regulation and that has resulted in preparation of the following documents:
• Annexure 1: Regulatory returns based on Table A and Table B of the Basel document. • Annexure 2: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and answers including National Discretions.
Implementation date
These rules are applicable from 1 January 2018 as specified in the Basel document. However, in 2018, the disclosures should be based on information as of 31 December 2017. The Banks should also send pro forma disclosures to SAMA based on 30 September 2017 data by 31 October 2017.
Basel paper is available at bis.org/bcbs/publ/d368.pdf
Annexure 1: Regulatory Returns Based on Table A and Table B of the Basel Document
This section has been updated by section 25 "Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book" under Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements Framework, issued by SAMA circular No (44047144), dated 04/06/1444 H, Corresponding To 27/12/2022 G.• No changes in Q17 template has been made. • Table A and Table B in Basel document (as shown below) should be used as a regulatory return to be reported to SAMA on a half yearly basis
Table A
Purpose: To provide a description of the risk management objectives and policies concerning IRRBB. Scope of application: Mandatory for all banks within the scope of application set out in Section III. Content: Qualitative and quantitative information. Quantitative information is based on the daily or monthly average of the year or on the data as of the reporting date. Format: Flexible. Qualitative disclosure a A description of how the bank defines IRRBB for purposes of risk control and measurement. b A description of the bank's overall IRRBB management and mitigation strategies, Examples are: monitoring of EVE and NII in relation to established limits, hedging practices, conduct of stress testing, outcomes analysis, the role of independent audit, the role and practices of the ALCO, the bank's practices to ensure appropriate model validation, and timely updates in response to changing market conditions. c The periodicity of the calculation of the bank's IRRBB measures, and a description of the specific measures that the bank uses to gauge its sensitivity to IRRBB. d A description of the interest rate shock and stress scenarios that the bank uses to estimate changes in the economic value and in earnings, e Where significant modelling assumptions used in the bank's IMS (ie the EVE metric generated by the bank for purposes other than disclosure, eg for internal assessment of capital adequacy) are different from the modelling assumptions prescribed for the disclosure in Table B, the bank should provide a description of those assumptions and of their directional implications and explain its rationale for making those assumptions (eg historical data, published research, management judgment and analysis). f A high-level description of how the bank hedges its IRRBB, as well as the associated accounting treatment g A high-level description of key modelling and parametric assumptions used in calculating △EVE and △NII in Table B, which includes:
For △EVE, whether commercial margins and other spread components have been included in the cash flows used in the computation and discount rate used.
How the average repricing maturity of non-maturity deposits in (1) has been determined (including any unique product characteristics that affect assessment of repricing behaviour).
The methodology used to estimate the prepayment rates of customer loans, and/or the early withdrawal rates for time deposits, and other significant assumptions.
Any other assumptions (including for instruments with behavioural optionalities that have been excluded) that have a material impact on the disclosed △EVE and △NII in Table B, including an explanation of why these are material.
Any methods of aggregation across currencies and any significant interest rate correlations between different currencies.
h (Optional) Any other information which the bank wishes to disclose regarding its interpretation of the significance and sensitivity of the IRRBB measures disclosed and/or an explanation of any significant variations in the level of the reported IRRBB since previous disclosures. Quantitative disclosures 1 Average repricing maturity assigned to NMDs, 2 Longest repricing maturity assigned to NMDs, Table B
Scope of application: Mandatory for all banks within the scope of application set out in Section III. Content: Quantitative information. Format: Fixed. Accompanying narrative: Commentary on the significance of the reported values and an explanation of any material changes since the previous reporting period. In reporting currency △EVE △NII Period T T-1 T T-1 Parallel up Parallel down Steepener Flattener Short rate up Short rate down Maximum Period T T-1 Tier 1 capital
DefinitionsFor each of the supervisory prescribed interest rate shock scenarios, the bank must report for the current period and for the previous period:
(i) the change in the economic value of equity based on its IMS, using a run-off balance sheet and an instantaneous shock or based on the result of the standardised framework as set out in Section IV if the bank has chosen to adopt the framework or has been mandated by its supervisor to follow the framework; and (ii) the change in projected NII over a forward-looking roiling 12-month period compared with the bank's own best estimate 12- month projections, using a constant balance sheet assumption and an instantaneous shock.
•
For Pillar 3 purposes, annual disclosure should be made using Table A and Table B following Pillar 3 timelines in one consolidated Pillar 3 document.Annexure 2: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and Answers including National Discretions
Log Ref # Challenges / Issues SAMA's response 1 Prepayment - page 30, paragraph 132
Where the IRRBB documentation suggests setting a suitable cap for determining the materiality of “prepayment” and “early redemptions”, the Working group recommends using 5% of a bank's banking book assets or liabilities, as a conservative cap, to allow for comparability between Saudi Banks. In the absence of any materiality criteria for the aforementioned, this analogy has been carried forward from the Basel document, where it defines material currencies as, “those accounting for more than 5% of either banking book assets or liabilities”
SAMA agrees with this proposal to use a cap of 5% of a bank's banking book assets or liabilities. 2 Prepayment - It has been widely agreed within the Working Group that early-redemptions and prepayments are immaterial in the Saudi Retail Sector. This assertion is built on the Working Group's members’ knowledge of their customers’ behavior.
Prepayment modeling of Corporate portfolio would be a challenge as these prepayments are more specific deal by deal in nature driven by specific customer business needs. Additionally, Banks will have greater ability to charge the replacement cost, which eliminates the prepayment risk. ARB is of the view that prepayment analysis of Corporate loans should not be mandatory.
Banks should submit prepayment analysis for both retail and corporate sector to SAMA by 31 March 2017 to determine the next steps.
3 Capital Charges - Several banks have raised questions regarding ICAAP. The Working Group would like to clarify that the standardized framework, as described in section IV, is not mandatory for ICAAP purposes (i.e. the section IV framework specifically relates to public disclosures of IRRBB) Banks have to write to SAMA to indicate their preferred approach, which ideally should be consistent for both ICAAP and Pillar 3 disclosures. However, the banks have a choice to use internal models if they wish so. However, SAMA, based on bilateral ICAAP discussions in 2017/2018 could mandate few banks on a case-by-case basis to follow standardized framework. Please note that the treatment of equity in internal models is subject to discussion with SAMA on a case-by-case basis. 4 Capital Charges - Principle 9, page 18, paragraph 72
The Working Group understands that as the IRRBB capital charge remains under pillar 2, it remains subject to the bank's own assessment methodology and assumptions (as per ICAAP) and as such does not necessarily have to follow Section IV assumptions.
This is correct. Same response as above. 5 Capital Charges - Principle 9, page 18, paragraph 74 and Annex 1, S4.2.ii
From the relevant documentation, the Working Group agrees that under the economic value approach, the ICAAP capital charge for IRRBB can be assessed based on the change in the economic value of the whole banking book including equity, thereby making an assessment based on a "going concern" basis.
This is correct. However, in the Pillar 2 forecast, banks should consider sufficient buffers for IRRBB. 6 Shock scenarios - page 30, paragraph 132
Shock scenarios are to be applied to IRRBB exposures in each currency for which the bank has material positions. The Technical Working Group refers to the pertinent documentation, which sets anything above 5% of a bank's balance sheet assets or liabilities as the criteria for determining the materiality of currency exposures.
SAMA agree with this threshold. 7 Shock scenarios - In relation to questions raised about shock scenarios in different currencies, the Working Group would like to highlight that the pertinent documentation clearly sets out different scenarios for each currency, which are to be used by all banks to allow for comparability of banks’ disclosures. This is correct. 8 Shock scenarios - Annex 2, page 45
In relation to shock scenarios, the pertinent documentation allows for the regulator to set a floor for interest rate shocks, provided it is less than or equal to zero. The Working Group suggests, given banks’ consumer pricing methods and the current economic environment in KSA, zero would be a suitable floor for SAMA to set for shock scenarios
Based on current economic environment, SAMA would like zero as a suitable floor for shock scenarios. However, if circumstances change in future, this Will be adjusted accordingly. 9 Conditional Prepayment rate - page 27, paragraph 121
In the event that SAMA does not prescribe any CPRs, SAMA is requested to facilitate the calculation of a set of standardized CPRs based on KSA / bank-wide data, that is available to it through SIMAH and for these CPRs to be made available to all banks as a fallback position due to lack of available good quality data.
SAMA will look into this and will communicate accordingly. In the meantime, all domestic banks should send weighted average CPRs to SAMA by 31 March 2017. 10 Disclosures -
Regarding the disclosure of the results from the standardized framework, the Working Group finds that this is sufficiently outlined within the IRRBB documentation, where any deviations from the standardized approach must be approved by SAMA.
This is correct. All banks should send proforma disclosures to SAMA based on 30 September 2017 data by 31 October 2017. SAMA will review this information and if needed, form a smaller sub group (reporting to CFO Committee) to ensure minimum consistency across the banking sector. 11 Disclosures - The medium for disclosures should be in line with all other Basel disclosures The medium for disclosure should be Pillar 3 document. Also, banks should make sure that this is in line with other Basel disclosures. 12 Outliers - page 21 paragraph 89
Regarding "additional outlier/materiality tests", the Working Group recommends that no additional materiality tests be applied at this time so as to allow banks and SAMA to become familiar and confident with the mechanics and output of the standardized framework.
SAMA agrees with the proposition during the transitional period next year and banks should communicate their potential charge by September 2017. During this time, SAMA will assess if additional outlier/materiality tests could be used based on Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital or the bank's IRRBB relative to earnings. However, this will not exceed Basel requirements of at least 15% of Tier 1 capital. 13 Timeline
Setting a timeline for implementation of the prescribed IRRBB documentation is an area implicitly requiring guidance from SAMA. Considering the culmination of the transitional implementation period on 30th September 2017, the Working Group recommends to make the first submission of IRRBB disclosures to SAMA within one month of this reporting date (i.e. first submission by 31st October 2017, based on 30th September 2017 positions)
SAMA agrees with this proposal. All banks should send pro forma disclosures to SAMA based on 30 September 2017 data by 31 October 2017. However, in terms of final timelines, SAMA would stick to Basel timeline of using 31 December 2017 year-end for Pillar 3 disclosures in 2018. 14 Executive Summary
Page 2, Para 4 : Supervisor must publish their criteria for identifying outliers banks under Principle 12.
The threshold for the identification of an “outlier bank” has been tightened, where the outlier/material tests applied by supervisors should at least include one which compares the bank's change EVE with 15% of its Tier Capital, under the prescribed interest rate shock
• Unclear criteria for outliers bank.
• Unclear minimum to be required by SAMA and the deadline to comply with this regulatory minimum threshold.
• Unclear whether this will be compulsory requirements?
• Any regulatory punishment if the minimum requirement is not complied?
• The frequency for reporting the minimum compliance with SAMA?Same response as 12 above. During transitional period, SAMA will observe the impact and will give deadline to meet minimum threshold. Once announced by SAMA, this will become compulsory requirement for the banking sector. This will not be published each year. However, if circumstances change, this threshold will be revisited as and when needed. 15 The standard template for submission is proposed be finalized (Table A). Any changes of current Q17 Reports arising from this new requirement need to be communicated to banking industry as soon as possible so the necessary action plans could be initiated to comply with this new reporting requirements. A new template based on Table A and Table B will be used in Q17 reports. i. What is the frequency of reporting to SAMA?
ii. What is templates for the reporting to SAMA/external party?
i. Quarterly through Q17 returns
ii. Annually in Pillar 3 table format as specified in the Basel document
16 Page 6, Principle 3: The bank risk appetite for IRRBB should be articulated in terms of risk to both economic value and earnings. Bank must implement policy limits that target maintaining IRRBB exposures consistent with their risk appetite.
Unclear regulatory requirement whether the risk appetite from earning perspective will be mandatory for the bank
Banks should decide the risk appetite themselves suitable to their balance sheets keeping in view regulatory minimum thresholds. 17 Interest Rate shock and Stress Scenarios
Page 8, Para 35 - Banks's IMS for IRRBB should be able to accommodate the calculation of the impact on economic value and earnings of multiple scenarios based on the six prescribed interest rate shock scenarios set-up in Annex 2
In the Annex 2, the standardized interest rate shock scenario, SAR Yield Curve is not included by the Basel Committee.
Banks should use USD to get indication about SAR yield curve. 18 Page 9, Para 40 - Bank should determine by currency, a range of potential movements against which they will measure IRRBB exposure
i. Unclear guidance on the minimum threshold for the currency to be measured and reported to regulator.
ii. Unclear guidance on whether the requirement is to be monitored at the Bank or Group level.
iii. Any threshold for the subsidiary to be excluded for the Group Level?
i. Already elaborated in 6 above.
ii. This will be applied at both Solo and Consolidated levels of all domestic banks
iii. Not at this stage.
19 Page 10, Para 43 - Qualitative of reverse stress testing
In order to identify interest rate scenarios that could severely threaten a bank's capital and earnings.
As IRRBB is a pillar 2 charge, target CAR should; be used as minimum capital threshold for each bank • How this scenario of interest rate to be implemented in practice? Are we assuming other factors are constant? Any increase of interest rate may affect the default rate of loan portfolio.
• Are we assuming the increase of interest rate until the RWCR is lower than minimum requirement of 8% or minimum capital ratio to be maintained by SAMA with the assumption the other factors are constant?
The unclear guideline in the Basel's document 20 Paragraph 4: Treatment of positions with behavior options other than NMDs
Page 27, Para 118 - Under standardized framework, the optionality in these products is estimated using two step approach. Firstly, baseline estimates of loan pre-payment and early withdrawal of fixed term deposits are calculated given the prevailing term structure of interest rate.
Note: These baseline parameters may be determined by bank subject to supervisor review and approval, or prescribed by supervisor.
Banks should do the calculations themselves and this will be assessed by SAMA for each bank on a case- by-case basis. • What is the standard methodology being accepted by SAMA to estimate the loan pre-payment and early withdrawal of the fixed deposits given the prevailing term structure of interest rate.
• Is baseline may be estimated by bank and subject to the approval by the SAMA?
• What is the prescribed baseline for the bank in Saudi by SAMA in the case on the baseline parameters is not approved by SAMA or the bank is not able to calculate the baseline parameters due to lack of historical data?
• In the case of lacking of the historical data to perform the analysis by the bank
• Will SAMA prescribe the baseline parameters?21 Whilst the Basel principles state that Credit Spread Risk in the Banking Book must be addressed, the document has little detail as to how this should be approached, in contrast to the more specific requirements for IRRBB.
Does SAMA anticipate issuing guidance in this regard or should all banks address individually?
The working group members should provide recommendations to SAMA whether central approach would work for them.
Some members suggested to include the full margin, which includes the customer's credit spread, but definitely exclude the Bank's own credit spread when discounting. However, each bank should consider this suggestion based on their internal needs and requirements.
22 Para 115 Table 2 provides caps on core deposits and average maturity by category. In case 10 years data history identifies higher core deposits than the CAP provided in this table.
As per treatment of Non-maturing deposits(NMDs), suggested in the standardized framework detailed in PRRBB circular dated April’16 (para 115), the cap on the core portion of corporate deposits is provided as 50%.
ARB is of the view that the minimum core threshold should be increased for the deposits which have operational relationship with the bank
Banks should determine an appropriate cash flow slotting procedure for each category of core deposits, up to the maximum average maturity per category and caps as specified in the Basel document. 23 Data availability is a big challenge, as NMD, Redemption Risk & Prepayment risk modeling require more than past 10 years of data which currently we don't have very matured data.
The duration of data should be based from what is only available since the Bank's inception
This requirement of 10 years will be waived on a case-by-case basis keeping in view newly incorporated banks not having sufficient history. However, the banks should specifically write to SAMA in this regard. Stress Testing
Rules on Stress Testing
No: 60697.BCS. 28747 Date(g): 23/11/2011 | Date(h): 27/12/1432 Status: In-Force *This circular should be read in conjunction with the following circulars addressing additional requirements on stress testing:
1) In terms of its Charter issued by **the Royal Decree No. 23 dated 23-5-1377 H (15 December 1957 G), Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency(SAMA) is empowered to regulate the commercial banks. In exercise of these powers, SAMA has been setting regulatory requirements for banks from time to time. With regard to stress testing, SAMA has earlier circulated to banks the “BCBS Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision” vide its Circular No. B.C.S/ 775 dated 02 August 2009. In addition, SAMA has provided some guidance on stress testing through its circulars on Basel-II implementation.
2) In order to further strengthen and converge the stress testing practices in banks, SAMA has decided to issue the enclosed “Rules on Stress Testing”. The objective of these Rules is to require banks to adopt robust stress testing techniques and use stress tests as a tool of risk management. These Rules set out the minimum requirements on stress testing and banks can adopt more sophisticated techniques and scenarios beyond the minimum specified thresholds.
3) These Rules have been finalized after taking into account the comments provided by banks. Some of the general queries/questions raised by banks in their comments have been responded in the enclosed Frequently Asked Questions(FAQs) for their guidance.
4) The enclosed Rules shall come into force with immediate effect and banks are required to fully realign their existing stress testing frameworks with these Rules by 30 June 2012. Furthermore, they are required to submit the information specified under the Rules to SAMA starting from the half-year ending 30 June 2012.
*ICAAP Circular should be added
**Should we replace this with SAMA new Law?
1. General Requirements
1.1. Introduction
Stress testing has become a standard risk management tool for financial institutions. It is being increasingly used as a component of their risk identification and risk management processes. The recent global financial crisis and their impact on financial institutions in many jurisdictions have also highlighted the importance of rigorous stress testing .
SAMA’s review of the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Plans(ICAAPs) of Saudi banks has indicated that they have started conducting stress tests but the choice of scenarios and their severity vary from bank to bank. SAMA expects banks to adopt robust techniques and scenarios in line with the best practices to further strengthen their stress testing programs. These Rules are being issued to guide banks in this direction.
1.2. Concept of Stress Testing
Stress tests are conducted by using a set of quantitative techniques to assess the vulnerability of individual financial institutions as well as the financial systems to exceptional but plausible events. The exceptional but plausible events can be defined either against a specific historical scenario or against a hypothetical scenario based on the analysis of past volatility and correlations or by use of other methods. The impact of such events on the profitability and capital adequacy of a financial institution is estimated to assess its capacity to absorb potential losses. The ultimate objective of stress testing is to enable a bank or financial institution to adopt countermeasures that reduce either the probability or the impact of a plausible event to preserve its solvency.
1.3. Objective of the Rules
The objective of these Rules is to require banks to adopt robust stress testing techniques and use stress tests as a tool of risk management. The results of stress tests should facilitate the management in making well-informed and timely decisions on strategic planning, risk management and capital planning.
1.4. Scope of Application
The Rules shall be applicable to all locally incorporated banks licensed and operating in Saudi Arabia. Banks may include their subsidiaries and associates in the scope of stress tests conducted by them if the risks faced by such subsidiaries/associates are material and have bearing on the solvency of the bank. Furthermore, the branches of foreign banks operating in Saudi Arabia are also required to adopt these Rules for conducting stress tests if the size of their total assets is more than 0.5% of total assets of the Saudi Banking System. However, such branches of foreign banks may apply these Rules with such modifications as may be considered expedient keeping in view the size and complexity of their business activities.
SAMA may extend the application of these Rules to any other institution or category of institutions, which are under its supervisory jurisdiction, as may be deemed fit by it from time to time.
These Rules sets out the minimum thresholds to be complied with by banks. However, banks can adopt more sophisticated techniques and scenarios beyond the minimum thresholds specified in these Rules. *In addition, banks would continue to take into account the guidance on stress testing provided by SAMA through its circulars on Basel-II implementation.
*Suggest to provide the circulars on Basel-II implementation. We need to ensure if this is relevant?
1.5. Effective Date
These Rules shall come into force with immediate effect. Banks are expected to create appropriate organizational structure and deploy required resources for designing and developing their stress testing frameworks in line with these Rules. Banks are also required to put in place a robust stress testing framework, which fully meets the requirements of these Rules, by 30 June 2012. Furthermore, the information required under Section 10 of these Rules shall be submitted to SAMA starting from the half-year ending 30 June 2012 and for each calendar half- year thereafter, within three months of the end of each half-year.
1.6. BCBS Stress Testing Principles
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has issued “Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision” in May 2009. SAMA has circulated these Principles to banks for compliance vide its Circular of 2nd August 2009. In addition to the requirements of these Rules, banks are also required to take into account the guidance provided in the aforesaid Principles and any other related documents of BCBS in designing, developing and implementing their stress testing programs. In case of any inconsistency in the requirements of these Rules and the BCBS Principles, they should approach SAMA for further guidance.
2. Conducting Stress Tests
2.1. Types of Stress Tests
The nature of stress tests would depend on the objective(s) of conducting such tests. For the purposes of these Rules, the stress tests would either be conducted by the banks themselves or by SAMA, and would fall in any of the following categories:
i. Regular Stress Tests: Such stress tests would be conducted by the banks either at their own initiative as part of their risk management framework (in which case the nature and frequency of tests is determined by the banks themselves) or to meet the regulatory requirements of SAMA. Such Regular Stress Tests, to be conducted by banks on regular basis, are also called Bottom-up Stress Tests;
ii. Ad-hoc Stress Tests: Such tests may be conducted by the banks at irregular intervals to assess the resilience of their overall portfolio or exposure to a specific business area in the backdrop of adverse market developments or abrupt changes in the external operating environment. SAMA may also require banks to conduct ad-hoc tests from time to time and report the results thereof to SAMA in the prescribed manner;
iii. Reverse Stress Tests: Such tests may be conducted by the banks to identify the vulnerabilities and assess the resilience of their business plan. The nature of such tests is further elaborated under Section 5.4 of these Rules;
iv. Macro Stress Tests: Such tests may be conducted by SAMA from time to time to assess the resilience of the Saudi Banking System to withstand adverse shocks. These tests are also called TopDown stress tests;
2.2. Stress Testing a Mandatory Requirement
Stress Testing would henceforth be a mandatory regulatory requirement for all locally incorporated banks and those branches of foreign banks having total assets of more than 0.5% of total assets of the Saudi Banking system.. In order to meet this requirement, banks are required to conduct stress tests on regular basis. For this purpose, they should design, develop and implement their own stress testing programs in line with the nature, size and complexity of their businesses and risk profiles. The stress testing framework to be developed for this purpose should, inter alia, provide for the following:
i. State objective(s) of the stress testing exercise;
ii. Types of stress tests to be conducted;
iii. Frequency of conducting stress tests;
iv. Methodologies and techniques to be used including the defined scenarios and assumptions;
v. Broad format for compiling the results of stress tests;
vi. Strategy to deal with potential risks highlighted by the stress testing exercise;
vii. Process for monitoring implementation of the remedial action plan.
2.3. Stress Testing Parameters
The banks shall observe the following parameters in the context of doing stress testing:
i. Stress tests should be designed in such a way that banks should be able to identify potential risks in their portfolios by application of exceptional but plausible shocks;
ii. Stress tests should not be treated as substitutes of statistical models rather they complement them in identification and measurement of business risks. Thus the use of statistical models such as value-at-risk models may be continued to predict the maximum loss in normal business conditions;
iii. The stress testing methodology should be comprehensive enough to cover all material risks faced by the bank. It should also provide flexibility to capture new risks emanating from diversification in business activities and changing operating environment;
iv. The use of stress testing is also encouraged for assessing risks in portfolios that lack historical data. The lack of sufficient data may hinder the development of statistical models for such portfolios or the insufficient information / data may compromise the robustness of such models even if developed. Thus the stress testing of such portfolios may provide useful information to the management;
v. Stress tests should enable the bank to better understand its risk profile, evaluate major risks (both internal and external) and take proactive measures to mitigate those risks. They should also enable the bank to assess the adequacy of its capital;
2.4. Frequency of Stress Tests
The frequency of stress testing would generally depend on the nature and composition of the bank’s portfolio and the risks associated therewith. It would also depend on the nature of stress tests being conducted. The frequency of Regular or Ad-hoc stress tests conducted by banks at their own initiative may be determined by them in line with their stress testing frameworks and the objective(s) of conducting such tests. However, banks should take into account the latest market developments and their risk profiles in determining the frequency of such stress tests. The market sensitive portfolios e.g. equity investments and other marketable securities, foreign exchange exposures, etc. should be stressed more frequently as against the non-trading portfolios e.g. credit exposures which may be stressed at relatively longer intervals.
The frequency of stress tests to be conducted by banks to meet the requirements of SAMA under these Rules would be as under:
i. Banks shall conduct stress testing of their portfolio on regular basis at the end of every calendar half-year and report the results thereof to SAMA in the specified manner as required under these Rules;
ii. Banks shall conduct Ad-hoc stress tests for regulatory purposes on specific business areas or the overall portfolio on such frequency and within such timeline as may be specified by SAMA from time to time.
3. Role of Board and Management
The board of directors and the senior management of the bank are required to play an important role in putting in place a robust stress testing framework. Specifically, they are expected to do, inter alia, the following:
3.1. Board of Directors
i. The board shall have the overall responsibility for the stress testing framework. For this purpose, it will provide the necessary oversight to ensure that the bank has a sound and robust stress testing program in place;
ii. The board (or a relevant committee of the board) shall approve the stress testing policy of the bank and any subsequent revision/updating thereof. Such a policy should broadly define the approach, structure and roles for conducting stress tests. It should also appropriately articulate the stress testing framework adopted by the bank which should be in line with its size, complexity of operations, nature of business activities and risk appetite, and also fully captures its risk profile;
iii. The board shall ensure that the management has devoted adequate resources and created necessary infrastructure for conducting stress tests in an effective manner;
iv. The board shall also ensure that the management has adopted appropriate processes and procedures for making effective use of stress testing as a risk management tool;
v. The Board shall review the major findings of the stress tests and ensure that appropriate remedial actions are being taken by the management to mitigate the identified risks;
vi. The board shall require the management to apprise it from time to time on the effectiveness of the bank’s stress testing framework. If deemed appropriate, the board may also require the management to get the stress testing program independently evaluated by the bank’s internal audit function or by a third-party consultant to be engaged for this purpose.
3.2. Senior Management
i. Senior management shall have the responsibility for designing, developing and implementing an effective stress testing framework. In this regard, it will establish an appropriate organizational structure, deploy qualified human resources, and adopt well-defined processes and procedures for conducting stress tests;
ii. Senior management should put in place necessary infrastructure and IT systems to support the conduct of stress tests. The infrastructure so provided should be adequate to support compilation and processing of data required for conducting stress tests in an effective manner;
iii. Senior management should provide oversight in defining the relevant stress scenarios, selection of methodologies and conduct of the stress tests;
iv. Senior management shall ensure that the results of the stress tests are compiled in a clear and concise manner, and communicated to the board of directors, relevant board and management committees, senior management, relevant business areas and SAMA;
v. Senior management shall prepare adequate action plans for dealing with the findings of the stress tests;
vi. Senior management should periodically assess the effectiveness of the stress testing policy, procedures and framework, and make necessary adjustments there in line with the market developments and changing business environment, and where-ever required seek approval of the board to the proposed changes. ,The ultimate objective should be to ensure the robustness and effectiveness of the bank’s stress testing program;
4. Stress Testing Framework
Banks are required to design, develop and implement a sound and robust stress testing frameworks. They are expected to ensure compliance of the following minimum requirements in this regard:
4.1. Approach to Stress Testing
i. Banks must adopt a holistic approach to stress testing, which means that all material risks (whether internal or external) to which the bank is or can be exposed to, should be covered in the stress testing process;
ii. The magnitude of the shock should be large enough to stress exposure of the bank to various risks;
iii. Banks should aim to capture all exceptional but plausible events in the scenario selection process;
iv. The stress tests should take into account the recent developments in domestic, regional and global financial markets as well as all other relevant developments;
v. The time horizon for capturing historical events for stress testing should be long enough to cover a period relevant to the portfolio of the bank;
4.2. Stress Testing Process
Banks should document the entire process of stress testing for the guidance of the concerned staff. This may become part of the bank’s policy on stress testing or included in its standard operating procedures. The process to be laid down by the banks should, inter alia, cover the following points:
i. Assigning the responsibility for conducting stress tests. This responsibility may be assigned to the Chief Risk Officer who should be supported by a team (which may be an inter-departmental team or a dedicated unit created for this purpose);
ii. Defining the responsibilities of the team members or individuals involved in stress testing;
iii. Determining the frequency of regular stress tests in line with the regulatory requirements and also defining the parameters which should lead the bank to conduct ad-hoc stress tests;
iv. Reviewing the composition and nature of the bank’s portfolio as well as the external factors affecting the quality of this portfolio in order to identify the major risks to which the bank is exposed to and which should be tested under its stress testing program;
v. Reviewing the historical data to identify the past events relevant to the bank’s portfolio, which can be used in designing the appropriate stress tests. Banks are expected to compile a time series of relevant data covering at least one business cycle;
vi. Determining the magnitude of shocks based on the identified historical events, future outlook and expert judgment;
vii. Deciding on the type of stress tests to be conducted. This would involve a choice to either use a sensitivity analysis or a scenario analysis or a combination of both;
viii. Listing the assumptions to be used in stress testing and articulating the basis of such assumptions;
ix. Documenting the procedures for conducting stress tests and compiling the results thereof;
x. Determining the procedure to be adopted for communicating results of stress tests to the board of directors, relevant board and management committees, senior management, relevant business areas and SAMA;
xi. Determining the procedure to be adopted for taking remedial actions to mitigate the potential risks highlighted by the stress tests;
xii. Laying down the criteria and factors which should lead the bank to review the effectiveness of its stress testing program. This may include, for instance, significant changes in bank’s activities or portfolio characteristics or operating environment.
4.3. Designing Stress Tests
Banks are expected to take into account the following factors in designing their stress testing programs:
i. The overall stress testing process should be managed/coordinated by the Chief Risk Officer of the bank;
ii. Stress testing process should identify and stress all relevant risks faced by the bank. This should cover all risks prevalent in the entire portfolio of the bank including both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet positions;
iii. The frequency of stress tests should be determined in line with the requirements set out under Section 2.4;
iv. The stress scenarios should be developed by using both quantitative and qualitative factors and can be based on historical events and/or expert judgment;
v. The adequacy of IT system and availability of required data for conducting robust stress tests. The IT system should be capable of producing aggregate data at portfolio level as well as granular data at the level of business units;
vi. The effectiveness of the bank’s stress testing framework. The stress testing program may be independently evaluated by the bank’s internal audit function or by a third-party consultant engaged for this purpose.
4.4. Other Requirements
As part of their stress testing frameworks, banks shall also specify the methodologies and techniques to be used, choice of scenarios, coverage of risks, procedures for compiling and communicating results, thresholds and options for taking remedial actions, and the process for compliance of regulatory reporting requirements. Detailed requirements in this regard are set out in the ensuing parts of these Rules.
5. Methodologies and Techniques
Banks should use appropriate methodologies and techniques for conducting stress tests keeping in view the nature of business activities, size and complexity of operations, and their risk profiles. They may adopt a combination of methodologies and techniques in line with their stress testing frameworks. The methodologies generally employed in this regard are described hereunder:
5.1. Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity Analysis measures the change in the value of portfolio for shocks of various degrees to a single risk factor or a small number of closely related risk factors while the underlying relationships among the risk factors are not evaluated For example, the shock might be a parallel shift in the yield curve. In sensitivity analysis, the impact of the shock on the dependent variable i.e. capital is generally estimated.
5.2. Scenario Analysis
Scenario Analysis measures the change in value of portfolio due to simultaneous moves in a number of risk factors. Scenarios can be designed to encompass both movements in a group of risk factors and the changes in the underlying relationships between these variables (for example correlations and volatilities). Banks may use either the historical scenarios (a backward looking approach) or the hypothetical scenarios (a forward-looking approach) as part of their stress testing frameworks. However, they should be aware of the limitations of each of these scenarios. For example, the historical scenario may become less relevant over time due to the rapid changes in market conditions and external operating environment. On the other hand, the hypothetical scenario may be more relevant and flexible but involves more judgment and may not be backed by empirical evidence.
5.3. Financial Models
Banks may also use financial models in analyzing the relationships between different risk factors. However, they should exercise due care in selection of the financial or statistical models. The choice of model should take into account, inter alia, the availability of data, nature and composition of the bank’s portfolio, and its risk profile.
5.4. Reverse Stress Testing
Reverse stress testing is used to identify and assess the stress scenarios most likely to cause a bank’s current business plan to become unviable. A reverse stress test starts with a specified outcome that challenges the viability of the bank. The analysis would then work backward (reverse engineered) to identify a scenario or combination of scenarios that could bring about such a specified outcome. The ultimate objective of reverse stress testing is to enable the banks to fully explore the vulnerabilities of their current business plan, take decisions that better integrate business and capital planning, and improve their contingency planning.
Banks are required to reverse stress test their business plan to failure i.e. the point at which the bank becomes unable to carry out its business activities due to the lack of market confidence. While doing this, they must identify a range of adverse circumstances which would cause their business plan to become unviable and assess the likelihood that such events could crystallize. In case the reverse stress testing reveal a risk of business failure that is inconsistent with the bank’s risk appetite or tolerance, it must take effective remedial measures to prevent or mitigate that risk. Banks should also document the entire process of reverse stress testing as a part of their stress testing framework.
6. Selection of Scenarios
Banks should use a range of scenarios for stress testing. The level and severity of scenarios may be varied to identify potential risks and their interactions. The decision of scenarios selection should be taken carefully after taking into account all the relevant factors. In this regard, the following broad parameters are being laid down to ensure consistency in stress testing practices across the banking industry:
6.1. Identification of Risk Factors
As part of their stress testing process, banks should identify the potential risk factors that have implications for their business activities and can adversely affect the quality of their portfolios. After careful analysis and studying the inter-relationship of various risks to which their business is exposed to, banks are expected to draw a list of the major risk factors that need to be stressed. Few examples of the risk factors are listed below:
i. Macro-economic factors such as changes in oil price, GDP growth, inflation rate, etc. which may adversely affect the bank’s business and the quality of its portfolio;
ii. Concentration risk which may be due to the concentration of a bank’s exposure to few borrowers or a few groups of borrowers or to a particular industrial sector or to a geographic region or country, etc;
iii. Counterparty credit risk which may be reflected in the relatively high Probability of Default(PD) or high Loss Given Default(LGD) of individual counterparties or of group of counterparties or at the overall bank level;
iv. Equity price risk arising from volatility in stock market index or major movements in prices of shares to which the bank has significant exposure;
v. Operational risk which may be due to the internal events such as the IT systems failure, internal frauds, disruption of services, etc. or due to the external events such as disruption of communication network, external frauds, etc;
vi. Liquidity risk arising from narrow depositors base, adverse cash flows, negative market perceptions or major rating downgrades, etc.
The above examples are for illustration only and the banks are expected to develop their own list of risk factors taking into account the nature of their business activities, the characteristics of their portfolios and their overall risk profiles.
6.2. Levels of Shocks
Banks may use the following levels of shocks to the individual risk factors taking into account the historical as well as hypothetical movement in the underlying risk factors:
i. Mild Level Shocks: These represent small shocks to the risk factors, which may vary for different risk factors;
ii. Moderate Level Shocks: These represent medium level shocks, the level of which may be defined for each risk factor separately;
iii. Severe Level Shocks: These represent severe shocks to all the risk factors and their level may also be defined separately for each risk factor. Such scenarios may reflect an extreme economic downturn or severe market conditions;
Banks are required to invariably choose and apply the three levels of shocks listed at points (i) to (iii) above to each of the identified risk factors. Furthermore, they are also required to conduct Reverse Stress Testing in line with Para 5.4 of these Rules.
6.3. Magnitude of Shocks
Banks are required to define the magnitude of the shock to be given to each of the identified risk factors separately for the above levels of shocks. They should take into account the following factors in defining the magnitude of the shock:
i. While determining the magnitude of shock, banks should review the historical pattern of worst events at portfolio level or at the level of specific business segment but this should not be the sole determinant of shock. Other qualitative factors and expert judgment should also guide this process;
ii. The time horizon for analyzing historical events should cover at-least one business cycle relevant to the underlying portfolio;
iii. The magnitude of the shock could be more than the worst historical movement in market value of the relevant portfolio but should not be so large or so small to render the stress testing exercise a hypothetical one;
iv. The magnitude of the shock should also take into account the prevailing market conditions, current operating environment and future perspectives;
v. The magnitude of the shock should be adequately varied for different levels of shock to assess the vulnerability of the bank under different scenarios;
vi. The magnitude of the shocks to be applied to the stress scenarios should be determined with reference to the “baseline” scenario and the magnitude for each level of shock should reflect an increasing level of stress when compared with the “baseline” position.
6.4. Scenario Assumptions
The results of stress tests and their interpretation is influenced by the underlying assumptions of stress testing. Therefore, banks should clearly outline the assumption made in drawing-up the list of relevant risk factors, determining the magnitude of shocks and the development of scenarios.
6.5. Development of Scenarios
Banks should develop a set of stress scenarios reflecting increasing levels of severity in line with the levels defined in Para 6.2 above. While developing the stress scenarios, banks should pay due regard to the following factors:
i. The selected stress scenarios should fully reflect the business environment and risk profile of individual banks;
ii. The scenarios may be based on historical events reflecting the actual experience of the bank or the banking industry in worst situations with appropriate adjustments, or non-historical/hypothetical ones based on a combination of factors including past experiences, prevailing market trends, future outlook and exercise of judgment;
iii. All material and significant risk factors having the potential to adversely affect the assets quality and profitability of the bank should be taken into account in scenario development;
iv. The scenarios should be comprehensive to cover the overall portfolio of the bank as well as its major business areas. Moreover, they should cover both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet/contingent exposures;
v. Stress tests should include scenario(s) that could threaten the viability of the institution (reverse stress testing). Further guidance on selection of such scenario(s) has been provided in Section 5.4.
7. Risk Coverage and Scenarios
Banks should cover all material and significant risks under their stress testing program. For this purpose , they should identify the major risk factors based on the assessment of their portfolios and its inherent vulnerabilities. The possible risk factors may include those related to credit, market, operational, liquidity and other risks. Banks should also capture the effect of reputational risk as well as integrate risks arising from off-balance sheet vehicles and other related entities in their stress testing program.
Some possible stress scenarios for stressing various risk factors are described in the following paragraphs. The scenarios listed hereunder are only for the reference of banks and should not be construed as an exhaustive list. Banks are expected to develop their own risk factors taking into account the nature of their business activities and the risks associated therewith. They should also determine the methodologies and techniques to be used for stressing the identified risk factors in line with the requirements of these Rules and the prevailing best practices.
7.1. Credit Risk
Credit risk is historically the most significant risk faced by the banks. It is measured by estimating the actual or potential losses arising from the inability or unwillingness of the obligors to meet their credit obligations on time. Banks may choose to conduct stress tests either under Standardized Approach or Internal Rating Based (IRB) Approach of *Basel-II. Furthermore, they may use a combination of risk parameters including Exposure at Default (EAD), Probability of Default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD) and Maturity (M) to measure the credit risk.
Banks should conduct the stress tests on credit risk to estimate the impact of defined scenarios on their asset quality, profitability and capital. For this purpose, both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet credit exposures should be covered. Some possible scenarios for conducting stress tests on credit risk are listed below:
i. Decrease in Oil Prices: Significant decrease in oil prices in the international market may affect the economic indicators of the country and possibly the credit portfolio of banks. The impact of significant reduction in oil prices on the asset quality, profitability and capital adequacy may be assessed;
ii. Economic Downturn: The adverse changes in major macro-economic variables may have implications for the quality of credit portfolio of banks. Banks may develop stress scenarios to assess the impact of adverse changes in economic variables like GDP, inflation, unemployment rate, etc. on their asset quality, profitability and capital adequacy. The unemployment rate and inflation may have direct impact on the quality of credit cards and personal loans.;
iii. Changes in LGDs and other Risk Parameters: Significant changes in LGDs, PDs, EAD, credit ratings, etc. of the obligors may heighten the credit risk of the bank. Banks may develop scenarios based on adverse changes in these credit risk parameters and assess the impact on their profitability and capital adequacy;
iv. Significant Increase in NPLs: Significant increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) due to multiple factors would adversely affect the asset quality and require additional provisioning. Such a scenario may involve increase in aggregate NPLs as well as downgrading all or part of the classified loans falling in various categories of classification by one notch. Banks may develop scenarios based on significant changes in the level of NPLs and their classification categories to assess the resultant impact on their provisioning requirements;
v. Slowdown in Credit Growth: Significant reduction in credit growth may adversely affect the income level and profitability. Banks may assess impact of marginal or negative growth in lending on their profitability and capital adequacy;
vi. Failure of Counterparties: Banks may have significant exposure to few counterparties or groups of related counterparties. Furthermore they might have significant exposure to few industrial sectors or geographic areas. Banks may develop scenarios to assess the impact of failure of their major counterparties or of increased default risk in a particular industry or geographic area on their profitability and capital adequacy.
Banks would develop their own scenarios taking into account the nature, size and mix of their credit portfolio. Furthermore, they should take into account the following factors while conducting stress tests on credit risk:
i. Stress tests may be conducted to cover the entire credit portfolio or selected credit areas like corporate lending, retail lending, consumer lending, etc. or a combination of both;
ii. Stress testing of corporate loans portfolio may involve the assessment of creditworthiness of individual borrowers and then aggregating the impact of risk factors on the portfolio level;
iii. Banks may use financial models to calculate the revised PDs and LGDs based on the selected scenarios and assess the impact thereof on the profitability and capital adequacy of the bank;
iv. Stress tests on consumer and retail loans may be conducted on portfolio level given the relatively large number and small value of such loans;
v. Banks having established internal credit rating systems may develop scenarios involving downgrading of the credit ratings of borrowers to assess the impact of identified risk factors on the quality of credit portfolio;
vi. The extreme but plausible events occurred over a business cycle may be taken into account in developing the relevant scenarios.
* This should be replaced with Basel III, Based on SAMA Circular on Basel III Reforms. 7.2. Market Risk
Market risk arises when the value of on- and off-balance sheet positions of a bank is adversely affected by movements in market rates or prices such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity prices, credit spreads and/or commodity prices resulting m a loss to earnings and capital of the bank. Banks should conduct stress tests to test the resilience of their on- and off-balance sheet positions that are vulnerable to changes in market rates or prices in stressed situations. The stress tests for market risk may be conducted for the following risk factors:
7.2.1. Interest Rate Risk
Interest rate risk arises when there is a mismatch between positions, which are subject to interest rate adjustment within a specified period. The vulnerability of an towards the adverse movements of the interest rate can be gauged by using duration GAP analysis or similar other interest rate risk models, Interest rate risk may arise due to (i) differences between the timing of rate changes and the timing of cash flows (re-Pricing risk); (ii) changing rate relationships among different yield curves effecting bank’s activities (basis risk); (iii) changing rate relationships across the range of maturities (yield curve risk); and (iv) interest- related options embedded in bank products (options risk). Banks should conduct stress tests for interest rate risk keeping in view the nature and composition of their portfolios. Some plausible scenarios relating to interest rate risk may include the following:
i. Re-pricing Risk: Banks may develop stress scenarios to assess the impact on their profitability of the timing differences in interest rate changes and cash flows in respect of fixed and floating rate positions on both assets and liabilities side including off-balance sheet exposures;
ii. Basis Risk: This scenario would involve assessing the impact on profitability due to unfavorable differential changes in key market rates;
iii. Yield Curve Risk: This scenario may assess the impact on profitability due to parallel shifts in the yield curve (both up and down shifts) and non-parallel shifts in the yield curve (steeping or flattening of the yield curve);
iv. Option Risk: Banks may develop this scenario if they have significant exposure to option instruments. This would involve assessing the impact on profitability due to changes in the value of both stand-alone option instruments (e.g. bond options) and embedded options (e.g. bonds with call or put provisions and loans providing the right of prepayment to the borrowers) due to adverse interest rate movements.
7.2.2. Foreign Exchange Risk
Foreign Exchange risk is the current or prospective risk to earnings and capital arising from adverse movements in foreign exchange rates. It refers to the impact of adverse movement in exchange rates on the value of open foreign exchange positions. The overall net open position is measured by aggregating the sum of net short positions or the sum of net long positions; whichever is greater regardless of sign.
The stress test for foreign exchange risk assesses the impact of change in exchange rates on the profitability. Such stress test may focus on the overall net open position of the bank including the on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposures. Some plausible scenarios relating to foreign exchange risk may include the following:
i. Appreciation in Exchange Rates: Banks may develop stress scenarios to assess the impact of certain assumed levels of appreciation in the relevant exchange rates in case they have significant cross currency exposures;
ii. Depreciation in Exchange Rates: Banks may develop stress scenarios to assess the impact of certain assumed levels of depreciation in the relevant exchange rates on their open foreign exchange positions;
Banks may develop such scenarios based on the significance and level of their open foreign exchange positions.
7.2.3. Equity Price Risk
Equity price risk is the risk to the earnings or capital of the bank that results from adverse changes in the value of its equity related portfolios. The equity price risk may arise from changes in the value of a bank’s equity investment portfolio either due to the adverse movements in the overall level of equity prices/stock markets indices or as a result of the price volatility in shares forming part of the bank’s portfolio. Some plausible stress scenarios relating to equity price risk may include the following:
i. Fall in stock market Indices: Banks may develop stress scenarios to assess the impact of certain assumed levels of decline in the stock market indices on their earnings and capital;
ii. Drop in value of portfolio: If the bank holds an equity portfolio highly concentrated in few sectors or few companies, it may conduct stress tests based on the assumed changes in the related sectoral stock indices or prices of shares forming major part of its portfolio;
iii. Drop in Collateral Coverage: Banks active in margin lending may conduct stress tests to assess the impact of decline in stock prices/indices on the collateral coverage level of their margin loans and the resulting impact on their earnings and capital.
While conducting stress tests for equity price risk, banks should cover both the on- balance sheet as well as off-balance sheet equity portfolios.
7.2.4. Commodity Price Risk
Commodity price risk is the risk to the earnings or capital of the banks, particularly those engaged in Sharia’h compliant banking, that results from the current and future volatility of market values of specific commodities. If a bank is exposed to commodity price fluctuations, it should develop appropriate scenarios to conduct stress test for commodity price risk. The bank should assesses the impact of changes in commodity prices on its profitability and capital adequacy.
7.3. Liquidity Risk
Liquidity risk is the risk of potential loss to a bank due to either its inability to meet its obligations in a timely manner or its inability to fund increases in assets /conduct a transaction at the prevailing market prices. The liquidity risk may arise from various sources including the significant mismatches in maturity structure of assets and liabilities, changes in interest rates which may encourage depositors to withdraw their deposits to seek better returns elsewhere, downgrading of credit rating and adverse market reputation which may pose challenges in accessing fresh liquidity, etc. Furthermore, derivatives and other off-balance sheet exposures may also become a source of liquidity risk and, therefore, banks should take into account the impact of off-balance sheet items and commitments in undertaking stress testing. Banks should analyze their liquidity position to assess their resilience to cope with stress situations. Some plausible stress scenarios relating to liquidity risk may include the following:
i. Deposits Withdrawals: Banks may develop scenarios of significant deposits withdrawals or major shifts in different categories of deposits e.g. from current deposits to term deposits, and analyze their impact on their liquidity and funding costs. The banks may assume different levels of withdrawals for current, savings and term deposits, and for local and foreign currency deposits;
ii. Tightening of Credit Lines: The banks which are heavily reliant on inter-bank borrowing should develop scenarios involving tightening or withdrawal of available inter-bank credit lines, identify alternate sources of funding and estimate the impact of such changes on the funding cost and profitability of the bank;
iii. Significant Maturity Mismatches: Such scenarios may be involved assumed widening of gaps in the overall and individual maturity buckets of total assets and liabilities as well as in the rate sensitive assets and liabilities, and assessing their implications for the liquidity management;
iv. Repayment Behavior of Borrowers: Banks may develop scenarios linking the level of projected cash flows with different assumed patterns of loan repayments. For instance, a stress scenario may assume delayed payment or prepayment of loans by some large borrowers and assess the impact thereof on liquidity position and earnings of the bank.
Banks may assess the resilience of their liquidity position by calculating the ratio of liquid assets to liquid liabilities” before and after the application of shocks. For this purpose, the liquid assets are the assets that can be easily and cheaply turned into cash and includes cash, balances with other banks and SAMA, inter-bank lending/placements, lending under repo and investment in government securities. The liquid liabilities includes the short-term deposits and borrowings. The ratio of liquid assets to liquid liabilities may be recalculated under each scenario to analyze the changes in liquidity position.
7.4. Operational Risk
Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from both internal and external operational events including e.g. technology failures, business disruption and system failures, breaches in internal controls, frauds, or other operational problems that may result in unexpected losses for the bank. The banks should systematically track and record frequency, severity and other information on operational loss events to provide a meaningful information for assessing the bank’s exposure to operational risk and developing a policy to mitigate / control that risk.
Banks should develop stress scenarios for operational risk stress tests based on the data of their past operational loss events and using professional judgment. The assumptions for operational risk stress tests would be different from those used in credit and market risk stress tests, and should be based on historical and plausible hypothetical operational loss events. A plausible stress scenario may assume a major business disruption or system failure (e.g. due to hardware or software failure or telecommunication problems) and assesses the effects of such disruptions /failures on the earnings and capital of the bank. Any additional capital requirements emanating from the outcome of operational risk stress tests should be taken into account in the capital planning process.
7.5. Other Risks
The risks and scenarios mentioned above are for the guidance of banks and this list may not be exhaustive. Banks are encouraged to identify any other risks and vulnerabilities related to their business and develop appropriate scenarios to stress those risks. They should identify the sources of risks using the guidance provided in these Rules and their own experiences, and then narrow down the list to significant risks potentially having material impact on their business and financial condition. Focusing on the material risks would enable banks to conduct the stress testing exercise in a meaningful way.
8. Compilation and Communication of Results
Banks should compile and communicate the stress testing results in a clear and concise manner. The stress testing exercise should provide an estimate of the expected losses under defined scenarios by using the appropriate methodologies and techniques. The impact of the stress tests should be measured on the following indicators of the bank:
i. assets quality - increase/decrease in classified assets particularly loans and the infection ratio thereof (i.e. classified assets to total assets and classified loans to total loans);
ii. profitability - increase/decrease in the accounting profit/loss;
iii. capital adequacy - measured in terms of the changes in total amount of capital and the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR);
iv. liquidity position - measured in terms of changes in key liquidity indicators and any funding gaps.
Banks should communicate the results of stress tests to both internal stakeholders and SAMA. The internal stakeholders for this purpose should include, inter alia, the board of directors, relevant board and management committees, senior management, and relevant business areas. The communication of results to SAMA will be made as part of the regulatory reporting on stress testing as specified under Section 10 of these Rules.
While communicating the results of stress tests to the above internal stakeholders and SAMA, banks should clearly specify the following:
i. The bank’s approach to stress testing;
ii. Scenarios used;
iii. Underlying assumptions;
iv. Methodologies and techniques used;
v. Any limitations of the stress testing process.
Banks should also exercise due care in interpreting the results of stress tests. They should be fully aware of the limitations of the stress testing exercise. The stress testing involves a significant amount of judgment and its effectiveness would largely depend on the expertise of the conductors of stress tests, the quality of data, and choice of right scenarios. Therefore, the designing of remedial actions for redressing the issues highlighted by the stress tests should take into account these factors.
Banks would also suitably reflect the results of stress tests conducted under these Rules in their Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Plan (ICAAP) document to be submitted to SAMA on annual basis. This requirement would not be applicable to branches of foreign banks as they are not required to prepare ICAAP.
9. Remedial Actions
Banks are required to take appropriate remedial action(s) to address potential risks and vulnerabilities identified by the stress testing results. They should lay down well-defined procedures to determine the nature and timing of the possible remedial actions. Furthermore, they should take into account the following factors in devising their remedial action plans:
i. The remedial actions identified to mitigate the adverse effects of stress tests should be realistic and implementable within the defined timeline. All relevant factors which may affect the usefulness of identified actions should be taken into account and, if needed, back-up plans are prepared to counter their adverse effects;
ii. The adequacy of existing capital buffers and possible sources of raising capital, if needed, should be assessed. This should be compared with any additional capital requirements under stressed conditions;
iii. The practicality of remedial actions under stressed conditions should be evaluated.This should be done carefully as some of the actions available in normal situations may not be workable in a period of stress;
iv. The possible remedial actions to be taken may vary depending on the nature and significance of the identified risks/vulnerabilities. These may include, for example, tightening of credit policy to reduce credit risk, revisiting of business growth plans or growth plans in a particular business area, raising additional capital to absorb potential losses, identifying alternate funding sources to mitigate potential liquidity risk, etc.;
v. The decision to take or not to take a remedial action should be duly justified and the mechanism adopted to arrive at such decision be properly documented;
vi. Banks should estimate the impact of identified actions on their profitability and solvency as well as on the overall financial condition to understand the implications of such actions. In case of significant divergence from the planned results, they may resort to alternate options to achieve the desired results;
vii. The results of stress tests should be reflected in the policies and risk tolerance limits set by the management;
viii. Banks may also set out the minimum thresholds or triggers (e.g. the impact on profitability or capital) for initiating the identified remedial actions. The process to be adopted and the level of authority for taking such actions should also be clearly defined;
All the identified risks and vulnerabilities may not necessarily require a remedial action particularly if the impact thereof on the bank is not significant. If the bank decides not to take an immediate action to address a potential risk, it should closely monitor the position and the post stress tests developments to ensure that the emerging position would not adversely affect its business. Furthermore, banks should have contingency plans in place to cope with any unexpected developments.
10. Regulatory Reporting
All banks including branches of foreign banks covered under these Rules are required to submit the following information to SAMA:
i. Statement providing Data for conducting Top-Down stress tests by SAMA as per the prescribed format (the format to be separately communicated electronically);
ii. Statement providing results of the Bottom-up stress tests conducted by banks on the format attached as Annexure-I to these Rules;
iii. Half-yearly / yearly financial statements prepared by banks on their standard formats.
The above information will be submitted to the Director, Banking Supervision Department on calendar half-yearly basis i.e. half-year ending 30th June /31st December, within three months of the end of every half-year. The first such return for the half year ending 30 June 2012 shall be submitted by 30 September 2012
11. Top-Down or Macro Stress Testing
SAMA views stress testing as an important tool for not only strengthening the risk management frameworks in individual banks but also for assessing the resilience of the overall banking system under stressful conditions. Therefore, in addition to the bottom-up stress testing by banks, SAMA would also conduct Top-Down stress tests. For this purpose, it has adopted a holistic approach comprising of following three key components:
i. Use of Bottom-up Stress Testing Results: Banks are required to submit their bottom-up stress testing results to SAMA which will be used by it in identifying and analyzing the potential vulnerabilities in the banking system and their systemic implications;
ii. Requiring Banks to Run Specified Scenarios: SAMA may require banks to run the specified scenarios on their portfolios to assess the plausibility of certain events. In this regard, SAMA may require banks from time to time to conduct specified sensitivity tests for individual businesses/portfolio segments or scenario tests on the overall portfolio. Banks are required to submit the results of such tests to SAMA in the prescribed manner. These results may be used by SAMA to assess vulnerabilities in the banking system;
iii. System-wide Stress Testing: SAMA may conduct its own stress tests based on the macro-economic data available with it and the banking data collected from banks.
Based on the findings of its Top-Down stress tests and supervisory reviews SAMA may provide additional guidance to banks on their stress testing programs during bilateral meetings on their ICAAPs or through separate communications.
12. Implementation and Monitoring
SAMA will assess the effectiveness of the banks’ stress testing programs as part of its supervisory review process and during bilateral meetings on their ICAAP documents. SAMA may also review the stress testing frameworks of banks during their on-site examinations. In conducting such a review, SAMA shall assess the efforts made by banks in embedding the requirements of these Rules into their risk management frameworks. Furthermore, the review may also cover the following aspects of the banks’ stress testing programs:
i. The nature and complexity of business activities and the overall risk profile of the bank;
ii. Evaluation of the organizational structure and resources deployed for conducting stress tests;
iii. The adequacy of stress scenarios and methodologies adopted by the bank for its stress testing program;
iv. The relevance and appropriateness of the assumptions made for stress testing;
v. The adequacy of the frequency and timing of stress testing to support timely remedial actions;
vi. The effectiveness of the policy, procedures and processes for conducting stress tests, compiling results and making use of the findings thereof;
vii. The level of involvement of the board and the senior management in the stress testing program;
viii. Assessment of the degree of compliance with these Rules;
ix. Any other matters related to stress testing program and risk management framework of the bank.
SAMA would determine the timing and frequency of conducting stress testing reviews for individual banks keeping in view the progress made in implementation of these Rules and the robustness of stress testing program of each bank.
Annexure-I
Name of the Bank: ------------------------- Stress Testing Results: Half-yearly Reporting to SAMA As of 30 June / 31 December ----------- I. Stress testing Framework
Salient features of the stress testing framework adopted by the bank should be described in this section. This would include, inter alia, a description of the organizational structure for conducting stress tests, composition of the stress testing team and their responsibilities, nature and frequency of stress tests, coverage of the portfolio, etc.
II. Stress Testing Methodologies
A description of the methodologies and techniques used for conducting stress tests should be provided in this section. This should be done in the light of guidance provided under Section 5 of the Rules.
III. Scenarios and Assumptions
A description of the stress testing scenarios and the underlying assumptions made by the bank for conducting stress tests should be provided in this section. This should be done, inter alia, in the light of guidance provided under Section 6 of the Rules.
IV. Risk Factors
The major risk factors identified by the bank based on the assessment of its portfolio and the inherent vulnerabilities should be described in this section. It may also be elaborated as to why the identified risks are considered relevant for the bank and why the other significant risks generally faced by banks are not considered relevant by the bank. This should be done, inter alia, in the light of guidance provided under Section 6 & 7 of the Rules.
V. Stress Testing Results
A summary of the results of stress tests should be provided in this section. This would include, inter alia, the following:
i. Listing of the levels of shocks used and the magnitude of shock applied for each level. This should be provided separately for each of the stressed risk factored;
ii. The estimated impact of the stress testing results on asset quality, liquidity, profitability and capital of the bank. The impact may be estimated based on the financial statements of the relevant reporting date i.e. as of 30th June or 31st December, based on which the half- yearly report would be submitted to SAMA;
iii. The results should contain both absolute amounts and key financial ratios e.g. NPLs to loans, liquid assets to liabilities, statutory liquidity ratio, return on assets, capital to risk weighted assets, etc. The results should provide both pre-stressed as well as stressed positions. They should also be in line with the regulatory requirements of SAMA;
iv. Listing of any violation of the SAMA’s regulatory ratios or any other requirements based on the stressed positions;
v. Any other information based on the stress testing results which the bank considers significant and would like to share with SAMA.
VI. Communication of Results
A confirmation to the effect that the results of the stress tests have been communicated to the board of directors, relevant board and management committees, senior management, and relevant business areas of the bank should be provided.
VII. Remedial Actions
Remedial action(s), if any, already taken by the bank to address potential risks and vulnerabilities identified by the stress testing results may be described in this section. Any planned remedial action(s) along with the expected timeline for their completion may also be described.
Rules on Stress Testing-Frequently Asked Questions(FAQs)
While providing comments on the Draft Rules on Stress Testing, banks have sought certain clarifications on these Rules. In addition, they have asked certain interpretation questions. Many such queries/questions have been responded in the final Rules being issued to banks. However, in order to ensure a consistent implementation of these rules, few general questions are answered in the following FAQs.
Q.1: Will SAMA provide standard risk factors and stress scenarios for ensuring consistency in stress testing by banks?
Ans.: The composition and characteristics of portfolios vary from bank to bank and, therefore, every bank is expected to identify risk factors and develop stress scenarios based on the peculiarities of its portfolio. It is not the intention of SAMA Rules to provide standard scenarios to banks for conducting regular stress tests by them. However, as provided under Para 2.1(ii) of the Rules, SAMA may require banks to conduct ad-hoc stress tests from time to time and for this purpose, may specify standard scenarios for conducting such tests to ensure comparability across all banks. The results of such stress tests will also be used as an input for conducting macro stress tests by SAMA.
Q.2: Can banks choose to stress only the main portfolio segments of credit risk (e.g. Corporate and Project Finance) and disregard smaller components (e.g. Retail)?
Ans.: Banks are required to stress test their credit exposures taking into account the nature, size and mix of their portfolio. The ultimate objective is to identify all major risk factors relating to credit portfolio. However, the approach to be adopted for stress testing corporate portfolio may be different from that of consumer and retail portfolio. The stress testing of corporate loans portfolio may involve the assessment of creditworthiness of individual borrowers and then aggregating the impact of risk factors on the portfolio level. The stress tests on consumer and retail loans on the other hand may be conducted on portfolio level given the relatively large number and small value of such loans.
Q.3: Will SAMA provide a covariance matrix of the risk factors and methodologies for multifactor stress testing for use as a common reference by all banks?
Ans.: The methodologies and techniques provided under Para 5 of the Rules are for the guidance of banks and they can adopt any of these and other appropriate techniques in line with their stress testing frameworks. The said Para 5 states that “banks should use appropriate methodologies and techniques for conducting stress tests keeping in view the nature of business activities, size and complexity of operations, and their risk profiles. They may adopt a combination of methodologies and techniques in line with their stress testing frameworks.” The methodologies generally employed in this regard are described under the Rules which include, inter alia, the Scenario Analysis. It is up to the banks to choose appropriate methodologies and techniques in line with their risk profiles and stress testing frameworks. It is not the intention of SAMA Rules to identify relevant risk factors on behalf of the banks. However, SAMA may separately require banks to stress any identified risk factors based on the standard scenarios to be communicated to them as and when deemed appropriate.
Q.4: Do banks need to consider the stress testing effects as at the reporting date, or should they also be applied to the projected figures (as presented in the ICAAP document)?
Ans.: Banks should consider stress testing effects as at the reporting date. The stress scenarios will be applied to the financial statements as of the cut-off dates for reporting of results. However, banks will take into account, inter alia, historical events, prevailing market trends and future outlook in developing the stress scenarios.
Q.5: Given the requirement that banks have to submit the results of their stress testing in the ICAAP, should the template provided in Appendix 1 be separately submitted for the stress test conducted as at 31 December (as the due dates for the ICAAP and this report are the same).
Ans.: Under Para 8 of the Rules, banks are required to reflect the results of stress testing in their ICAAP document. Furthermore, under Para 10 (Regulatory Reporting), banks have to separately submit the results of their stress tests to SAMA on half-yearly basis as per the format attached with the Rules. The reporting under ICAAP is for capital planning purposes whereas the one under Stress Testing Rules is aimed at assessing the effectiveness of stressing testing frameworks developed by banks. Given the differing objectives and scope of both these regulatory reporting, banks are required to ensure compliance of the separate reporting requirements.
Q.6: Is the format for the Statement providing Data for conducting Top- down stress tests the same as the template which is currently provided on a semi-annual basis, or will a new format be prescribed?
Ans.: The format for providing data under Para 10(i) of the Rules will largely be in line with the existing template on which banks are currently providing data on half-yearly basis. However, certain additional data may be requested from time to time given the dynamic nature of the stress testing process. Any future revisions to the data collection template will be communicated by SAMA to banks well in advance.
Q.7: Will SAMA provide banks with the results of any ad-hoc/top-down/macro stress tests conducted by it?
Ans.: SAMA will not formally provide banks with the results of any stress tests conducted by it. However, it may share high level relevant findings with them during bilateral supervisory review meetings, as deemed appropriate.
Q.8: Whether the reverse Stress Testing a mandatory requirement under the Rules or whether this form of test remains optional?
Ans.: Reverse stress testing is a technique widely used to assess the robustness of business plan of a bank. The BCBS “Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision” also require that the stress testing program should include some extreme scenarios which would cause the bank to become insolvent. Thus, conducting reverse stress tests is a mandatory requirement for banks.
Q.9: Can the branches of foreign banks rely on their Group's organizational structure and expertise where the required resources have already been deployed to carry out local stress testing?
Ans.: The concerned branches of foreign banks can seek guidance from their Head Office and rely on their Group’s organizational structure and resources for conducting stress tests locally provided the confidentiality of data and records is duly ensured. Furthermore, they have to maintain proper records of the stress tests so conducted locally and produce them for verification by SAMA as and when required.
Q.10: Can the branches of foreign banks use their Head Office/ Group's stress testing policies/ framework and procedures for conducting stress tests locally?
Ans.: The branches of foreign banks may use their Head Office/ Group's stress testing policies/ framework and procedures for conducting stress tests locally provided such policies and procedures meets all the requirements of SAMA Rules. Furthermore, they should be prepared to provide copies of such policies and procedures to SAMA as and when required by it.
Credit Risk Management
Prudential Treatment of Problem Assets
The global financial crisis highlighted the difficulties in identifying and comparing banking data, particularly regarding the quality and types of bank assets and how they are monitored in supervisory reports and disclosures. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognized significant differences in practices among countries.
Therefore, the Committee issued guidelines for managing non-performing assets, particularly non-performing loans and loans subject to forbearance, concerning the scope of evaluation standards and the level of application by banks within the current accounting and regulatory framework. These guidelines will be applied to several topics, including:
- Monitoring and supervision of asset quality to ensure more consistent comparability across countries.
- Internal Rating-Based (IRB) credit classification systems for banks for credit risk management purposes.
- Pillar 3 disclosure regarding asset quality.
- Published data related to asset quality indicators.
Based on the above, SAMA emphasizes the importance of banks adhering to the guidelines for managing non-performing assets issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Rules on Management of Problem Loans
No: 41033343 Date(g): 6/1/2020 | Date(h): 11/5/1441 Status: In-Force In line with SAMA responsibilities to maintain financial stability and contribute to economic development in the Kingdom, and its commitment to fairness in banking transactions,
We would like to inform you that Rules and Guidelines have been issued for the management of Problem Loans granted to Juristic Persons. These Rules and Guidelines aim to support banks in monitoring loans showing signs of distress, organizing procedures for restructuring such loans, and enhancing fair treatment of customers by providing appropriate solutions. Please find attached the following:
- Rules on Management of Problem Loans, which SAMA emphasizes must be adhered to by all banks.
- Guidelines on Management of Problem Loans, to provide guidance on best practices to help banks comply with the aforementioned Rules.
For your information and action accordingly as of 01/07/2020G.
- Rules on Management of Problem Loans, which SAMA emphasizes must be adhered to by all banks.
1. General Requirements
1.1 Introduction
In exercise of the powers vested upon Saudi central Bank* (SAMA) under the charter issued by the Royal Decree no. 23 on 23-05-1377AH (15 December 1957G) and the Banking Control Law promulgated by Royal Decree no. M/5 dated 22/2/1386AH. SAMA is hereby issuing the enclosed Rules on the Management of Problem Loans aimed to develop the practices followed by banks while dealing with loans showing signs of stress along with the loans already specified as non-performing.
These rules should be read in conjunction with SAMA rules on Credit Risk Classification and Provisioning.
Also, SAMA issued the Guidelines on Management of Problem Loans as good practices to support banks in implementing these Rules.
* The "Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency" was replaced By the "Saudi Central Bank" in accordance with The Saudi Central Bank Law No. (M/36), dated 11/04/1442H, corresponding to 26/11/2020G.
1.2 Objective of the Rules
The objectives of these rules are as follows:
i. To ensure banks put in place a conceptual framework which would facilitate rehabilitation of viable borrower, thereby supporting economic activity.
ii. To ensure banks look into aspects of customer conduct and fair treatment whilst dealing with problem loans, especially in instances involving the MSMEs.
iii. To ensure banks have adequate controls over non-performing and problem loan management and restructuring processes, including documented policies and procedures.
1.3 Scope of Implementation
These rules are applicable for all banks licensed under Banking Control Law.
1.4 Definitions
The following terms and phrases, where used in these Rules, should have the corresponding meanings, unless the context requires otherwise:
Problem loans:
Loans that display well-defined weaknesses or signs of potential problems. Problem loans should be classified by the banks in accordance with accounting standards, and consistent with relevant regulations, as one or more of:
a) non-performing;
b) subject to restructuring on account of inability to service contractual payments;
c) IFRS 9 Stages 2; and exhibiting signs of significant credit deterioration or Stage 3;
d) under watch-list, early warning or enhanced monitoring measures; or
e) where concerns exist over the future stability of the borrower or on its ability to meet its financial obligations as they fall due.
Non-performing loans:
As stipulated in BCBS 403 “Guidelines –Prudential treatment of problem assets – definitions of non-performing exposures and forbearance” endorsed by SAMA through circular no. 381000099757 dated 23/09/1438AH.
Watch-list:
Loans that have displayed characteristics of a recent increase in credit risk, and are subject to enhanced monitoring and review by the bank.
Early Warning Signals:
Quantitative or qualitative indicators, based on liquidity, profitability, market, collateral and macroeconomic metrics.
Cooperating borrower:
A borrower which is actively working with a bank to resolve their problem loan.
Viable borrower:
Is that, wherein the loss of any concessions as a result of restructuring, is considered to be lower than the loss borne due to foreclosure.
Viability Assessment:
An assessment of borrower’s ability to generate adequate cash flow in order to service outstanding loans.
Covenant:
A Borrower’s commitment that certain activities will or will not be carried out.
Key performance indicators:
Indicators through which bank management or supervisor can assess the institution’s performance.
Collateral:
Are those, whose value can be considered whilst computing the recoverable amount for workout cases or foreclosed cases, on account of meeting the stipulated conditions laid out in these rules, as would be applicable based on the nature of the collateral.
Failed restructuring:
Any restructuring case where the borrower failed to repay the revised contractual cash flows as agreed upon with the bank and has transitioned into default.
Further to the above, Banks should adopt all requirements relating to i) Restructuring, ii) Identification of forbearance; iii) Identification of financial difficulty; iv) Identification of concession; and v) Stage allocation for forborne loans, as stipulated under SAMA Rules on Credit Risk Classification and Provisioning.
2. Problem Loan Prevention and Identification
2.1 Early Warning Signals
Banks should develop a clear, robust and demonstrable set of policies, procedures, tools, and governance around the establishment of Early Warning Signals (EWS) which are fully integrated into the bank’s risk management system.
The established EWS should be comprehensive and relevant to the specific portfolios of the Banks, and should enable Banks to proactively identify potential difficulties, investigate the drivers of the borrowers stress, and act before the borrower’s financial condition deteriorates to the point of default.
Banks should organize their EWS process in the following three stages:
i. Identification of EWS:
Banks’ EWS should, at a minimum, take into account indicators that point to potential payment difficulties. Individual banks should undertake an internal assessment as to which EWS are suitable for each of their lending portfolios taking into account a combination of the following:
a. Economic environment: Banks should monitor indicators of the overall economic environment, which are relevant for determining the future direction of loan quality, and not only the individual borrower’s ability to pay their obligations but also collateral valuations.
Examples of economic indicators, based on the nature of the respective portfolios, can include GDP growth, Inflation/deflation, and unemployment, as well as indicators that may be specific to certain sectors/portfolios, e.g. commodity or real estate.
b. Financial indicators: Banks should establish a process in order to get frequent interim financial reports (or cash-flow/ turnover details for MSME) from their borrowers (e.g., quarterly for material loans to listed entities and semi-annual for all others), to ensure that EWS are generated in a timely manner.
Examples of financial indicators, based on the nature of the respective portfolios, can include Debt/EBITDA, Capital adequacy, Interest coverage - EBITDA/ interest and principal expenses, Cash flow, Turnover (applicable for MSME).
c. Behavioral indicators: Banks should institute behavioral warning signals to assess the integrity and competency of key stakeholders of the borrower. These indicators will help in the assessment of how a borrower behaves in different situations.
Examples of these indicators are: regular and consistent attempts at delaying financial reporting requirements; reluctance or unwillingness to respond to various communications, any attempt at deception or misrepresentation of facts, excessive delays in responding to a request for no valid reason.
d. Third-party indicators: Banks should organize a reliable screening process for information provided by third parties (e.g. rating agencies, General Authority of Zakat and Tax, press, and courts) to identify signs that could lead to a borrower’s inability to service its outstanding liabilities.
Example of these indicators are: Default at other financial institutions / any negative information, insolvency proceedings for major supplier or customer, downgrade in external rating assigned and trends with respect to external ratings.
e. Operational indicators: Banks should establish a process where any changes in the borrower’s operations are flagged as soon as they occur.
Examples of these indicators, based on the nature of the portfolio can include, frequent changes of suppliers, frequent changes of senior management, qualified audit reports, change of the ownership, major organizational change, management and shareholder contentiousness.
Banks should establish a comprehensive set of EWS that provide banks with an opportunity to act before the borrower’s financial condition deteriorates to the point of default, and enable them to proactively identify and flag other loans that have similar characteristics, i.e. multiple loan facilities extended to the same borrower, or borrowers in same sector that may be affected by the overall economic environment, or loans with similar type of collateral.
ii. Corrective action:
Banks should have a proper written procedures to be followed in case any of the established EWS is triggered. The response procedure should clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of all the sections responsible for taking action on the triggered EWS, specific timelines for actions along with, identification of the cause and severity of the EWS.
iii. Monitoring:
Banks should have a robust monitoring mechanism for following up on the triggered EWS, in order to ensure that the corrective action plan has been executed to pre-empt potential payment difficulties of the borrowers. The level and timing of the monitoring process should reflect the risk level of the borrower.
3. Non-performing loans (NPL) Strategy
3.1 Developing the NPL Strategy
i. Banks should develop and implement an NPL strategy that is approved by the Board of Directors or its delegated authority.
ii. The NPL strategy should layout in a clear, concise manner the bank’s approach and objectives, and establish annual quantitative targets over a realistic but sufficiently ambitious timeframe, divided into short, medium and long-term horizons. It should serve as a roadmap for guiding the allocation of internal resources (human capital, information systems, and funding) and the design of proper controls (policies and procedures) to monitor interim performance and take corrective actions to ensure that the overall goals are met.
iii. The NPL strategy should consider all available options to deal with problem loans, where banks review the feasibility of such options and their respective financial impact. These include hold/restructuring strategies, active portfolio reductions through either sales and/or writing off provisioned NPLs that are deemed unrecoverable, taking collateral onto the balance sheet, legal options and out-of-court options.
iv. Banks should follow the principle of proportionality and materiality, while designing the NPL strategy, where adequate resources should be exhausted on specific segments of NPLs during the resolution process, including MSME’s.
3.2 Implementing the NPL Strategy
i. Banks should ensure that the components of the NPL strategy are communicated to relevant stakeholders across the bank, and proper monitoring protocols are established, together with performance indicators.
ii. The NPL strategy should be backed by an operational plan detailing how the NPL strategy will be implemented. This should include clearly defining and documenting the roles, responsibilities, formal reporting lines and individual (or team) goals and incentives geared towards reaching the targets in the NPL strategy.
iii. Banks should put in place mechanisms for a regular review of the strategy and monitoring of its operational plan effectiveness and its integration into the bank’s risk management framework.
4. Structuring the Workout Unit
i. Banks should establish a dedicated Workout Department/Section/or Unit to manage all workout related cases in order to effectively manage NPL resolution process. The Workout Department/Section/or Unit should be independent of the Business/Loan Originating Units to avoid any potential conflicts of interest.
ii. Banks should ensure that. Workout Unit is properly staffed with resources having the required skill sets to manage workout situations, strong analytical, legal, financial analysis skills, and proper understanding of the workout process.
4.1 Performance Management
i. Banks should establish proper and well-defined performance matrices for Workout Unit staff that should not be based solely on the reduction in the volume of nonperforming loans; An appraisal system and compensation structures tailored for the NPL Workout Unit should be implemented and in alignment with the overall NPL strategy, operational plan and the bank’s code of conduct.
ii. In addition to quantitative elements linked to the bank’s NPL targets and milestones (with a strong focus on the effectiveness of workout activities), the appraisal system should include qualitative measurements such as; level of negotiations competency, technical abilities relating to the analysis of the financial information and data received, structuring of proposals, quality of recommendations, and monitoring of restructured cases.
iii. The importance of the respective weight given to indicators within the overall performance measurement framework should be proportionate to the severity of the NPL issues faced by the bank.
5. Approaching Restructuring Cases
5.1 Viability of Restructuring
Banks should implement a well-defined restructuring policy aligned with the concept of viability that recognizes in a timely manner those borrowers who are non-viable. The policy should ensure that only viable restructuring solutions are considered, which should contribute to reducing the borrower’s balance of credit facilities.
Long-term restructuring measures should only be considered viable where the following conditions are met:
i. The bank can demonstrate, based on reasonable documented financial information, that the borrower can realistically afford the restructuring solution.
ii. Outstanding arrears are addressed as part of the restructured terms. That does not necessarily mean full repayment, and should not conflict with the potential reduction in the borrower’s balance in the medium to long-term that could be required to align with the borrower’s loan service capacity.
iii. In cases, where there have been previous restructuring solutions granted in respect of a loan, the bank should ensure that additional internal controls and early warning signals are implemented, so that the subsequent restructuring treatment meets the viability criteria. These controls should include, at a minimum, approval of a designated Senior Management Committee.
Short-term restructuring measures should only be considered viable where the following conditions are met:
i. The bank can demonstrate, based on reasonable documented financial information, that the borrower can realistically afford the restructuring solution.
ii. Short-term measures are to be applied temporarily where the bank has satisfied itself and is able to attest, based on reasonable financial information, that the borrower demonstrates the ability to repay the original or agreed modified amount on a full principal and interest basis commencing from the end of the short-term temporary arrangement.
iii. The solution approved is not perceived to lead to multiple consecutive restructuring measures in the future.
The bank’s assessment of viability should be based on the financial characteristics of the borrower and the restructuring measure to be granted at that time.
Whilst evaluating borrower’s viability, due consideration need be made, that any increase in pricing (for instance, over and above driven by risk-based pricing principles) with respect to the borrower’s outstanding facilities, does not make the resultant installments, unserviceable.
Banks should undertake the viability assessment irrespective of the source of restructuring, for instance, borrowers using restructuring clauses embedded in a contract, bilateral negotiation of restructuring between a borrower and the banks, public restructuring scheme extended to all borrowers in a specific situation.
5.2 Code of Conduct
Banks should develop a written Code of Conduct for managing problem loans, the Code of Conduct should define a robust problem loan resolution process to ensure that viable borrowers are provided a chance for reaching a workout solution, rather than invoking outright enforcement actions.
The Code of Conduct should be based broadly on but not limited to following:
i. Communication with the borrower: Banks should establish a written procedure around initiating communication with the borrowers along with the content, format, and medium of communication that is aligned with relevant Laws and Regulations, in the event that a borrower fails to pay in part or in full the installments as per the agreed repayment schedule.
ii. Information-gathering: Banks should establish a written procedure with proper timelines to collect adequate, complete and accurate information on the borrower’s financial condition from all available sources, in addition to standardized submissions such as quarterly/year-end financial statements, business/ operating plans obtained/submitted by the borrowers.
iii. Financial assessment of the borrower: Banks should ensure that proper analysis is performed on the information gathered relating to the borrower, in order to assess the borrower’s current repayment capacity, the borrower’s credit record, and the borrower’s future repayment capacity over the proposed workout period. Banks should ensure that reasonable efforts are made to cooperate with the borrower throughout the assessment process with the objective of reaching a mutual agreement on an appropriate workout solution.
iv. Proposal of resolution/solutions: Based on the assessment performed for the borrowers, banks should provide borrowers who are classified as cooperating a proposal for one or more alternative restructuring solutions, or if none of such solutions is agreed upon, one or more resolution and closure solutions, without this being considered as a new service to the borrower.
In presenting the proposed solution or alternative solutions, banks should be open to comments and queries on the part of borrowers, providing them with standardized - to the extent possible - and comprehensive information to help them understand the proposed solution or, in the case where there is more than one proposed solution, the differences across the proposed alternatives.
v. An objection-handling process: Banks should establish a clear and objective process for handling objections raised by the borrowers, and the process should be communicated to the borrowers. The process should highlight the appropriate forums for appeals and the timeframe for their closure.
Banks should develop standardized forms to be used by borrowers in case they want to raise an appeal. The forms should specify the list of information and required documents necessary to review the appeal, along with timelines for the submission and review of appeals.
vi. Workout fee: Banks should establish clear policy and procedure relating to charging fee for workout solution reached with borrowers. Banks should ensure that the policy and practice provide for impact analysis of the fee on borrower cash-flows, i.e. that increased cost is not going to further deteriorate the financial condition of the borrower. The rationale for charged fees should be clearly documented and transparency must be ensured through proper and clear communication with the borrower on fees charged by the banks.
The Code of Conduct should be reflected in all pertinent internal documentation with reference to problem loan resolution and be effectively implemented.
6. Workout Plan
i. Banks should develop a workout plan agreed between the viable borrower and the bank in order to return the non-performing borrower to a fully performing status in the shortest feasible time-frame, matching the borrower’s sustainable repayment capacity with the correct restructuring option(s).
ii. The workout plan needs to be approved by a designated Management Committee based upon the bank’s delegation of authority matrix.
iii. Banks should establish and document a policy with clear and objective time-bound criteria for the mandatory transfer of loans from Loan Originating Units to the Workout Unit along with the specification of relevant approvals required for such transfers.
iv. The policy should include details on areas where proper collaboration is required between the Workout Unit and Loan Originating Units especially in scenarios where the borrowers are showing signs of stress but still being managed by the Loan Originating Units.
6.1 Negotiating and Documenting Workout Plan
Banks should develop a process for negotiating and documenting the workout plan with a viable borrower. The process should cover the following components:
i. Developing the negotiating strategy:
Banks should have a proper process to manage the negotiations with viable borrowers on the potential workout solutions, the process should cover the following:
a) Identify minimum information required to objectively assess the borrower’s capacity to repay the proposed restructured solution.
b) Assess the strengths and weaknesses of both the bank’s and the borrower’s positions and then develop a negotiating strategy to obtain objectives of a successful restructuring for a viable borrower.
c) Where deemed essential, encourage less sophisticated borrowers to seek the advice of counsel or financial advisor to ensure they fully understand the terms and conditions of the proposed restructured solution.
d) Develop covenants appropriate to the level of complexity and size of the transaction, and comprehensiveness of the information available.
ii. Communicating with the borrower during the workout process:
Communication with borrowers should be as per the procedures outlined in the bank’s code of conduct. This should include; timelines for responding to borrower’s requests/complaints, identify who within the bank is responsible/authorized to issue various types of communications to the borrowers, documenting process for all communications to/from the borrowers, signing/acknowledgement protocols with timelines, approval requirements for all workout proposals, templates to be used for communication with the borrowers.
iii. Resolution of disputes:
Banks should follow the objection handling process for managing disputes with the borrowers in cases where the bank and the borrower fail to reach an agreement. This should include providing the borrower with prompt and easy access to filing an appeal, along with all necessary information to review the appeal, and a timeline for its closure, it should also be ensured that the dispute is being reviewed independently of the individual or team against whom the appeal has been filled.
6.2 Monitoring the Workout Plan
i. Banks should develop proper policies and procedures for establishing a monitoring mechanism over restructured loans in order to ensure the borrowers continued ability to meet their obligations. Banks monitoring mechanism should analyze the cause of any failed restructuring, and the analysis should be used for improving the workout solutions provided to borrowers.
ii. Banks should define proper and adequate key performance indicators (including workout effectiveness) comparable with their portfolios and should be monitored on a periodic basis along-with regular detailed reporting to the executive management.
7. Collateral
Banks should ensure proper collateral management and apply the following requirements throughout the credit process irrespective of the performance on the loan.
7.1 Governance
i. Banks should develop policies and procedures in order to ensure proper management of collateral obtained to mitigate the risk of loss associated with the potential default of the borrowers. Collateral policies and procedures should be approved by the Board of Directors or its delegated authority and should be reviewed at least every three years or more frequently if the bank deems is necessary based on the changes in the relevant regulatory requirements or business practices. Collateral policies and procedures should be fully aligned with the bank’s risk appetite statement (RAS).
ii. Consistent with SAMA’s requirements on valuation of real-estate collateral, banks should institute an appropriate governance process with respect to valuers and their performance standards. Banks should monitor and review the valuations performed by internal or external valuers on a regular basis, as well as develop and implement a robust internal quality assurance of such valuations.
iii. The internal audit function of banks should regularly review the consistency and quality of the collateral policies and procedures, the independence of the valuers selection process and the appropriateness of the valuations carried out by valuers.
7.2 Types of Collateral and Guarantees
Banks should clearly document in collateral policies and procedures the types of collateral they accept and the process in respect of the appropriate amount of each type of collateral relative to the loan amount. Banks should classify the collaterals they accept as follows:
i. Financial collateral - cash (money in bank accounts), securities (both debt and equity) and credit claims (sums owed to banks).
ii. Immovable collateral - immovable object, an item of property that cannot be moved without destroying or altering it - a property that is fixed to the earth, such as land or a house.
iii. Receivables - also referred to as accounts receivable, are debts owed to a company by its customers for goods or services that have been delivered or used but not yet paid for.
iv. Other physical collateral - physical collateral other than immovable property.
v. Treating lease exposures as collateral - exposure arising from leasing transactions as collateralized by the type of property leased.
vi. Other funded credit Protection - cash on deposit with, or cash assimilated instruments held by, a third party bank should come under this category.
vii. Guarantee- is a promise from a bank, corporate, any other entity or individual, that the liabilities of a borrower will be met in the event of failure to fulfil contractual obligations.
7.3 General Requirements for Collateral
Banks should ensure that the following requirements are incorporated with respect to the management of collaterals accepted by them:
i. Banks should properly document the collateral arrangements and have in place clear and robust procedures that ensure that any legal conditions required for declaring the default of a borrower and timely collection/ liquidation of collateral are observed.
ii. Banks should fulfil any contractual and statutory requirements in respect of, and take all steps necessary to ensure, the enforceability of the collateral arrangements under the law applicable to their interest in the collateral. In connection therewith, banks should conduct sufficient legal review confirming the enforceability of the collateral arrangements in all areas of operations, for example, foreign branches and subsidiaries. They should re-conduct such review as necessary to ensure continuing enforceability.
iii. The collateral policies and procedures should ensure mitigation of risks arising from the use of collateral, including risks of failed or reduced credit protection, valuation risks, risks associated with the termination of the credit protection, concentration risk arising from the use of collateral and the interaction with the bank's overall risk profile.
iv. The financing agreements should include detailed descriptions of the collateral as well as detailed specifications of the manner and frequency of revaluation.
v. Banks should calculate the market and the forced sale values (incorporating haircuts) of the collateral at a minimum frequency to enable it to form an objective view of borrower or workout viability; such valuations should incorporate the cost and time to realise, maintain and sell the collateral in the event of foreclosure.
vi. Where the collateral is held by a third party, banks should take reasonable steps to ensure that the third party segregates the collateral from its own assets.
vii. While conducting valuation and revaluation, banks should take into account any deterioration or obsolescence of the collateral.
viii. Banks should have the right to physically inspect the collateral. They should also have in place policies and procedures addressing their exercise of the right to physical inspection.
ix. When applicable, the collateral taken as protection should be adequately insured against the risk of damage the risk of damage.
7.4 Specific Requirements for Each Type of Collateral and Guarantees
A) Financial collateral
Under all approaches and methods, financial collateral should qualify as eligible collateral where all the following requirements are met:
i. The credit quality of the borrower and the value of the collateral should not have a material positive correlation. Where the value of the collateral is reduced significantly, this should not alone imply a significant deterioration of the credit quality of the borrower. Where the credit quality of the borrower becomes critical, this should not alone imply a significant reduction in the value of the collateral.
Securities issued by the borrower, or any related group entity, should not qualify as eligible collateral. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, a borrower's own issues of covered bonds qualify as eligible collateral, when they are posted as collateral for a repurchase transaction, provided that they comply with the condition set out in this paragraph.
ii. Banks should ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to the orderly operation of margin agreements with OTC derivatives and securities-financing counterparties, as measured by the timeliness and accuracy of their outgoing margin calls and response time to incoming margin calls.
B) Immovable property
i. Banks should clearly document the types of residential and commercial immovable property they accept in their lending policies.
ii. Immovable collateral should be classified in the following categories based on the underlying nature and behaviour:
a) Investment properties;
b) Owner-occupied properties;
c) Development properties;
d) Properties normally valued on the basis of trading potential.
C) Receivables
Receivables should qualify as eligible collateral, where all the following requirements are met:
i. Banks should have in place a sound process for determining the credit risk associated with the receivables, such a process should include analyses of a borrower's business and industry and the types of customers with whom that borrower does business. Where the bank relies on its borrowers to ascertain the credit risk of the customers, the bank should review the borrowers' credit practices to ascertain their soundness and credibility;
ii. The difference between the amount of the loan and the value of the receivables should reflect all appropriate factors, including the cost of collection, concentration within the receivables pool pledged by an individual borrower, and potential concentration risk within the bank's total loans beyond that controlled by the bank's general methodology.
iii. Banks should maintain a continuous monitoring process appropriate to the receivables. They should also review, on a regular basis, compliance with loan covenants, environmental restrictions, and other legal requirements;
iv. Receivables pledged by a borrower should be diversified and not be unduly correlated with that borrower. Where there is a material positive correlation, banks should take into account the attendant risks in the setting of margins for the collateral pool as a whole;
v. Banks should not use receivables from subsidiaries and affiliates of a borrower, including employees, as eligible credit protection:
vi. Banks should have in place a documented process for collecting receivable payments in distressed situations. Banks should have in place the requisite facilities for collection even when they normally rely on their borrowers for collections.
D) Other physical collateral
Physical collateral other than immovable property should qualify as eligible collateral, when the conditions specified as general requirements for collateral are met.
E) Treating lease exposures as collateralized
Banks should treat exposures arising from leasing transactions as collateralized by the type of property leased, where all the following conditions are met:
i. The conditions set out for the type of asset/property leased to qualify as eligible collateral are met;
ii. The lessor has in place robust risk management with respect to the use to which the leased asset is put, its location, its age and the planned duration of its use, including appropriate monitoring of its value;
iii. Where this has not already been ascertained in calculating the Loss Given Default level, the difference between the value of the unamortized amount and the market value of the security is not so large as to overstate the credit risk mitigation attributed to the leased assets.
F) Other funded credit protection
Cash on deposit with, or cash assimilated instruments held by, a third-party institution should be eligible, where all the following conditions are met:
i. The borrower's claim against the third party institution is openly pledged or assigned to the lending bank and such pledge or assignment is legally effective and enforceable and is unconditional and irrevocable;
ii. The third party institution is notified of the pledge or assignment;
iii. As a result of the notification, the third party institution is able to make payments solely to the lending bank, or to other parties only with the lending bank's prior consent.
G) Guarantees
Credit protection deriving from a guarantee should qualify as eligible unfunded credit protection where all the following conditions are met:
i. The credit protection is direct and explicitly document the obligation assumed by the protection provider;
ii. The extent of the credit protection is clearly defined and incontrovertible;
iii. The credit protection contract does not contain any clause, the fulfillment of which is outside the direct control of the bank, that would:
a) allow the protection provider to cancel the protection unilaterally;
b) increase the effective cost of protection as a result of a deterioration in the credit quality of the protected loan;
c) prevent the protection provider from being obliged to pay out in a timely manner in the event that the original borrower fails to make any payments due, or when the leasing contract has expired for the purposes of recognizing the guaranteed residual value;
d) allow the maturity of the credit protection to be reduced by the protection provider.
iv. The credit protection contract is legally effective and enforceable, at the time of the conclusion of the credit agreement and thereafter i.e. over the life of the exposure;
v. The credit protection covers all types of payments the borrower is expected to make in respect of the claim. Where certain types of payment are excluded from the credit protection, the lending bank has to adjust, the value of credit protection to reflect the limited coverage;
vi. On the qualifying default of or non-payment by the borrower, the lending bank has the right to pursue, in a timely manner, the protection provider for any monies due under the claim in respect of which the protection is provided and the payment by the protection provider should not be subject to the lending bank first having to pursue the borrower. 7.5 Valuation Frequency
i. Banks should clearly document in collateral policies and procedures the frequency of collateral valuations. The policies and procedures should also provide for the following:
a) Banks monitor the value of each type of collateral on a defined frequent basis.
b) More frequent valuations where the market is subject to significant negative changes and/or where there are signs of a significant decline in the value of an individual collateral.
c) Defined criteria for determining that a significant decline in collateral value has taken place. These will include quantitative thresholds for each type of collateral established, based on the observed empirical data and qualitative bank experience, taking into consideration relevant factors such as market price trends or the opinion of independent valuers.
d) Revaluation of collateral for restructuring cases should be done only where necessary, and should be done in accordance with the requirements of these rules.
ii. Banks should have appropriate IT processes and systems in place to flag outdated valuations and to trigger valuation reports.
7.6 Specific Requirements for Valuers
Banks valuation process should be carried out by valuers who possess the necessary qualifications, ability and experience to execute a valuation and who are independent of the credit decision process.
Banks should ensure compliance with SAMA circular no. 371000061185 dated 28/05/1437AH on "Obligations of Real Estate Appraisal Clients Subject to SAMA Supervision" and the revision made to the said circular through circular no. 65768/99 dated 25/10/1439AH along with all relevant regulatory requirements in that regard.
8. Regulatory Reporting Requirements
Banks are required to submit to SAMA on a quarterly basis all Restructuring Cases (Responses should only cover restructuring cases of “Problem loans” as defined in section 1.4 of these Rules) and Associated Fees as per the templates provided by SAMA. The reports should be submitted within 30 days of quarter end.
9. Effective Date
These Rules should come into force with effect from the 1st of July 2020.
Guidelines on Management of Problem Loans
No: 41033343 Date(g): 6/1/2020 | Date(h): 11/5/1441 Status: In-Force 1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose of Document
The purpose of this document is to support the Saudi banking sector in their ongoing efforts to accelerate the resolution of non-performing loans (NPLs) associated with large corporates, micro, small and medium-sized enterprise sector. This document seeks to reflect the local and international best practices on dealing with problem loans, these guidelines also seek to take into account the specifics of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) economic and banking sector structure and the extensive experience accumulated by KSA banks in dealing with their corporate borrowers, as well as KSA's existing legal, regulatory and institutional framework for resolution and does not identify the possible obstacles to efficient and timely problem loan management that might still exist in this broader framework, or to propose potential improvements which would be outside the banks’ sphere of control.
Bank loans can become “problem loan" because of problems with the borrower’s financial health, or inadequate processes within banks to restructure viable borrowers, or both. In ascertaining how to deal with a problem loan, it is important to distinguish between a borrower's “ability to pay” and “willingness to pay,” Making this distinction is not always easy and requires effort. These guidelines should guide banks staff in dealing with problem loans including non-performing loans (NPLs) extended to corporate and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). It deals with both ad-hoc and systemic financial distress and delves into how borrower problems may have arisen in the first place. It provides guidance to banks staff responsible for handling individual problem loans and to senior managers responsible for organizing portfolio-wide asset resolution.
1.2 Scope of Implementation
These guidelines are applicable as better practices for all banks licensed under Banking Control Law, including Foreign Bank Branches. These guidelines should be read in conjunction with Mandatory Rules on the Management of Problem Loans and Rules on Credit Risk Classification and Provisioning issued by Saudi Central Bank* (SAMA).
Whenever the requirements specified under these guidelines differ from existing laws, regulations and circulars issued by SAMA or other government organizations, the later shall take precedence over these guidelines
* The "Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency" was replaced By the "Saudi Central Bank" in accordance with The Saudi Central Bank Law No. (M/36), dated 11/04/1442H, corresponding to 26/11/2020G.
2. Problem Loan Prevention & Identification
2.1 Early Warning Signals as a Tool for Preventing NPLs
One of the keys to maintaining acceptable levels of Non-Performing Loans lies in the ability to identify potential payment difficulties of a borrower as early as possible. SAMA views instituting an effective framework within regulated entities as a mandatory requirement. The sooner the problem is identified, the easier it will be to remedy it. Early warning signals (EWS), fully integrated into the bank's risk management system, is a crucial tool to identify and manage upcoming problems with a borrower’s ability to service his loan.
The purpose of the EWS is therefore twofold:
i. To produce an early signal of potential payment difficulties of the borrower; and
ii. To allow the opportunity to develop a corrective action plan at a very early stage.
iii. When the borrower exhibits early warning signs, the bank should proactively identify the driver and assess whether the borrower’ case should continue to be handled by the business / commercial unit or if the Workout Unit (whether involved in a shadow capacity at first or have full control of the case) should be involved.
Banks should ensure that proper training is provided to the business units on how to manage accounts with early signs of stress.
2.2 Scope of EWS Process
The EWS process is organized in three stages: identification, action, and monitoring. Each of these stages is described in detail in the following sections. The timeline for implementing actions included in each of these stages is explained in section 2.3.
# Area Description 1 Signal Identification • Responsibility for establishing parameters for signals and monitoring resides in a separate unit or function within risk management, middle or back office. • Upon identification of a signal, notification is sent to the respective relationship manager and his team leader that action is required to close the EWS breach. 2 Action
• Relationship Manager contacts the borrower and identifies the source and magnitude of a potential payment difficulty. • After analysis and in consultation with risk management, a corrective action plan is put in place. • A loan is added to the watch list prepared on the basis of EWS for the purposes of further monitoring. 3 Monitoring • Risk management approval required to remove the loan from watch list prepared on the basis of EWS. • A loan can remain on watch list for a time period specified by the bank. After that period, loan must be either returned to originating unit or transferred to Workout Unit. • While on the watch list, a loan should be classified with a lower risk rating compared to the one prior to moving to the watch list. 2.3 Stages of EWS Process
1. Identification:
Early warning signs are indicators that point to potential payment difficulties. These indicators could be alienated into five broad categories:
i. Economic environment,
ii. Financial indicators,
iii. Behavioral indicators,
iv. Third-party indicators, and
v. Operational indicators.
The main aim of this list is to produce a comprehensive set of signals that provides the bank an opportunity to act before the borrower’s financial condition deteriorates to the point of default. Each of these categories has been explained below from sections “i to v”.
It is the responsibility of the unit/section assigned for managing EWS process to interpret the signals received from a borrower and determine whether that borrower should be included in the watch list (prepared on the basis of EWS) for further corrective action.
In most cases, such a decision will involve the identification of groups of signals that validate one another. Taken alone, individual indicators can be too ambiguous/inconclusive to predict financial distress, but when a holistic approach is adopted the unit/ section responsible for managing EWS, may decide that the combination of certain signs anticipates serious financial distress.
Determining what combination of signs, that will trigger the scenario to classify the borrower as watch list, requires adequate knowledge of the industry and will involve some subjective judgment as well. In most cases, the specialized unit will have to identify very subtle warning signs that reinforce others in arriving at a judgment. These subtle signs might be based also on personal contacts between the bank and the borrower, especially in the context of medium-size enterprises.
For example, a trigger for the transfer to the watch list could be a signal received from only one substantial indicator, such as Debt/ Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to be above 5 (the aforementioned example has been included for clarity purposes only and; should not be viewed as SAMA’s interpretation of the given financial ratio). However, the transfer may also be triggered by the combination of less significant indicators, e.g., an increase in the general unemployment rate, increase in days of receivables outstanding, or frequent changes of suppliers. In addition, signals received from at least two less significant indicators could trigger a deeper review of the borrower’s financial health.
The bank may expand the list of substantial indicators based on the findings from the analysis of the historical data and backtesting results. For the purpose of simple EWS approach (using one or multiple indicators with specific thresholds), the bank should define trigger points for creating signals based on good practice and analysis of historical data. In case of availability, a differentiation between the thresholds for different economic sectors would be a good practice. The bank should apply a prudent approach when selecting specific thresholds for particular indicators.
Criteria for the inclusion in the watch list should be applied at the individual level or at a portfolio level. For example, if real estate prices fall by more than 5 percent on an annual basis, for the group of loans that have real estate as collateral a review should be performed to determine if the collateral value is adequate in the light of price adjustment or not. Collateral evaluation should be done in accordance with SAMA Guidelines. In cases the collateral is no longer sufficient, a bank should take corrective action to improve collateral coverage.
An additional factor that should be considered in managing EWS is the concept of materiality. For this reason, a bank may define a level of average loan size in the NPL portfolio, determine that all loans above this indicator are material, and require more attention from the bank. The main principle behind this concept is to give a higher level of attention, scrutiny, and resources to specified cases.
i. Economic environment:
Indicators of the overall economic environment are very important for the early identification of potential deterioration of the loan portfolio. Their importance stems from the fact that they can point to the likely economic downturn. As such, they are a powerful determinant of the future direction of loan quality (as per international practices, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth is the main driver of nonperforming loan ratios) influencing not only the individual borrower's ability to pay his obligations but also collateral valuations.
Table 1 below provides major indicators that should be monitored to identify potential loan servicing difficulties early on. Data sources for these indicators should be a combination of the bank’s internal economic forecasts and (particularly, in case of smaller banks) forecasts of respected forecasting banks in the country or abroad. Indicators of economic environment are especially relevant for predicting the future payment ability of individual entrepreneurs and family business owners. Given the broad nature of these indicators, they should be monitored continuously using information collected on a monthly or quarterly basis. When a downturn is signaled, a more thorough review of those segments of the portfolio that are most likely to be affected should be undertaken.
Table 1: List of Potential Economic Environment Indicators
Indicator Description Economic sentiment indicators (early indicator on monthly basis) or GDP growth Economic growth directly influences borrowers’ (company and individuals) ability to generate cash flows and service their loans. Major changes in economic sentiment indicators and consequently growth forecasts should serve as a key flag for certain loan groups (retail, real estate, agriculture, hospitality sector, etc.). In most cases, oil prices, government spending, and inflation along with GDP growth has a good correlation with the prices of real estate. In a forecasted economic contraction, horizontal adjustments to real estate valuations (all assets classes) should be made. Inflation/deflation Above-average inflation or deflation may change consumer behavior and collateral values. Unemployment For MSME, an increased unemployment rate indicates a potential adjustment in the purchasing power of households, thus influencing businesses’ ability to generate cash flows to service their outstanding liabilities. Non-elastic consumption components (e.g., food, medicine) will be less sensitive to this indicator than elastic ones (e.g., hotels, restaurants, purchase of secondary residence and vacationing).
Note: The above has been outlined for illustrative purposes only,
ii. Financial indicators:
Financial indicators (Table 2) are a good source of information about the companies that issue financial reports. However, it is not sufficient to rely only on annual financial reports. To ensure that warning signals are generated in a timely manner, the bank may require more frequent interim financial reporting (e.g., quarterly for material loans and semi-annual for all others).
Data sources for financial indicators may be either company financial statements received directly from the borrower. For example, an increase in debt/EBITDA ratio could be due to (i) an increasing loan level, or (ii) a decrease of EBITDA. In the first case, appropriate corrective action could be the pledge of additional collateral. In the second case, it could be a short term or permanent phenomena and corrective actions could range from light restructuring to a more comprehensive restructuring of the obligations as part of the workout process. Financial indicators should be monitored continuously based on quarterly financial statements for material loans and on a semi-annual basis for others.
Table 2: List of Potential Financial Indicators
Indicator Description Debt/EBITDA The prudent ratio should be used for most companies with somewhat higher threshold possible for sectors with historically higher ratios. Capital adequacy Negative equity, insufficient proportion of equity, or rapid decline over a certain period of time. Interest coverage - EBITDA/ interest and principal expenses This ratio should be above a defined threshold. Cash flow Large decline during reporting period, or negative EBITDA. Turnover (applicable for MSME) A decrease in turnover, loss of substantial customer, expiry of patent. Changes in working capital Lengthening of days in sales outstanding and days in inventory. Increase in credit loan to customers Lengthening of days in receivables outstanding. Sales can be increased at the expense of deteriorating quality of customers.
Note: The above has been outlined for illustrative purposes only.
For the MSME portfolio, wherein the quality of financial statements is weak it may be feasible to develop financial ratios based on cash flow statements, Banks are therefore advised to require the respective borrower to disclose details of all its bank accounts maintained, so as to enable capturing the state of liquidity. However, the privacy of the borrowers has to be ensured and written consent needs to be taken in order to access their personal information.
iii. Behavioral indicators:
This group of indicators (Table 3) includes signals about potential problems with collateral adequacy or behavioral problems. Most of these signals should be monitored at a minimum on a quarterly basis with more frequent monitoring of occupancy rates and real estate indexes during downturns.
Table 3: List of potential behavioral indicators:
Indicator Description Loan to value (LTV) LTV > 100 % indicates that the value of the collateral is less than the loan amount outstanding. Reasons for this could be that collateral has become obsolescent or economic conditions have caused a rapid decrease in value. To be prudent, the ratio should be below 80 %, to provide adequate cushion to cover the substantial cost associated with collateral enforcement. Downgrade in internal credit risk category An annual review of borrower's credit profile reveals shortcomings. Breaches of contractual commitments Breach of covenants (financial or non-financial) in the loan agreement with bank or other financial institutions. Real estate indexes The bank should monitor real estate indexes in adequate-granularity. Depending on the collateral type (commercial or individual real estate) the bank needs to establish reliable, timely, and accurate tracking of changes in respective values. Decline larger than 5 percent on annual basis (y/y) should create a flag for all loans that have similar collateral. At this stage, the bank should review if LTV with the new collateral value is adequate. Credit card loans Delay in settling credit card loans or increasing reliance on provided credit line (particularly for partnerships and individual entrepreneurs).
Note: The above has been outlined for illustrative purposes only.
iv. Third-party indicators:
The bank should organize a reliable screening process for information provided by third parties (e.g. rating agencies, tax authorities, press, and courts) to identify signs that could lead to a borrower’s inability to service its outstanding liabilities. These should be monitored on a daily basis so that they can be acted on immediately upon receipt of the information.
Table 4: List of potential third party information indicators
Indicator Description Default / any negative information SIMAH Report / Negative press coverage, reputational problems, doubtful ownership. and involvement in financial scandals. SIMAH Report / Media Insolvency proceedings for major supplier or customer May have a negative impact on the borrower Information from courts and other judicial institutions. External rating assigned and trends Any rating downgrade would have been an indicator deteriorating in the borrower profile Rating Agencies
Note: The above has been outlined for illustrative purposes only.
v. Operational indicators:
In order to capture potential changes in the company’s operations, close monitoring of frequent changes in management and suppliers should be arranged.
Indicator Description Frequent changes in senior management Often rotation of senior management, particularly Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Risk Officer (CRO), could indicate internal problems in the company. Annual report and discussion with the company. Qualified audit reports At times, auditors raise concerns about the quality of financial statements by providing modified opinions such as qualification, adverse and even some times disclaimer. Annual report Change of the ownership Changes in ownership or major shareholders (stakeholders or shareholders). Public registries and media. Major organizational change Restructuring of organizational structure (e.g., subsidiaries, branches, new entities, etc.). Public registries and media. Management and shareholder contentiousness Issues arising from the management and from the shareholders which would result in serious disputes. Public registries and media.
It is important to note that the proposed categories and indicators presented above are not exhaustive. Each bank should work to create a solid internal database of these and other indicators, which should be, utilized for EWS purposes. The indicators from the database should be backtested in order to find out the indicators with the highest signaling power. For this purpose, indicators should be tested at different stages of an economic cycle.
Note: The above has been outlined for illustrative purposes only.
2. Corrective Action:
Once an early warning signal is identified, based on the criteria explained above, the unit responsible for managing EWS, needs to flag the potentially problematic loan to the relationship officer / respective portfolio manager in charge of the borrower's relationship.
The cause and severity of the EWS is assessed and based on the assessment the borrowers can be categorized as ‘watch list'. Following are the two potential scenarios:
• Loans remain performing while on the watch list and will be brought back to regular loans after some time, and
• The credit quality of the loan continues to deteriorate and it is transferred to the bank’s Workout Unit (Remedial / Restructuring etc.).
Once the borrower is classified as watch list, the bank should decide, document and implement appropriate corrective actions (within the specified timeframe) in order to mitigate further worsening of loan's credit quality.
Corrective action might include:
i. Securing additional collateral or guarantee (if considered necessary).
ii. Performing more regular site visits.
iii. More frequent updates to the credit committee.
iv. Assessment of financial projections and forecast loan service capacity.
3. Monitoring:
Once increased credit risk is identified, it is crucial for the bank to follow up on the signal received as soon as possible, and develop a corrective action plan to pre-empt potential payment difficulties. The intensification of communication with the borrower is of utmost importance. The action plan may be as simple as collecting missing information such as an insurance policy or as complex as initiating discussions on a multi-bank restructuring of the borrower's obligations.
While the borrower remains on the watch list, bank’s primary contact with the borrower remains the business officer/portfolio manager, although the head of business as well as risk management, are expected to take a more active involvement in the decision and action process for larger, more complex loans. While on the watch list, the borrower should be classified in a lower rating than “ordinary” borrowers.
All loans in the bank's portfolio should be subject to the EWS described above. This applies to performing loans that never defaulted, but to restructured loans as well.
A. Timeline
For EWS to be effective, clear deadlines for actions should be in place, and consistently enforced (see an indicative timeline in Table below). The level and timing of the monitoring process should reflect the risk level of the loan. Large loans should be monitored closely and by the Risk department and respective Credit committees or any higher management committees.
Banks should also establish the criteria to monitor large corporate loans and at the same time importance to be provided to smaller loans, and the same should be followed by designated staff within the bank, with the results reported to the management.
Indicator Responsibility Workout (once the trigger identified) Description Any triggers identified / or any Signal received Relationship Manager (RM) / Portfolio Manager (PM). Max 1 working day. RM / PM starts analyzing the borrower details to investigate further. Follow up with the borrower and report with analysis Relationship Officer / Portfolio Manager. Max 3 working days for a material loan and 5 working days for others. RM / PM contacts borrower determines reasons, and provide analysis. Decision on further actions Relationship Manager & Head of Business; EWS manager. Max 6 working days for material loan and 10 working days for others. Decision for a loan to be: (i) put on watch list and potential request for corrective action; (ii) left without action or mitigating measures; and (iii) transferred to Workout Unit. Review of watch list Relationship Manager & Head of Business, EWS manager and Credit Committee. Every fortnightly for material loans and 1 month for others, the list is reviewed and amended, if needed. Risk manager/EWS manager (in consultation with Head of Business) monitors the performance of the borrower and agreed mitigation measures. If needed, based on the recommendation of Credit Committee or any other delegated committee takes decision to transfer to Workout Unit. Final decision Head of Business /Risk manager, EWS manager. Banks as per their internal policy can specify the maximum time a borrower can remain on watch list. Borrower can be on watch list only on a temporary basis. Banks should assess as how much time should be specified for which the borrower remains in watch list, once the specified time is completed a final decision should be taken, i.e., loan either removed from watch list (if problems are resolved), or transferred to Workout Unit. B. Establishing criteria for transfer to Workout Unit:
Banks shall establish and document a policy with clear and objective time-bound criteria for the mandatory transfer of loans from Loan Originating Units to the Workout Unit along with the specification of relevant approvals required for such transfers. The policy should include details on areas where proper collaboration is required between the Workout Unit and Loan Originating Units especially in scenarios where the borrowers are showing signs of stress but still being managed by the Loan Originating Units.
While corrective actions should be taken as soon as a problem is identified, if the problem cannot be solved within a reasonably short period, the loan should be transferred to the Workout Unit (WU) for more intensive oversight and resolution. Allowing past-due loans to remain within the originating unit for a long time perpetuates the problem, leads to increased NPL levels within the bank, and ultimately results in a lower collection/recovery rate.
C. Following are generally the key indicators for transferring to Workout Unit (not all-inclusive):
i. Days past due (DPD) based on internal thresholds and considering the nature of the borrower should be included as a mandatory trigger (For further guidance on this refer to SAMA rules on Credit Risk Classification and Provisioning).
ii. Debt to EBITDA ≥ Internally set threshold dependent on the nature and industry of the borrower (not applicable to an MSME, in cases wherein reliable financial information is not available),
iii. Net loss during any consecutive twelve-month period ≥Internally set threshold dependent on the nature and industry of the borrower,
iv. A loan classification of “Watch list ” if syndication is involved and/or reputational/legal issues are at stake;
v. Length of time on watch list (e.g., more than twelve months), or at least two unsuccessful prior restructurings;
vi. An indication of an imminent major default or materially adverse event, including government intervention or nationalization, notice of termination of operating license or concession, significant external rating downgrade of borrower or guarantor, sudden plant closure, etc.;
vii. Litigation, arbitration, mediation, or other dispute resolution mechanism involving or affecting the banks; or
viii. Evidence or strong suspicion of corruption or illegal activity involving the borrower or the borrower's other stakeholders.
Note: Banks are encouraged to develop customized indicators for the MSME sector.
The decision to transfer a loan to the Workout Unit should be based on a refined judgment that the loan will not be repaid in time, in full and urgent action is needed in view of the borrower’s deteriorating situation. The above-mentioned criteria can give a clear signal that: (i) loan-level is unsustainable; (ii) equity of a company has been severely depleted; or (iii) previous restructurings were not successful, and more drastic measures should be applied.
Exceptions to this policy should be rare, well documented in writing, and require the approval of the Board of Directors or any other bank's board designated committee.
Note: Banks should define clear and objective criteria in its internal documentation, for handing over a borrower to the workout and legal support unit, as well as the criteria for returning the borrower back to the commercial unit for regular management. The commercial unit and the workout and legal support unit must he completely separated in terms of functional, organizational and personnel issues.
The work out unit should seek to restructure the loan and maximize banks recovery for borrowers considered as viable. Borrower's viability needs to be evaluated in light of comparing the losses that may transpire in case of restructuring versus foreclosure.
However, on the other hand, foreclosure proceedings may be initiated, if the bank after due process concludes that the case is ineligible for restructuring consideration either because of financial or qualitative issues.
2.4 EWS Structure and Institutional Arrangements
Structure of EWS within the Bank
To ensure the independence of the process, and achieve a holistic approach to credit risk monitoring, and prevent conflicts of interest, the unit responsible for managing EWS should operate outside of the loan originating unit. Best practice indicates that the responsibilities to manage the EWS process should be assigned within the credit risk management department and fully incorporated into the bank's regular risk management processes.
Since an effective EWS requires an operational IT system that draws all information available about a particular borrower, EWS benefit from being part of the bank's internal credit rating system that already contains information about the borrower, the bank should allocate enough staff and financial resources to keep the system operational and effective.
The operation of the EWS should be governed by written policies and procedures, including time thresholds for required actions, approved by the Board of Directors of the bank. They should be subject to annual review and reapproved by the Senior Management Committee to incorporate:
i. Required changes identified during previous operational periods;
ii. Regulatory amendments; and
iii. Additionally, independent quality assurance (e.g., review of the process by an external expert or the Internal Audit function) should be considered.
Reporting:
All actions during the EWS process should be recorded in the IT system to provide a written record of decisions and actions taken. At a minimum, the system should record:
i. Time the action was taken;
ii. Name and department of those participating/approving the actions;
iii. The reasons for actions taken; and
iv. The decision of the appropriate approval authority, if applicable.
The watch list should include, at a minimum, the following information:
i. Details of the loan;
ii. Is it part of a group or related party;
iii. Material or non-material loan;
iv. Date added to the list;
v. Reviews taken (including timestamps) and outcomes,
vi. Mitigation measures; and
vii. Reasons for inclusion in the watch list.
The watch list (or at least material loans on it) should be presented monthly to a designated management committee (Executive Committee or Risk Committee) only or in parallel with the credit committee for information purposes and potential action. For major cases, the bank's Management Board must be included in the decision-making process. The Board should also receive monthly:
a) A detailed list of material loans for information: and
b) Aggregate figures for the loans on the watch list. Information about the borrower/group in potential payment difficulties must be disseminated widely and promptly within the banking group, including branches and subsidiaries. (For details on samples of EWS refer to Appendix 1).
3. Non-performing Loans (NPLs) Strategy
The bank's goal in the resolution process should be to reduce non-performing assets as early as possible, in order to:
i. Free up coinage and capital for new lending;
ii. Reduce the bank's losses, and return assets to earning status, if possible;
iii. Generate good habits and a payment culture among borrowers; and
iv. Help maintain a commercial relationship with the borrower by conducting a responsible resolution process. To ensure that the goal is met, each bank should have a comprehensive, written strategy for management of the overall NPL portfolio, supported by time-bound action plans for each significant asset class. The bank must also put in place and maintain adequate institutional arrangements for implementing the strategy.
3.1 Developing the NPL Strategy
The NPL reduction strategy should layout in a clear, concise manner the bank's approach and objectives (i.e., maximizing recoveries, minimizing losses) as well as establish, at a minimum, annual NPL reduction targets over a realistic but sufficiently ambitious timeframe (minimum 3 years). It also serves as a roadmap for guiding the internal organizational structure, the allocation of internal resources (human capital, information systems, and funding) and the design of proper controls (policies and procedures) to monitor interim performance and take corrective actions to ensure that the overall reduction goals are met.
The strategy development process is divided into the following two components:
1. Assessment; and
2. Design.
1. Assessment
In order to prepare the NPL strategy, Banks should conduct a comprehensive assessment of their internal operating environment, external climate for resolution, and the impact of various resolution strategies on the bank's capital structure.
i. Internal Self-Assessment
The purpose of this self-assessment is to provide management with a full understanding of the severity of the problems together with the steps that are to be taken into consideration to correct the situation. Specific details are noted below:
a) Internal Operating Assessment:
A thorough and realistic self-assessment should be required and performed to determine the severity of the situation and the paces that need to be taken internally to address it, there are a number of key internal aspects that influence the bank's need and ability to optimize its management of, and thus reduce, NPLs and foreclosed assets (where relevant).
b) Scale and drivers of the NPL issue:
- Size and evolution of its NPL portfolios on an appropriate level of granularity, which requires appropriate portfolio segmentation:
- The drivers of NPL in-flows and outflows, by portfolio where relevant;
- Other potential correlations and causations.
c) Outcomes of NPL actions taken in the past:
- Types and nature of actions implemented, including restructuring measures;
- The success of the implementation of those activities and related drivers, including the effectiveness of restructuring treatments.
d) Operational capacities:
Processes, tools, data quality, IT/automation, staff/expertise, decision-making, internal policies, and any other relevant area for the implementation of the strategy) for the different process steps involved, including but not limited to:
- early warning and detection/recognition of NPLs;
- restructuring;
- provisioning;
- collateral valuations;
- recovery/legal process/foreclosure;
- management of foreclosed assets (if relevant);
- reporting and monitoring of NPLs and the effectiveness of NPL workout solutions.
For each of the process steps involved, including those listed above, banks should perform a thorough self-assessment to determine strengths, significant gaps and any areas of improvement required for them to reach their NPL reduction targets. The resulting internal report should be prepared and the same to be maintained for the record purpose.
Banks should monitor and reassess or update relevant aspects of the self-assessment at least annually and regularly seek independent expert views on these aspects, if necessary.
ii. Portfolio Segmentation
Purpose and principles of portfolio segmentation
Segmentation is the process of dividing a large heterogeneous group of Nonperforming loans into smaller more homogeneous parts. It is the essential first step in developing a cost-effective and efficient approach to NPL resolution. Grouping borrowers with similar characteristics allow the bank to develop more focused resolution strategies for each group. Using basic indicators of viability and collateral values, the portfolio can be broken down at an early stage by proposed broad resolution strategies (hold/restructure, dispose, or legal enforcement). Identifying broad asset classes at an early stage of workout is also helpful for efficient set up of Workout Unit, including allocation of staffing and specialized expertise for a more in-depth analysis of borrower’s viability and design of final workout plan.
The segmentation, including initial viability assessment, should be done immediately after the non-performing loan is transferred to the Workout Unit, and before the loan is assigned to a specific workout officer. The exercise is normally performed by a dedicated team in the Workout Unit.
In order to deal with the stock of NPLs, the bank should follow the principles of proportionality and materiality. Proportionality means that adequate resources should be spent on specific segments of NPLs during the resolution process, taking into account the substantial internal costs of the workout process borne by the bank. Materiality means that more attention should be allocated to larger loans compared to smaller loans during the resolution process. These principles should guide the allocation of financial, time and human (in terms of numbers and seniority) resources in WU.
A well-developed management information system containing accurate data is an essential pre-condition for conducting effective segmentation. The exercise is expected to be performed on the basis of information already contained in the loan file when it is transferred from the originating unit to the WU.
Two-Stage segmentation process
It is recommended that the basic segmentation of the bank's NPL portfolio is done in the following two stages. The main objective is to select a smaller pool of loans relating to potentially viable borrowers, which warrant the additional (substantial in case of material loans) follow-up effort from WU, including in-depth viability analysis and re-evaluation of collateral, in order to design an appropriate workout plan.
Stage one - Segmentation by nature of business, past-due buckets, loan balance, and status of legal procedure
The bank's portfolio, segmentation can be conducted by taking multiple borrowers’ characteristics into consideration. Segmentations should have a useful purpose, meaning that different segments should generally trigger different treatments by the NPL WUs or dedicated teams within those units. Following is the list of potential segmentation criteria that can be utilized by banks:
i. Nature of the business: Micro, Small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), including sole traders/ partnerships and Corporates: (by asset class or sector).
ii. Legal status: for existing loans already in legal proceedings or legal action has already been taken.
iii. Arrears bucket/days past due (the higher the level of arrears the narrower the range of possible solutions)
a) Early arrears (>1 dpd and ≤90 dpd)
b) Late arrears of (>90 dpd)
c) Loan Recovery Cases >90 dpd or 180dpd)
iv. Loan balance: Banks may decide the threshold for segmentation based on the size of the outstanding loan and cases with multiple loans;
Stage two - initial viability assessment
Following the initial segmentation, NPLs which are currently not in legal procedure should be further screened according to two criteria: (i) financial ratios (or Cash flows based ratios in case of MSME); and (ii) loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. These ratios are generally available to the bank from the borrower's latest financial statements (or bank statements) in the loan file, and should ideally not require any additional information from the borrower.
LTV ratio provides a good indication of the level of collateral against the outstanding loan. It is seen as a readily available indicator that captures quantitative aspect of collateralization of the loan, which should be an integral part of initial viability assessment. However, banks should consider stressed value of collateral (i.e. forced sale value in case of liquidation) for computation of these ratios. The quality of the collateral should also be considered for further assessment during later stages of restructuring process.
Banks are expected to set up internal LTV ratios depending on the size segment (Corporate / MSME) and the nature of the industry in which it operates and annual refine/ assess parameters, with an aim to be able to compare the cost of restructuring vs the cost of foreclosure/ legal proceeding. Segmentation according to LTV at this early stage is helpful for starting to consider various workout strategies described in Chapter 6.
Banks may consider below indicative broad benchmarks for the viability parameters as a part of initial assessment, these are intended to be indicative rather than prescriptive (i.e. determining viable, marginally-viable and non- viable borrowers):
• Debt/EBITDA ratio is used as a proxy for initial viability assessment of the borrower and reflects how leveraged the company is. The company is considered highly leveraged post breaching a certain threshold and the risk of loan repayment in full and in time could be excessive.
• The loan service coverage ratio should be comparable to the sector average within the restructuring period in which the unit should become viable.
• Trends of the company based on historical data and future projections should be comparable with the industry. Thus, the behavior of past and future EBIDTA should be studied and compared with industry average.
• For project finance and other multi-year loans, Loan life coverage ratio (LLCR), as defined below should be 1.4, which would give a cushion of 40% to the amount of loan to be serviced. For the details on the computation of LLCR , refer to Appendix 2.
Present value of total available cash flow (ACF) during the loan life period (including interest and principal) + Cash Reserves LLCR = ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Outstanding amount of loan The selection of thresholds for these indicators used in the initial viability assessment should be based on general market indicators.
SAMA is cognizant that acceptable thresholds with regards to key financial and collateral coverage ratio would vary depending on the nature of the industry, its economic outlook over the life of the loan, and size of the loans, hence does not lay down prescriptive limits. However, Banks are expected to assess document the above, as part of its NPL portfolio segmentation exercise. No particular ratio should be considered in Isolation, whilst segmenting the borrower and banks are advised to develop (either expert-based or statistical) rationale.
The following has been illustrated to provide indicative guidelines as to how a segmentation could be undertaken:
Figure 1: Stage two of segmentation based on LTV and EBITDA (the below ratios are indicative only)
Borrower Segmentation Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratio Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) Ratio Viable borrower ≤ 80 or ≥ 80 Debt/EBITDA ≤ 5 Marginally viable borrower ≤ 80 or ≥ 80 Debt/EBITDA ≤ 8 ≥ 5 Non-viable borrower ≤ 80 or ≥ 80 Debt/EBITDA ≥ 8 Banks should identify loans that may be non-viable as a result of primary viability assessment at this stage of the segmentation. Segregating these loans at this stage would enable banks to save time and financial resources. Identified non-viable loans should be promptly referred to legal unit under Workout Unit or considered for foreclosures.
The remaining pool of loans, recognized as viable and marginally viable after the initial assessment, should be assigned to the Workout Unit for an in-depth viability assessment based on additional information to be collected from the borrower and collateral re-evaluation. The differentiation on the grounds of collateral value reflected in the LTV ratio at this early stage allows the Workout Unit to receive a workout file with more granular information. Following this analysis, a customized workout plan is selected based on comparison of Net Present Value (NPVs - is the difference between the present value of cash inflows and the present value of cash outflows over a period of time) of expected recoveries under various alternative options.
Potential additional segmentation criteria:
In addition to basic segmentation using loan size, financial or collateral-based loan ratios, banks may choose to further segment the NPL portfolio using additional borrower characteristics. These include:
i. Industry and subsector of industry (e.g., real estate can be treated as a separate category with office buildings, apartments, land development, construction as sub-categories);
ii. Number of days past due. Higher payment interruption period could indicate a higher predisposition to legal actions;
iii. Loan purpose (e.g., working capital, purchase of the real estate, or tangible assets);
iv. Type of collateral (e.g., commercial or residential real estate, land plot, financial assets);
v. Location of collateral;
vi. Country of residence/incorporation ((a) residents, (b) non-residents); and
vii. Interest coverage ratio (low ratio indicates problem with free cash flows).
If however, further segmentation into small groups is unlikely to lead to better results and may result in lost focus, banks are advised to document the rationale for SAMA’s comfort.
iii. External conditions and operational environment
Understanding the current and possible future external operating conditions/environment is fundamental to the establishment of an NPL strategy and associated NPL reduction targets, related developments should be closely followed by banks, which should update their NPL strategies as needed.
The following list of external factors should be taken into account by banks when setting their strategy, however, it should not be seen as exhaustive as other factors not listed below might play an important role in specific circumstances.
a) Macroeconomic conditions:
Macroeconomic conditions will play a key role in setting the NPL strategy. This also includes the dynamics of the real estate market and its specific relevant sub-segments. For banks with specific sector concentrations in their NPL portfolios (e.g. Building & Construction, Manufacturing, Wholesale and Retail Trade), a thorough and constant analysis of the sector dynamics should be performed, to inform the NPL strategy.
b) Market expectations:
Assessing the expectations of external stakeholders (including but not limited to rating agencies, market analysts, researchers, and borrowers) with regard to acceptable NPL levels and coverage will help to determine how far and how fast banks should reduce their portfolios. These stakeholders will often use national or international benchmarks and peer analysis.
c) NPL investor demand:
Trends and dynamics of the domestic and international NPL market for portfolio sales will help banks make informed strategic decisions regarding projections on the likelihood and possible pricing of portfolio sales. However, investors ultimately price on a case-by-case basis and one of the determinants of pricing is the quality of documentation and loan data that banks can provide on their NPL portfolios.
d) NPL servicing:
Another factor that might influence the NPL strategy is the maturity of the NPL servicing industry. Specialized services can significantly reduce NPL maintenance and workout costs. However, such servicing agreements need to be well steered and well managed by the bank.
iv. Capital implications of the NPL strategy
Capital levels and their projected trends are important inputs to determining the scope of NPL reduction actions available to banks. Banks should be able to dynamically model the capital implications of the different elements to their NPL strategy, ideally, under different economic scenarios, those implications should also be considered in conjunction with the risk appetite framework (RAF) as well as the internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP).
Where capital buffers are slim and profitability low, banks should include suitable actions in their capital planning which will enable a sustainable clean-up of NPLs from the balance sheet.
2. Design
The design phase should identify options to be used to resolve NPLs, establish specific targets for NPL reduction, together with performance indicators detailing how the NPL reduction strategy will be implemented over short, medium and long term periods. Following are key components of the design phase:
i. Strategy implementation options
Banks should review the range of NPL strategy implementation options available and their respective financial impact. Examples of implementation options, not being mutually exclusive, are:
• Hold/restructuring strategy: A hold strategy (A hold strategy is not to terminate the relationship with the troubled borrower) option is strongly linked to the operating model, restructuring and borrower assessment expertise, operational NPL management capabilities, outsourcing of servicing and write-off policies.
• Active portfolio reductions: These can be achieved through either sales and/or writing off provisioned NPL loans that are deemed unrecoverable. This option is to be linked to provision adequacy, collateral valuations, quality loan data, and NPL investor demand.
• Change of loan type: This includes foreclosure, loan to equity swapping, loan to asset swapping, or collateral substitution.
• Legal options: This includes insolvency proceedings and foreclosure proceedings
• Out-of-court solutions: Out-of-court debt restructuring involves changing the composition and/or structure of assets and liabilities of borrowers in financial difficulty, without resorting to a full judicial intervention, and with the objective of promoting efficiency, restoring growth, and minimizing the costs associated with the borrower’s financial difficulties (for details on out of court solutions please refer to section 5.2.2.)
Banks should ensure that their NPL strategy includes not just a single strategic option but rather combinations of strategies/options to best achieve their objectives over the short, medium and long term and explore which options are advantageous for different portfolios or segments and under different conditions.
Banks should also identify medium and long-term strategic options for NPL reductions which might not be achievable immediately, e.g. a lack of immediate NPL investor demand might change in the medium to long term. Operational plans might need to foresee such changes, e.g. the need for enhancing the quality of NPL loan data in order to be ready for future investor transactions.
Where banks assess that the above-listed implementation options do not provide an efficient NPL reduction in the medium to long-term horizon for certain portfolios, segments or individual loans, this should be clearly reflected in an appropriate and timely provisioning approach. The bank should write off loans that are deemed to be uncollectable in a timely manner.
ii. Targets
Before commencing the short to medium-term target-setting process, banks should establish a clear view of what reasonable long-term NPL levels are, both on an overall basis but also on a portfolio-level basis. In spite of uncertainty around the time frame required to achieve these long-term goals, however, they are an important input to setting adequate short and medium-term targets.
Banks should include, at a minimum, clearly defined quantitative targets in their NPL strategy (where relevant including foreclosed assets), which should be approved by the senior management committee. The combination of these targets should lead to a concrete reduction, gross and net (of provisions), of NPLs, at least in the medium term. While expectations about changes in macroeconomic conditions can play a role in determining target levels (if based on solid external forecasts), they should not be the sole driver for the established NPL reduction targets.
In determining, the targets banks should establish at least the following dimensions:
• by time horizons, i.e. short-term (indicative 1 year), medium-term (indicative 3 years) and possibly long-term;
• by main portfolios (e.g. retail mortgage, retail consumer, retail small businesses and professionals, MSME corporate, large corporate, commercial real estate);
• by implementation option chosen to drive the projected reduction, e.g. cash recoveries from hold strategy, collateral repossessions, recoveries from legal proceedings, revenues from the sale of NPLs or write-offs.
The NPL targets should at least include a projected absolute or percentage NPL reduction, both gross and net of provisions, not only on an overall basis but also for the main NPL portfolios.
Where foreclosed assets are material, a dedicated foreclosed assets strategy should be defined or, at least, foreclosed assets reduction targets should be included in the NPL strategy. It is acknowledged that a reduction in NPLs might involve an increase in foreclosed assets for the short term, pending the sale of these assets. However, this timeframe should be clearly limited as the aim of foreclosures is a timely sale of the assets concerned.
Targets shall be initially defined for all main portfolios on a quarterly basis for the first year. Each of these high-level targets is to be accompanied by a standard set of more granular monitoring items, e.g. non-performing loan ratio and coverage ratio, etc.
Below shows high-level quantitative targets as per better international practices.
Sustainable solutions-oriented operational target:
• Loans with long term modifications / NPL plus performing forborne loans with Long term Modifications.
Action-oriented operational targets:
• Active NPL MSMEs for which a viability analysis has been conducted in the last 12 months / Active NPL MSMEs.
• MSME and Corporate NPL common borrowers for which a common restructuring solution has been implemented.
• Corporate NPLs for which the bank(s) have engaged a specialist for the implementation of a company restructuring plan.
Banks running the NPL strategy process for the first time should not solely focus on the short-term horizon. The aim here is to address the deficiencies identified during the self-assessment process and thus establish an effective and timely NPL management framework, which allows the successful implementation of the quantitative NPL targets approved for the medium to long-term horizon.
Note 1:
As an illustration. Banks which have internally calibrated (through the cycle) TTC PD’s against a validated rating system, should not aim to foreclose accounts, against which a viable restructuring could lead to an ECL output which is less than the internal (if the same has been internally computed) or regulatory loss given default, if legal proceeding were to be initiated against the borrower.
Hence, for instance, by forgiving 20% of the outstanding amount would lead to a risk classification into a grade, which has 16% PD, (ignoring the 12 month period, for which the restructured loan would be classified as NPL. provided performance is satisfactory) and assuming that the internally computed LGD is 36%, the ECL % expected to arise from such a transaction would be around 24.6%, (20 % concession and ((100% -20 % concession) *.16 PD * 36% LGD) = 4.6%))) vs an expected LGD for foreclosure of say 43%.
The above is a simplified illustration, SAMA is cognizant that:
• Obligors granted a material concession in course of foreclosures are classified as NPL for provisioning purposes for at least a year, which should be taken into account whilst computing the cost of foreclosure to the bank and;
• Expert Level Judgement or rating system override with respect to grade classification may be warranted whilst making the above assessment
However, the purpose of outlining the above is to endorse a long term vision in terms of making a balanced decision with respect to restructuring a distressed borrower ( i.e. determining the viability of a borrower) rather than seeking outright enforcement proceeding.
3.2 Implementing the NPL Strategy
Banks should ensure that significant emphasis is placed on communication of the components of the approved strategy to relevant stakeholders across the bank and proper monitoring protocols are established. Following are key components of implementing an NPL strategy:
i. Monitoring of Results
a. Banks should establish a proper monitoring mechanism for NPL strategy to ensure it is delivering the expected results. Where any variances are identified prompt corrective action is to be taken to ensure goals/targets are met.
b. The strategy to be reviewed at a minimum on an annual basis. Where collection targets and budgets will require substantial annual revisions, policies and procedures should be revised as necessary.
ii. Embedding the NPL strategy
As execution and delivery of the NPL strategy involve and depends on many different areas within the bank, it should be embedded in processes at all levels of an organization, including strategic, tactical and operational.
All banks should clearly define and document the roles, responsibilities and formal reporting lines for the implementation of the NPL strategy, including the operational plan.
Staff and management involved in NPL workout activities should be provided with clear individual (or team) goals and incentives geared towards reaching the targets agreed in the NPL strategy, including the operational plan.
All relevant components of the NPL strategy should be fully aligned with and integrated into the business plan and budget. This includes, for example, the costs associated with the implementation of the operational plan (e.g. resources, IT, etc.) but also potential losses stemming from NPL workout activities. NPL strategy should be closely monitored to ensure it is delivering the expected results, variances should be identified and prompt corrective action taken to ensure longer-term goals and targets are met.
iii. Operational plan
The NPL strategy of banks should be back by an operational plan (which is to be approved by the senior management committee). The operational plan should clearly define how the bank would operationally implement its NPL strategy over a time horizon of at least 1 to 3 years (depending on the type of operational measures required).
The NPL operational plan should contain at a minimum:
• Clear time-bound objectives and goals;
• Activities to be delivered on a segmented portfolio basis;
• Governance arrangements including responsibilities and reporting mechanisms for defined activities and outcomes;
• Quality standards to ensure successful outcomes;
• Staffing and resource requirements;
• Required technical infrastructure enhancement plan;
• Granular and consolidated budget requirements for the implementation of the NPL strategy;
• Interaction and communication plan with internal and external stakeholders (e.g. for sales, servicing, efficiency initiatives, etc.).
• The operational plan should put a specific focus on internal factors that could present impediments to successful delivery of the NPL strategy.
Implementing the operational plan
The implementation of the NPL operational plans should rely on suitable policies and procedures, clear ownership and suitable governance structures (including escalation procedures). Any deviations from the plan should be highlighted and reported to the management
4. Structuring the Workout Unit
Effective management of NPL resolution requires that the bank establish a dedicated unit to handle workout cases. Such Workout Unit (WU) should be established as a permanent unit within the bank's organizational structure reporting directly to the Risk Management function rather than the Business / Loan Originating Units.
The rationale for creating an independent unit for dealing with NPLs includes the elimination of potential conflicts of interest between the originating officer and the troubled borrower. The segregation of duties includes not only relationship management (negotiation of the restructuring plan, legal enforcement, etc.) but also the decision-making process along with support services (loan administration, loan and collateral files, appraisers, etc.) and technical IT resources.
The appropriate organizational structure of the Workout Unit varies greatly depending upon the circumstances each individual bank faces. Larger banks dealing with a significant number of NPLs are likely to establish separate Working Units or create sub-divisions within a single WU to handle different asset classes such as Large Corporates, Medium Corporates, Small and Micro loans. Smaller banks may have to follow a simpler structure where a single work unit may handle a wide variety of borrowers.
4.1 Staffing the Workout Unit
Skills Required
Banks should ensure that the managers of the WU, their team leaders and workout officers are highly qualified professionals, who would be able to discharge their functions effectively and in connection therewith, training needs should be assessed and proper training plans are to be prepared accordingly. Within the individual NPL WUs, more specialization is often useful based on the different NPL workout approaches required per relevant borrower segment.
Such workout officers should have strong analytical and financial analysis skills, understand the depth of the restructuring process and have the ability to work well under pressure.
Remuneration
Compensation structures for workout staff need to be aligned with long term strategy of the bank. If compensation is based on cash recoveries, officers may choose to optimize their own short-term income at the expense of longer-term profit maximization for the bank. Conversely, basing compensation on a reduction in the volume of non- performing loans may lead to improper restructuring or the bankruptcy of otherwise viable companies as officers seek to reduce the numbers by the quickest means possible. The staff may also be reluctant to employ the full range of restructuring options (particularly with respect to loan forgiveness) without provisions to indemnify them for costs and provide legal counsel to defend them in case legal charges are brought against them.
Assigning workload
Banks should establish policies specifying timelines for assigning stressed accounts to Work Officers, once the account is marked to be stressed.
4.2 Incorporating Legal and Support Functions Into Workout Unit
Banks require legal advice on a variety of matters related to the origination, management, and restructuring of loans. This includes not only documenting loan and restructuring transactions but also overseeing the collection process for those defaulted loans. It is highly recommended that Banks should maintain a dedicated legal team (or legal experts) within the Workout Unit to:
i. Assist in the negotiation of the restructuring of those loans that need to be addressed; and
ii. To be responsible for those loans that require legal solutions to be collected (bankruptcy or foreclosure).
4.3 Performance Management
For Workout Unit (WU) staff involved in the management of Nonperforming Loans (NPLs), proper performance metrics should be established which should cater not only to the individual’s performance but also assess the performance of the team as a whole. Further, the performance of the Workout Unit should be monitored and measured on a regular basis. For this purpose, an appraisal system tailored to the requirements of the NPL Workout Unit should be implemented in alignment with the overall NPL strategy and operational plan.
Further to quantitative elements linked to the bank's NPL targets and milestones (probably with a strong focus on the effectiveness of workout activities), the appraisal system may include qualitative measurements such as level of negotiations competency, technical abilities relating to the analysis of the financial information and data received, structuring of proposals, quality of recommendations, or monitoring of restructured cases.
It should also ensure that the higher degree of commitment, usually required of NPL WU staff is inculcated in the agreed working conditions, remuneration policies, incentives, and performance management framework.
As part of the performance measurement framework, it is recommended that banks' management should include specific indicators linked to the targets defined in the NPL strategy and operational plan. The importance of the respective weight given to these indicators within the overall performance measurement frameworks should be proportionate to the severity of the NPL issues faced by the bank.
Finally, given that the important role of efficient addressing of pre-arrears is a key driver for the reduction of NPL inflows, a strong commitment of relevant staff regarding the addressing of early warnings should also be fostered through the remuneration policy and incentives framework.
Technical resources
One of the key success factors for the successful implementation of any NPL strategy option is an adequate technical infrastructure. In this context, it is important that all NPL-related data is centrally stored in robust and secured IT systems. Data should be complete and up-to-date throughout the NPL workout process.
An adequate technical infrastructure should enable NPL WUs to:
i. Easily access all relevant data and documentation including:
a) current NPL and early arrears borrower information including automated notifications in the case of updates;
b) loan and collateral/guarantee information linked to the borrower; or connected borrowers;
c) monitoring/documentation tools with the IT capabilities to track restructuring performance and effectiveness;
d) status of workout activities and borrower interaction, as well as details on restructuring measures, agreed, etc.;
e) foreclosed (foreclosure is the repayment of the outstanding loans to the extent possible through, legal enforcement by a bank) assets (where relevant); and
f) tracked cash flows of the loan and collateral.
ii. Efficiently process and monitor NPL workout activities including:
a) automated workflows throughout the entire NPL life cycle;
b) automated monitoring process ("tracking system”) for the loan status ensuring a correct flagging of non-performing and forborne loans;
c) industrialized borrower communication approaches, e.g. through call centers (including integrated card payment system software on all agent desktops) or internet (e.g. file sharing system);
d) incorporated early warning signals (see also EWS section);
e) automated reporting throughout the NPL workout lifecycle for NPL WU management, senior management, and other relevant managers as well as the regulator;
f) performance analysis of workout activities by NPL WU, sub-team and expert (e.g. cure/success rate, rollover information, effectiveness of restructuring options offered, cash collection rate, vintage analysis of cure rates, promises kept rate at call center, etc.); and
g) evolution monitoring of portfolio(s) / sub-portfolio(s) / cohorts / individual borrowers.
iii. Define, analyze and measure NPLs and related borrowers:
a) recognize NPLs and measure impairments;
b) perform suitable NPL segmentation analysis and store outcomes for each borrower;
c) support the assessment of the borrower's personal data, financial position and repayment ability (borrower affordability assessment), at least for non-complex borrowers; and
d) conduct calculations of (i) the net present value (NPV) and (ii) the impact on the capital position of the bank for each restructuring option and/or any likely restructuring plan under any relevant legislation (e.g. foreclosures law, insolvency laws) for each borrower.
The adequacy of technical infrastructure, including data quality, should be assessed by an independent function on a regular basis (for instance internal or external audit).
4.4 Developing a Written Policy Manual
All the banks should have a documented Policy Manual, which evidently mentioned a clear standard timeline for NPL management and resolution. The longer a borrower remains past due, the less likely that the borrower is to repay the loan. A successful resolution, therefore, requires that the bank recognizes the problem early on and adheres to a tight but realistic timetable to ensure that the loan is restructured, sold to a third party, or collected through legal proceedings - in the case of non-viable borrowers) in a timely manner.
5. Workout Plan
5.1 Preparing for the Workout Process
As the first step after receiving a new NPL, the workout team should ensure collection of all relevant and necessary information on the borrower’s loan and financial details to enable the selection of an appropriate workout plan. The Corporate/MSME team should ensure that the file is transferred with all necessary documentation and a case update summary is attached. In the best-case scenario, the bank should aim at achieving a consensual solution that satisfies the interests of both parties and results in a successful restructuring. Adopting such perspective implies not only a self-assessment of the bank’s options and legal position but also an analysis of the existing options and situation for the borrower. A comprehensive approach requires a thorough preparation process on both sides, which, if done properly, will maximize the chances of achieving a successful and mutually beneficial solution. All workout exercises should adhere to principles of restructuring outlined in Appendix 3 of this document and abide by Section 5 of the “Rules on the Management of Problem Loans”.
On the bank’s side, a thorough preparation includes:
i. Gathering all relevant information available on the borrower;
ii. Perform a thorough review of the borrower’s historical financials, business viability, business plan and forecast loan service capacity.
iii. Accurately assessing the value of the collateral securing the loan; and
iv. Conducting a detailed analysis of the bank’s legal position.
These aspects are further explained in the sections below.
5.1.1 Gathering of Information About the Borrower
All borrowers and guarantors should be informed promptly (within 5 business days) that responsibility for their relationship has been transferred to the Workout Unit. This notification should be in writing and contain a complete and accurate description of all legal obligations outstanding with the bank, the amounts and dates of all past due amounts together with any fees or penalties which have been assessed. The Workout Unit should intimate the borrower with any violations and loan covenants or agreements observed at the time of information collection.
The borrower should be requested to submit the following information, preferably in electronic format:
i. Information on all loans and other obligations (including guarantees) outstanding.
ii. Detailed contact information (mail, telephone, e-mail), including representatives, if applicable.
iii. Detailed latest financial statements of the company (balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, explanatory notes). MSME’s and financially less-sophisticated enterprises may submit only aggregate financial figures.
iv. Updated business plan and the proposal for repayment/restructuring of loan obligations.
v. Individual entrepreneurs (for example sole proprietors), should also submit information about the household. The two additional parameters for determining the loan servicing ability of such borrowers are: (i) the borrower’s family composition (number of children, number of earners in the family) to determine justified expenses; and (ii) total net earnings.
Updated financial information, together with a detailed listing of all guarantees outstanding, if any, should be also collected from the guarantors (natural or legal persons) of loans. In addition, the bank should exercise all legal efforts to acquire additional information from other sources to form an accurate, adequate, and complete view of the borrower’s loan servicing capability.
During the file review, the Workout Unit should pay close attention to identifying any other significant creditors. These may include other banks and financial institutions, Zakat/Tax authority, utilities, trade creditors and loans to shareholders, related parties, or employees.
For any missing key information identified during the file review, the Workout Unit should develop a corrective action plan to ensure collection of these documents with the help of the business team. Some of this information should be requested promptly from the borrower or third party sources such as Credit Bureaus.
5.1.2 Identifying Non-cooperative Borrowers:
The Workout Unit should define non-cooperative borrowers and carefully document their non-compliance. Useful criteria to be used to identify these borrowers are:
i. Borrowers who default on their loans while having the ability to pay (“strategic defaulters") in hopes of receiving unwarranted concessions from the bank.
ii. Failure to respond either orally or in writing to two consecutive requests from the bank for a meeting or financial information within 15 calendar days of each request.
iii. Borrowers who deny access to their premises and/or books and records.
iv. Borrowers who do not engage constructively with the bank, including those that are generally unresponsive, consistently fail to keep promises, and/or reject restructuring proposals out of hand.
Non-cooperative borrowers are more likely to be transferred to the legal team as it would be difficult to reach a consensual restructuring solution if the Borrowers are not willing to cooperate with the Banks.
However, banks would have to maintain an appropriate audit trail, documenting the rationale for classifying a borrower as “non-cooperative"
5.1.3 Determining the Bank’s Legal Rights and Remedies
The banks having reviewed and understood the borrower’s business plan, but before initiating restructuring negotiations with a borrower, must prepare for these negotiations and have a very clear understanding of its bargaining position from a legal standpoint.
The Workout Unit should perform a thorough review of all documents relating to the borrower, with special emphasis on the loan agreement and the security package that was formalized when the transaction took place. An accurate assessment of the bank's rights will have a critical impact on determining the resolution strategy to be adopted.
The following are general indicators that a Workout Unit could pay attention to when reviewing the documentation:
i. Whether the parties to the loan were adequately described in the loan documentation;
ii. Whether all key documents were signed by the duly authorized persons under Saudi governing law;
iii. Whether the bank is in possession of all original documents;
iv. Whether the collateral has been duly perfected, including registration at the applicable registry
v. Whether the loan documentation included non-compliance with certain financial indicators as ‘events of default’, and whether these indicators have been breached;
vi. Historical financial position, driver of historical underperformance and to what extent this is expected to drive forecast performance:
a) Current market challenges and outlook: The Banks should form a view on how this has impacted the borrower’s historically and how is it expected to impact its forecast performance and ability to repay the loan;
b) The capabilities of the borrower’s Management team and whether they are capable of turning around the business;
c) Strategy and turnaround initiatives: Does the borrower have a clear strategy or plan to turnaround the business? Has this plan been clearly documented and communicated to banks?
d) Business plan and financial projections: How is the borrower expected to perform of the medium to long-term? What are the borrower's cash flow projections, which should provide an indication of his loan service capacity going forward? What is the level of sustainable versus unsustainable loan;
e) Alignment with credit terms: To what extent are all of the above aligned with existing credit terms and repayment plan;
vii. Whether the loan documentation included a cross-default clause and whether there are other loans that may be considered breached and/or accelerated as a result of the breach of one single loan;
viii. Whether there was an obligation on the bank to notify the borrower or potential guarantors of major changes in the documentation or the terms of the loan, like changes in legislation, currency, interest rates, etc.
If the borrower is not fully equipped to provide such information or if the banks would like to independently review such information, they can seek to appoint a financial advisor to perform an independent business review and clarify the above.
Once the Banks have formed a good understanding of the above, it is expected to assist them in identifying sustainable and commercial restructuring options that could align the banks' interest with that of the borrower and maximize recovery. Such options should be continuously evaluated as the WU engage in restructuring discussions and gather further information.
5.1.4 Ensuring Collateral’s Validity
The workout team should ensure that the collateral taken at the time of loan agreement/origination was formalized and is still valid and enforceable. The banks should complete timely validation of legal documents to evade probable disputes or delay at the time of negotiating restructuring proposal. Furthermore, the banks should establish procedures around periodic (e.g. yearly basis) valuation and monitoring of acquired collateral
The Bank is required to perform detailed collateral analysis for all the accounts referred to WU. The workout team should perform this analysis as detailed out in section 7 of the “Rules on Management of Problem Loans"
5.1.5 Financial Viability Analysis
Banks need to conduct a thorough financial and business viability analysis of its borrowers especially MSME NPL borrowers to determine their ability to repay their obligations. In addition, it is important to obtain sufficient insight into the business plan and projected cash flows available with the borrower for loan service. This will entail determining the borrower’s forecasted loan service capacity and assessment needs to be performed by the banks to align this with the restructured credit terms.
This analysis serves as the foundation for making an informed decision on the appropriate resolution approach – restructuring, sale to a third party, change of loan type (loan-to-asset or loan-to-equity swap) or legal proceedings. This analysis is required to be conducted by WU not previously involved in the loan approval process.
A. Analysis of key financial ratios
Financial ratios, calculated from data provided in the balance sheet and income statement, provide an insight into a firm’s operations and are among the most readily available and easy to use indicators for determining the borrower’s viability. In case of MSME borrowers, in the absence of availability of audited and reliable financial information banks should focus on cash-flow based analysis and should also assess the reasonableness of financial information (where this information is available).
Below are four categories of financial ratios that banks may consider for their initial financial analysis (being illustrated below for indicative purposes and should not be considered prescriptive):
i. Liquidity ratios measure how easily a company can meet its short-term obligations within a short timeframe.
a. Current ratio (total current assets/total current liabilities) measures a company’s ability to pay current liabilities by using current assets. It must be recognized that the distressed borrower’s ratios will be considerably lower. The Workout Unit should assess how the borrower can achieve a more normal ratio within a reasonable time frame.
b. Quick ratio, which includes only liquid assets (cash, readily marketable securities and accounts receivable) in the numerator, is a measure of the firm’s ability to meet its obligations without relying on inventory.
ii. Solvency or leverage ratios measure the company’s reliance on loan rather than equity to finance its operations as well as its ability to meet all its obligations and liabilities.
iii. Profitability ratios measure the company’s growth and ability to generate profits or produce sufficient cash flow to survive, rate of sales growth, gross profit margin, and net profit margin are some of the key ratios to be considered.
iv. Efficiency ratios measure management’s ability to effectively employ the company’s resources and assets. These include receivable turnover, inventory turnover, payable turnover and return on equity.
Detailed financial analysis of the borrower needs is to be performed in order to ensure completeness and avoid ignoring important underlying trends. Banks should undertake detailed analysis to understand the interrelation of these financial ratios, which can enable identification of borrower’s real problems as well as probable corrective actions to restore the company’s financial health.
The workout team should exercise prudence in his analysis and utilize reasonable caps and floors for certain ratios, as these ratios vary across borrower segments and sectors as well as economic conditions.
B. Balance sheet analysis
In addition to computing and analyzing the key ratios, the workout team should carefully review the balance sheet to develop a basic understanding of the composition of the borrower’s assets and liabilities. Primary emphasis should be placed on developing a complete understanding of all obligations outstanding to the bank and other creditors, including the purpose of the credits, their repayment terms, and current status, to determine the total debt burden of the borrower and the amount of loan that needs to be restructured.
The composition of liabilities, particularly “other liabilities" and accrued expense items should be addressed. Wages payable and taxes are two particularly problematic accounts. Both represent priority claims against the borrower's assets and must be settled if a successful restructuring or bankruptcy is to take place.
C. Cash flow analysis - defining financial viability
When financial statements are prepared on an accrual basis, cash flow analysis ties together the income statement and the balance sheet to provide a more complete picture of how cash (both sources and uses) flows through the company. Cash is the ultimate source of loan repayment.
The less cash is generated by operations, the less likely the borrower will be able to repay the loan, making it more likely that the bank will need to rely on its collateral (asset liquidation or bankruptcy) for repayment. Thus, the primary emphasis when conducting the financial analysis of the borrower should be on its forecasted cash generation capabilities. The proper analysis of cash flow involves the use of both the balance sheet and the income statement for two consecutive fiscal years to identify the sources and uses of cash within the company. Changes in working capital and fixed asset expenditures are quantified and cash needs are highlighted, providing a clear view of the many competing uses of cash within the company.
With respect to MSME borrowers, in case reliable and timely financial information is not available, cash flow based assessment is recommended. Banks should incorporate a robust and efficient internal process of cash flow estimation for these borrowers.
D. Business Plan
A comprehensive financial analysis of the non-performing borrower includes an assessment of the company’s business plan containing a detailed description of how the owners and management are going to correct existing problems. While no one can forecast the future with certainty, a candid discussion between the borrower and the bank on new business plan and financial projections is an essential part of the viability assessment exercise. It provides both the bank and the borrower an opportunity to explore how the company will operate under different scenarios and allows management to have a contingency (or corrective action) plans in place should actual results deviate significantly from the projections. The focus of the Workout Unit will be on validating the assumptions (whether realistically conservative and in line with past performance) and performing a sensitivity analysis to see how results will vary under changed assumptions. Again, the emphasis should be placed on tracing the flow of cash through the business to determine the company’s ability to pay.
E. Cash budget
Cash budget is a powerful tool, which helps the borrower to limit expenditures and preserve cash to meet upcoming obligations such as taxes. It can also compensate for the poor quality of formal financial statements in the case of micro and small enterprises.
In a workout, the ability to generate and preserve cash is the key to the company’s survival. All borrowers should be encouraged to prepare a short-term cash budget. The cash budget is similar to the cash flow analysis and differs, however, in two important respects: (i) it is forward-looking; and (ii) it breaks down the annual sources and uses by month to reveal the pattern of cash usage within the company. It also clearly identifies additional financing needs as well as the timing and amount of cash available for loan service. For smaller borrowers, a simple listing of monthly cash receipts and cash disbursements will suffice. Actual results need to be monitored monthly and corrective actions are taken immediately to ensure that the company remains on plan.
5.1.6 Business Viability Analysis
Unlike financial analysis, which is highly quantitative, the business analysis is more qualitative in nature. Its purpose is to assess the borrower's ability to survive over the longer term. It focuses not on the borrower's financial performance, but rather on the quality of its management, the nature of the products & services, facilities and the external environment in which the borrower operates (including competition).
The primary cause of a business failure that has been acknowledged is the management of the business. The most common reasons include: (i) lack of necessary management skills required to run an organization; (ii) inability or unwillingness to delegate responsibilities; (iii) lack of experienced and qualified managers in key positions; (iv) lack of skills to run the business; and (v) inadequate management systems and controls.
Product assessment focuses on the nature of the product and its longevity potential. The main considerations include services or products, product mix diversified or reliant on a single product, technical obsolescence, and demand of the product/service.
The primary focus of the assessment of the facilities (physical plant, manufacturing units, etc.) is not on their valuation but rather on their capacity and efficiency. The attempt should be made to evaluate any requirements of significant upgrades or new facility to meet demand for the product presently and in the foreseeable future. The costs for the same should then be assessed and included in the base projections.
External factors include the assessment of the general macro environment as well as overall industry and market conditions. It focuses on assessing the potential impact on the borrower of changes in the economic as well as regulatory climate; analyzing the strength of the borrower's position within the industry (market share) and its competitors; and gaining a better understanding of the borrower's market and how changes within the market might affect the company's performance.
A. Use of outside expertise to prepare business viability assessment
For large commercial or real estate loans, the business viability portion of the analysis may be performed or validated by an independent third party such as a consultant or a restructuring advisor.
i. Micro and Small Enterprises
In the case of micro and small companies and subject to the cooperation of the owner or the management, which is trustworthy and provides reliable financial and other information, the use of external consultants may not be efficient in terms of time and costs. Banks are, therefore, encouraged to build internal capacity (or engage with external service providers as necessary) to assess the business viability of this segment and enable reasonable decision making in this regard.
ii. Medium-sized companies:
Medium-sized companies should be analyzed in more detail and it may be reasonable to use a similar approach as in the case of large companies. This may require a guided and aligned coordination between the banks and the inclusion of an external consultant to prepare an independent overview of operations, particularly in the following cases.
The process can be followed in case where at least one of the following conditions are met:
i. There is doubt about the reliability of financial and other information;
ii. There is doubt about the fairness and competence of the management;
iii. Activity involved of which the bank does not have sufficient internal knowhow;
iv. There is a great probability that the company will need additional financial assets.
All banks should have clear procedures regarding the level of approval authority required and the process to be followed when contracting for an independent review. The procedure guidelines at a minimum should include qualifications of the advisor, selection criteria, evaluation process and approval for these appointments. Whenever possible, Workout team should request proposals from several firms. In addition, these procedures should require that the deliverables (together with their due dates) and the pricing structure, should be clearly laid out. To expedite and further standardize the onboarding process, banks may choose to establish a list of pre-approved vendors.
B. Documenting the results of the financial and business viability analysis
The findings of the financial and business viability analysis should be documented in writing and communicated to the credit committee for review. The documentation should have sufficient detail to provide a comprehensive picture of the borrower's present financial condition and its ability to generate sustainable cash flows in the future. Banks will have its own standard format for documenting the analysis but should ensure that it incorporates, at a minimum, the below information:
i. Minutes of the meeting with the borrower with a clear identification of the reasons for the problems and the assessment of the ability to introduce radical changes into the operations;
ii. Exposure of the banks and all other creditors (related persons, in particular);
iii. The analysis of the balance sheet structure - the structure of maturity of receivables and operating liabilities, identification of assets suitable for sale and assessment of the value of this property;
iv. The analysis of the trends of the key indicators of individual categories of financial statements: EBITDA margin, net financial /EBITDA, total debt/equity, interest coverage, debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), net sales revenue/operating receivables, accounts payable/total debt, quick liquidity ratio, cash flow from operations, costs of services etc. (these ratios are indicative, banks in practice are free to utilize such ratios, which they deem appropriate).
v. 3- to 5-year projection (time period is dependent based on the tenor of the loan) of cash flows based on conservative assumptions - the plan of operations must not be a wish list but rather a critical view of the possibilities of the company's development in its branch of industry;
vi. Analysis of the necessary resources for the financing of working capital and investments (Capex);
vii. Review of all indemnities (in the case of personal guarantees also an overview and an assessment of the guarantor's property);
viii. Overview of the quality and assessment of the value of collaterals and the calculations of different scenarios (implementation of restructuring or the exit strategy).
The results of the financial analysis should be updated at least annually or more frequently in conjunction with the receipt of the borrower's financial statements. The business assessment should be updated at least every three years or whenever major changes occur in either borrower's management or the external operating environment.
Based on the financial analysis, the business plan and the understanding of the borrower’s loan service capacity, the banks should consider various restructuring solutions that can offer a sustainable restructuring and align the credit terms with the cash flow forecasts of the business. These solutions could include, but are not limited to:
i. Grace periods.
ii. Reduced interest rates or in some cases payment in kind (PIK) (PIK is the option to pay interest on debt instruments and preferred securities in kind, instead of in case.PIK interest has been designed for borrowers who wish to avoid making cash outlays during the growth phase of their business. PIK is the financial instrument that pays interest or dividends to investors of bonds, notes, or preferred stock with additional securities or equity instead of cash) interest.
iii. Assessing sustainable versus unsustainable debt.
iv. Agreeing repayment profiles around sustainable debt in line with forecast sensitized cash flows of the borrower.
v. Agreeing an asset sale plan.
vi. Agreeing a debt to equity conversion.
vii. Agreeing a debt to asset swap.
viii. Agreeing a cash sweep mechanism (it is the mandatory use of excess free cash flows to pay outstanding debt rather than distributing it to the shareholders) to benefit from any upsides to the borrower's business plan.
ix. Longer-term tenors when the business plan and financial analysis suggest that this is necessary for a more sustainable restructuring
5.2 Identifying the Workout Options
5.2.1 Purpose of Workout
Under a best-case workout scenario, the bank and the viable (or marginally viable) borrower will agree on the restructuring strategy aiming to return the defaulted borrower to a fully performing status in the shortest feasible time frame. This requires matching the borrower's sustainable repayment capacity with the correct restructuring option(s). There is no one standard (“one size fits all") approach and instead, the Workout Unit must choose from a variety of options to tailor a restructuring plan that meets the needs of specific borrower.
For the bank to consider approving a restructuring plan, the borrower must meet two essential pre-conditions: (i) borrower's projected cash flows must be sufficient to repay all or a substantial portion of its past due to obligations within a reasonable time frame: and (ii) borrower must display cooperative behavior.
Not all borrowers will be able to repay their obligations in full. However, this does not mean they should automatically be subject to legal action. Banks are advised to invoke out of court settlements for borrowers willing to cooperate with the restructuring process and are able to demonstrate that the economic loss as a result of any foreseeable restructuring is likely to be lower than seeking foreclosure. Instead, the bank should proceed with restructuring whenever it can reasonably document that the revised terms (which may include conditional loan forgiveness) will result in a greater recovery value for the bank than a legal procedure (bankruptcy or foreclosure).
In a syndicated or multi-bank scenario, wherein minority banks don't agree to a restructured/ work out solution, dissenting banks may utilize the guidelines laid down in the Bankruptcy law.
5.2.2 Workout Options
At the initial segmentation stage, the loan-to-value and viability parameters are generally used to help identify potentially viable borrowers (Refer to Chapter 3). This group of borrowers is then subject to in-depth financial analysis and business viability assessment, which narrows the number of candidates for potential restructuring even further. At this stage, the Workout Unit should have a fully informed view as to the nature and causes of the borrower's difficulties. Based on this understanding, the Workout Unit should work with the borrower on developing a realistic repayment plan designed around the borrower's projected sustainable cash flows and/or the liquidation of assets within acceptable timeframes. Understanding and knowing when to use each of the options discussed below provides a Workout Unit with the flexibility necessary to tailor appropriate restructuring proposals.
Consider personal guarantees, conversion of loans from owner(s) to equity or other subordinated form, capital increase, additional collateral, sale of excess assets, achievement of certain levels of financial indicators.
Borrower Type Workout Measure Description Viable Normal reprogramming Future cash flows sufficient for repayment of loan until a sustainable level of cash flow reached within the stipulated period (Actual timeline dependent on the profile of the borrower and tenor of the loan). Consider personal guarantees, conversion of loans from owner(s) to equity or other subordinated form, capital increase, additional collateral, sale of excess assets, achievement of certain levels of financial indicators. Marginal Extended repayment period Extended period of reprogramming (rescheduling) needed to reach a sustainable level of cash flow, i.e., with final payment in equal installments or balloon or bullet payment. Loan Splitting Loan is split into two parts: the first, representing the amount that can be repaid from sustainable cash flow) is repaid in equal installments (principal and interest) with a specified maturity date; the remaining portion is considered to be excess loan (which can be subordinated), which may be split into several parts/tranches. These may be non-interest bearing with interest payable either at maturity or from the proceeds of specific asset sales. Conditional Loan Forgiveness To be used to encourage owners to make an additional financial contribution to the company and to ensure that their interests are harmonized with those of the bank, particularly in those cases when the net present value of the company (taking into consideration all collateral and potential cash flow) is lower than the total loan. Bank may choose to: i. Partial write-off in the framework of the owner's cash equity contribution, particularly in all cases where the owner(s) have not guaranteed the loan; ii. Partial write-off in the framework of a cash capital increase from a third-party investor where they have not assumed the role of the guarantor; iii. Partial write-off in the case of a particularly successful business restructuring that materially deviates from the operating plan that served as the basis for the restructuring; iv. Partial write-off in those cases when the above-average engagement of the owner(s) (i.e. successful sale of excess assets) guarantees a higher level of repayment to the bank(s). Loans can also be written off if the collateral has no economic value, and such action ensures the continuation of the borrower's operations and the bank has confidence in the management or if the cause for the problems came from objective external factors. Loan to Equity Swaps Appropriate for medium-sized companies where the company can be sold, has established products/services, material know-how; or significant market share, etc. However, such measures should be in-line with the requirements stipulated by Banking Control Law (Issued by SAMA) under Article 10 subsection 2 and 4. Loan to Asset Swaps Can be an effective tool particularly in the case of stranded real estate projects provided that the real estate is in good condition and can be economically viable managed in the future. The transaction must not be legally disputable, considering the provisions of the bankruptcy and enforcement legislation. It may also be used for other real estate cases, equity stakes, and securities with determinable market value. Short Term restructuring Restructuring agreements with a one-year maturity may be appropriate in those cases such as micro and small borrowers, where the bank feels closer monitoring or increased pressure to perform is necessary. Loan Sale Sale of the loan is reasonable under the following conditions: • The bank does not have sufficient capacity to effectively manage the borrower; • The buyer has a positive reference; and • The buyer is a major specialist in the area of resolving non-performing loans. Non-Viable Borrowers Collateral Liquidation by owner MSME owners have strong attachments to their property. They may fail to carry out the sale within the agreed-upon time frame or have unrealistic expectations regarding the value of the property. It is recommended that the bank set short deadlines; obtain a notarized power of attorney allowing it to activate the sale procedures; and have sufficient human resources within the real estate market to expedite the sales process. Execution or Insolvency To be used when the borrower is not viable or non-cooperative, and no feasible restructuring solution can be put in place. The below figure presents the various options broken into three broad categories: (i) short term measures most appropriately used in early-stage arrears to stabilize the situation and give the borrower and the bank time to develop a longer-term strategy; (ii) longer-term/ permanent solutions, which will result in the reduction of the loan: and (iii) additional measures, which do not directly lead to repayment but strengthen the bank's collection efforts.
5.2.3 Short Term Restructuring Measures:
Short-term measures do not lead, in and of themselves, to the repayment of a borrower's obligations. Instead they are designed to provide: (i) temporary relief in response to a clearly identified short term disruption in a borrower's cash flow (e.g., event out of the borrower's control, like a sudden fall in demand due to external circumstances); or (ii) time for the creditor(s) to assess the situation and determine an appropriate course of action. They are most appropriate to use when there is a reasonable expectation that the borrower's sustainable cash flow will be strong enough to allow the resumption of its existing payment schedule at the end of the restructuring period. Evidence of such an event should be demonstrated in a formal manner (and not speculatively) via written documentation with defined evidence showing that the borrower's income will recover in the short-term or on the basis of the bank concluding that a long-term restructuring solution was not possible due to a temporary financial uncertainty of a general or borrower-specific nature. As these options envision that the borrower will be able to bring defaulted amounts of interest and/or principal current at the end of the restructuring period, they should not exceed a tenor of 24 months (12 months in the case of real estate or construction projects) and must be used in combination with longer-term solutions such as an extension of maturity, revision in terms and additional security.
Specific short-term measures to consider include:
i. Reduced payments - the company’s cash flow is sufficient to service interest and make partial principal repayments.
ii. Interest-only - the company's cash flow can only service its interest payments, and no principal repayments are made during a determined period of time.
iii. Moratorium - an agreement allowing the borrower to suspend payments of principal and/or interest for a clearly defined period. This technique is most commonly used at the beginning stages of a workout process (especially with multi-bank borrowers) to allow the bank and other creditors time to assess the viability of the business and develop a plan for moving forward. Another appropriate use is in response to natural disaster, which has temporarily interrupted the company's cash flow.
The contractual terms for any restructuring solution should ensure that the bank has the right to review the agreed restructuring measures if the situation of the borrower improves and more favorable conditions for the bank (ranging from the restructuring to the original contractual conditions) could, therefore, be enforced. The bank should also consider including strict consequences in the contractual terms for borrowers who fail to comply with the restructuring agreement (e.g. additional security).
5.2.4 Long Term/Permanent Restructuring
Longer-term/permanent options are designed to permanently reduce the borrower’s loan. Most borrowers will require a combination of options to ensure repayment. In all cases, the bank must be able to demonstrate (based on reasonable documented financial information) that the borrower's projected cash flow will be sufficient to meet the restructured payment terms.
Specific options that may be considered include:
i. Interest and Arrears capitalization - adds past due payments and/or accrued interest arrears to the outstanding principal balance for repayment under a sustainable revised repayment program. Workout Unit should always attempt to have the borrower bring past due payments and interest current at the time a loan is rescheduled. Capitalization, intended to be used selectively, is likely to be more widespread when borrowers have been in default for an extended period. This measure should be applied only once, and in an amount that does not exceed a pre-defined size relative to the overall principle as defined in the bank's Remedial/restructuring policy. The bank should also formally confirm that the borrower understands and accepts the capitalization conditions.
ii. Interest rate reduction - involves the permanent (or temporary) reduction of the interest rate (fixed or variable) to a fair and sustainable rate. This option could be considered when the evolution of interest rates has resulted in the borrower receiving finance at an exorbitant cost, compared with prevailing market conditions. However, banks should ensure that lower interest rate is sufficient to cover the relevant credit risk.
iii. Extension of maturity - extension of the maturity of the loan (i.e., of the last contractual loan installment date) allows a reduction in installment amounts by spreading the repayments over a longer period
iv. Rescheduled Payments - the existing contractual payment schedule is adjusted to a new sustainable repayment program based on a realistic assessment of the borrower's cash flows, both current and forecasted. This is usually used in combination with an extension of maturity. In addition to normal rescheduling, additional repayment options include:
a. Partial repayment - a payment is made against the credit facility (e.g., from a sale of assets) that is lower than the outstanding balance. This option is used to substantially reduce the loan at risk and to enable a sustainable repayment program for the remaining outstanding amount. This option is generally preferable, from the bank's standpoint to the balloon, bullet or step-up options described below.
b. Balloon or bullet payments - are used in the case of more marginal borrowers whose sustainable cash flow is insufficient to fully repay the loan within the rescheduled tenor. A balloon payment is a final installment substantially larger than the regularly scheduled installments. Bullet loans carry no regular installment payments. They are payable in full at the maturity date and frequently contain provisions allowing the capitalization of interest throughout the life of the loan.
These options are generally only be used/considered in exceptional circumstances, and when the bank can duly document future cash flow availability to meet the payment. Bullet loans are frequently used in conjunction with loan splitting. In this case, the unsustainable portion of the loan represented by the bullet loan should be fully provisioned and written off in accordance with bank policy.
c. Step-up payments - should be used when the bank can ensure and demonstrate that there is a good reason to expect that the borrower's future cash flow will be sufficient to meet increases (step-up) in payments.
v. Sale by owner/assisted sale - this option is used when the borrower agrees to voluntarily dispose of the secured assets to partially or fully repay the loan. It is usually combined with the partial repayment option or conditional loan forgiveness. The borrower must be monitored closely to ensure that the sale is conducted in a timely manner and the agreement should contain a covenant allowing the borrower to conduct the sale if the borrower fails to do so within the specified timeframe.
vi. Conditional loan forgiveness - involves the bank forfeiting the right to legally recover part or the whole of the amount of an outstanding loan upon the borrower's performance of certain conditions. This measure may be used when the bank agrees to a “reduced payment in full and final settlement", whereby the bank agrees to forgive all the remaining loan if the borrower repays the reduced amount of the principal balance within an agreed timeframe. This option should be used to encourage owners to make an additional financial contribution to the company and to ensure that their interests are aligned with the banks. It is particularly appropriate in those cases where the net present value of the borrower's projected repayment capacity (taking into consideration all the collateral and potential cash flow) is lower than the total loan. In these cases the bank may consider:
a) Partial write-off in return for a cash equity contribution from an owner(s), particularly in those cases where the owner(s) have not guaranteed the loan.
b) Partial write-off in the framework of a cash capital increase from a third- party investor where they have not assumed the role of guarantor.
c) Partial write-off in the case of a particularly successful business restructuring that materially deviates from the operating plan that served as the basis for the restructuring.
d) Partial write-off in those cases when the above-average engagement of the owner(s) (i.e. successful sale of excess assets) guarantees a higher level of repayment to the bank(s).
e) Loan can also be written off if: (i) the collateral has no economic value, and such action ensures the continuation of the company's operations; (ii) it is evident that the owner has invested his entire property in the business and has lost it; (iii) the borrower possesses significant “know-how", and the bank has confidence in the management; or, (iv) the problems were caused by objective external factors.
Banks should apply loan forgiveness options carefully since the possibility of forgiveness can give rise to moral hazard, weaken the payment discipline, and encourage “strategic defaults". Therefore, banks should define specific forgiveness policies and procedures to ensure strong controls are in place.
vii. Fresh money - providing new financing arrangements to support the recovery of a distressed borrower is usually not a standalone viable restructuring solution but should be combined with other measures addressing existing arrears. It should only be applied in exceptional cases and requires a thorough assessment of the borrower's ability to repay. For loans with significant amount, independent sector experts should be used to validate the viability of proposed business plans and cash flow projections.
The Banks are recommended to have strict policies prohibiting lending new monies or allowing roll-overs. There are, however, three specific situations where it may be warranted. They are: (i) the need for fresh money to be used for working capital to restart the business; (ii) advances required to protect the bank's collateral position; or, (iii) small advances to prevent large contingent exposures (guarantees) from being called.
viii. Loan splitting - is used to address collateral and cash flow shortfalls. In this option, the loan is split into two parts: (i) the portion representing the amount that can be repaid from sustainable cash flow is repaid in equal installments of principal and interest; and (ii) the remaining portion represents “excess loan" (which can be subordinated). This portion can be used in combination with payments from the sale of specific assets or bullet payments at the maturity.
5.2.5 Additional Measures
Additional measures are not considered to be viable stand-alone restructuring options as they do not result in an immediate reduction in the loan. However, when combined with one or more of the previously identified options, they can provide incentives for repayment or strengthen the bank's overall position.
i. Loan-to-asset swap - transfers a loan, or portion of a loan, into “other assets owned" where the ultimate collection of the original loan requires the sale of the asset. This technique is generally used in conjunction with conditional loan forgiveness or partial loan repayment and maturity extension options. The management and sale of real estate properties also requires specialized expertise to ensure that the bank maximizes its returns from these assets.
ii. Loan-to-equity swap - transfers the loan, or portion of the loan, into an investment. Generally used to strengthen the capital structure of large highly indebted corporate borrowers, it is seldom appropriate for MSME borrowers due to limited access to equity markets and difficulties in determining the fair value of illiquid securities. Like the loan-to-asset swap above, this option may also require the bank to allocate additional resources for managing the new investment. However, such measures should be in-line with the requirements stipulated by Banking Control Law (Issued by SAMA) under Article 10 subsection 2 and 4.
iii. Loan Consolidation - more common for small loans, entails the combination of multiple loans into a single loan or a limited number of loans. This solution should be combined with other restructuring measures addressing existing arrears. This option is particularly beneficial in situations, where combining collateral and secured cash flows provides greater overall security coverage for the entire loan than individually.
iv. Other alterations of contract/covenants - when entering a restructuring agreement, it is generally necessary to revise or modify existing contracts/covenants to meet the borrower’s current financial circumstances. Examples might include revising ratios such as minimum working capital or providing additional time for a borrower to sell excess assets.
Additional security - additional liens on unencumbered assets (e.g., pledge on a cash deposit, assignment of receivables, or a new/additional mortgage on immovable property) are generally obtained as additional security from a borrower to compensate for the higher risk loan or cure existing defaults in loan-to-value ratio covenants.
5.2.6 Utilizing New Information
If new information is obtained after deciding on the resolving approach, the bank must re-examine and refresh it. For example, if it turns out that the borrower had been misleading it with certain material information, the approach and the measures must be more conservative. On the other hand, if the borrower puts forward or presents a repayment proposal during the measures, which would considerably improve the bank's position, the bank may mitigate the measures subject to fulfillment of certain conditions or eliminate them completely. This means that there is a certain flexibility of restructuring measures for the company.
Banks generally have a choice of choosing to restructure a loan, sell the loan (note sale), or liquidate the underlying collateral either by sale by owner or legal procedures (e.g. enforcement or insolvency). These guidelines require banks to compare the value of the proposed restructuring option against the other alternatives. The analysis will be confined to comparing the value of the proposed restructuring against enforcement and bankruptcy. Choosing the optimal option, i.e., the solution that returns the highest value to the bank is not always clear-cut.
Evaluating alternative strategies based on NPV analysis
Using a simple Net Present Value (NPV) analysis is recommended in order to provide more quantitative justification for the decision.
The general formula to calculate net present value is:
Where i = interest rate per period
N = total number of periods
Rt= net cash flow per period t
t = period in which cash flow occurs
Net present value (NPV) is the sum of the present values (PV) of a stream of payments over a period of time. It is based on the concept of time value of money - money received in the future is less valuable than money received today. To determine NPV, the net cash flow (cash payments of principal, interest, and fees less the bank’s out-of-pocket costs for legal fees, consultants, etc.) received annually is calculated. Each of these amounts or future values (FV) is then discounted to the present by using an appropriate market-based discount rate. Alternatively, the Banks may also use original effective interest rate used for computation of provisioning under International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 guidelines.
The sum of the PVs equals the NPV. Because of its simplicity, NPV is a useful tool to evaluate which of the possible workout options results in the maximum recovery to the bank.
For NPV analysis, the bank's standard risk-adjusted discount rate should be considered. NPV from various options should be considered including below considerations in each option:
i. Restructuring: evaluation based on estimated cash-flows for a period under negotiation for new tenor of contract. The factors to be considered are interest rate of the new term, any other expenses involved in restructuring and business plan or internal estimations of the bank.
ii. Enforcement (including legal): the parameters to be considered includes current value of the property, suitable haircuts to be applied, litigation charges and additional time to be taken to conclude these proceedings.
iii. Insolvency: cost of insolvency procedure, length of time to conclude insolvency proceedings and estimated value to be recovered.
5.3 Negotiating and Documenting Workout Plan
5.3.1 Developing the Negotiating Strategy
Restructuring plan should be viable and mutually acceptable. As every restructuring is unique, depending on borrower and the executing team, the notion of the strategy should keep, following things in mind before drafting the plan:
• Restructuring a loan, which is under stress, means introducing changes that will make underlying business viable and profitable once again and to implement changes so that it will generate enough cash flow to cover the service of loan and satisfactorily returns to shareholders. It is important to understand the underlying causes of the problem.
• The restructuring is more than just changing the terms and structure of the facility, as it focuses on sustainable business.
• Economic profitability should be priorities over accounting profitability while restructuring. The objective is to render the company viable and to ensure its continuity.
A. Better Practices for approaching negotiation in an efficient manner
i. Preparation is essential before the negotiation starts: Every negotiation requires preparation and a strategy to implement. During their preparation, the bank can propose and determine how the possible refinancing is going to be distributed, under what conditions, and subject to what limits and guarantees. Negotiating strategy and tactics should include identification of the negotiable points, possible counter-proposals from the banks, and matters kept in reserve (if possible) to be raised during the process.
a. Be Prepared - It is not possible to draw up a restructuring strategy without a reliable resolvability analysis. The bank should review all available information of the company and current state of business sector, identify the reason and nature of the distress situation.
b. Evaluate the position - Bank should evaluate its ranking in terms of security among the other creditors and stakeholders. The bank should also assess the number and value of secured claims in relation to other secured and unsecured creditors,
ii. Keep the borrower informed: For a successful negotiation, the bank should inform all the stakeholders and be involved actively in talks about the negotiation progress. Successful restructuring is a team effort. Success requires that borrowers work closely with their investment partners. In a restructuring, investors are not only shareholders but also supporting financial entities. For managers the challenge is always to be a step ahead by preparing the (eventual) next round: to be transparent, and to communicate effectively.
iii. Consistency will deliver results: At this crucial stage in a company's life, inconsistency in communication or strategy can be detrimental. Some ways to be consistent:
a) Draw up a consistent and credible action plan to improve the company's liquidity. Determine the financial needs in the short, medium and long term.
b) Be consistent in the plan: try to cover short-term needs with short-term funds, and long-term needs with long-term funds.
c) Do not equate restructuring with loan renegotiation n. Long-term needs can and must be financed by converting loan to equity, whenever the level of leverage is excessive.
d) When converting loan to equity, negotiate in detail the value of the stake held by the new shareholders or look for alternative sources of capital.
e) Finally, the success of the restructuring depends to a large extent on the company surrounding itself by qualified advisors who can offer the benefit of their experience.
iv. A restructuring process consists of reaching a private agreement in order to prevent legal proceedings. It is also possible to base the agreement on corresponding bankruptcy law, although it would have to be under judicial protection and subject to regulations that are often more rigid (creditors agreement).
B. SWOT (Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) Analysis
While negotiating the rehabilitation plan, the bank should identify and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses in the account. The strengths and weaknesses in the account should be thoroughly evaluated to assess and draft the strategy. Before initiating the negotiations with the borrower, bank should prepare a strategy to discuss and finalize the meaningful and successful plan.
The cases where the borrower is not sound to understand the restructuring, the banks should make all the efforts to educate and represent the facts in full faith and trust. If necessary, bank should involve external party for explaining the plan and reducing the resistance by the borrower in restructuring.
Bank may adopt SWOT analysis to formulate the plan. In SWOT, all internal and external factors are considered for identification of strengths and weaknesses in the account. On critical assessment of these factors, bank can build the plan into negotiating strategy. The strategy should cover the defined objectives along with needs of the borrower, reason for restructuring, root cause analysis of the problem, proposed solutions, and negotiating parameters. The strategy of the bank should be focused on incentivizing the borrower and must include fees, penalties, and interest. The structure of the new and old facility has to be clearly explained to borrower while negotiating the strategy. A good background check and through homework may reduce the last-minute surprises and enhances the chances of a successful outcome.
Although the borrower should be made aware of deadlines to complete negotiations (i.e., at the specific restructuring plan being offered will expire if not accepted within 30 days), the situation should not end up into a sub-optimal restructuring.
Despite the fact that negotiating with the borrower on restructuring may be heated at times, both parties must understand the need of the situation and work collaboratively in the interest of both the parties and to come to a consensual and mutually acceptable agreement. The negotiation should be drafted as win-win situations for both parties.
C. Use of advisor
After ascertaining the viability of business and ensuring that business plans are sustainable, both parties should come to a negotiable agreement. Depending on the complexity of structure and borrower's financial knowledge and sophistication, an external advisor may be required. Potential areas for advice are: a) drafting the entire restructuring proposal (financial and legal) and b) drafting business plans as a cornerstone for restructuring discussion with the bank.
In order to build trust of borrower in the restructuring plan, especially for less sophisticated borrowers, it is recommended to involve external advisor viz. a lawyer or a financial specialist.
The bank should organize borrower educational unit within the bank that would provide general financial counsel services to borrowers, including NPL resolution.
The bank should also consider providing independent counseling/mediation services to borrowers for finalizing the strategy.
D. Involvement of guarantor (/s)
Depending on the terms of a guarantee, a guarantor is either fully or partially liable for the loan of third party (the borrower). The guarantor, therefore, should be kept fully informed about the status of the loan and the resolution process so that the guarantor is fully prepared to meet his obligations if the bank chooses to call the guarantee. New guarantees or a re-statement of the previous ones should be obtained whenever changes are made to the loan.
This is to ensure that the guarantor cannot use as a defense against payment that changes were made, to which the guarantor would not have agreed, without prior knowledge or consent.
E. Dealing with multi-bank borrowers
The role of the coordinator should be assumed by the bank with the largest loan, but the other banks must also be willing to accept it, should the bank with the largest expose refuse such activities for objective reasons. When appointing the coordinator and setting its powers, the banks shall strive for the following:
i. As a rule, a coordinator should be appointed within 1 month.
ii. The coordinator should be appointed for a certain period (no more than 6 months) with the possibility of renewal (3 months).
iii. During this mandate term, the coordinator may not withdraw without a grounded reason. If the banks do not renew the coordinator's mandate term 1 month prior to expiry, the restructuring process is completed.
iv. The coordinator shall be responsible for the assessment of the need to sign a Standstill Agreement, the assessment of the need to extend the coordinator's mandate, the assessment of the need for external consultant (financial or legal) and the drafting of the proposed solution for borrower restructuring.
v. In the beginning of the process, the coordinator must clearly define the goals, take care of strict compliance of the deadlines, transparent communication and information of all stakeholders and cooperation by agreement
vi. The coordinator takes care of the minutes of creditor meetings which sum up the decisions and the orientations of the process. In case individual creditors or the borrower constantly change their positions without reason, thereby jeopardizing the process, the coordinator transparently informs all creditors and the borrower and is entitled to withdraw as coordinator.
vii. If appointment of an agent is necessary after the completion of the restructuring, this role can be assumed by the coordinator unless agreed otherwise by the creditors. The coordinator takes over all further communication with the borrower, with the purpose of limiting mutual administrative activities.
It is generally agreed that a negotiated out-of-court debt restructuring is preferable to court proceedings. It tends to be both faster and less costly, hence banks are encouraged to explore the same prior to seeking legal recourse
To facilitate the process, the primary bank must familiarize themselves with the role of the coordinator and be prepared to assume the responsibilities, if necessary, when a borrower has loans from more than one bank.
Banks should strive to actively participate and cooperate in these negotiations. While banks may have genuine differences of opinion about the proper course of action to be taken with a borrower, they should state their views openly and be prepared to compromise, when warranted.
F. Bearing the costs of the workout
Formalizing a workout implies incurring multiple costs that may significantly compromise the financial position of the parties involved in the workout.
This implies that the borrower does not only assume his own costs, but also the costs and fees of auditors, lawyers and financial advisors that were engaged at creditors' request to complete the restructuring. While this is standard practice, there are certain limits to this general rule that try to prevent that the amount of these external costs become excessive:
a) The borrower is only supposed to assume those costs incurred by the whole body of creditors. This implies that creditors who wish to use their own advisers shall cover their own costs.
b) When engaging the external consultants, throughout the course of the workout process, creditors must strive to help the borrower control and manage such costs, and should not incur any costs that may not be considered reasonable.
For MSME borrowers, banks are required to streamline workout processes, review existing processes to ensure that any cost levied to the borrower is kept at manageable levels
G. Checklists for Negotiations
Best practice in the recovery of distressed business loans is based on ensuring that ample effort goes into preparing for negotiations. To prepare for negotiations bank must have a
i. Know loans and security position.
ii. Know the mindset of each negotiating borrower.
iii. Have a realistic assessment of counterparties’ other personal or psychological attributes.
iv. Know the main negotiating points critical to the success of the workout, and how each negotiating point is likely to be perceived by the borrower.
v. Determine the overall posture best to adopt in conducting the negotiations.
vi. Detail the relative merits of your chosen “posture" in terms of flexibility.
vii. Separate the counterparties and their representatives from the problems caused by differences in positions.
viii. Focus on each borrower's needs and interests rather than their stated or presumed position.
ix. Look for solutions with mutual benefits (win-win strategies).
x. Push for objectivity in judging proposals.
H. Pricing the workout
While considering the price of the workout, the banks should consider cash flow, net present value, involvement of other banks (share, interest rate), and collateral value. The pricing should also factor in the risk in the proposal i.e. the change in risk profile of the borrower and waiver/ sacrifice amount while finalizing the work out strategy.
I. Maintaining fallback strategics
Fall-back strategies are important because of the potential fluidity of any workout. The following are worth keeping in mind as strategy is being developed:
a) Workout strategies can be rendered ineffective suddenly, without warning and often as the result of revisions to what were previously believed to be immutable facts.
b) The importance of comparing options carefully during initial strategy selection - The scope for different views and approaches is ample. While occasionally some solutions will so clearly dominate all others as to not require deep discussion of alternatives, more often the best course of action is not so immediately obvious. In such cases, a thorough analysis and discussion of the strategy options will be an indispensable part of the asset recovery process. Best practice also involves formalizing the process, by holding the type of decision meeting appropriate for removing ambiguity as to what was decided and by recording the decision.
Comparisons of the various asset recovery options should involve quantification. As a minimum, each strategy option considered should be presented in terms of its internal rate of return (IRR) and/or its net present value (NPV). However, to the extent that certain aspects of risk and uncertainty play an important role yet are not always easily quantified, the framework for analysis and presentation should accommodate important qualitative considerations as well. The SWOT framework may be useful for comparing alternative workout strategies. Regardless of the framework used, it is important to ensure that all main assumptions are set in writing. Over time, assumptions that appear obvious early on are altered and rendered inapplicable. The workout specialist will appreciate having a record of the changing assumptions as the workout plan evolves.
Clear communication helps keep market participants informed, build confidence in the resolution strategy and maintain public support. Authorities gather a large amount of information in the process of assessing the NPL problem and play a strong coordination role in the resolution strategy. They are therefore best placed to explain to market participants how the NPL crisis is developing, and to propose and implement solutions. Communication is essential to build public support, given that public sector intervention will have fiscal implications, as well as an impact on borrower companies and households. Finally, communication of the resolution strategy creates a basis for a subsequent policy review, thus keeping the authorities accountable.
J. Documentation of plan
Banks must document each loan workout determination as part of the formal record. This includes documented communication with the borrower demonstrating the borrower has a renewed willingness and ability to repay the loan. Further, sufficient documentation of the ability to repay the loan must be on records for the options evaluated for assessing the borrower's ability to repay.
The bank should establish comprehensive management and internal controls over loan workout activity. This includes establishing authority levels and segregation of duties over the various types of workouts (modification, refinance, adjusting due dates, etc.). In addition, the policy needs to specify volume thresholds tied to financial performance elements such as net worth, delinquency and/or net charge off rates, etc. that trigger enhanced reporting to SAMA.
The contract and documentation should include a well-defined borrower milestone target schedule, detailing all necessary milestones to be achieved by the borrower in order to repay the loan over the course of the contract term. These milestones/targets should be credible, appropriately conservative and take account of any potential deterioration of the borrower's financial situation.
Based on the collective monitoring of the performance of different restructuring options and on the examination of potential causes and instances of re-defaults (inadequate affordability assessment, issue with the characteristics of the restructuring treatment product, change in the borrower's conditions, external macroeconomic effects etc.), banks should regularly review their restructuring policies and products.
For the cases, where the borrower has experienced an identifiable event which has caused temporary liquidity constraints. Evidence of such an event should be demonstrated in a formal manner (and not speculatively) via written documentation with defined evidence showing that the borrower's income will recover in the short-term or on the basis of the bank concluding that a long-term restructuring solution was not possible due to a temporary financial uncertainty of a general or borrower specific nature.
Greater transparency on NPLs can improve the viability of all resolution options, as well as market functioning in normal times. In cases where the ownership of the NPL passes from the originating bank to an external party, information limitations play an important role. To help overcome this problem, some standardization of asset quality data, as well as completeness of legal documentation on the ownership of these loans, would help buyers and sellers agree on pricing. In addition, co-investment strategies in securities originated from a pool of NPLs may reduce information asymmetries between buyers and sellers. This could increase transaction volumes, or facilitate sales at higher prices. A third option is the establishment of databases for realized prices of real estate transactions, given that real estate is the most widely used form of collateral. A transparent and sufficiently large database on real estate sale prices would, therefore, enhance the stability and reliability of NPL valuations, ultimately facilitating the NPL disposal process and leading to smaller price discounts. This would encourage market-based solutions for NPL disposal.
K. Information Access:
One of the key success factors for the successful implementation of any strategy option is adequate technical infrastructure. In this context, it is important that all cases related data is centrally stored in robust and secured IT systems. Data should be complete and up-to-date throughout the workout process. An adequate technical infrastructure should enable units to easily access all relevant data and documentation including:
i. current NPL and early arrears borrower information including automated notifications in the case of updates;
ii. loan and collateral/guarantee information linked to the borrower or connected borrowers;
iii. monitoring/documentation tools with the IT capabilities to track restructuring performance and effectiveness;
iv. status of workout activities and borrower interaction, as well as details on restructuring measures, agreed, etc.;
v. foreclosed assets (where relevant);
vi. tracked cash flows of the loan and collateral;
vii. sources of underlying information and complete underlying documentation;
viii. access to central credit registers, land registers and other relevant external data sources where technically possible.
L. External Information
As a minimum, the following information should be obtained when restructuring a non-retail loan:
i. latest audited financial statements and/or latest management accounts;
ii. Verification of variable elements of current income; assumptions used for the discounting of variable elements;
iii. overall indebtedness;
iv. business plan and/or cash-flow forecast, depending on the size of the borrower and the maturity of the loan;
v. latest independent valuation report of any mortgaged immovable properties securing the underlying facility;
vi. information on any other collateral securing the underlying loan facilities.
vii. latest valuations of any other collateral securing the underlying loan facilities;
viii. historical financial data;
ix. relevant market indicators (unemployment rate, GDP, inflation, etc.).
x. In case of MSME's access to bank statements of all accounts maintained by the borrower may also be necessary.
M. Internal Information
Banks should maintain in the credit file of the transactions the documentation needed so that a third party can replicate the individual estimations of accumulated credit losses made over time. This documentation should include, inter alia, information on the scenario used to estimate the cash flows it is expected to collect (going concern vs. gone concern scenario), the method used to determine cash flows (either a detailed cash-flow analysis or other more simplified methods), their amount and timing as well as the effective interest rate used for discounting cash-flows.
Banks should maintain all internal supporting documentation, which may be made available for review by the supervisory authority upon request. It should include:
i. the criteria used to identify loans subject to an individual assessment;
ii. rules applied when grouping loans with similar credit risk characteristics, whether significant or not, including supporting evidence that the loans have similar characteristics;
iii. detailed information regarding the inputs, calculations, and outputs in support of each of the categories of assumptions made in relation to each group of loans;
iv. rationale applied to determine the considered assumptions in the impairment calculation;
v. results of testing of the assumptions against actual loss experience;
vi. policies and procedures which set out how the bank sets, monitors and assesses the considered assumptions;
vii. findings and outcomes of collective allowances;
viii. supporting documentation for any factors considered that produce an impact on the historical loss data;
ix. detailed information on the experienced judgment applied to adjust observable data for a group of financial assets to reflect current circumstances.
N. Restructuring documentation
Important documents in any workout will be the term sheet, the loan agreement, and the security documents. Even before the banks have determined that a going concern solution is feasible and indeed preferable and the transaction starts crystallizing, they will want to start preparing documents.
The documentation will also determine the conditions of effectiveness of the restructuring. Before these have been met, the restructuring is not complete and it is theoretically possible to revert to the default and real bankruptcy.
The proposal should contain the following elements:
i. Full description of the borrower
ii. Amount(s) of the loan(s) to be restructured
iii. Restructuring fees and expenses, if any
iv. Name(s) of the bank(s)
v. Anticipated date of closing
vi. Representations and warranties
vii. Repayment schedule(s)
viii. Mandatory repayment(s), if any
ix. Cash sweep mechanism, if any
x. Interest rate(s) and applicable margin(s) if floating rate
xi. Default interest
xii. Interest payment dates
xiii. (Revised) events of default
xiv. (Additional) security
xv. List of documentation
xvi. Taxes
xvii. Governing law
O. Checklist:
i. Establish parties to be part of the workout transaction
ii. Establish what minimum terms acceptable to parties other than the borrower
iii. Prepare draft term-sheet
iv. Negotiate draft term-sheet among parties other than borrower and reach tentative agreement
v. Submit draft term-sheet to borrower
vi. Negotiate, agree, and initial term-sheet
vii. Have lawyers prepare draft legal documents for workout, including new or amendatory loan agreement and security documents, based on initialed term-sheet
viii. Negotiate, agree, and sign legal documents for workout
ix. Determine when conditions of effectiveness have been met and workout is complete.
5.3.2 Drafting the Restructuring Agreement
A typical restructuring agreement at minimum should include: Purpose, Restructuring Fees and Expenses, banksLenders, Nature and Amount of Current Principal Loan, Role of External Counsel, Signing Date of the Loan Restructuring Agreements and other Documentation, Conditions of Effectiveness, Representations and Warranties, Repayment Schedule, Mandatory Prepayments, Cash Sweep Mechanism, Interest Rates, Applicable Margin - Base, Default Interest, Interest Periods, Shareholder Loan, Emergency Working, Deferral of Principal Payment, Undertakings, Events of Default, Security, Documentation, Taxes, Withholdings, Deductions and Relevant Governing Law.
A. Determining required documentation
Every restructuring transaction is different in its own way, and these differences lead to defining the type and number of documents required to formalize the workout. Factors like the number of creditors, the size of the loan restructured and the type of collateral used in the original lending transaction determine the complexity and number of documents required to formalize a workout.
Regardless of the number of creditors and complexity of loan structure, the restructuring documentation will determine the conditions and effectiveness of the restructuring, and it is essential that all parties should agree and sign the documents before implementing the workout. Until all documents have been formalized, it is still possible that the restructuring negotiations fail and initiating the bankruptcy proceedings.
The documentation formalizing the workout should always be prepared by a legal practitioner. While the legal practitioner should be primarily responsible for elaborating this documentation, close collaboration is required with the Workout Unit in charge of negotiating the workout.
In the case of MSME workouts, the banks are encouraged to explore developing restructuring documentation, which is typically simplified in comparison with the restructuring of larger corporate borrowers. This is just a reflection of the fact that the negotiating process is simpler, and most negotiating milestones are either abridged or do not take place at all.
For further guidance on relevant agreements refer to Appendix 4.
B. Communicating with the borrower during the workout process
The bank should have detailed internal guidelines and rules regarding bank's staff communication with the borrower. Communication with borrowers should be as per the procedures outlined in the bank's code of conduct. This should include; timelines for responding to borrower's requests/complaints, identify who within the bank is responsible/authorized to issue various types of communications to the borrowers, documenting process for all communications to/from the borrowers, signing/acknowledgement protocols with timelines, approval requirements for all workout proposals, templates to be used for communication with the borrowers.
With respect to borrowers, transferred to the specialized unit, some of the basic principles are as follows:
i. Work out unit must act honestly, fairly, and professionally at all times.
ii. RM should avoid putting excessive pressure on the borrower and/or guarantor. All contacts with the borrower should take place at reasonable times) and at a mutually convenient location.
iii. Documenting all the communication with the borrowers (and guarantors) and retaining for an appropriate time. Notes to the credit file should be factual.
iv. Sign all communications of a legal nature such as commitment letters, demand letters, or other communications with respect to legal proceedings by those individuals authorized to do so by policy.
v. All written communications from the borrower should be acknowledged within (5) business days.
vi. RM should make clear from the beginning that all restructuring proposals require the approval of either one or more committees or senior managers. The borrower should be given an approximate timetable for approval and promptly notified of any delays.
vii. All approved restructuring proposals should be communicated to the borrower and guarantor(s) in writing, clearly spelling out all the terms and conditions, including covenants if required together with all reasonable costs arising from the transaction.
viii. Notify borrowers in writing if their restructuring proposal is declined, including the reasons for rejection.
C. Resolution of disputes
When the bank and the borrower fail to reach an agreement or the borrower considers the proposed restructuring plan of the bank or negotiation process does not follow the principles described in the paragraphs above, the borrower should have the right to elevate his case to the level above the specialized unit. General established practice is for the borrower to write directly to the CRO. It should be ensured that the dispute is being reviewed independently of the personnel/team against whom the appeal has been filled.
Given the nature of the resolution process, which is likely, to generate a number of such inquiries, banks may wish to consider formalizing this process. An indicative example of a more formal process can be summarized as follows:
i. An Appeals Committee consisting of at least three senior officers is formed.
ii. The members of the Committee should be knowledgeable about the credit granting process but be independent of the credit origination, workout, and risk management functions.
iii. A member should disclose potential conflicts of interest and recuse themselves from further discussions with respect to any relevant case being discussed by the Committee.
The borrowers should have prompt and easy access to filing an appeal. Good practice in this regard includes standardized appeal forms together with a list of information or required documents needed in the review of the appeal, and deadlines for the submission and reviews of appeals.
a) Acknowledgment of submission of appeals in writing.
b) The decision of the Appeals Committee should be announced within one (1) month from the date of submission and should be in writing and include the reasons for the committee's decision.
c) The borrower would have a right to appeal on a specific issue only once.
Educating borrowers, especially in the MSME category may be required that restructuring of loan obligations is a concession provided by the bank and not a legal right of the borrower.
5.4 Monitoring the Restructuring Plan
SAMA expects banks to maintain effective controls in relation to restructured loans and in connection therewith, have laid out regulatory expectations regarding monitoring performance in accordance with the restructuring agreements once the new workout “regime” has been decided and implemented.
The monitoring function will need to address several aspects, the tracking of both how and when will the cash be generated is important.
The approval of the restructuring agreement is only a part of the resolution, whereas the bank must continue to monitor the borrower to ensure timely reprogramming of payments and meeting of commitments. If reasons exist on the part of the borrower to deviate from the agreement, that are reasonable and objectively justifiable, the bank may approve a waiver of commitment. In the event of material unjustified deviations, the bank must impose additional requirements, penalty interest, termination of agreement, blocking of the transaction account, execution, etc.
The control over the fulfillment of all commitments and timely payments must be ensured by the bank by setting up appropriate IT and Organizational support. If there is no confidence in the management, the bank should strive to involve an external consultant or authorized person to periodically monitor the company's operations on behalf of the bank.
For MSMEs, a short quarterly review may be the most cost-efficient manner, namely in the form of meetings with the key staff and inspecting the documentation, analyzing the financial statements in order to obtain an overview of a realistic business and financial situation of the borrower.
Tracking financial obligations and managing cash flow during the workout
Note: The below is not illustrated with a purpose of regulating borrowers, but rather as a guideline to banks to ensure that cash-flows management pertaining to restructured borrowers, is subject to adequate and proper oversight by the bank's staff, within the legal rights given by the restructuring agreement.
During a workout, managing cash becomes even more critical because the company as a borrower must concern itself not only with the overall manageability of its loan levels and timeliness of loan servicing payments but also with questions of fairness and equitable treatment among its various creditors and other payees as cash becomes available and decisions are taken as to how it is to be applied. Sales of assets, which during good times would have happened without issue, now must be subjected to additional scrutiny to ensure that they do not trigger alarms of “fraudulent conveyance.”
Careful cash flow forecasting should be accompanied by sound cash controls within the borrower company. This can be achieved either within the borrower's own systems or by introducing special organizational arrangements that effectively cordon off the cash management function.
When cash continues to be managed within the borrower company, the following is strongly advisable:
i. Establish expenditure thresholds for different levels of review and control.
ii. For expenditures over a certain threshold, ensure that double signatures are required to authorize payment.
iii. Depending on the nature of the business, either centralize approvals and handling of expenditures or set regular budgetary guidance and spending “envelopes" for unit or department managers with appropriate procedures for enforcing spending/budgeting reconciliation and accountability.
iv. Rationalize approvals and payments system.
v. Use a third-party consultant or auditor or bank's internal independent resource to perform periodic operational audits as part of an ongoing monitoring process tailored to the key aspects of the workout and distinct from other audit and financial reporting functions.
5.4.1 Monitoring Arrangements for Restructured Loans
Restructured borrowers should be subject to intensive monitoring to ensure their continued ability to meet their obligations, The specialized team should use the bank’s EWS system to alert business segments of any potential problems. All borrowers should be subject to periodic review, the timing of which and depth of analysis required should be proportional to the size of the loan together with the level of risk inherent in the credit. Those loans which are material in nature and pose the greatest risk to the bank should be reviewed monthly on an abbreviated basis focused on recent developments. More in-depth reviews would be done on a quarterly and annual basis in conjunction with receipt of interim and annual financial statements. Smaller loans might be monitored semi-annually for the first year with annual reviews thereafter. Finally, the smallest loans could be subject to an annual review of their financial statements.
Senior management should also be monitoring closely the key performance indicators (KPIs) of specific portfolio segments to ensure that the goals embedded in the strategic plan are on track. Deviations from the plan should be identified and appropriate time-bound, corrective action plans put in place and monitored.
A. Changing the risk rating of the loan
All banks should have clear written policies and procedures in place which outline the specific criteria together with required cure periods which must be satisfied to upgrade (or downgrade) the risk rating on a loan. While the goal of the restructuring is to improve the loan's risk rating, the borrower must demonstrate its ability to meet the terms of the restructuring as well as show an improvement in its risk profile for a specified period of time before an upgrade is appropriate. It requires a one year waiting period after restructuring before a loan becomes eligible for consideration of an upgrade.
It is important to realize that upgrade is not automatic after the one year period, but rather should be based on the borrower's current and expected future performance. The borrowers should demonstrate that financial difficulties no longer exist. The following criteria should be met in order to dispel concerns regarding financial difficulties:
i. the borrower has made all required payments in a timely manner for at least one year;
ii. the loan is not considered as impaired or defaulted;
iii. there is no past-due amount on the loan;
iv. the borrower has demonstrated its ability to comply with all other post restructuring conditions contained in the master restructuring agreement; and
v. the borrower does not have any other loans with amounts more than 90 dpd or 180 dpd (as the case may be) at the date when the loan is reclassified.
Particular attention should be paid to bullet and balloon loans (with reduced front payments). Even after one year of flawless performance, the repayment in full of a balloon loan that relies on a large payment at the end of repayment period can be questionable.
B. Transferring the borrower back to the originating unit
The following criteria should be applied when transferring a borrower back to the business unit:
i. The borrower regularly meets all its obligations from the restructuring agreement;
ii. At least one year has passed from the beginning of validity of the restructuring and
iii. The borrower has repaid at least 10 percent of the restructured principal in that period;
iv. The borrower's indebtedness, measured with the net financial liabilities/EBITDA indicator, etc.;
v. The transfer had been approved on the basis of the analysis of the borrower's financial position by the competent committee of the bank.
Once a borrower has demonstrated its ability to meet the all the terms of its restructured obligations for a period of at least one year, repaid at least 10 percent of its restructured loan, and no longer displays any of the signals which would cause automatic transfer to the specialized team, the loan should be transferred back to the originating unit for servicing and follow up. Borrowers need to be seen to be viable by their customers and suppliers. A bank's willingness to work with a company to resolve its problems together with the resumption of a normalized banking relationship provides the public with a level of comfort that allows them to do business with the company.
C. Monitoring of workout activities
Banks should establish a robust set of metrics to measure progress in the implementation of their work out strategy for all the accounts.
The monitoring systems should be based on targets approved in the risk strategy and related operational plans which are subsequently cascaded down to the operational targets of the business and specialized teams. A related framework of key performance indicators (KPIs) should be developed to allow the senior management committee and other relevant managers to measure progress.
Clear processes should be established to ensure that the outcomes of the monitoring of restructured indicators have an adequate and timely link to related business activities such as pricing of credit risk and provisioning.
Restructuring related KPIs can be grouped into several high-level categories, including but not necessarily limited to:
i. Bad/ stressed loan KPI's;
ii. Borrower engagement and cash collection;
iii. Restructuring activities;
iv. Liquidation activities;
v. Other (e.g. NPL-related profit and loss (P&L) items, foreclosed assets, early warning signals, outsourcing activities).
D. Bad/ stressed loan KPI’s:
Banks should define adequate indicators comparable with the portfolio should be monitored on a periodic basis.
Banks should closely monitor the relative and absolute levels of stressed loans and early arrears in their books at a sufficient level of portfolio granularity. Absolute and relative levels of foreclosed assets (or other assets stemming from workout activities), as well as the levels of performing forborne loans, should also be monitored.
Another key monitoring element is the level of impairment/provisions and collateral/ guarantees overall and for different NPL cohorts. These cohorts should be defined using criteria which are relevant for the coverage levels in order to provide the senior management and other relevant managers with meaningful information (e.g. by number of years since NPL classification, type of product/loan including secured/unsecured, type of collateral and guarantees, country and region of loan, time to recovery and the use of the going and gone concern approach).
Coverage movements should also be monitored and reductions clearly explained in the monitoring reports. Where possible, indicators related to the NPL ratio/level and coverage should also be appropriately benchmarked against peers in order to provide the senior management with a clear picture on competitive positioning and potential high-level shortcomings.
Finally, banks should monitor their loss budget and its comparison with actual. This should be sufficiently granular for the senior management and other relevant managers to understand the drivers of significant deviations from the plan.
Key figures on NPL inflows and outflows should be contained in periodic reporting to the senior management, including moves from/to NPLs, NPLs in cure period, performing, performing forborne and early arrears. Inflows from a performing status to a non-performing status appear gradually (e.g. from 0 dpd to 30dpd. 30dpd to 60dpd. 60dpd to 90dpd, or 180 days as the case may be etc.) but can also appear suddenly (e.g. event-driven). A useful monitoring tool for this area is the establishment of migration matrices, which will track the flow of loans into and out of non-performing classification.
Banks should estimate the migration rates and the quality of the performing book month by month so that actions can be taken promptly (i.e. prioritize the actions) to inhibit the deterioration of portfolio quality. Migration matrices can be further elaborated by loan type (housing, consumer, real estate), by business unit or by other relevant portfolio segment to identify whether the driver of the flows is attributed to a specific loan segment.
E. Borrower’s engagement and cash collection
Key operational performance metrics should be implemented to assess the specialized unit or employees' (if adequate) efficiency relative to the average performance and/or standard benchmark indicators (if they exist). These key operational measures should include both activity-type measures and efficiency type measures. The list below is indicative of the type of measures, without being exhaustive:
i. Scheduled vs. actual borrower engagements;
ii. Percentage of engagements converted to a payment or promise to pay;
iii. Cash collected in absolute terms and cash collected vs. contractual cash obligation split by:
- Cash collected from borrower payments;
- cash collected from other sources (e.g. collateral sale, salary garnishments, bankruptcy proceedings);
iv. promises to pay secured and promises to pay kept vs. promises to pay due;
v. total and long-term restructuring solutions agreed with the borrower (count and volume).
F. Workout activities
One key tool available to banks to resolve or limit the impact of NPLs is restructuring if properly managed. Banks should monitor workout activity in two ways: efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency relates mainly to the volume of credit facilities offered restructuring and the time needed to negotiate with the borrower while effectiveness relates to the degree of success of the restructuring option (i.e. whether the revised/modified contractual obligations of the borrower are met).
In addition, proper monitoring of the quality of the restructuring is needed to ensure that the ultimate outcome of the restructuring measures is the repayment of the amount due and not a delaying of the assessment that the loan is uncollectable.
In this regard, the type of solutions agreed should be monitored and long-term (sustainable structural) solutions should be separated from short-term (temporary) solutions.
It is noted that modification in the terms and conditions of a loan or refinancing could take place in all phases of the credit life cycle; therefore, banks should ensure that they monitor the restructuring activity of both performing and non-performing loans.
G. Efficiency of workout activity
Depending on the potential targets set by the bank and the portfolio segmentation, key metrics to measure their efficiency could be:
a) the volume of concluded evaluations (both in number and value) submitted to the authorized approval body for a defined time period;
b) the volume of agreed modified solutions (both in number and value) reached with the borrower for a defined time period;
c) the value and number of positions resolved over a defined time period (in absolute values and as a percentage of the initial stock).
It might also be useful to monitor the efficiency of other individual steps within the workout process, e.g. length of decision-taking/approval procedure.
H. Effectiveness of workout activity
The ultimate target of loan modifications is to ensure that the modified contractual obligations of the borrower are met and the solution found is viable. In this respect, the type of agreed solutions per portfolio with similar characteristics should be separated and the success rate of each solution should be monitored over time.
Key metrics to monitor the success rate of each restructuring solution include:
i. Cure rate (the rate arrived at by conducting performance analysis of the forborne credit facilities after their designated cure period) and re-default rate (the rate arrived at by performing a performance analysis of the forborne credit facilities after their designated cure period):
Given the fact that most of the loans will present no evidence of financial difficulties right after the modification; a cure period is needed to determine whether the loan has been effectively cured. The minimum cure period applied to determine cure rates should be minimum for 12 months. Thus, banks should conduct a vintage analysis and monitor the behavior of forborne credit facilities after 12 months from the date of modification to determine the cure rate. This analysis should be conducted per loan segment (borrower with similar characteristics or basis industry segment) and, potentially, the extent of financial difficulties prior to restructuring.
Cure of arrears on facilities presenting arrears could take place either through restructuring measures of the credit facility (forborne cure) or naturally without modification of the original terms of the credit facility (natural cure). Banks should have a mechanism in place to monitor the rate and the volume of those defaulted credit facilities cured naturally. The re-default rate is another key performance indicator that should be included in internal NPL monitoring reports for the senior management and other relevant managers.
ii. Type of workout measure: Banks should clearly define which types of workout measures are defined as short-term versus long-term solutions. Individual characteristics of workout agreements should be flagged and stored in the IT systems and periodic monitoring should provide the senior management and other relevant managers with a clear view on what proportion of restructuring solutions agreed are:
o of a short-term versus long term nature; and
o have certain characteristics (e.g. payment holidays ≥ 12 months, increase of principal, additional collateral, etc.).
iii. Cash collection rate: Another key metric of workout activity is the cash collection from restructured credit facilities. Cash collection could be monitored against the revised contractual cash flows, i.e. the actual to contractual cash flow ratio, and in absolute terms. These two metrics may provide information to the bank for liquidity planning purposes and the relative success of each workout measure.
iv. NPL write-off: In certain cases, as part of a workout solution, banks may proceed with a restructuring option that involves NPL write-off, either on a partial or full basis. Any NPL write-off associated with the granting of these types of restructuring should be recorded and monitored against an approved loss budget. In addition, the net present value loss associated with the decision to write off unrecoverable loans should be monitored against the cure rate per loan segment and per restructuring solution offered to help better inform the banks’ restructuring strategy and policies. All NPL write off policies developed by banks are required to follow the rules defined under the circular on “Credit Risk Classification and Provisioning”.
Indicators relating to workout activities should be reported using a meaningful breakdown which could for instance include the type and length of arrears, the kind of loan, the probability of recovery, the size of the loans or the total amount of loans of the same borrower or connected borrowers, or the number of workout solutions applied in the past.
I. Liquidation activities
Provided that no sustainable restructuring solution has been reached, the bank is still expected to resolve the stressed loan. Resolution may involve initiating legal procedures, foreclosing assets, loan to asset/equity swap, and/or disposal of credit facilities.
Consequently, this activity should be monitored by the bank to help inform strategy and policies while also assisting with the allocation of resources.
J. Legal measures and pre-closure
Banks should monitor the volumes and recovery rates of legal and foreclosure cases. This performance should be measured against set targets, in terms of number of months/years and loss to the bank. In monitoring the actual loss rate, banks are expected to build historical time series per loan segment to back up the assumptions used for impairment review purposes and stress test exercises.
For facilities covered with collateral or another type of security, banks should monitor the time period needed to liquidate the collateral, potential forced sale haircuts upon liquidation and developments in certain markets (e.g. property markets) to obtain an outlook regarding the potential recovery rates.
In addition, by monitoring the recovery rates from foreclosure and other legal proceedings, banks will be in a better position to reliably assess whether the decision to foreclose will provide a higher net present value than pursuing a restructuring option. The data regarding the recovery rates from foreclosures should be monitored on an ongoing basis and feed potential amendments to banks' strategies for handling their loan recovery / legal portfolios.
Banks should also monitor the average lengths of legal procedures recently completed and the average recovery amounts (including related recovery costs) from these completed procedures.
K. Loan to asset/equity swap
Banks should carefully monitor cases where the loan is swapped with an asset or equity of the borrower, at least by using the volume indicators by type of assets and ensure compliance with any limits set by the relevant national regulations on holdings. The use of this approach as a restructuring measure should be backed by a proper business plan and limited to assets where the bank has sufficient expertise and the market realistically allows the determined value to be extracted from the asset in a short to medium-term horizon. The bank should also make sure that the valuation of the assets is carried out by qualified and experienced appraisers.
L. Other monitoring items
i. P&L-related items
Banks should also monitor and make transparent to their management bodies the amount of interest accounted for in the P&L stemming from restructured loans. Additionally, a distinction should be made between the interest payments on those restructure actually received and those not actually received. The evolution of loan loss provisions and the respective drivers should also be monitored.
ii. Foreclosed assets
If foreclosure is a part of banks' strategy, they should also monitor the volume, aging, coverage and flows in their portfolios of foreclosed assets (or other assets stemming from restructured loans). This should include sufficient granularity of material types of assets. Furthermore, the performance of the foreclosed assets with respect to the predefined business plan should be monitored in an appropriate way and reported to the senior management and other relevant managers on an aggregate level.
iii. Miscellaneous
Other aspects that might be relevant for reporting would include the efficiency and effectiveness of outsourcing/servicing agreements. Indicators used for this are most likely very similar to those applied to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of internal units, though potentially less granular.
Generally, where restructuring-related KPIs differ from a regulatory and an accounting or internal reporting viewpoint, these differences should be clearly reported to the senior management and explained.
5.4.2 When Restructuring Fails
It is to be expected that a certain number of restructurings will fail. If the restructured borrower does not perform his obligations, the bank needs to quickly assess if the problem is temporary in nature and easily corrected (e.g., a temporary slowdown in sales to a major customer who is moving to a new location) or more permanent in nature (e.g., the company's major product has been rendered obsolete by regulations). If the company is still viable in the long term and the problem can be easily corrected, the borrower could be allowed to restructure the terms of repayment one more time. In general, however, multiple restructurings can be an indication that the borrower is no longer viable and that there are problems in the approval process. If the problem is of a more permanent nature (e.g., as evidenced by second payment default), the borrower should be deemed non-viable and promptly referred for legal proceedings.
The bank should closely monitor failed restructurings to determine the reasons behind them and assess the appropriateness of its strategies.
Appendix 1: Samples of Early Warning Signals
The Following are illustrated for indicative purposes and are not intended to be prescriptive, as stated in the rules of Management of Problem Loans, banks should establish EWS that are suitable to their portfolio:
EWS At Borrower Level from External Sources Debt and collateral increase in other banks Past-due or other NP classifications in other banks Guarantor default Debt in private central register (if any) Legal proceeding External Sources Bankruptcy Changes in the company structure (e.g. merger, capital reduction) External rating assigned and trends Other negative information regarding major clients/counterparties of the debtor/suppliers EWS at a borrower level from internal sources Negative trend in internal rating Balances not appearing in current account / lower balances in Margin account / Negative own funds Significant change in liquidity profile Liabilities leverage (e.g. equity/total < 5% or 10%) Number of days past due Companies Number of months with any overdraft/overdraft exceeded Profit before taxes/revenue (e.g. ratio < -1%) Continued losses Continued excess in commercial paper discount Decrease of turnover Reduction in credit lines related to trade receivables (e.g. year- on-year variation, 3m average/1y average) Unexpected reduction in undrawn credit lines (e.g. undrawn amount/total credit line) Negative trend in behavioral scoring Negative trend in probability of default and/or internal rating Mortgage loan installment > x time credit balance Mortgage and consumer credit days past due Decrease in the credit balance > 95% in the last 6 months Average total credit balance < 0.05% of total debt balance Forborne Exposures Nationality and related historic loss rates Individuals / sole proprietors Decrease in payroll in the last 3 months Unemployment Early arrears (e.g. 5-30 days of past due, depending on portfolio/borrower types) Reduction in bank transfers in current accounts Increase of loan installment over the payroll ratio Number of months with any overdraft exceeded Negative trend in behavioral scoring Negative trend in probability of default and/or internal rating EWS at a portfolio/segment level Size distribution and concentration level Portfolio Distribution Top X (e.g. 10) groups of connected borrowers and related risk indicators Asset class distribution Breakdown by industry, sector, collateral types, countries, maturities, etc. Risk parameters PD/LGD evolution (overall and per segment) PD/LGD forecasts and projections Default loan Volumes and trends of significant risk provisions on individual level NPL/restructuring status/foreclosure NPL volume by category (>90 past due, etc.) Restructuring volume and segmentation ( workout, forced prolongation, other modifications, deferrals, >90 past due, LLP) Foreclosed assets on total loans NPL ratio without foreclosed assets EWS by specific type of borrowers/sectors General Customizable index data (GDP, stock markets, commodity prices, CDS prices, etc.) Real estate Real estate-related indexes (segment, region, cities, rural areas, etc.) Rental market scores and expected market value changes Aviation Airline-specific indicators (passenger load, revenue per passenger, etc.) Energy Index data on regional alternative energy sources (e.g. wind quantities, etc.) Information-gathering system on potential technical or political risks on energy Appendix 2: Loan Life Coverage Ratio
Application and computation of the ratio
Loan Life Coverage Ratio (LLCR) should be used by Workout teams to assess the viability of a given amount of debt and consequently to evaluate the risk profile and the related costs. Unlike Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) which captures just a single point in time, LLCR allows for several time periods more suitable for understanding liquidity available for loans of medium to long time horizons. Thus, given its long-term nature, this ratio should be used for project finance and other multi-year loans, where long term viability needs to be assessed.
The LLCR is a financial ratio used to estimate the solvency of a firm, or the ability of a borrowing company to repay an outstanding loan. LLCR is calculated by dividing the net present value (NPV) of the money available for debt repayment by the amount of outstanding debt.
The Formula for the computation is as follows:
Present value of total available cash flow (ACF) during the loan life period (including interest and principal) + cash reserve available to repay the debt (the debt reserve)
LLCR = --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Outstanding loan Amount at the time of assessment
Where, CFt= cash - flows available for debt service at year t
t = the time period (year)
s = the number of years expected to pay the debt back
i = the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) expressed as an interest rate
In this calculation, the weighted average cost of debt is the discount rate for the NPV calculation and the project "cash flows" are more specifically the cash flows available for debt service. The loan life coverage ratio is a measure of the number of times over the cash flows of a project can repay an outstanding debt over the life of a loan. The higher the ratio, the less potential risk there is for the bank.
Appendix 3: Restructuring Principles
The guidelines set out below a set of generic principles that banks are encouraged to follow and adopt as part of their culture in relation to restructuring activities. These principles include, but are not limited to:
i. Restructuring activities should not be viewed as a cost center. Restructuring measures can allow the banks to maximize their recovery and maintain a good and long-term relationship with their borrowers.
ii. Restructuring can allow the borrowers to survive and potentially return to a sustainable and growth path that would benefit the borrower, the economy and the banks.
iii. If banks are effective in identifying early warning signs, addressing the issues and engaging in early restructuring solutions, this could prevent long-term default and losses and result in higher profit for both banks and borrowers.
iv. Restructuring should be done in utmost good faith and both banks and borrowers should show seriousness and commitment to lead a successful process.
v. Negotiations must be in the best interest of the borrower and the bank.
vi. Transparency and regular communication should take place between various stakeholders in a restructuring situation.
vii. Transparency and full disclosure of information, when appropriate, should take place between the borrower and the banks to ensure both parties can make informed decisions for the best interest of both parties.
viii. The banks should aim to provide a prompt response to the borrower's proposal for a restructuring solution.
ix. The borrower shall have reasonable and sufficient time to provide the requested information and consider the restructuring proposal.
x. Banks and borrowers should seek sustainable solutions and avoid repeated short-term fixes.
xi. Confidentiality should be respected throughout the process.
xii. Consensual but sustainable out-of-court restructuring solutions are considered the best and most favorable outcome when it comes to restructuring. Banks are expected to exhaust all consensual options before deciding to follow a court-led process or enforcing on securities.
Appendix 4: Details of Relevant Agreements
Standstill Agreement
In cases, where several creditors are involved, formalizing a standstill agreement is typically the first step involved in the workout process. The standstill is an agreement between the borrower and relevant creditors, typically lending banks, confirming that they will not enforce their rights against the borrower for any default during a limited period. The main purpose of the standstill is to give the borrower sufficient ‘breathing space' to collect information and prepare a survival strategy, while in parallel creditors work on formulating a joint approach. Standstill agreements may also include other obligations to be observed during the standstill period, for example, that creditors grant additional financing to the borrower to cover working capital or postpone any capital or interest payments due.
In the context of an MSME workout, it may be necessary to sign a Standstill agreement, even if the number of creditors is limited. The main advantage of formalizing such document is that it will provide sufficient certainty to both parties that a workout is being negotiated, ensuring that the borrower can focus his efforts in the operational changes needed to succeed. For those cases where it is required to formalize a Standstill agreement, a simplified template adopted to the MSME context. However, in certain cases, it may not be necessary to formalize a Standstill agreement and creditor(s) and borrower will proceed on the mutual understanding that a standstill exists. This will typically occur when there is just a single creditor that holds a close and long-standing commercial relationship with the borrower, who is being cooperative in the workout negotiations.
The contents of the standstill agreement will largely depend on the transaction at hand, but typically will imply that creditors will assume some (or all) of the following obligations, among others:
i. Not to start enforcement actions against the borrower or his assets;
ii. Not to declare the loan agreement breached, or accelerate the loan;
iii. Not to take additional collateral or improve his position with respect to other creditors;
iv. Not to charge additional fees or penalty interests;
v. Not to set-off any amounts against the borrower for pending obligations.
In return, the borrower will agree not to take any action that would harm the creditors, such as the sale or transfer of assets to a third party or make payments to any creditors except in the ordinary course of business, and will allow the creditors full access to all necessary books and records.
Restructuring Agreement
The restructuring agreement is the main document that regulates all the details of the workout. In the case of MSMEs, where the workout documentation will often be simplified, the restructuring agreement will many times be the only document formalized, and it is very important that all details be captured accurately, not just in connection with the payment obligations of the borrower but also with his behaviour during the lifetime of the restructuring agreement. When drafting a restructuring agreement, it should be born in mind that the main purposes of this document are (i) to explain how the borrower is going to restructure both his debt and his operations, if applicable, and (ii) to specify how and when creditors are to be repaid.
There is no standard format for how a restructuring agreement should look like. The details of the agreement will largely depend on the needs of the business and the willingness of creditors to make concessions to avoid a bankruptcy of the borrower. For example, in the case of a workout consisting of a simple rescheduling of maturities, a signed letter may be enough to document the workout. However, in case of modification in the maturity dates as well as the principal and applicable interests of the loan agreement, drafting a new agreement will probably be necessary. In this case, it is highly advisable that the legal department of the lending banks is brought on-board from the outset, since they should determine whether
i. the workout will be documented into a new agreement that will replace the existing contractual documentation existing between the borrower and creditors, or
ii. the original loan agreement will remain in place but as amended by the terms and conditions included in an additional agreement.
This second approach has the advantage that it will not be necessary to amend the already existing security package, which will keep its priority without the need of seeking new registrations.
In terms of the substantive content of the restructuring agreement, the document may include any of the loan restructuring techniques. These options can be combined or arranged in such a way that alternative options can be offered to several types of creditors, depending on the class to which they are allocated. Restructuring plans are consensual in nature and assume all parties to the agreement consent to the terms agreed in the document. However, a key concept for restructuring agreements to succeed is to treat all parties fairly and avoid discrimination of similarly situated creditors in terms of their collateral, priority and outstanding obligations. All creditors holding the same position vis-à-vis the borrower should obtain a similar treatment.
The Restructuring Proposal - Term Sheet
The term sheet is the most important piece of the workout documentation, as all further documentation will find their origin therein. A draft term sheet drawn up right at the beginning of the workout process provides banks with a useful checklist of parties involved in the workout process and of the terms that will have to be agreed upon with the borrower, other banks, and stakeholders. The draft term sheet is revised at every stage of the workout process, particularly during negotiations. In addition, before drafting the final and formal workout documents, including the new or amendatory loan agreement, lawyers will want to make sure that they can see the full picture of the proposed workout and can iron out any discrepancies and controversial points.
Term-sheets are a common feature in project lending or in the structuring of term loans. They facilitate the negotiations in that the various terms that have been discussed and agreed upon during the progress of the negotiations can be laid down until the final deal or transaction is agreed.
Term-sheets are particularly useful in workouts, as they allow the borrower and bank to spell out what has been agreed upon and move on to the next item to be negotiated. In a workout, it may be necessary to include more than one creditor or stakeholder in the transaction, and the term-sheet allows the parties to agree on the main terms of the proposed restructuring transaction before the lawyers are asked to prepare the legal documents.
After determining, that a workout will be feasible, banks will want to put a proposal on the table. For smaller borrowers, this may take the form of a conversation between the bank and the borrower, to be confirmed in writing. For medium to large companies, where the terms are likely to be more complex and there is a need for the borrower to carefully study and absorb them, the proposal will more typically be in the form of a draft term sheet spelling out the conditions on which the bank is willing to restructure or reschedule the loan(s).
The Restructuring Documents:
- Loan Agreements
The complexity of the restructuring dictates which documents will be necessary. For a simple rescheduling of maturities, a letter may suffice and will have legal validity. However, if the face value of the loan and basic terms such as maturities and interest are changed, there may be a need for a new agreement. Legal practitioners are better placed to determine whether this will take the form of an amendatory agreement, where the body of the original loan agreement is left intact and the terms and conditions to be changed are covered in an additional agreement, amending the original.
- Security Agreements
In the event that there is additional security under negotiated strategy, additional agreements will be required to have such security registered. Particular care will be necessary to ensure that the existing rights of the senior, secured banks are honored and are not diluted or set aside in favor of those of the junior and unsecured banks.
- Ancillary Agreements
These will include additional overdraft agreements, guarantee agreements, share pledge agreements, security-sharing agreements, and the like, all in line with what has been agreed among the borrower and banks.
Key covenants
Covenants are undertakings (or promises) given by a borrower as part of a loan agreement. Their purpose is to provide the bank with an early warning sign of potential problems. They also provide another avenue of communication between the borrower and the bank.
Covenants can be affirmative, negative or positive in nature. They usually cover such areas as financial performance (e.g., will maintain total debt to EBITDA not greater than 2:1, or pay all taxes as they become due); information sharing (e.g., will provide audited annual financial statements); or ownership/ management arrangements (e.g., will employ financial management with demonstrated experience, or will not pay dividends without the consent of the bank).
Violation of any covenant gives the banks right to call the loan, charge fees, or collect interest at a higher rate. In practice, it has proven difficult to call a loan that is paying as agreed based on a covenant default. In this case, after developing a thorough understanding of the cause of the problem and its severity, the borrower is likely to issue either a temporary or permanent waiver in return for the borrower undertaking an agreed upon corrective action program.
All restructuring agreements should contain covenants. At a minimum, they should include provisions to submit financial statements; pay taxes as they become due; prohibit sale of company, completely or in part, without prior approval of bank. Covenants for larger, more complex borrowers need to be specifically tailored to meet their individual situations. Bank should include covenants pertaining to but restricted to profitability, efficiency, liquidity, and solvency ratios; requirements to dispose of assets or raise equity within specific timeframes; or prohibit investments or restrict business activities to those currently engaged in. Bank should also develop an internal process to be able to monitor adherence to these covenants.
Appendix 5: Glossary of Technical Terms
For the purpose of this document, the terms and phrases used in these guidelines have the following meaning:
Term Definition Balloon payment Interest paid regularly together with only small repayments of principal so that the bulk of the loan is payable upon maturity. Bullet payment Principal and interest paid at maturity. Collateral Whose value can be considered whilst computing the recoverable amount for workout cases or foreclosed cases, on account of meeting the stipulated conditions laid out in these rules, as would be applicable based on the nature of the collateral. Collateral enforcement The exercise of rights and remedies with respect to collateral that is pledged against a loan. Conditional loan forgiveness A bank forfeiting the right to legally recover part or the whole of the amount of an outstanding loan upon the borrower's performance of certain conditions. Cooperative borrower A borrower which is actively working with a bank to resolve their problem loan. Cure rate The percentage of loans that previously presented arrears and,post restructuring, present no arrears. Covenant A borrower's commitment that certain activities will or will not be carried out. EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) Valuation metric for comparing the income of companies with different capital structures. Early warning signals Quantitative or qualitative indicators, based on liquidity, profitability, market, collateral and macroeconomic metrics. Failed restructuring Any restructuring case where the borrower failed to repay the revised contractual cash flows as agreed upon with the bank and has transitioned into default. Key performance indicators Indicators through which bank management or supervisor can assess the institution's performance. Loan to value ratio Financial ratio expressing the value of the loan compared to the appraised value of the collateral securing the loan. Problem Loans Loans that display well-defined weaknesses or signs of potential problems. Problem loans shall be classified by the banks in accordance with accounting standards, and consistent with relevant regulations, as one or more of: a. non-performing; b. subject to restructuring (including forbearance) and/or rescheduling; c. IFRS 9 Stages 2; and exhibiting signs of significant credit deterioration or Stage 3; d. under watch-list, early warning or enhanced monitoring measures; or e. where concerns exist over the future stability of the borrower or on its ability to meet its financial obligations as they fall due Restructuring An agreement between the bank and the borrower to modify the terms of loan contract so as to enable eventual repayment. Restructuring plan A document containing the measures to be taken in order to restore borrower's viability. Risk management system A centralized system that allows a bank to holistically monitor bank's risks, including credit risk. Unsuccessful restructuring The cases where the bank and the borrower are not able to reach any restructuring agreement. Viability assessment An assessment of borrower's ability to generate adequate cash flow in order to service outstanding loans. Viable borrower Wherein the loss of any concessions as a result of restructuring, is considered to be lower than the loss borne due to foreclosure. Watch list Loans that have displayed characteristics of a recent increase in credit risk which are subject to enhanced monitoringand review by a bank. Workout Unit A bank's operational unit in charge of handling problematic loans. Sound Practices for Banks’ Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions (HLI)-BCBS
No: 191000000710 Date(g): 9/3/1999 | Date(h): 22/11/1419 Status: In-Force As you are aware, in September 1998 the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a highly leveraged, hedge fund posed a significant threat to the US financial markets necessitating a major response from the US Banking Supervisory Authorities. Since then there has been global scrutiny of international banks’ exposures to highly leveraged financial institutions in general and hedge funds in particular.
A Task Force established by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has completed a study of the risks for banks arising from their dealings with such institutions. The Committee has prepared the attached paper on “Sound Practices for Banks’ Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions (HLI)” that aims to encourage development of prudent approaches by banks to the assessment, measurement and risk management of credit exposures to HLIs.
In Saudi Arabia, some Banks may have dealings with institutions that meet the definitions of an HLI or a hedge fund. We expect these exposures to be managed in accordance with the Internal Control Guidelines for Commercial Banks issued by SAMA, and prudent internal credit policies and procedures of your Bank. In issuing this Basle Committee paper to Saudi Banks our expectations are as follows:
1. You should ensure that managers of your Bank’s credit, risk management, and other relevant functions are fully conversant with the best management practices outlined in this paper. 2. The Bank should internalize these practices by ensuring that these are reflected in your credit management and risk management policies and procedures. 3. An internal procedural framework that requires regular identification and monitoring of such exposures and their reporting to senior management should be developed.
Preface
In recent years, the activities of highly leveraged institutions (HLIs) have grown in both magnitude and complexity. The scope of the interactions between HLIs and mainstream financial institutions, such as banks and securities firms, has also expanded, emphasising the need for a full understanding and management of the risks generated from these activities. As with other borrowers and counterparties, banks and other financial intermediaries play a key role in allocating credit to HLIs. However, in the case of HLIs this can be particularly challenging given the relative opaqueness of their activities, the significant use of leverage and the dynamic nature of their trading positions and, in some cases, their market impact. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognises that not all banks deal with or have significant exposures to HLIs. Most institutions that do have exposures to HLIs appear to be reviewing and tightening their credit standards for HLIs following the near-collapse of the hedge fund LTCM in September 1998. A key motivation for issuing sound practices is to ensure that improvements in credit standards and risk management processes are "locked in” over time and that the lessons are applied to the management of counterparty credit relationships more generally.
The management of credit risk in respect of HLIs involves the same principles as management of credit risk in general, but must also take account of the particular types of counterparty risk associated with such institutions. The Committee will shortly publish general principles for the management of credit risk. This paper should be seen as complementary to that effort, and is a response to the specific challenges posed by credit risk emanating from interactions with HLIs. The Committee’s review of banks’ dealings with HLIs has revealed that in many cases there has not been an appropriate balance among the key elements of the credit risk management process, with an over reliance on collateralisation of mark-to-market exposures.1 Insufficient weight was placed on in-depth credit analyses of the HLI counterparties involved and the effective measurement and management of exposures. Moreover, in some cases, competitive forces and the desire to conduct business with certain counterparties may have led banks to make exceptions to their firm-wide credit standards.
Counterparty exposures to HLIs can take a variety of forms, including in particular secured and unsecured credits resulting from off-balance-sheet contracts. The characteristics and implications of OTC derivatives were analysed by G-10 central banks in 1994. Following that review, the Committee issued risk management guidelines for derivatives that identified the types and sources of risk to counterparties in OTC transactions and reviewed sound risk management practices for each type of risk. In September 1998, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Euro-currency Standing Committee published a report on settlement procedures and counterparty risk management related to OTC derivatives, which provides a thorough analysis of the policies and procedures employed by OTC derivatives dealers. Where appropriate, these guidelines will draw on these earlier studies and apply them, together with other recent insights, to the specific risks posed by highly leveraged counterparties.
The Basel Committee is distributing these sound practice standards to supervisors, banks and other interested parties worldwide with the expectation that they will encourage the further development of prudent approaches to the assessment, measurement and risk management of credit exposures to HLIs. The Committee invites the financial industry to assess standards and practices and to react to the recommendations. The Committee encourages supervisors to promote the application of sound practices by banks in their interactions with HLIs. The Committee wishes to emphasise that sound internal risk management, including effective counterparty credit risk management, is essential to the prudent operations of banks. With respect to their involvement with HLIs, it may also contribute significantly to ensuring that HLIs do not assume excessive risks and leverage. Should a major HLI nevertheless default, sound risk management at the counterparty level could contribute considerably to limiting the destabilising effects on markets resulting from, for example, the rapid deleveraging and liquidation of positions. By helping to reduce the potential for stressed-market exposures, sound credit management and monitoring practices by counterparties of HLIs should contribute to greater stability in the financial system as a whole.
1 Banks ' interactions with highly leveraged institutions, Basel Committee (BIS), January 1999.
I Introduction
This paper sets out sound practice standards for the management of counterparty credit risk inherent in banks’ trading and derivatives activities with highly leveraged institutions (HLIs). Its recommendations are directed at relationships with HLIs, which are defined as large financial institutions that are subject to very little or no direct regulatory oversight as well as very limited public disclosure requirements and that take on significant leverage. For the purpose of this paper, leverage is defined broadly as the ratio between risk, expressed in a common denominator, and capital. Leverage increases HLIs’ exposure to movements in market price’s and consequently can expose creditors to significant counterparty risk. Hedge funds are currently the primary example of institutions within this definition but it should be noted that many hedge funds are not highly leveraged, and that other institutions may also have some or all of the attributes of an HLI.
While this paper focuses on the management of credit risk resulting from interactions with HLIs, the issues raised are not unique to interactions with such institutions. However, it is not intended to provide a complete overview of the more general credit management practices. The sound practices set out here specifically address the following areas: (1) establishing clear policies and procedures for banks’ involvement with HLIs as part of their overall credit risk environment; (2) information gathering, due diligence and credit analysis of HLIs’ activities, risks and operations; (3) developing more accurate measures of exposures resulting from trading and derivatives transactions; (4) setting meaningful overall credit limits for HLIs; (5) linking credit enhancement tools, including collateral and early termination provisions, to the specific characteristics of HLIs; and (6) closely monitoring credit exposures vis-à-vis HLIs, including their trading activities, risk concentration, leverage and risk management processes.
In Sections II to VII the credit risk management issues highlighted above are set out in more detail.
II Banks’ Involvement with HLIs and their Overall Credit Risk Strategy
Before conducting business with HLIs, a bank should establish clear policies that govern its involvement with these institutions consistent with its overall credit risk strategy. Banks should ensure that an adequate level of risk management, consistent with their involvement with HLIs, is in place.
In general terms, each bank should have in place a clear credit risk strategy and an effective credit risk management process approved by the board of directors and implemented by senior management. The credit risk strategy should define the bank’s risk appetite, its desired risk return trade-off and mix of products and markets. In this context, a bank should assess whether dealings with HLIs are consistent with its credit risk strategy, its risk appetite and its diversification targets. If so, policies and procedures for interactions with HLIs must be devised that establish effective monitoring and control of such relationships. These policies and procedures should drive the credit setting process and govern banks’ relationships with HLIs, and should not be overridden by competitive pressures.
An effective credit risk management process includes appropriate documentation, comprehensive financial information, effective due diligence, use of risk mitigants such as collateral and covenants, methodologies for measuring current and future exposure, effective limit setting procedures, and ongoing monitoring of both the firm’s exposure to and the changing risk profile of the counterparty. Upholding these standards is particularly important with respect to interactions with HLI counterparties, where information has been limited, leverage may be high and risk profiles can alter rapidly. Where credit concerns are identified with regard to an HLI, a bank should either not conduct business or take appropriate steps to limit and manage the exposure consistent with their overall underwriting standards and risk appetite. HLIs that provide either insufficient information to allow meaningful credit assessments or proportionately less information about their risk profile than other counterparties should face tougher credit conditions, including, for instance, a higher level of initial margin, no loss threshold, a narrower range of assets which are deemed acceptable for collateral purposes, and a stricter range of other financial covenants.
The long-term success of a bank’s credit relationships relies heavily on effective and sophisticated risk management. This applies to banks that assume credit risks arising out of derivatives and other trading transactions with HLIs such as repurchase agreements and securities lending, as well as to banks that commit funds to HLIs through loans, credit lines or equity participations. Assuming credit exposure implies counterparty monitoring commensurate with the size of the exposure. Effective monitoring of the activities of an HLI requires thorough knowledge and understanding of its trading strategies, exposure levels, risk concentrations and risk controls. Reliance on collateral cannot substitute for day-to-day risk management and monitoring. While it can help reduce counterparty credit risk, full collateralisation of mark-to-market positions does not eliminate exposure to secondary risks (such as declines in the value of securities pledged as collateral) from a volatile market environment that could follow the default or disorderly liquidation of a major HLI. Moreover, collateral cannot fully mitigate credit risk and may add to other risks, such as legal, operational and liquidity risks.
III Information Gathering, Due Diligence and Credit Analysis of HLIs
A bank that deals with HLIs should employ sound and well-defined credit standards which address the specific risks associated with HLIs.
An effective credit approval process is the first line of defence against excessive counterparty credit risk. It should be a general requirement but one which assumes increasing importance with the size and/or risk of the counterparty relationship. A sound credit approval process for HLIs should begin with comprehensive financial and other information, providing a clear picture of a counterparty’s risk profile and risk management standards. The credit process should identify the purpose and structure of the transactions for which approval is requested and provide a forward-looking analysis of the repayment capacity based on various scenarios. Credit standards should articulate policy regarding the use and nature of collateral arrangements and the application of contractual provisions designed to protect the bank in the event of changes in the future risk profile of the counterparty such as covenants and close-out provisions (Section VI). Moreover, credit standards should set a clear methodology and process for establishing limits (Sections IV and V).
Before entering into any new relationship with an HLI, a bank must become familiar with the counterparty and be confident that it is dealing with an institution of sound repute and creditworthiness. This can be achieved in a number of ways, including asking for references from known parties, accessing credit registers, evaluating legal status, and becoming knowledgeable about the individuals responsible for managing the institution by, for example, checking their personal references and financial state. Banks must also have a clear view about the stability of the HLI, in terms not only of tangible factors such as earnings but also of less tangible ones such as strategy, quality of risk management practices, and staff composition and turnover. However, a bank should not grant credit solely because the counterparty, or key members of its management, are familiar to the bank or are perceived to be highly reputable.
Before establishing a credit relationship with an HLI, a bank should ensure that all information relevant to that relationship will be available to the bank on a sufficiently timely and ongoing basis. Stipulating the conditions in advance for an adequate transfer of information lays the foundation for an appropriate monitoring of credit risk and for assessing the potential need for adjustments to non-price terms or the application of termination provisions. Banks should seek to obtain information about material developments such as changes in the general direction of trading activities, profit and loss developments, significant changes to leverage, alterations to the risk management procedures or the risk measurement process and changes in key personnel. In order to secure the necessary information, banks must in turn satisfy their HLI counterparties that they have in place effective procedures to ensure the confidentiality of the information obtained through the credit review process.
Banks should obtain comprehensive financial information about an HLI; covering both on and off-balance-sheet positions, to understand the overall risk profile of the institution. Although additional efforts may be necessary to develop effective measures of leverage that relate capital to a common denominator of risk across on and off-balance-sheet positions, a starting point could be some measure of firm-wide value-at-risk (VaR), supplemented with the results of realistic stress testing. It is important that, where this information is used, the bank understand the parameters and the assumptions used in arriving at measures of risk and leverage in order to check the plausibility of the VaR and stress testing results. The bank should establish a clear understanding of the quality and integrity of the HLI’s processes and operations for measuring, managing and controlling market, credit and liquidity risks, including back-office systems, accounting and valuation policies and methodologies. The bank should also obtain information about the HLI’s liquidity profile, such as committed lines of credit and the availability of liquid, unpledged assets to meet possible increases in margin calls under adverse market conditions. Banks should periodically confirm, in various scenarios, whether the HLI’s future repayment capacity is reasonably assured or, for instance, highly dependent on specific assumptions.
Comprehensive and current financial information about an HLI is essential for an effective analysis of the counterparty’s credit quality and prudent setting of an internal rating and, consequently, the credit limits granted to the institution and the credit enhancements applied to the relationship. Credit assessment of HLIs and the monitoring and control of the associated counterparty risks are a more complex and time-consuming activity than credit management in respect of other conventional counterparties. It entails a high level of skill and a willingness to devote resources to regular updating and monitoring, resulting in costs which banks must recognise as part of doing business prudently with such institutions.
IV Exposure Measurement
A bank taking on OTC derivatives positions, vis-à-vis HLIs should develop meaningful measures of credit exposure and incorporate these measures into its management decision-making process.
Exposure measurement methodologies which provide meaningful information for decision making are an essential underpinning of the credit risk management process for trading and derivatives activities. They form the basis of effective limit setting and monitoring, discussed in Section V. As banks’ trading and derivatives activities grow in complexity and as banks move in the direction of relying more on firm-wide credit modelling techniques, it is increasingly important that measures of exposure be based on meaningful methodologies that are subject to continuous improvements commensurate with changing market conditions and practices and the bank’s needs. In particular, there are three areas where individual banks and the industry should focus their efforts: (1) the development of more useful measures of potential future exposure (PFE) that provide a meaningful calculation of the overall extent of a bank’s activity with a given counterparty; (2) the effective measurement of unsecured exposure inherent in OTC derivatives transactions that are subject to daily margining; and (3) realistic and timely stress testing of counterparty credit exposures.
First, the banking industry must devote further resources to developing meaningful measures of PFE. Banks generally measure total exposure to a counterparty as the sum of the current replacement cost (mark-to-market exposure) and PFE. PFE is a measure of how far a contract could move into the money over some defined horizon (typically the life of the contract) and at some specified confidence interval. When added together with the current replacement cost, measures of PFE are used to convert derivatives contracts to “loan equivalent” amounts for aggregating counterparty credit exposures across products and instruments.
Banks must have an effective measure of PFE which gives an accurate picture of the extent of their involvement with the counterparty in relation to their overall activities. Peak exposure measures should be determined to serve as true loan equivalent measures. PFE should adequately incorporate netting of long and short positions, as well as portfolio effects across products, risk factors and maturities, and be analysed across multiple time horizons. Banks should seek greater industry consensus on the appropriate confidence interval, the volatility concept and calculation period, and the frequency with which volatilities are updated. Banks should also incorporate such improved measures of PFE into their management decision-making process. This would include the ongoing monitoring of mark- to-market exposures against initial estimates of PFE. Banks should use this measure of PFE for assessing whether counterpartie’ financial capacity is sufficient to meet the level of margin calls implied by their measure of PFE.
Second, banks must develop more effective measures for assessing the unsecured risks inherent in collateralised derivatives positions. Such unsecured exposures can take many forms, for example through the use of initial loss thresholds, potential gaps or delays in the collateral/margining process, and the time it takes to liquidate collateral and rebalance positions in the event of counterparty default. Even where OTC derivatives are subject to daily payment and receipt of variation margin (including initial margin), a bank can still face significant unsecured credit exposure under volatile market conditions.
Currently there is no clear industry consensus on how to measure this type of unsecured exposure. Many banks calculate just one measure of PFE, typically over the life of the contract. While such lifetime measures of PFE are appropriate for the purpose of comparing uncollateralised derivatives and loan exposures and measuring overall activity with a given counterparty, they do not provide a meaningful measure of the unsecured credit risk inherent in collateralised derivatives positions. Shorter horizons would be necessary to capture the exposure arising over the time needed to liquidate and rebalance positions and to realise the value of collateral in the event of a failure to meet a margin call or a default by the counterparty. Moreover, shorter horizons will be more appropriate for calibrating initial margins and establishing loss threshold amounts on collateralised derivatives transactions.
Third, banks must develop more meaningful measures of credit risk exposures under volatile market conditions through the development and implementation of timely and plausible stress tests of counterparty credit exposures. Stress testing should also evaluate the impact of large market moves on the credit exposure to individual counterparties and the inherent liquidation effects. Stress testing should also consider liquidity impacts on underlying markets and positions and the effect on the value of any pledged collateral. Simply applying higher confidence intervals or longer time horizons to measures of PFE may not capture the market and exposure dynamics under turbulent market conditions, particularly as they relate to the interaction between market, credit and liquidity risk.
V Limit Setting
Effective limit setting depends on the availability of meaningful exposure measurement methodologies. In particular, banks should establish overall credit limits at the level of individual counterparties that aggregate different types of exposures in a comparable and meaningful manner.
Effective measures of PFE are essential for the establishment of meaningful limits, placing an upper bound on the overall scale of activity with, and exposure to, a given counterparty, based on a comparable measure of exposure across a bank’s various activities (both on and off-balance-sheet). Mark-to-market exposures should be monitored against initial limits on PFE.
Banks should monitor actual exposures against these initial limits and have in place clear procedures for bringing down exposure as such limits are reached. Moreover, limits should generally be binding and not driven by customer demand. A bank’s limit structure should cover the types of exposures discussed in Section IV.
Moreover, banks’ credit limits should recognise and reflect the risks associated with the near-term liquidation of derivatives positions in the event of a counterparty default. Where a bank has several transactions with a counterparty, its potential exposure to that counterparty is likely to vary significantly and discontinuously over the maturity over which it is calculated. PFEs should therefore be calculated over multiple time horizons. In the case of collateralised OTC derivatives exposures, limits should factor in the unsecured exposure in a liquidation scenario, that is, the amount that could be lost over the time it takes to rebalance positions and liquidate collateral (net of any initial margin received).
Finally, banks should consider the results of stress testing in the overall limit setting and monitoring process.
VI Collateral, Early Termination and Other Contractual Provisions
A bank interacting with HLIs should align collateral, early termination and other contractual provisions with the credit quality of HLIs, taking into account the particular characteristics of these institutions such as their ability to rapidly change trading strategies, risk profiles and leverage. In doing so, banks may be able to control credit risk more pre-emptively than is the case when such provisions are driven solely by net asset values.
Bank policies should determine the contractual provisions that govern HLI counterparty relationships. It is these contractual arrangements, together with the bank’s internal limit structure, that should determine the size of unsecured credit exposure assumed by the bank. In a number of market segments the types of collateral arrangements and covenants offered to a counterparty, rather than pricing, constitute the primary means for compensating for risk differentiation. It is therefore paramount that these contractual conditions closely relate to the credit quality of the counterparty.
The use of collateral can significantly reduce counterparty credit risks. Banks use collateral provisions in secured loans, repurchase agreements2 and OTC derivatives transactions. This includes transactions for which PFE (Section IV) is highly uncertain and transactions with less creditworthy counterparties. Nonetheless, the use of collateral does not eliminate credit risk and may entail other risks: liquidity, legal, custody and operational risks. Moreover, two-way collateral provisions could give rise to another type of credit risk. A loss could occur, for instance, when the bank has provided collateral owing to a negative exposure and the value of this collateral at the moment of the counterparty's default is larger than the mark-to-market position.
In establishing collateral provisions vis-à-vis HLIs, banks should bear in mind that HLIs are unregulated financial institutions whose leverage is not restricted by the prudential supervision of risk management practices and the capital requirement regimes that apply to regulated financial intermediaries. If a bank does not receive meaningful financial information on a sufficiently frequent basis to permit effective monitoring of counterparty credit risk, it should consider requiring the institution to post excess collateral even when the bank has no current exposure (i.e. posting of initial margin). At a minimum, banks should design and enforce clear internal guidelines for determining when initial margin will be required from counterparties. Similar prudent policies should be established for setting minimum transfer amounts (amounts of collateral below which a counterparty is not required to transfer collateral) and loss thresholds (exposures below which no collateral is posted). Similarly, the granting of two-way margining and rehypothecation rights should be a function of the credit quality of the counterparty. If banks agree to two-way collateral provisions, they should make sure that the resulting additional credit risk exposure is integrated in the overall risk management process (including measurement of the PFE).
Contractual provisions should reflect bank credit standards regarding haircuts applied to the securities taken as collateral, by discounting the collateral value relative to the current market value. Banks usually base the size of the valuation adjustments on the price volatility of the securities over the time that would be required to liquidate them on the default of a counterparty (in normal market conditions). In accepting collateral from HLIs, banks should carefully assess and take into account the correlation between the probability of counterparty default and the likelihood of the collateral being impaired owing to market, credit or liquidity developments. Experience has shown that in stressed-market conditions, all but the most liquid securities issued by the best credits worldwide may be downgraded owing to a broad-based flight to quality following, during or preceding the default of a major HLI.
With respect to OTC derivatives transactions, banks should bear in mind that the effectiveness of collateral provisions established to cover counterparty credit exposures may be significantly reduced if the value of the collateral is negatively correlated with the probability of the counterparty’s default or with the market value of the contracts. In stressed-market conditions, sizable amounts of additional collateral may have to be posted by an HLI with a concentrated portfolio. There should be clear documentation setting forth the actions to be taken in the event that a counterparty fails to meet collateral calls.
In addition, banks should include covenants which permit termination or other action in the event of a material deterioration in an HLI’s credit quality. The application and design of such early termination or close-out provisions should be a function of the counterparty’s credit quality and the ability of the bank to observe changes in (prospective) creditworthiness and to react swiftly to any negative changes. In the case of HLIs, publicly available information may be insufficiently up-to-date to permit continuous credit monitoring. The bank should set adequate standards for information disclosure during the credit relationship and establish termination provisions in relation to the counterparty’s risk profile so that it can take risk-reducing measures in a timely manner.
Banks’ standard practice in relation to conventional corporate credits is to set a range of covenants relating to financial strength. For HLIs, verifiable covenants addressing significant changes in strategy, or relating to leverage and risk concentration, appear particularly relevant. Reflecting the difficulties of measuring the absolute levels of some of these variables, covenants should be specified in terms of changes to the levels existing at the start of a credit relationship and based on agreed definitions of risk and capital. They should be designed with a view to tightening credit limits as counterparty risk increases. However, banks should realise that industry-wide use of “sudden death” termination provisions could have systemic implications. If these provisions do not affect the extent of risk-taking by HLIs ex ante, the intended credit risk reduction may not materialise, and all lenders may tighten credit terms at the same time. Covenants should ensure that banks are made aware of adverse financial developments and are able to press for adjustment well before the time when cessation of the relationship is appropriate. This pre-emptive aspect is as important as the ability to require repayment once adverse changes have occurred.
2 Although different in legal terms, the purchase (sale) of securities in combination with an agreement to reverse the transaction within a specified period amounts to a collateralised transaction in economic terms. In credit risk terms, similar risk management techniques apply to collateralised loans and (reverse) repurchase agreements.
VII Ongoing Monitoring of Positions Vis-À-Vis HLIs
A bank dealing with HLIs should effectively monitor HLI creditworthiness and the development of its exposure to HLI counterparties. Banks should assess HLI risk profiles and risk management capabilities frequently, while considering the potential for stressed-market conditions.
Given the speed with which HLIs can change their risk profile, banks should conduct reviews of counterparty credit quality of material HLI exposures on a frequent basis, at least quarterly. Additional reviews should be triggered by significant increases in exposure or market volatility. With respect to HLIs, effective monitoring tools should go beyond monthly changes in net asset value and crude balance-sheet measures. There should be detailed quantitative information about risk, for instance VaR numbers supplemented with internal stress testing results. Banks should conduct regular reviews of HLI risk management capabilities. In addition, banks should have a proper understanding of concentrations of risk, including their own exposures to HLIs as a group as well as the risk concentration facing HLIs themselves.
Effective collateral management systems are important for monitoring and limiting counterparty credit exposures. Banks should ensure that collateral management systems capture all counterparty positions, that such positions and related collateral are marked to market on at least a daily basis, and that payment and receipt of (additional) collateral is conducted in a timely manner. Haircuts that apply to the various types of securities that are accepted as collateral should be revised on a regular basis, taking into account price volatility, liquidity and credit quality developments. Where banks focus on limiting credit risk resulting from OTC derivatives positions by timely collateralisation, they should monitor the unsecured part of the exposure (including PFE) particularly closely, taking into account the counterparty’s ability to meet future collateral demands. Since OTC derivatives exposures often make up a large part of the total exposure to HLIs, assessing the ability to provide additional collateral when required and setting meaningful credit limits based on such assessments may be especially relevant in dealings with HLIs.
Finally, ongoing exposure monitoring should incorporate the results of periodic stress testing of counterparty credit exposures that takes into account the interaction between market, credit and liquidity risks (Section IV). Such stress testing results should be included in senior management reports and provide sufficient information to trigger risk-reducing actions where necessary.
General Provisions
Guidelines on the Regulatory Treatment of Banks' Exposures to Central Counterparties
No: 41038270 Date(g): 26/1/2020 | Date(h): 1/6/1441 Status: In-Force Based on the powers granted to the Central Bank under Bank Control Law No. M/5 dated 22/02/1386 H Simultaneously with the announcement by the Saudi Stock Exchange Company (Tadawul) regarding the establishment of the Securities Clearing Center Company (Clearing Center), the aim is to develop clearing services and ensure the settlement of all categories of securities traded in the market in line with the best practices and international standards.
Facilities for regulatory treatment instructions regarding banks' exposures to Central Counterparties (CCPs), aimed at regulating banks' exposures to central securities clearing houses.
1. Introduction
- Central Counterparties (CCPs) have become increasingly critical components of the financial system in recent years, due in part to the introduction of mandatory clearing for standardised OTC derivatives in some jurisdictions. Consistent with the key responsibility of guaranteeing the fulfilment of transactions to their clearing participants, CCPs play an important role in mitigating contagion risk in the event of a participant default. A CCPs ability to effectively manage a default is essential to its resilience and can help reduce systemic risk. - SAMA via these guidelines, is emphasizing on the treatment of banks' trade exposures to a CCP under capital, large exposures, leverage ratio rules along with Pillar 2 framework. - Banks should note that the foreign regulators would do an assessment to include Saudi CCPs in the list of their Qualifying Counterparties (QCCPs), in terms of exposures of banks under their jurisdictions to this entity. 2. General terms
- Central Counterparty (CCP): (As defined in the BCBS guidelines on Capital Requirements for Banks Exposures to Central Counterparties and as published via SAMA circular No. 371000101116 dated 15/09/1437 AH)
A clearinghouse that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the future performance of open contracts. A CCP becomes counterparty to trades with market participants through novation, an open offer system, or another legally binding arrangement.
- Qualifying Central Counterparty (QCCP): (As defined in the BCBS guidelines on Capital Requirements for Banks Exposures to Central Counterparties and as published via SAMA circular no. 371000101116 dated 15/09/1437 AH)
An entity that is licensed to operate as a CCP (including a license granted by way of confirming an exemption), and is permitted by the appropriate regulator/overseer (CMA) to operate as such with respect to the products offered. This is subject to the provision that the CCP is based and prudentially supervised in a jurisdiction where the relevant regulator/overseer has established. (Saudi Arabia) and publicly indicated that it applies to the CCP on an ongoing basis, domestic rules and regulations that are consistent with the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures.
- Direct Clearing Member: (As defined in Securities Central Counterparties Regulations Issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority Pursuant to its Resolution No. 3-127-2019 Dated 21/03/1441AH)
A Clearing Member who is authorised to clear Securities which it has traded in its capacity as a member of an Exchange, including Securities it has traded on its own account or on behalf of its Client (s). A Direct Clearing Member shall not be permitted to clear for Exchange members with no clearing memberships.
- General Clearing Member: (As defined in Securities Central Counterparties Regulations Issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority Pursuant to its Resolution No. 3-127-2019 Dated 21/03/1441AH)
A Clearing Member who is authorised to clear Securities on behalf of its Client(s), including Exchange members that with no clearing memberships. A General Clearing Member, to the extent that it is a member of an Exchange, shall be permitted to clear Securities which it has traded in its capacity as a member of an Exchange, including Securities it has traded on its own account or on behalf of its Client(s).
3. Scope
These requirements are applicable to all banks (domestic and foreign) licensed under the Banking Control Law (Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 22/2/1386 H) that wish to become members of a CCP and have exposures to the CCP.
Foreign banks branches who are clearing members of the CCP will be deemed to be engaged in Critical Economic Functions and as such will be considered Systemically Important under the Foreign Bank Branch regulations issued by SAMA via circular No.4922/67 dated 25/01/1441AH.
4. SAMA Requirements for Banks Who Wish to Apply for Clearing Membership
Banks who wish to engage in CCP activities and apply for a General Clearing Membership, to clear activities on behalf of their customers, must obtain a Non-objection from SAMA.
5. Regulatory Treatment of a Bank's and its clients' Exposures to CCPs
- Capital Requirements: Firstly, Qualifying CCP (QCCP): - Where a bank acts as a clearing member of a CCP for its own purposes, a risk weight of 2% must be applied to the bank's trade exposure to the CCP in respect of derivatives transactions. - Where the bank, as a clearing member, offers clearing services to clients, the 2% risk weight also applies to the clearing member's trade exposure to the CCP that arises when the clearing member is obligated to reimburse the client for any losses suffered due to changes in the value of its transactions in the event that the CCP defaults. - Where a client is not protected from losses in the case that the clearing member and another client of the clearing member jointly default or become jointly insolvent but all other conditions relating to offsetting and default (as stated in circular no. 371000101116 dated 15/09/1437AH) are met, a risk weight of 4% will apply to the client's exposure to the clearing member, or to the higher-level client, respectively. - The banks' contribution to the CCP's default fund will be risk weighted according to the methods explained in Basel rules (SAMA circular no. 371000101116 dated 15/09/1437AH). Secondly, Non-Qualifying CCP: - Banks must apply the standardized approach for credit risk, according to the category of the counterparty, to their trade exposure to a non-QCCP. - For a default fund, a risk weight of 1250% will be applied. For the purposes of this paragraph, the default fund contributions of such banks will include both the funded and the unfunded contributions which are liable to be paid should the CCP so require. - Large Exposures: - Banks exposures to CCPs are subject to the regulatory requirements as defined in SAMA Large Exposures Rules (circular no.1651/67 dated 09/01/1441 AH). - Banks' exposures to QCCPs related to clearing activities are exempted from the large exposures framework. However, these exposures are subject to the regulatory reporting requirements as defined in the rules mentioned above. - In the case of non-QCCPs, banks must measure their exposures as a sum of both the clearing exposures and other exposures as described in rules mentioned above, and must meet the general large exposure limit of 25% of the eligible capital base. - Leverage Ratio: Where a bank acting as clearing member offers clearing services to clients, the clearing member's derivative trade exposures to the CCP that arise when the clearing member is obligated to reimburse the client for an)/ losses suffered due to changes in the value of its transactions in the event that the CCP defaults must be captured by applying the same treatment that applies to any other type of derivative transaction. Therefore, this will be included in the exposure measure in the leverage ratio calculation. (For further guidance, refer to SAMA circular No. 351000133367 dated 29/10/1435AH and circular No. 351000155075 dated 28/12/1435AH). - Basel Reporting: Banks must use SAMA Q17 - Template to report their risks and exposures to the CCP in the following cells:
Sheet Cell Description Q17.2 $B$27 Exposure amount for contributions to the default fund of a Domestic CCP Q17.2 $B$28 Domestic QCCP Q17.2 $B$29 Foreign QCCP Q17.2 $B$68 Risk Relating to CCP Q17.4 $A$12 Of which: Centrally cleared through a Domestic QCCP Q17.4 $A$13 Of which: Centrally cleared through a Foreign QCCP Q17.4 $A$16 2% Q17.4 $A$17 4% Q17.5 $A$26 Centrally cleared through a Domestic QCCP Q17.5 $A$27 Centrally cleared through a Foreign QCCP Q17.5.3 $A$26 Centrally cleared through a Domestic QCCP Q17.5.3 $A$27 Centrally cleared through a Foreign QCCP Q17.9 $C$127 Risk Relating to CCP - ICAAP and ILAAP: Banks must capture an)/ risks arising from their CCP activities in the ICAAP and ILAAP documents in line with SAMA ICAAP and ILAAP rules issued via circulars No. 58514.BCS.27835 dated. 15/11/2011 and 381000120488, dated 03/12/1438AH. Special attention should be paid in terms of concentration risks if any, arising from a CCP. 6. Additional Requirements
Banks are required to report "reportable transactions" cleared through the CCP to the SAMA authorised Trade Repository Operator (as defined and stated in SAMA circular No. 16278/67 dated 13/03/1441 AH).
Rules on Credit Risk Management
No: 341000036442 Date(g): 1/2/2013 | Date(h): 21/3/1434 Status: In-Force 1) In terms of its Charter issued by Royal Decree No. 23 dated 23-5-1377 H (15 December 1957 G), SAMA is empowered to regulate the commercial banks. In exercise of the powers vested upon it under the said Charter and the Banking Control Law, SAMA has decided to issue this Circular and the enclosed Rules on Credit Risk Management for Banks. The requirements contained in this Circular and the Rules are aimed to complement the existing regulatory requirements issued by SAMA from time to time.
2) The enclosed Rules on Credit Risk Management contain, inter alia, the following major requirements for banks:
i. The Board of Directors is required to provide effective oversight to ensure prudent conduct of credit activities and avoid unduly excessive risk taking by their bank;
ii. The Board of Directors is responsible for formulation of a well-defined Credit Policy for the bank. The Policy should set out the overall strategy and credit risk appetite of the bank as well as the broad parameters for assuming and managing credit risk. The Policy should be reviewed regularly to take into account market developments and any changes in the operating environment;
iii. The Board is also required to constitute a Board Committee headed by a non-executive director to assist the Board in overseeing the credit risk management process and to discharge such other related responsibilities as may be assigned to it by the Board;
iv. Banks are required to put in place an elaborate credit risk management framework to effectively manage their credit risk. Such framework would include, inter alia, the process for Board and senior management oversight, organizational structure, and systems and procedures for identification, acceptance, measurement, monitoring and control of credit risk;
v. The senior management of the bank is responsible for ensuring effective implementation of the credit policy and credit risk strategy approved by the Board. For this purpose, the management should develop and implement well-defined policies and procedures for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling credit risk in line with the overall strategy and credit policy approved by the Board;
vi. The organizational structure/framework for credit risk management should be commensurate with the bank’s size, complexity of operations and diversification of its activities. The organizational structure should facilitate effective management oversight and proper execution of credit risk management and control processes. The structure may comprise of a credit risk management department or unit independent of credit origination function and a management committee responsible for monitoring of credit risk;
vii. Banks should ensure to have in place adequate systems and procedures for credit risk management including those for credit origination, limit setting, credit approving authority, credit administration, credit risk measurement and internal rating framework, credit risk monitoring, credit risk review, and management of problem credits;
viii. Banks should conduct stress tests on their credit portfolio to assess its resilience under “worst case” scenario and to analyze any inherent potential risks in individual credits or the overall credit portfolio or any components thereof. For this purpose, banks should follow the guidance provided in the SAMA Rules on Stress Testing issued on 23 November 2011;
ix. Banks should ensure to have in place an effective management information system(MIS) to measure, monitor and control the credit risk inherent in the bank’s on- and off-balance sheet activities. The MIS should produce reports on measures of credit risk for appropriate levels of management, the relevant Board committee and the Board to enable them to take timely decisions on credit risk management;
x. Banks should introduce effective internal controls to manage credit risk. In this regard, bank’s internal audit function should independently assess the adequacy and effectiveness of such internal controls and report findings thereof to the senior management and the Board or its relevant committee for timely corrective actions;
3) The enclosed Rules shall be applicable to the locally incorporated banks as well as the branches of foreign banks. Where a locally incorporated bank has majority owned Subsidiary(ies) operating in the financial sector, it will either formulate group level Credit Policy consistent with these Rules for application across the group or will ensure that the subsidiary’s credit policies and procedures are in line with these Rules. Furthermore, in case of foreign subsidiaries, the legal and regulatory requirements of the host country shall also be taken into account while framing their credit policies and procedures. For the purpose of these rules, majority owned subsidiary(ies) include those subsidiary(ies) where a bank owns more than 50% of its shareholding. The branches of foreign banks licensed and operating in Saudi Arabia shall also follow these Rules. However, they will apply these Rules to the extent practically applicable to them and with such modifications as may be considered expedient keeping in view the size and complexity of their business activities. Further, their Credit Policy can be approved by the Chief Executive or a relevant management committee at Head Office instead of the Board of Directors.
4) Banks are also required to ensure compliance with all other regulatory requirements and guidelines on credit risk management as issued by SAMA from time to time. They are also required to comply with the “Principles for the Management of Credit Risk”, “Sound credit risk assessment and valuation for loans” and “Principles for enhancing corporate governance” issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in September 2000, June 2006 and October 2010 respectively as well as any other related principles and standards including updates thereof issued by the relevant international standard setting bodies.
5) The enclosed Rules shall come into force with immediate effect and banks are required to take all necessary steps to bring their existing policies, procedures and structures in line with these Rules by 30 June 2013. Furthermore, they are also required to submit a copy of their revised Credit Policy fully aligned with these Rules and duly approved by their Board of Directors to the Central bank latest by 30 June 2013. In case there are any practical issues in implementation of these rules, banks should approach SAMA to seek further guidance on addressing such issue
1. General Requirements
1.1. Overview
Credit risk is historically the most significant risk faced by banks. It is measured by estimating the actual or potential losses arising from the inability or unwillingness of the obligors to meet their credit obligations on time. Credit risk could stem from both on and off balance sheet exposures of banks. Keeping in view the importance of effective credit risk management for the safety and soundness of banks, these Rules are being issued by SAMA to set out the regulatory requirements for further strengthening of credit risk management framework in banks.
All banks operating in Saudi Arabia are required to ensure that they have put in place an elaborate credit risk management framework to effectively manage their credit risk. Such framework would cover various types of lending including corporate, commercial, SME, retail, consumer, etc. The credit risk management framework should include, inter alia, the following components:
i. Board and senior management’s Oversight;
ii. Organizational structure;
iii. Systems and procedures for identification, measurement, monitoring and control of credit risk.
While designing and strengthening their credit risk management framework, banks should ensure compliance of these Rules. Furthermore, banks should also take into account the requirements of the “Principles for the Management of Credit Risk”, “Sound credit risk assessment and valuation for loans”, and “Principles for enhancing corporate governance” issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in September 2000, June 2006 and October 2010 respectively, and any other related principles and standards including updates thereof issued by the relevant international standard setting bodies.
1.2. Objective of the Rules
The objective of these Rules is to set out the minimum requirements for banks in the area of credit risk management. However, banks are encouraged to adopt more stringent standards beyond the minimum requirements of these Rules to effectively manage their credit risk.
1.3. Scope of Application
These Rules shall be applicable to the locally incorporated banks as well as the branches of foreign banks. Where a locally incorporated bank has majority owned Subsidiary(ies) operating in the financial sector, it will either formulate group level Credit Policy consistent with these Rules for application across the group or will ensure that the subsidiary’s credit policies and procedures are in line with these Rules. Furthermore, in case of foreign subsidiaries, the legal and regulatory requirements of the host country shall also be taken into account while framing their credit policies and procedures. For the purpose of these rules, majority owned subsidiary(ies) include those subsidiary(ies) where a bank owns more than 50% of its shareholding. The branches of foreign banks licensed and operating in Saudi Arabia shall also follow these Rules. However, they will apply these Rules to the extent practically applicable to them and with such modifications as may be considered expedient keeping in view the size and complexity of their business activities. Further, their Credit Policy can be approved by the Chief Executive or a relevant management committee at Head Office instead of the Board of Directors.
1.4. Effective Date
These Rules shall come into force with immediate effect. All banks are required to take all necessary steps to bring their existing policies, procedures and structures in line with these Rules by 30 June 2013. Furthermore, they are also required to submit a copy of their revised Credit Policy fully aligned with these Rules and duly approved by their Board of Directors to the Central Bank latest by 30 June 2013. In case there are any practical issues in implementation of these rules, banks should approach SAMA to seek further guidance on addressing such issues.
2. Board and Senior Management’s Oversight
2.1. Responsibilities of the Board Of Directors
The Board of Directors is responsible for approving the credit risk strategy of the bank in line with its overall business strategy. The credit strategy should be aimed at determining the credit risk appetite of the bank. The overall credit strategy and related policy matters shall be clearly outlined in a policy document to be called “Credit Policy”. Specifically, the Board’s responsibilities with regard to creditgranting function of the bank would include the following:
i. Developing a credit strategy for the bank to spell out its overall risk appetite in relation to credit risk;
ii. Ensuring that the bank has a well-defined Credit Policy duly approved by the Board;
iii. Forming a Board Committee headed by a non-executive director to assist the Board in overseeing the credit risk management process and defining its terms of reference (this Committee may also monitor other risks in addition to credit risk);
iv. Ensuring that the bank has an effective credit risk management framework for the identification, measurement, monitoring and control of credit risk;
v. Requiring the management to ensure that the staff involved in credit appraisal, monitoring, review and approval processes possess sound expertise and knowledge to discharge their responsibilities;
vi. Ensuring that bank has adequate policies and procedures in place to identify and manage credit risk inherent in all products and activities including the risks of new products and activities before being introduced or undertaken. Such policies and procedures should also provide guidance on evaluation and approval of any new products and activities before being introduced or undertaken by the bank;
vii. Ensuring that the bank’s remuneration policies do not contradict its credit risk strategy. In this regard, the board should ensure that the bank’s credit processes are not weakened as a result of rewarding unacceptable behavior such as generating short-term profits while deviating from credit policies or exceeding established limits;
viii. Ensuring that the bank’s overall credit risk exposure is maintained at prudent levels;
2.2. Responsibilities of the Senior Management
The senior management of the bank shall be responsible, inter alia, for the following:
i. Ensuring effective Implementation of the credit policy and credit risk strategy approved by the board of directors. In this regard, the management should ensure that the bank’s credit-granting activities conform to the established strategy, that written procedures are developed and implemented, and that loan approval and review responsibilities are clearly and properly assigned;
ii. Developing policies and procedures for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling credit risk. Such policies and procedures should be in line with the overall strategy and credit policy approved by the Board and address credit risk in all of the bank’s activities and at both the individual credit and portfolio levels. These policies and procedures should, inter alia, provide guidance to the staff on the following matters:
a. Detailed and formalized credit evaluation/ appraisal process;
b. Credit approval authority at various hierarchy levels including authority for approving exceptions;
c. Credit risk identification, measurement, monitoring and control across all products and activities of the bank including risks inherent in new products and activities;
d. Credit risk acceptance criteria;
e. Credit origination, credit administration and loan documentation procedures;
f. Roles and responsibilities of units/staff involved in origination and management of credit;
g. Procedures for dealing with defaulted credits.
iii. Communication of approved credit policy and procedures down the line to the concerned staff;
iv. Ensuring that there is a periodic independent internal assessment of the bank’s credit policy and strategy as well as of the related credit-granting and management functions;
v. Instituting a process for reporting any significant deviation/exception from the approved policies and procedures to the senior management/board and ensuring rectification thereof through corrective measures;
3. Credit Policy and Procedures
Each Bank shall formulate a Credit Policy that is approved by its Board of Directors. Such policy should be clearly defined, consistent with prudent banking practices and relevant regulatory requirements, and adequate for the nature and complexity of the bank’s activities. The Credit Policy should be applied on a consolidated bank basis and at the level of individual subsidiaries, as applicable.
The Policy should, inter-alia, cover the following:
i. Overall strategy of the bank to determine its risk appetite and risk tolerance levels in relation to credit risk;
ii. Broad parameters for taking credit exposures to customers, banks, geographic areas/countries, economic sectors, related parties, etc. This should, inter alia, include obtaining a credit report from SIMAH and credit checks about the borrower from other banks;
iii. Exposure limits for different categories of borrowers. Such limits should be in line with the SAMA’s “Rules on Exposure Limits” as amended from time to time;
iv. Policy parameters for achieving reasonable diversification of credit portfolio. This would include diversification over client segments, loan products, economic sectors, geographical locations, lending currencies and maturities;
v. Know Your Customer process for taking credit exposures. Such process should, inter alia, include obtaining information on legal and ownership structure of the corporate borrowers, their governance structure including management profile, beneficial ownership and basic financial information of their major business affiliates / subsidiaries (both local and foreign), details of their global financial commitments (both local and foreign) including the lenders and type of security/collateral provided to them, business plan/financial forecasts of the borrower covering the tenor of the credit facilities,, regular visits to owners of borrowing entities and their guarantors, monitoring involvement of owners/major shareholders in key business decisions, and the requirements for signing credit agreements and associated documents by the borrowers in the presence of bank’s staff. With regard to signing of credit documents, the Credit Policy should provide that credit agreements and associated documents in respect of all those exposures (including funded and / or non-funded facilities) exceeding one percent of total Tier-1 capital of the bank or SAR 100 million whichever is less, must be signed in the presence of bank’s senior officers. The Policy should also lay down an elaborate process for signing the credit documents in respect of all other exposures in the presence of bank’s staff to fully protect the interest of the bank;
vi. Structuring of credit facilities/transactions with clearly defined purpose and monitoring end use of credit facilities. Furthermore, no financing to be provided to support speculative activities and general purpose activities or any activity which lacks a well-defined purpose for utilization of credit facilities. This will, however, not include the working capital or overdraft facilities provided the end use of such facilities is monitored by the bank to ensure their ultimate utilization for the purpose for which those were granted;
vii. Broad parameters for providing financing for the subscription of initial public offering(IPO) of shares. Such financing, if provided, should be based on a clear and cautious policy and against adequate collateral with sufficient margins to mitigate the risk of volatility in share prices. The maximum financing for the subscription of IPO of shares shall be restricted to 50% of the amount to be subscribed by a single person. Banks shall also obtain complete particulars of the borrower and verify his credentials including name, identity and credibility before granting any financing (as per SAMA Circular dated 22 Shaban 1413 H);
viii. Broad parameters for seeking collateral against financing facilities as well as the nature of such collateral. Furthermore, the parameters for taking any exposures without collateral should be clearly spelled out along with the procedures to cover the associated recovery/settlement risk in such exposures;
ix. Requiring the Senior Management to ensure that the staff involved in credit appraisal, credit administration, credit review and other related functions are well trained to discharge their responsibilities and are periodically rotated in their assignments;
x. Other related matters to spell out the credit policy parameters of the bank.
A copy of the Policy duly approved by the Board shall be submitted to SAMA within 30 days of its approval. The Board of Directors or a relevant sub-committee of the Board of each bank shall review their Credit Policy as and when needed but at-least once in every three years. All significant/material changes to the Credit Policy shall be approved by the Board of Directors or a relevant sub-committee of the Board and a copy thereof submitted to the Central Bank within 30 days of such approval. In case of frequent changes in the Credit Policy, banks may choose to submit the revised Credit Policy to the Central Bank once a year incorporating all changes made during a year, within 30 days of the end of a calendar year.
4. Organizational Structure
The overall structure for credit risk management should be commensurate with the bank’s size, complexity of operations and diversification of its activities. The organizational structure should facilitate effective management oversight and proper execution of credit risk management and control processes. While the organizational structure may vary from bank to bank, it would generally comprise of the following:
4.1. Credit Risk Management Department or a Unit
Such department or unit can be part of the overall risk management function of the bank but should be independent of the loan origination function. This department or unit should be responsible, inter alia, for the following:
a. Monitoring adherence to the overall risk tolerance limits set out in the Credit Policy of the bank;
b. Ensuring that the business lines comply with the established credit risk parameters and prudential limits;
c. Establishing the systems and procedures relating to credit risk identification, internal risk rating approaches, Management Information System, monitoring of loan portfolio quality and early warning;
d. undertaking portfolio evaluations and conducting comprehensive studies on the environment to test the resilience of the loan portfolio;
e. Coordinating on remedial measures to address deficiencies/problems in credit portfolio;
f. Other matters relating to credit risk management.
4.2. Credit Risk Management Committee
This Committee will be a management committee and responsible for monitoring of credit risk taking activities and overall credit risk management function. This Committee can either be a separate committee comprising of the heads of relevant functions depending upon their size, organizational structure and corporate culture or these responsibilities can be assigned to the overall Risk Management Committee of the bank. Its terms of reference may include, inter alia, the following:
a. Ensure implementation of the credit risk policy / strategy approved by the Board;
b. Monitor credit risk on a bank-wide basis and ensure compliance with limits approved by the Board;
c. Providing input in formulation of credit policy of the bank particularly on credit risk related issues including, for example, setting standards for presentation of credit proposals, financial covenants, rating standards and benchmarks, etc.;
d. Make Recommendations to the Risk Management Committee or any other relevant committee of the Board on matters relating to delegation of credit approving powers, prudential limits on large credit exposures, standards for loan collateral, portfolio management, loan review mechanism, risk concentrations, risk monitoring and evaluation, pricing of loans, provisioning, etc. as and when required;
e. Dealing with any other matters relating to credit risk management.
The Credit Risk Management Department or Unit will provide necessary support to the Credit Risk Management Committee in discharging its responsibilities.
5. Systems and Procedures
Banks should put in place adequate systems and procedures for credit risk management. Broad guidelines for setting systems and procedures regarding various credit related activities of a bank are provided hereunder:
5.1. Credit Origination
Banks should establish sound and well-defined credit-granting criteria, which is essential to approving credit in a safe and sound manner. These criteria should include a clear indication of the bank’s target market and a thorough understanding of the borrower or counterparty, as well as the purpose and structure of the credit, and its source of repayment.
Banks should also have clearly established processes and procedures to assess the risk profile of the customer as well as the risks associated with the proposed credit transaction before granting any credit facility. These processes and procedures should be applicable for approving new credits as well as the amendment, renewal and re-financing of existing credits. The factors to be considered for origination of credit may include, inter alia, the following:
a. Credit assessment of the borrower’s industry, and macro economic factors;
b. The purpose of credit and source of repayment;
c. Assessing the track record / repayment history of the borrower. In case of new borrowers, assessing their integrity and repute as well as their legal capacity to assume the liability;
d. Assessment/evaluation of the repayment capacity of the borrower;
e. Determination of the terms and conditions and covenants of credit;
f. Assessment of the adequacy and enforceability of collaterals;
g. Assessment of adherence to exposure limits and determination of appropriate authority for credit approval;
All extensions of credit must be made on an arm’s-length basis. In particular, credits to related borrowers must be authorized on an exception basis, monitored with particular care and other appropriate steps taken to control or mitigate the risks of non-arm’s length lending.
In case of consortium/syndication loans, it is important that other consortium members should not over rely on the lead bank and should have their own systems and procedures to perform independent analysis and review of syndication terms.
5.2. Limit Setting
Banks should establish overall credit limits at the level of individual borrowers and counterparties, and groups of connected counterparties that aggregate in a comparable and meaningful manner different types of exposures, both in the banking and trading book and on and off the balance sheet.
SAMA has separately specified exposure limits for single counterparties and group of connected counterparties. While remaining within the overall limits specified by SAMA, banks can establish more conservative exposure limits. Banks are required to have well-defined policies and procedures for establishing their internal exposure limits as such limits are an important element of credit risk management. The limit structure should set the boundaries for overall risk taking, be consistent the bank’s overall risk management approach, be applied on a bank-wide basis, allow management to monitor exposures against predetermined risk tolerance levels and ensure prompt management attention to any exceptions to established limits. Banks should take into account the following parameters in establishing their exposure limits:
a. The size of the limits should be based on the credit strength of the borrower, genuine requirement of credit, economic conditions and the bank’s risk tolerance;
b. The limits should be consistent with the bank’s risk management process and commensurate with its capital position;
c. The limits should be established for both individual borrowers as well as groups of connected borrowers. The limits can be based on the internal risk rating of the borrower or any other basis linked to the borrower’s risk profile;
d. There can be separate limits for different credit products and activities, specific industries, economic sectors or geographic regions to avoid concentration risk. The ultimate objective should be to achieve reasonable diversification of credit portfolio;
e. The results of stress testing should be taken into account in the overall limit setting and monitoring process;
f. Credit limits should be reviewed regularly at least annually or more frequently if the borrower’s credit quality deteriorates;
g. All requests of increase in credit limits should be fully evaluated and substantiated.
Banks should closely monitor their credit exposures against established limits and put in place adequate procedures for timely identification of any exceptions against the approved limits. There should also be well defined procedures to deal with any excesses over approved limits. Furthermore, all such instances of excesses over limits should be reported to the senior management along with the details of the corrective action taken. Exceptions to the approved limits should be approved at senior level by the authorized persons. In case of occurrence of frequent exceptions, the management or the board should review the limit structure and devise a strategy to ensure non-occurrence of such breaches.
5.3. Delegation of Authority
Banks are required to establish responsibility for credit approvals and fully document any delegation of authority to approve credits or make changes in credit terms. In this regard, banks are required to take into account the following factors:
a. Board of Directors or its relevant sub-committee should approve the overall lending authority structure, and explicitly delegate credit sanctioning authority to senior management (by position/level of hierarchy) and/or the Credit Committee. The Senior Management may assign the delegated powers to specific individuals or positions down the line subject to adherence of the overall delegation of authority and the criteria laid down for this purpose by the Board or its relevant subcommittee;
b. Lending authority assigned to different levels of hierarchy should be commensurate with the level, experience, ability and character of the person. For this purpose, banks may develop a risk-based authority structure whereby the lending authority is tied to the risk ratings of the obligor;
c. There should be a clear segregation of duties between Relationship Managers, Credit Approvers, Operations processors and Risk Managers with regard to credit approvals or making any changes in credit terms. Any limitations on who should hold credit approval authority should also be clearly stated;
d. The credit policy should spell out the escalation process to ensure appropriate reporting and approval of credit extension beyond prescribed limits or any other exceptions to credit policy;
e. There should be a periodic review of lending authority assigned to different levels of hierarchy;
f. There should be an appropriate system in place to detect any exceptions or misuse of delegated powers and reporting thereof to the senior management and/or the Board of Directors or its relevant sub-committee;
5.4. Credit Administration
Credit administration is an important element of the credit process that support and control extension and maintenance of credit. Banks should have in place a system for the ongoing administration of their various credit risk-bearing portfolios. Banks should also have separate units to perform credit administration function. A typical credit administration unit generally performs the following functions:
a. Credit Documentation: Ensuring completeness of documentation (loan agreements, guarantees, transfer of title of collaterals, etc.) in accordance with the approved terms and conditions of credit;
b. Credit Disbursement: Ensuring that credit approval have been obtained from the competent authority and all other formalities have been completed before any loan disbursement is effected;
c. Credit monitoring: This process starts after disbursement of credit and include keeping track of borrowers’ compliance with credit terms, identifying early signs of irregularity, conducting periodic valuation of collateral and monitoring timely repayments;
d. Loan Repayment: The obligors should be communicated ahead of time as and when the principal and/or commission income becomes due. This may be done either by providing details of the due dates and repayable amounts for both commission and principal in the facility agreement or through a separate communication to the obligor before each due date of the principal and/or commission income or by adopting both these practices. Any delinquencies involving non-payment or late payment of principal or commission should be tagged and communicated to the management. Proper records and updates should also be made after receipt of overdue amount;
e. Maintenance of Credit Files: All credit files should be properly maintained including all original correspondence with the borrower and necessary information to assess its financial health and repayment performance. The credit files should be maintained in a well organized way so that these are easily accessible to external / internal auditors or SAMA inspection team. Banks may resort to maintain electronic credit files only if permitted by relevant law(s) and subject to compliance of all relevant rules/regulations;
f. Collateral and Security Documents: Ensuring that all collateral/security documents are kept in a secured way and under dual control. Proper record of all collateral/security documents should be maintained to keep track of their movement. Procedures should also be established to track and review relevant insurance coverage for facilities/collateral wherever required. Physical checks on collateral/security documents should also be conducted on a regular basis.
Banks should ensure that the credit administration function should be independent of business origination and credit approval process. In developing their credit administration function, banks should ensure:
a. the efficiency and effectiveness of credit administration operations, including monitoring documentation, contractual requirements, legal covenants, collateral, etc.;
b. the accuracy and timeliness of information provided to management information systems;
c. adequate segregation of duties;
d. the adequacy of controls over all “back office” procedures; and
e. compliance with prescribed management policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations.
5.5. Credit Risk Measurement
Banks should adopt elaborate techniques to measure credit risk which may include both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Banks should also establish and utilize an internal credit risk rating framework in managing credit risk. The internal credit risk rating is a summary indicator of a bank’s individual credit exposures and categorizes all credits into various classes on the basis of underlying credit quality. This rating framework may incorporate, inter alia, the business risk (including industry characteristics, competitive position e.g. marketing/technological edge, management capabilities, etc.) and financial risk (including financial condition, profitability, capital structure, present and future cash flows, etc.). The rating system should be consistent with the nature, size and complexity of a bank’s activities.
An internal rating framework would facilitate banks in a number of ways such as:
a. Credit selection;
b. Amount of exposure;
c. Tenure and price of facility;
d. Frequency or intensity of monitoring;
e. Analysis of migration of deteriorating credits and more accurate computation of future loan loss provisions;
f. Deciding the level of approving authority of credit approval.
It is not the intention of these guidelines to prescribe any particular rating system. Banks can choose a rating system which commensurate with the size, nature and complexity of their business as well their risk profile. However, banks are encouraged to take into account the following factors in designing and implementing an internal rating system;
a. The rating system should explicitly define each risk rating grade. The number of grades on rating scale should be neither too large nor too small. A large number of grades may increase the cost of obtaining and analyzing additional information and thus make the implementation of rating system expensive. On the other hand, if the number of rating grades is too small it may not permit accurate characterization of the underlying risk profile of a loan portfolio;
b. The rating system should lay down an elaborate criteria for assigning a particular rating grade, as well as the circumstances under which deviations from criteria can take place;
c. The operating flow of the rating process should be designed in a way that promotes the accuracy and consistency of the rating system while not unduly restricting the exercise of judgment;
d. The operating design of a rating system should address all relevant issues including which exposures to rate; the division of responsibility for grading; the nature of ratings review; the formality of the process and specificity of formal rating definitions;
e. The rating system should ideally aim at assigning a risk rating to all credit exposures of the bank. However, the banks may decide as to which exposures needs to be rated taking into account the cost benefit analysis. The decision to rate a particular credit exposure could be based on factors such as exposure amount, nature of exposure(i.e. corporate, commercial, retail, etc.) or both. Generally corporate and commercial exposures are subject to internal ratings whereas consumer / retail loans are subject to scoring models;
f. Banks should take adequate measures to test and develop a risk rating system prior to adopting one. Adequate validation testing should be conducted during the design phase as well as over the life of the system to ascertain the applicability of the system to the bank’s portfolio. Furthermore, adequate training should be imparted to the staff to ensure uniformity in assignment of ratings;
g. Banks should clearly spell out the roles and responsibilities of different parties for assigning risk rating. Ratings are generally assigned /reaffirmed at the time of origination of a loan or its renewal /enhancement. Generally loan origination function initiates a loan proposal and also allocates a specific rating. This proposal passes through the credit approval process and the rating is also approved or recalibrated simultaneously by approving authority. This may, however, vary from bank to bank;
h. The rating process should take into account all relevant risk factors including borrower’s financial condition, size, industry and position in the industry; the reliability of financial statements of the borrower; quality of management; elements of transaction structure such as covenants, etc. before assigning a risk rating. The risk rating should reflect the overall risk profile of an exposure;
i. Banks should also ensure that risk ratings are updated periodically and are also reviewed as and when any adverse events occur. There should also be a periodic independent review of the risk ratings by a separate function independent of loan origination to ensure consistency and accuracy of ratings.
5.6. Credit Risk Monitoring
Banks should put in place an effective credit monitoring system that enables them to monitor the quality of individual credit exposures as well as the overall credit portfolio and determine the adequacy of provisions. The monitoring system should also enable the bank to take remedial measures as and when any deterioration occurs in individual credits or the overall portfolio. An effective system of credit monitoring should ensure that:
a. the current financial condition of the borrower is fully understood and assessed by the bank;
b. the overall risk profile of the borrower is within the risk tolerance limits established by the bank;
c. all credits are in compliance with the applicable terms & conditions and regulatory requirements;
d. usage of approved credit lines by borrowers is monitored by the bank;
e. the projected cash flow of major credits meet debt servicing requirements;
f. collateral held by the bank provides adequate coverage;
g. all loans are being serviced as per facility terms & conditions;
h. potential problem credits are identified and classified on a timely basis;
i. provisions held by the bank against non-performing loans are adequate;
The banks’ credit policy should explicitly provide procedural guidelines relating to credit risk monitoring covering, inter alia, the following points:
a. The roles and responsibilities of individuals responsible for credit risk monitoring;
b. The assessment procedures and analysis techniques (for individual loans & overall portfolio). This may include, inter alia, the assessment procedures for assessing the financial position and business conditions of the borrower, monitoring his account activity/conduct, monitoring adherence to loan covenants and valuation of collaterals;
c. The frequency of monitoring;
d. The periodic examination of collaterals and loan covenants;
e. The frequency of site visits;
f. Renewal of existing loans and the circumstances under which renewal may be deferred;
g. Restructuring or rescheduling of loans and other credit facilities;
h. The identification of any deterioration in any loan and follow-up actions to be taken.
5.7. Independent Credit Risk Review
Banks should establish a mechanism of conducting an independent review of credit risk management process. Such a review should be conducted by staff involved in credit risk assessment, independent from business area. The placement of this function within the organization and its reporting lines can be determined by the banks themselves provided its independence from the business is ensured. The Credit Policy of the bank should contain provisions for conducting the credit risk review whereas the modalities of conducting such a review should be spelt out in the procedural documents. The purpose of such review is to independently assess the credit appraisal and administration process, the accuracy of credit risk ratings, level of risk, sufficiency of collaterals and overall quality of loan portfolio. Banks should take into account the following factors for conducting a credit risk review:
a. All facilities except those managed on a portfolio basis should be subjected to individual risk review at least once in a year. The review may be conducted more frequently for new borrowers as well as for classified and low rated accounts that have higher probability of default;
b. The credit review should be conducted with updated information on the borrowers financial and business conditions, as well as conduct of account. Any exceptions noted in the credit monitoring process should also be evaluated for impact on the borrowers’ creditworthiness;
c. The credit review should be conducted on a solo as well as consolidated group basis to factor in the business connections among entities in a borrowing group;
d. The results of such review should be properly documented and reported directly to the board or its relevant sub-committee as well as to the senior management;
The credit risk review will mainly focus on corporate and commercial loans. Banks may decide not to cover a particular loans products or categories e.g. consumer loans or retail loans under the risk review. However, they should closely monitor the quality of such loans and report any deterioration in their quality along with the results of credit reviews conducted on other loans.
5.8. Managing Problem Credits
Banks should establish a system to identify problem loans ahead of time for taking appropriate remedial measures. Such a system should provide appropriate guidance to concerned staff on identifying and managing various types of problem loans including corporate, commercial and consumer loans. Once a loan is identified as a problem loan, it should be managed under a dedicated remedial process. In this regard, banks may take into account the following factors:
a. The credit policy should clearly set out how the bank will manage problem credits. The basic elements of managing problem credits may include, inter alia, negotiations and follow-up with the borrowers, working out remedial strategies e.g. restructuring of loan facility, enhancement in credit limits, reduction in commission rates, etc., review of collateral/security documents, and more frequent review and monitoring. Banks should provide detailed guidance in this regard in their systems and procedures for dealing with problem credits;
b. The organizational structure and methods for dealing with problem credits may vary from bank to bank. Generally the responsibility for such credits may be assigned to the originating business function, a specialized workout section, or a combination of the two, depending upon the size and nature of the credit and the reason for its problems. When a bank has significant credit-related problems, it is important to segregate the workout function from the credit origination function;
c. There should be an appropriate system for identification and reporting of problem credits along with the details of remedial measures on regular basis to the senior management and/or the Board of Directors or its relevant sub-committee;
6. Stress Testing of Credit Risk
Banks should take into consideration potential future changes in economic conditions when assessing individual credits and their credit portfolios, and should assess their credit risk exposures under stressful conditions. This will enable them to review their credit portfolio and assess its resilience under “worst case” scenario. For this purpose, banks should adopt robust stress testing techniques. The stress testing of credit portfolio will enable banks to proactively analyze any inherent potential risks in individual credits or the overall credit portfolio or any components thereof. This will also enable them to identify any possible events or future changes in economic conditions that have unfavorable effects on their credit exposures and assessing their ability to withstand such effects. Such detection of any potential events or risks which are likely to materialize in times of stress, will also enable the banks to take timely corrective actions before the situation may get out of control.
Some of the common sources of credit risk which should, inter alia, be analyzed by banks are mentioned hereunder for their guidance:
i. Credit concentrations are probably the single most important cause of major credit problems. Credit concentrations are viewed as any exposure where the potential losses are large relative to the bank’s capital, its total assets or the bank’s overall risk level. Credit concentrations can further be grouped roughly into two categories: (i) Conventional credit concentrations e.g. concentrations of credits to single borrowers or counterparties, a group of connected counterparties, and sectors or industries; (ii) Concentrations based on common or correlated risk factors reflecting subtler or more situation-specific factors e.g. correlations between market and credit risks, as well as between those risks and liquidity risk, etc.;
ii. Weakness in the credit granting and monitoring processes including e.g. shortcomings in credit appraisal processes as well as in underwriting and management of market-related credit exposures;
iii. Excessive reliance on name lending i.e. granting loans to persons with a reputation for strong financial condition or financial acumen, without conducting proper credit appraisal as done for other borrowers;
iv. Credit to related parties which are affiliated, directly or indirectly, with the bank;
v. Lack of an effective credit review process to provide appropriate checks and balances and independent judgment to ensure compliance of bank’s credit policy and prevent weak credits being granted;
vi. Failure to monitor borrowers or collateral values to recognize and stem early signs of financial deterioration;
vii. Failure to take sufficient account of business cycle effects whereby the credit analysis may incorporate overly optimistic assumptions relating to income prospects and asset values of the borrowers in the ascending portion of the business cycle;
viii. Challenges posed by the market-sensitive and liquidity-sensitive exposures to the credit processes at banks. Market-sensitive exposures (e.g. foreign exchange and financial derivative contracts) require a careful analysis of the customer’s willingness and ability to pay. Liquidity-sensitive exposures (e.g. margin and collateral agreements with periodic margin calls, liquidity back-up lines, commitments and some letters of credit, etc.) require a careful analysis of the customer’s vulnerability to liquidity stresses, since the bank’s funded credit exposure can grow rapidly when customers are subject to such stresses. Market- and liquidity-sensitive instruments change in riskiness with changes in the underlying distribution of price changes and market conditions;
Stress testing should involve identifying possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavorable effects on a bank’s credit exposures and assessing the bank’s ability to withstand such changes. Three areas that banks could usefully examine are: (i) economic or industry downturns; (ii) market-risk events; and (iii) liquidity conditions. Stress testing can range from relatively simple alterations in assumptions about one or more financial, structural or economic variables to the use of highly sophisticated financial models. Whatever the method of stress testing used, the output of the tests should be reviewed periodically by senior management and appropriate action taken in cases where the results exceed agreed tolerances. The output should also be incorporated into the process for assigning and updating policies and limits.
Detailed guidance on stress testing of credit risk has been provided in the SAMA Rules on Stress Testing issued on 23 November 2011. Banks are required to take into account the requirements of these SAMA Rules in stress testing of their credit portfolio.
7. Management Information System
Banks should put in place effective management information system(MIS) to enable management to be aware, measure, monitor and control the credit risk inherent in the bank’s all on- and off-balance sheet activities. An accurate, informative and timely management information system is an important factor in the overall effectiveness of the risk management process. Banks should comply with the following guidelines in developing and strengthening the MIS for credit risk:
i. The system should be capable of compiling credit information both on solo and consolidated basis as well as across various credit categories and products (including off-balance sheet activities);
ii. The system should be able to produce all the required information to enable the management to assess quickly and accurately the level of credit risk, ensure adherence to the risk tolerance levels and devise strategies to manage the credit risk effectively;
iii. The system should be able to provide information on the composition of the portfolio, concentrations of credit risk, quality of the overall credit portfolio as well as various categories of the portfolio and rescheduled/restructured and “watchlist” accounts;
iv. The reporting system should ensure that exposures approaching pre-defined maximum risk limits/thresholds set out for individual exposures are brought to the attention of management. All exposures should be included in a risk limit measurement system;
v. The management information reports should be prepared by persons who are independent of the business unit(s);
The credit risk management function should monitor and report its measures of risk to appropriate levels of management, the relevant Board committee and the Board. The board should be regularly briefed on the overall credit risk exposure (including off-balance sheet activities) of the bank. The board should be provided, inter alia, the following information for its review:
i. The amount of credit exposures undertaken with broken down by loans categories, types of exposures, products and level of credit grades, etc.;
ii. A periodic report on the existing lending products, their target market, performance and credit quality as also the details of any planned new products;
iii. Concentrations of credit to large exposures, groups of connected parties, specific industries, economic sectors or geographic regions, etc.;
iv. A report on the overall quality of the credit portfolio. This may include, inter alia, details of problem loans including those on the watchlist, categories of their classification, potential loss to the bank on each significant problem loan, the level of existing and additional provisions required there against, etc.;
v. Details of the actions taken and planned to recover the significant problem loans as well as the status of adherence to the terms and conditions of any significant rescheduled/restructured loans;
vi. Such other information as may be required by the board or deemed appropriate by the management to bring to the attention of the board;
Banks should regularly review their management information systems to ensure their adequacy and effectiveness, and introduce changes wherever required.
8. Internal Controls System
Bank's disclosures regarding Risk Management (both quantitative and qualitative) should be subject to the internal controls outlined in this section.As part of their internal controls system, banks should introduce effective controls to manage credit risk. The internal audit function of the bank should independently assess the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls relating to credit risk management. The internal audit should periodically evaluate the soundness of relevant internal controls covering, inter alia, the following:
i. Adequacy of internal controls for each stage of the credit process;
ii. Appropriateness and effectiveness of internal controls in commensuration to the level of risks posed by the nature and scope of the bank’s lending activities;
iii. Reliability and timeliness of information reported to the Board of Directors, its relevant committee(s) and senior management;
iv. Effectiveness of organizational structure to promote checks and balances and to ensure existence of clear lines of authority and responsibilities for monitoring adherence to approved credit policies, procedures and limits;
v. Adequacy of credit policies and procedures as well as adherence to such policies and procedures;
vi. Compatibility of credit policies and procedures with legal and regulatory requirements as well as adherence to applicable laws/ regulations (this function can either be performed by internal audit or compliance);
vii. An assessment of the alignment of remuneration incentive plans with the approved risk appetite and credit policies of the bank;
viii. Identification of any weaknesses in the credit policies, procedures and related internal controls to enable the management and/or the Board to take timely corrective actions;
The internal audit should report the findings on adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls relating to credit function independently to the senior management and the Board or its relevant committee. The internal audit reports should also provide an assessment of the adequacy of any corrective actions being taken to address the material weaknesses.
loan Classification, Provisioning and Credit Review
No: 241000000312 Date(g): 19/1/2004 | Date(h): 27/11/1424 Status: In-Force In July 2002, SAMA had issued a draft Circular entitled ‘Credit Classification and Review.’ Subsequently, Saudi banks were required to provide comments on the circular and estimate the quantitative impact of these rules on their financial position. In 2003, all Saudi banks have submitted their comments to SAMA.
SAMA has also closely monitored international developments in this regard emanating from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Accounting Standard Board. Currently there is considerable amount of work in progress which has relevance for this subject in these organizations. However, we have incorporated various relevant concepts from recent developments in this circular and also highlighted their implications over the next few years.
Consequently, the Central Bank has decided to implement the proposed rules as minimum standards, while Saudi banks are encouraged to develop more sophisticated and refined methodologies for loan classification and provisioning. The added incentive for the banks would be better alignment of their methodologies for provisioning and the Basel capital requirements under the IRB approaches. Consequently, an integrated system based on historical loss experience, on a portfolio based approach, may be desirable to enable banks for estimating their provision and capital requirements.
SAMA has also addressed specific issues raised by banks as follows:
1. There are inevitable differences between Accounting Provisions and Supervisory Provisions. The annual difference between the two calculations should be adjusted to the accumulated retained earnings in the Supervisory Returns. No adjustment needs to be made to the published financial statements of the banks. Where a bank has no accumulated retained earnings, the adjustment could be made to a general reserve or to statutory reserve following approval by SAMA on a case by case basis.
2. General Provisions will be 1% of loans in the ‘Standard’ and ‘Special Mention’ categories. All Saudi Government loans or claims fully backed by collateral of Saudi Government in form of securities or guarantees should be deducted before calculating general provisions.
3. SAMA has specified automatic provisioning requirements related to Banks’ non-performing loan portfolios, based on the number of days past due. However, exceptions are permitted for individual loans where a bank has strong documentary evidence that a loan is performing despite being past due. It is expected that such exceptions will be used in limited number of cases. Saudi banks are required to maintain a list of such loans that have been treated under this exception and document the underlying reasons.
SAMA requires all Saudi banks to provide the following information. These are to be provided by 15th of the month following the end of the quarter.
1. A quarterly report on the loan portfolios according to the proposed classification system - Annex 1.
2. A quarterly report on Loan Provisions -Annex 2.
3. A quarterly list of loans where exceptions have been made to the general rule of automatic classification - Annex 3.
4. Guidance Notes-Annex 4.
These rules are to be implemented from 1 January 2004, with the first Quarterly Reports due as of 31 March 2004.
Section I. Loan Classification
1.1 Introduction
Realistic assessment of asset quality and prudent recognition of income and expenses lie at the heart of the assessment of financial soundness of any individual banking institution. Therefore, it is essential that banks in Saudi Arabia follow minimum standards for loan assessment and classification.
This regulation aims to provide a degree of uniformity and consistency by requiring Saudi banks to use the proposed principal categories for loan classifications. All Saudi banks will be required to provide supervisory data on the basis of these proposed classification grades for comparison and for consolidation on a banking system-wide basis. However, Saudi banks are encouraged to develop and use more sophisticated classification systems and methodologies as long as they are consistent with the principal classification categories defined in this regulation.
1.2 Scope
The credit products covered by this regulation (collectively referred to as “loans”) include all types of consumer and corporate loans, advances, overdrafts, credit card balances, leasing, musharaka, murabaha, istisna, letters of guarantee and credit and any other commission and non-commission bearing credit-related instruments and arrangements. They also include loans to businesses, financial institutions, governments and their agencies, individuals, project finance, residential and commercial mortgages and direct financial leases. Off balance sheet items such as guarantees, letters of credits, and derivatives such as futures and forward contracts, etc. carry credit risk. These may turn into loans or receivables as a result of defaults and other events and should be classified in appropriate categories, when such credit risk crystallizes into a loan or receivable.
1.3 Objectives
The main objectives of a system of Ioan classification are as follows:
• To highlight those loans that represent an above-normal credit risk;
• To evaluate the degree of risk involved;
• To develop a strategy or action plan for monitoring and follow-up on weak loans and for the recovery or liquidation of impaired loans and other such outstanding credits;
• To provide essential information for the determination of adequate provisions for expected credit losses; and,
• To bring a degree of uniformity and consistency in the method of classification of loans outstanding among Saudi banks.
1.4 Assessment and Classification of Individual Loans
1.4.1 Large commercial loans to corporates, governments, private banking customers and others are often reviewed and assessed on an individual basis. Systematic measurement of impairment of individual loans must include the use of a classification system for assigning loans to risk categories. Such a system should segregate loans by the probability of risks associated with individual loans. Over time, banks should monitor and evaluate the levels and trends of risk in their commercial loan portfolios through an analysis of the classification categories. Banks should also target troubled loans for more frequent reviews and higher levels of scrutiny.
1.4.2 The assessment of each loan should be based upon its fundamentals, including as a minimum the following evaluation factors:
• The obligor’s character and integrity.
• The purpose of the loan and the sources of repayment.
• The overall financial condition and resources of the obligor, including the current and future cash flows.
• The credit and delinquency history of the obligor.
• The probability of default on existing loan and any new Ioan being extended.
• The types of secondary sources of repayment available, such as guarantor’s support and collateral values when they are not a primary sources of repayment. (Undue reliance on secondary sources of repayment should be questioned and the bank’s policy on such practice should be reviewed.)
1.4.3 While assessing a loan, banks should consider the extent of the shortfall in the operating results and cash flows of the obligor, the support provided by any pledged collateral, and/or the support provided by any third party.
1.4.4 In order to promote uniformity in the criteria used by Saudi Banks for assigning quality rating to loans, SAMA proposes the system of credit classifications described in the following paragraphs. It should be noted that banks may use classification systems that have more grades than those noted below, as long as they can demonstrate that their systems comply with and their data can be summarized in a manner consistent with the system proposed in these regulations.
1.4.5 Standard Category
Loans in this category are performing and have sound fundamental characteristics such as borrower’s overall financial conditions, resources and cash flows, credit history and primary or secondary sources of repayment.
A classification of standard should be given to all loans that exhibit neither actual nor potential weaknesses. Loans that exhibit potential weaknesses should be categorized as Special Mention. Standard and Special Mention loans are considered as “performing” credits.
1.4.6 Special Mention Category
A ‘Special Mention’ loan is defined as having potential weaknesses that deserve management’s close attention. If left uncorrected, these potential weaknesses may, at some future date, result in the deterioration of the repayment prospects for the loan. These loans are normally current and up-to-date in terms of principal and commission/income payments but deserve management’s close attention. These potential weaknesses may include:
• Declining profitability
• Tightening liquidity or cash flow
• Increasing leverage and/or weakening net worth
• Weakened marketability and/or value of collateral
• Industry-specific problems
• Economic and/or other problems affecting the obligor’s performance
• Concerns about the obligor’s management competence or depth
• Material documentation problems
• Inability to obtain current financial information
1.4.7 ‘Special Mention’ loans would not expose an institution to sufficient risk to warrant a non-performing classification and would continue to accrue commission. ‘Special Mention’ loans would have characteristics, which corrective management actions could remedy. The ‘Special Mention’ category should also not be used to list loans that contain risks usually associated with that particular type of lending. Any lending involves certain risks, regardless of the collateral or the obligor’s capacity and willingness to repay the debt. But only where the risk has increased beyond that which existed at origination, should the loans be categorized as ‘Special Mention’. However, loans to businesses in certain industries (for example, those with declining revenues or reducing margins or which are subject to specific competitive issues) may be included.
1.4.8 Loans, which exhibit well-defined weaknesses and a distinct possibility of loss, should be assigned the following categories from less to most severe:
• “Substandard”
• “Doubtful”
• “Loss”
Loans in the ‘Substandard’, ‘Doubtful’ and ‘Loss’ categories would be collectively termed as “non-performing” credits.
1.4.9 ‘Substandard’ Category
Loans in this category have well-defined weaknesses, where the current financial soundness and paying capacity of the obligor is not assured. Orderly repayment of debt may be in jeopardy. A ‘Substandard’ loan is inadequately protected by future cash flows, the obligor’s current net worth or by the collateral pledge, if any. An important indicator is that any portion of commission/income or principal or both are more than 90 days past due or where there is insufficient credits for an overdraft. For corporate, government and private banking loans and other individually reviewed loans, the 90 days past due rule will also generally apply, unless a bank has strong documentary evidence to support a different classification.
1.4.10 ‘Doubtful’ Category
A loan classified as ‘Doubtful’ has all the weaknesses inherent in one classified ‘Substandard’ with the added characteristic that the weaknesses make collection or liquidation of the principal and contractual commission/income in full, on the basis of currently existing facts, conditions, and values, highly questionable and improbable. Classification as ‘loss’ is not warranted because of specific factors that generate additional cash flows other than from realization of existing collateral. Such factors include business cash flows, potential merger, acquisition, capital injection or additional collateral. In general a loan where the principal and commission are more than 180 days past due should be included in this classification, except where a bank has strong documentary evidence to support a different categorization such as ‘Sub-standard’ or ‘Special Mention’.
1.4.11 ‘Loss’ Category
A loan classified as ‘Loss’ is considered uncollectible in the normal course of business and recourse will have to be made to collateral. Loss category does not mean that the asset has absolutely no recovery or salvage value but rather that it is prudent to establish a provision for the entire loan not covered by collateral. For private banking loans and other individually reviewed loans where principal or commission/income are past due for more than 360 days should be included in this classification except where a bank has strong documentary evidence to support a different categorization.
1.5 Split Classifications
1.5.1 Split classifications refer to the practice of assigning different classifications to different entities within the same group relationship, or to different loans extended to the same obligor, or to different portions of a single loan.
1.5.2 Split within a relationship. Loans extended to subsidiaries of a parent company on the basis of direct or implied support from the parent should generally not be classified at the higher level than the parent. On the other hand, loans extended to subsidiaries without direct or implied parent support may be classified at a lower level than the parent. An exception may be where there is tangible collateral or independent cash flow.
1.5.3 Split to same obligor. All loans extended to one borrower should generally be classified at the same level. However, certain loans to an obligor may be classified at a different level than other loans if they are secured by collateral or guarantees of unquestionable value. For example, a loan secured by properly hypothecated cash collateral would be less severely classified than other less well-secured loans to the same borrower.
1.6 Assessing Classification and Impairment of a Group of Loans
1.6.1 Generally, it is impractical for a bank to analyze and provide for impairment losses for their smaller loans on an individual, Ioan by loan basis, e.g. consumer and credit card loans. For groups of small homogenous loans, the loss attributes should normally be based on available information such as past due status.
1.6.2 For retail and consumer loans, it is difficult or impractical to make an individual assessment, the banks should use the following classification system to classify outstandings on a grouped basis.
1.6.3 Standard Loans. Loans in this category are performing and have sound fundamental characteristic of credit history, cash flow and timely repayment. These are normally represented by current balances with no hint of default.
1.6.4 Special Mention. These loans exhibit potential weaknesses that at a future date may result in deterioration of repayment. These loans are current and up to date but deserve management’s close attention.
1.6.5 Substandard. Loans where any portion of commission income or principal are more than 90 days overdue.
1.6.6 Doubtful Category. Loans where any portion of commission income or principal are more than 180 days overdue.
1.6.7 Loss Category. Loans where any portion of commission income or principal are overdue by more than one year.
1.6.8 For banks that wish to use more sophisticated methodologies based on historical data, there is no single best method for quantifying loss attributes for groups of loans. Acceptable methods range from a simple average of bank’s historical loss experience over a period of years to more complex ‘migration’ analysis techniques. The specific method often depends on the sophistication of a bank’s information system.
1.7 Recognition of Income
1.7.1 Notwithstanding the provisions made under Section II below, all commission/income accrued but not received on loans that become non-performing should not be recognized as income and should be transferred to a commission/income in suspense account. Similarly, commission/interest charged to a non-performing overdraft is not considered to have been received. The bank should set aside a specific provision for the full amount of the commission transferred to the suspense account. This provision would offset the commission income receivable included under assets. These transfers to a suspense account should be made without regard to collateral, if any, and the possibility of the ultimate collection of the overdue amounts.
1.7.2 When amounts are received from borrowers in repayment of overdue commission/income or overdue principal, such amounts should first be offset against the overdue commission. This should be followed until such time as the loan is regularized and can be classified as performing, i.e. Standard or Special Mention.
Section II Minimum Provisioning Requirements
2.1 General Provisions
Experience shows that loan portfolios often contain loans which are in fact impaired at that balance sheet date, but which will not be specifically identified as such until some time in the future. Generally, there will not be sufficient information on hand during the review of loans to be certain that all impaired loans have been identified or of the correctness of the estimated losses and the adequacy of the provision for loan losses.
2.2 Impaired Loans
As a result, a general provision should be made to cover the impaired loans which will only be identified as such in the future. Unless otherwise prescribed by SAMA, this general provision should be a minimum of 1% of the outstanding balances of the Standard and Special Mention categories. All Saudi government loans or claims fully backed by collateral of Saudi government in form of securities or guarantees should be deducted before calculating general provision.
2.3 Historical Data
In general, if a bank has at least 3 years of reliable historical data captured through a system validated and approved by SAMA, it could establish an appropriate general provision using such data adjusted for current observable conditions. Such banks may seek exemption from SAMA in relation to the requirements in paragraph 2.2 above. Saudi banks are also encouraged to develop and implement more sophisticated systems that capture historical data on loan defaults and loss experience that could be used for general provisioning purposes. Although historical loss experience provides a reasonable starting point for a bank analysis, these cannot be accepted without analysis of current conditions and future prospects. Banks must make an adjustment that should reflect management’s best estimate of the level of charge-offs or specific provision that will be recognized. Factors include:
• Change in national and international lending policies and procedures.
• Change in local, national and international economic and business conditions.
• Changes in trends, volumes and severity of past due loans, impaired loans and troubled debt restructuring.
• Changes in experience, depth and ability of lending management and staff.
• Changes in bank’s loan review system and the degree of oversight by the Board.
• Existence and effect of any concentration of credit.
• Effect of external factors, competition, legislation, regulatory requirement, etc.
• Changes in the risk profile of the portfolio as a whole.
Loans that have been individually analyzed and provided for with a provision should also be included in the group for determining a bank’s historical experience for such group. However, to avoid double counting, loans for which specific provision has already been made should be subtracted from the group before a historical loss factor is applied to the group to establish appropriate general provisions.
Saudi banks should use a period of at least 3 years to determine their average historical loss experience. However, banks should weigh recent experience more heavily to accurately estimate bank’s expected losses in the current economic climate.
2.4 Specific Provisions
A specific provision should be made for incurred and expected losses for individually assessed corporate, government, private banking and other large loans to reduce the carrying value of impaired credits to their estimated net realizable amount. Retail loans that fall under the non-performing loan categories should also be covered by specific provisions. Unless otherwise prescribed by SAMA, the following minimum provisions should be made on the aggregate of individual net exposures for each classification category. Loans which have been individually assessed and on which specific provisions, in excess of the prescribed minimum, have been made should be excluded in computing the minimum provisions by each classification category. Minimum provisions are to be computed on the net exposure which represents the balance outstanding less a prudent estimate of the fair value of the perfected collateral.
Category Minimum Provision (% of net exposure) ‘Substandard’ 25% ‘Doubtful’ 50% ‘Loss’ 100% 2.5 Treatment of Differences between Supervisory and Accounting Provisions
Saudi banks are expected to apply the relevant Accounting Standards. For purposes of bank accounting and financial reporting, the computation of general and specific provisions for loan impairment is governed by these accounting standards. Consequently, these are likely to differ from the supervisory general and specific provisions provided in this circular. While the accounting provisions are to be used for all published financial statements of a Saudi bank, the supervisory provisions are to be used solely for the purpose of prudential reporting to SAMA.
The treatment of accumulated specific and general accounting and supervisory provisions will continue to be guided by the relevant accounting standards and relevant SAMA rules respectively. However, the difference in the annual charge between accounting and supervisory provisions must be reflected by an adjustment directly into the accumulated retained earnings of the bank on the supervisory returns. In case a bank has no retained earnings, the adjustment will be made to the general or statutory reserves after discussion with the Central Bank on a case by case basis.
Section III. Other Matters
3.1. Rescheduled Loans
A restructured troubled loan arises when a bank, for economic or legal reasons related to the obligor’s financial difficulties, grants him a concession that it would not otherwise consider. A bank should measure a restructured troubled loan by reducing the recorded outstanding to net realizable value as required by the relevant accounting standards, taking into account the cost of all concessions at the date of restructuring. The reduction in the outstanding amount should be recorded as a charge to the income statement in the period in which the loan is restructured.
In cases where non-performing loans in particular are rescheduled, such loans should not be upwardly reclassified merely because of the existence of a rescheduling agreement. Upward reclassification should only be made if and when there is sufficient evidence of adherence to the terms of the rescheduling agreement. This evidence would include the establishment of a history for at least 12 months of timely repayments of both principal and commission/interest under the rescheduling agreement.
3.2. Overdrafts
Formal procedures should be put into place to support the determination of the classification of an overdraft based on transactions within the overdraft and in particular the timeliness of repayments of commission/income.
As a minimum, these procedures should include:
• Periodic systematic comparison of the aggregate value of credits in the overdraft account with the repayments due and other debits in the account.
• Understanding the nature and source of the credits in the account.
• Review of the history of the account balance.
3.3. Collateral
Prudent and proper valuation of collateral is critical to the determination of provisions. Proper procedures should be put into place to value collateral on a periodic basis, at least once a year, using external appraisers or external reliable published information. In cases where judgment is used in the valuation of the collateral and where the collateral or the credit is significant, valuations should be carried out by more than one external appraiser. In general, collateral obtained for consumer credit and similar credits where large number of relatively small balances is outstanding would be excluded from such requirements. The valuations so obtained should be adjusted downwards by an appropriate percentage to reflect costs of disposal, fluctuations in market values and the inherent lack of accuracy in such valuations.
3.4. The Basel Capital Accord and Provisioning
The Basel 2 Capital Accord provides incentives to internationally active banks to develop and implement sophisticated and advance system for measuring and capturing credit, market and operational risks. For credit risk, it encourages banks to develop and implement sophisticated internal ratings based approaches. As a minimum, it requires all credit risk on the bank’s banking book to be classified into a system that has as a minimum 7 grades for performing loans and one for non-performing loans. It also requires banks to gather data for a minimum of 3 years on their history of losses arising from loan defaults. Data gathered from such systems permits banks and supervisors to collect information on Probability of Default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD), and Expected Amount at Default (EAD). Such data permits banks to compute a capital charge for capital ratio purposes, using the risk weighted assets models designed by Basel under the IRB approach.
SAMA encourages all Saudi banks to understand, develop and implement, where cost-justified and appropriate, IRB approaches for capital adequacy purposes. While the IRB systems are primarily aimed at computation of regulatory capital, it is understood that the information on historical loss experience may have relevance for a bank’s calculation of general provisions. Consequently, SAMA will encourage Saudi banks to look into ways of aligning their capital adequacy and provisioning methodologies.
Section IV. Independent Credit Review System
4.1. Introduction
All Saudi banks are expected to establish a system of independent, ongoing credit review and results of such reviews should be communicated directly to senior management, the Board of Directors and the Audit Committee. While the determination of the impairment of an asset is made by banks based on their own internal credit review procedures, which can vary from one bank to another, this regulation is aimed at ensuring that banks’ own systems as a minimum meet the following requirements.
4.2. Objectives
The principal objectives of an effective independent credit review system are as follows:
• To ensure the credits are appropriately classified;
• To ensure that credits with potential or well-defined weaknesses are identified promptly and that timely action is taken to minimize credit losses;
• To project relevant trends that affect the collectibility of the portfolio and to isolate potential problem areas;
• To review the adequacy of the allowance for credit losses;
• To assess the adequacy of and adherence to internal credit policies and administrative procedures and to monitor compliance with relevant laws and regulations;
• To evaluate the activities of credit personnel;
• To provide senior management, the Board of Directors and the Audit Committee with an objective and timely assessment of the overall quality of the credit portfolio; and,
• To ensure that management is provided with accurate and timely information related to credit quality that can be used for financial and regulatory reporting purposes.
For an effective achievement of the above objectives, financial institutions should operate an independent credit review system having regard to the size of the institution and the complexity of its operations.
4.3. Elements of an Independent Credit Review System
An institution’s written policy on its independent credit review system should address the following elements:
• Qualifications of credit review personnel
• Independence of credit review personnel
• Frequency of reviews
• Scope of reviews
• Depth of reviews
• Review of findings and follow-up
• Workpaper and report distribution
4.4. Qualifications of Credit Review Personnel
Persons involved in the credit review function should be qualified based on level of education, experience, and extent of formal credit training and should be knowledgeable in both sound lending practices and the institution’s lending guidelines for the types of credits offered by the bank. In addition, these persons should be knowledgeable of all relevant laws and regulations affecting the bank’s lending activities.
4.5. Independence of Credit Review Personnel
An effective credit review system utilizes both the initial identification of emerging problem credits by credit officers, and the review of credit by individuals independent of the credit approval decisions. An important element of an effective system is to place responsibility on credit officers for continuous portfolio analysis and prompt identification and reporting of problem credits. Because of their frequent contact with borrowers, credit officers can usually identify potential problems before they become apparent to others. However, financial institutions should be careful to avoid over-reliance upon credit officers for identification of problem credits. Financial institutions should ensure that credits are also reviewed by individuals who do not have control over the credits they review and are not part of, or influenced by anyone associated with, the credit approval process.
While larger financial institutions would typically establish a separate department (unit) staffed with credit review specialists, cost and volume considerations may not justify such a department in smaller financial institutions. In smaller financial institutions, an independent credit review officer or internal audit may fill this role.
4.6 Frequency of Reviews
Optimally, the credit review function can be used to provide useful continual feedback on the effectiveness of the credit process in order to identify any emerging problems. For example, the frequency of independent review of significant credits could be at least annually, upon renewal, or more frequently for ‘Special Mention’ loans, or when internal or external factors indicate a potential for deteriorating credit quality in a particular type of credit or pool of credits. A system of on-going or periodic portfolio reviews is particularly important for the provisioning process, which is dependent on the accurate and timely identification of problem credits.
4.7. Scope of Reviews
The review should cover all credits that are significant. Also, the review typically includes, in addition to all credits over a pre-determined size, a sample of small credits, past due, non-accrual, renewed credits, restructured credits, credits previously considered non-performing or designated as ‘Special Mention’, related party credits, and concentrations and other credits affected by common repayment factors. The sample for each type of facility/portfolio selected for review should provide reasonable assurance that the results of the reviews have identified the major problems in the portfolio and reflect its quality as a whole, Financial institutions’ management is required to document the scope and the process of its reviews. The scope of credit reviews should be approved by the financial institutions’ Board of Directors and its Audit Committee on an annual basis or when any significant changes to the scope of reviews are made.
4.8. Depth of the Reviews
These reviews should analyze a number of important aspects of selected credits, including:
• Credit quality
• Sufficiency of credit and collateral documentation
• Proper lien perfection
• Proper approvals
• Adherence to any credit agreement covenants
• Compliance with internal policies and procedures and laws and regulations
• Appropriateness of the classification assigned to the credits
• Adequacy of the provisions made against such credits
Furthermore, these reviews should consider the appropriateness and timeliness of the identification of problem credits by credit officers and the adequacy of the overall level of provisions for the whole credit portfolio and for the nonperforming credits.
4.9. Review of Finding and Follow-Up
Findings should be reviewed with appropriate credit officers, department managers, and members of senior management and any existing or planned corrective action should be clarified for all noted deficiencies and identified weaknesses, including the timeframes for correction. All noted deficiencies and identified weaknesses that remain unresolved beyond the assigned timeframes for correction should be promptly reported to senior management, the Board of Directors and the Audit Committee.
4.10. Workpaper and Report Distribution
A list of credits reviewed, the date of the review and documentation (including summary analysis) to substantiate assigned classifications of credits should be prepared on all credits reviewed. A report that summarizes the results of the credit review should be submitted to the Board of Directors on at least a quarterly basis. In addition to reporting current credit quality findings, comparative trends can be presented to the Board of Directors that identify significant changes in the overall quality of the portfolio. Findings should also address the adequacy of and adherence to internal policies, practices and procedures, and compliance with laws and regulations so that any noted deficiencies can be remedied in a timely manner.
Annex 1 SAMA Prudential Return Classification of Loans For the Quarter Ending
Individually Assessed Loans Loans Assessed as a Group Total Loans (SR OOP's) (SR 000's) (SR OOP's) Current QTR Previous QTR QTR in Previous Year Current QTR Previous QTR QTR in Previous Year Current QTR Previous QTR QTR in Previous Year Standard Special Mention Substandard Doubtful Loss TOTAL Annex 2 SAMA Prudential Return Supervisory Loan Provisioning For the Quarter Ending
(SR 000's)
Current QuarterGross Loan Amount Interest in Suspense General Provision Specific Provision Total Total Previous QTR Current QTR Charge to Net Income 1. Standard 2. Special Mention 3. Substandard 4. Doubtful 5. Loss TOTAL 6. Provisions for Published Statements per IAS Retained Eaminqs: • Retained Earnings on Supervisory Returns 7. Cumulative Charge (Addition) to Accumulated Retained Earnings on Supervisory Return 8. Supervisory Retained Earnings at end of the period Annex 3 SAMA Prudential Return List of Individually Assessed Loans Where Exceptions Made to the 90, 180, 360 Day Rule for Classification For the Quarter Ending
(SR 000's)
I. Analysis of the Loan Portfolio:
Performing Loans Loans 90 Overdue Loans 180 Overdue Loans 360 Overdue Total Number of Loans Amount II. Analysis of Exceptions:
Gross Amount (SR OOP's) Loans on Which Exceptions Made Impact on Classification Number of Loans Amount (+ or -) Standard Specific Mention Substandard Doubtful Loss TOTAL III. List 10 Major Loans on which exceptions made:
(SR OOP's) Name of Counterparty Amount Impact on Classification (+ or -) Annex 4 Guidance Notes for Prudential Returns For Loan Classification and Provisioning
1. Annex 1 - Loan Classification
• Columns 1, 4 and 7 - Total reflects gross loan amount before Provisions.
• Columns 2, 5 and 8 - Previous quarter gross Loans.
• Columns 3, 6 and 9 - Same Quarter previous year.
• Totals in columns 7, 8 and 9 should agree with total for item 9 on the M-1 returns.
2. Annex 2 - Loan Provisioning
• Column 1 - Shows gross loan outstanding amounts before Provisions. This should agree with item 9 on M-1 Return.
• Column 2 - Interest in suspense to agree with 27.2 on M-1 return.
• Column 3 - Shows general provisions to agree with 27.13 on M-1.
• Column 4 - Shows specific provisions to agree with 27.12 on M-1.
• Column 5 - Total Provisions for columns 2, 3 and 4.
• Column 6 - Total provisions for same Quarter in previous year
• Column 7 - This should reflect the charge (or credit) to net income on supervisory returns for the current Quarter.
• Item 6 - This line should reflect the most recent available Quarter (indicate date) for which Accounting provision information is available.
• Item 7 - This should reflect the adjustment (charge or credit) to supervisory Accumulated Retained Earnings arising from the difference between supervisory and accounting provisions.
• Item 8 - Supervisory retained earnings at the end of the Quarter.
3. Annex 3 - Loan Classification Exceptions
• Item I - This is a simple aging analysis of the loan portfolio of the bank in terms of the number of loans and the amounts (before any exceptions are made).
• Item II - Analysis of Exceptions:
• Column 1 - Shows gross amount of loans in each category - equals item 9 on M-1.
• Column 2 - Shows # of loans on which exception is made
• Column 3 - Shows Amount of Loans on which exception is made
• Column 4 - Impact of the exception on proposed classifications - show + or i.e. net impact on classification grades.
• Item III - Shows impact for top 10 loans on standard classifications.
Liquidity Risk Management
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
No: 361000009335 Date(g): 9/11/2014 | Date(h): 17/1/1436 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision
No: 351000147075 Date(g): 25/9/2014 | Date(h): 1/12/1435 Status: In-Force On 5 December 2008, SAMA issued a Circular entitled "Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision". This circular was based on a BCBS document on this subject issued in September 2008. SAMA provided specific instructions to banks to introduce and integrate these Principles concerning Sound Liquidity Risk Management into their internal systems and processes. *SAMA also instructed banks to audits their internal systems and processes against these Principles and submit a report to SAMA on the main findings. Banks had undertaken those audits and submitted their findings to SAMA.
*SAMA would like the Banks to arrange an internal audit to assess the implementation of these Principles by the Banks (refer to attachment for guidance).
*The highlighted text is no longer applicable. SAMA’s General Guidance Concerning Amended LCR
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio Regulations and Guidance Documents were issued by SAMA circular No (341000107020), dated 02/09/1434H, corresponding to 10/07/2013G, and amended by SAMA Circular No. (361000009335), dated 17/01/1436H, Corresponding To 09/11/2014G.For the ease of implementation, SAMA has used reference to paras in the BCBS document of January 2013. For example para 16 on page 2 of this document is adopted from para 16 of the BCBS document.SAMA's General Guidance
1. Background and Frequency of Reporting
SAMA wishes to continue monitoring the LCR and NSFR Global Liquidity Ratios where for LCR, it will be on the basis of the Amended LCR package being implemented through this circular, and NSFR will continue to be on the basis of SAMA’s circular of 8 February, 2012.
These guidance notes are built under the current BCBS regime of LCR as agreed in the GHOS meeting of January, 2013. In this regard, the following documents were issued in January 2013 and approved by the BCBS.
• A GHOS Press Release was issued entitled "Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision endorses revised liquidity standard for banks" of January 2013
• A BCBS document entitled "Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Monitoring Tool".
The attached Guidance Notes and Prudential returns are based on the most recent Basel QIS package, and it should be noted that the attached SAMA Prudential returns contains a column entitled "Paragraph in document". This is reference to the paragraph in the BCBS document of January 2013 entitled "Basel III: Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Monitoring tools” which can be obtained from the BIS website.
1A). Objective of LCR and use of HQLA
16. This standard aims to ensure that a bank has an adequate stock of unencumbered HQLA that consists of cash or assets that can be converted into cash at little or no loss of value in private markets, to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. At a minimum, the stock of unencumbered HQLA should enable the bank to survive until Day 30 of the stress scenario, by which time it is assumed that appropriate corrective actions can be taken by management and supervisors (SAMA), or that the bank can be resolved in an orderly way. Furthermore, it gives the central bank additional time to take appropriate measures, should they be regarded as necessary. As noted in the Sound Principles, given the uncertain timing of outflows and inflows, banks are also expected to be aware of any potential mismatches within the 30-day period and ensure that sufficient HQLA are available to meet any cash flow gaps throughout the period.
17. The LCR builds on traditional liquidity “coverage ratio” methodologies used internally by banks to assess exposure to contingent liquidity events. The total net cash outflows for the scenario are to be calculated for 30 calendar days into the future. The standard requires that, absent a situation of financial stress, the value of the ratio be no lower than 100%. The 100% threshold is the minimum requirement absent a period of financial stress, and after the phase-in arrangements are complete. References to 100% may be adjusted for any phase-in arrangements in force (The 100% threshold is the minimum requirement absent a period of financial stress, and after the phase-in arrangements are complete.) I.e. the stock of HQLA should at least equal total net cash outflows, on an ongoing basis because the stock of unencumbered HQLA is intended to serve as a defense against the potential onset of liquidity stress. During a period of financial stress, however, banks may use their stock of HQLA, thereby falling below 100%, as maintaining the LCR at 100% under such circumstances could produce undue negative effects on the bank and other market participants. SAMA will subsequently assess this situation and will adjust their response flexibly according to the circumstances.
18. SAMA’s decisions regarding a bank’s use of its HQLA should be guided by consideration of the core objective and definition of the LCR. SAMA would exercise judgment in their assessment and account not only for prevailing macro financial conditions, but also consider forward-looking assessments of macroeconomic and financial conditions. In determining a response, SAMA is aware that some actions could be pro-cyclical if applied in circumstances of market-wide stress. SAMA would seek to take these considerations into account on a consistent basis across jurisdictions, where considered pertinent.
(a) SAMA would assess conditions at an early stage, and take actions if deemed necessary, to address potential liquidity risk.
(b) SAMA would allow for differentiated responses to a reported LCR below 100%. Any potential supervisory response would be proportionate with the drivers, magnitude, duration and frequency of the reported shortfall.
(c) SAMA would assess a number of firm- and market-specific factors in determining the appropriate response as well as other considerations related to both domestic and global frameworks and conditions. Potential considerations include, but are not limited to: (i) The reason(s) that the LCR fell below 100%. This includes use of the stock of HQLA, an inability to roll over funding or large unexpected draws on contingent obligations. In addition, the reasons may relate to overall credit, funding and market conditions, including liquidity in credit, asset and funding markets, affecting individual banks or all institutions, regardless of their own condition; (ii) The extent to which the reported decline in the LCR is due to a firm-specific or market-wide shock; (iii) A bank’s overall health and risk profile, including activities, positions with respect to other supervisory requirements, internal risk systems, controls and other management processes, among others; (iv) The magnitude, duration and frequency of the reported decline of HQLA; (v) The potential for contagion to the financial system and additional restricted flow of credit or reduced market liquidity due to actions to maintain an LCR of 100%; (vi) The availability of other sources of contingent funding such as central bank funding,(The Sound Principles require that a bank develop a Contingency Funding Plan (CFP) that clearly sets out strategies for addressing liquidity shortfalls, both firm-specific and market-wide situations of stress. A CFP should, among other things, “reflect central bank lending programs and collateral requirements, including facilities that form part of normal liquidity management operations, e.g. the availability of seasonal credit)” or other actions by prudential authorities.
(d) SAMA has a range of tools/ options at their disposal to address a reported LCR below 100%, Banks may use their stock of HQLA in both idiosyncratic and systemic stress events, although the supervisory response may differ between the two. (i) At a minimum, a bank should present an assessment of its liquidity position, including the factors that contributed to its LCR falling below 100%, the measures that have been and will be taken and the expectations on the potential length of the situation. Enhanced reporting to SAMA should be commensurate with the duration of the shortfall. (ii) If appropriate, SAMA could also require actions by a bank to reduce its exposure to liquidity risk, strengthen its overall liquidity risk management, or improve its contingency funding plan. (iii) However, in a situation of sufficiently severe system-wide stress, effects on the entire financial system should be considered. Potential measures to restore liquidity levels should be discussed, and should be executed over a period of time considered appropriate to prevent additional stress on the bank and on the financial system as a whole.
(e) SAMA’s responses should be consistent with the overall approach to the prudential framework.
1B) Definition of the LCR
19. The scenario for this standard entails a combined idiosyncratic and market-wide shock that would result in:
(a) The run-off of a proportion of retail deposits;
(b) A partial loss of unsecured wholesale funding capacity;
(c) A partial loss of secured, short-term financing with certain collateral and counterparties;
(d) Additional contractual outflows that would arise from a downgrade in the bank’s public credit rating by up to and including three notches, including collateral posting requirements;
(e) Increases in market volatilities that impact the quality of collateral or potential future exposure of derivative positions and thus require larger collateral haircuts or additional collateral, or lead to other liquidity needs;
(f) Unscheduled draws on committed but unused credit and liquidity facilities that the bank has provided to its clients; and
(g) The potential need for the bank to buy back debt or honor non-contractual obligations in the interest of mitigating reputational risk.
20. In summary, the stress scenario specified incorporates many of the shocks experienced during the crisis that started in 2007 into one significant stress scenario for which a bank would need sufficient liquidity on hand to survive for up to 30 calendar days.
21. This stress test should be viewed as a minimum supervisory requirement for banks. Banks are expected to conduct their own stress tests to assess the level of liquidity they should hold beyond this minimum, and construct their own scenarios that could cause difficulties for their specific business activities. Such internal stress tests should incorporate longer time horizons than the one mandated by this standard. Banks are expected to share the results of these additional stress tests with SAMA.
22. The LCR has two components:
(a) Value of the stock of HQLA in stressed conditions; and
(b) Total net cash outflows, calculated according to the scenario parameters outlined below.
Stock of HQLA/ Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days ≥ 100%
Stock of HQLA23. The numerator of the LCR is the “stock of HQLA”. Under the standard, banks must hold a stock of unencumbered HQLA to cover the total net cash outflows (as defined below) over a 30-day period under the prescribed stress scenario. In order to qualify as “HQLA”, assets should be liquid in markets during a time of stress and, ideally, be central bank eligible. The following sets out the characteristics that such assets should generally possess and the operational requirements that they should satisfy. (Refer to the sections on “Definition of HQLA” and “Operational requirements” for the characteristics that an asset must meet to be part of the stock of HQLA and the definition of “unencumbered” respectively.)
Characteristics of HQLA24. Assets are considered to be HQLA if they can be easily and immediately converted into cash at little or no loss of value. The liquidity of an asset depends on the underlying stress scenario, the volume to be monetized and the timeframe considered. Nevertheless, there are certain assets that are more likely to generate funds without incurring large discounts in sale or repurchase agreement (repo) markets due to fire-sales even in times of stress. This section outlines the factors that influence whether or not the market for an asset can be relied upon to raise liquidity when considered in the context of possible stresses. These factors should assist supervisors in determining which assets, despite meeting the criteria from paragraphs 49 to 54 of BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013, are not sufficiently liquid in private markets to be included in the stock of HQLA.
(i) Fundamental characteristics
• Low risk: assets that are less risky tend to have higher liquidity. High credit standing of the issuer and a low degree of subordination increase an asset’s liquidity. Low duration, (Footnote: Duration measures the price sensitivity of a fixed income security to changes in interest rate.) low legal risk, low inflation risk and denomination in a convertible currency with low foreign exchange risk all enhance an asset’s liquidity.
• Ease and certainty of valuation: an asset’s liquidity increases if market participants are more likely to agree on its valuation. Assets with more standardized, homogenous and simple structures tend to be more fungible, promoting liquidity. The pricing formula of a high-quality liquid asset must be easy to calculate and not depend on strong assumptions. The inputs into the pricing formula must also be publicly available. In practice, this should rule out the inclusion of most structured or exotic products.
• Low correlation with risky assets: the stock of HQLA should not be subject to wrong-way (highly correlated) risk. For example, assets issued by financial institutions are more likely to be illiquid in times of liquidity stress in the banking sector.
• Listed on a developed and recognized exchange: being listed increases an asset’s transparency.
(ii) Market-related characteristics
• Active and sizable market: the asset should have active outright sale or repo markets at all times. This means that:
- There should be historical evidence of market breadth and market depth. This could be demonstrated by low bid-ask spreads, high trading volumes, and a large and diverse number of market participants. Diversity of market participants reduces market concentration and increases the reliability of the liquidity in the market.
- There should be robust market infrastructure in place. The presence of multiple committed market makers increases liquidity as quotes will most likely be available for buying or selling HQLA.
• Low volatility: Assets whose prices remain relatively stable and are less prone to sharp price declines over time will have a lower probability of triggering forced sales to meet liquidity requirements. Volatility of traded prices and spreads are simple proxy measures of market volatility. There should be historical evidence of relative stability of market terms (e.g. prices and haircuts) and volumes during stressed periods.
• Flight to quality: historically, the market has shown tendencies to move into these types of assets in a systemic crisis. The correlation between proxies of market liquidity and banking system stress is one simple measure that could be used.
Note: By large, deep and active markets, SAMA understands that the relevant instrument should be at least repo-able with the Central banks and preferably other regulated entities
25. As outlined by these characteristics, the test of whether liquid assets are of “high quality” is that, by way of sale or repo, their liquidity-generating capacity is assumed to remain intact even in periods of severe idiosyncratic and market stress. Lower quality assets typically fail to meet that test. An attempt by a bank to raise liquidity from lower quality assets under conditions of severe market stress would entail acceptance of a large fire-sale discount or haircut to compensate for high market risk. That may not only erode the market’s confidence in the bank, but would also generate mark-to-market losses for banks holding similar instruments and add to the pressure on their liquidity position, thus encouraging further fire sales and declines in prices and market liquidity. In these circumstances, private market liquidity for such instruments is likely to disappear quickly.
26. HQLA (except Level 2B assets as defined below) should ideally be eligible at central banks (In most jurisdictions, HQLA should be central bank eligible in addition to being liquid in markets during stressed periods. In jurisdictions where central bank eligibility is limited to an extremely narrow list of assets, SAMA may allow unencumbered, non-central bank eligible assets that meet the qualifying criteria for Level 1 or Level 2 assets to count as part of the stock - see Definition of HQLA beginning from paragraph 45) for intraday liquidity needs and overnight liquidity facilities. In the past, central banks have provided a further backstop to the supply of banking system liquidity under conditions of severe stress. Central bank eligibility should thus provide additional confidence that banks are holding assets that could be used in events of severe stress without damaging the broader financial system. That in turn would raise confidence in the safety and soundness of liquidity risk management in the banking system.
27. It should be noted however, that central bank eligibility does not by itself constitute the basis for the categorization of an asset as HQLA.
Operational Requirement28. All assets in the stock of HQLA are subject to the following operational requirements. The purpose of the operational requirements is to recognize that not all assets outlined in paragraphs 49-54 of BCBS LCR Guidelines 2013 that meet the asset class, risk-weighting and credit-rating criteria should be eligible for the stock as there are other operational restrictions on availability of HQLA that can prevent timely monetization during a stress period.
29. These operational requirements are designed to ensure that the stock of HQLA is managed in such a way that the bank can, and is able to demonstrate that it can, immediately use the stock of assets as a source of contingent funds that is available for the bank to convert into cash through outright sale or repo, to fill funding gaps between cash inflows and outflows at any time during the 30-day stress period, with no restriction on the use of the liquidity generated.
30. A bank should periodically monetize a representative proportion of the assets in the stock through repo or outright sale, in order to test its access to the market, the effectiveness of its processes for monetization, the availability of the assets, and to minimize the risk of negative signaling during a period of actual stress.
31. All assets in the stock should be unencumbered. “Unencumbered” means free of legal, regulatory, contractual or other restrictions on the ability of the bank to liquidate, sell, transfer, or assign the asset. An asset in the stock should not be pledged (either explicitly or implicitly) to secure, collateralize or credit- enhance any transaction, nor be designated to cover operational costs (such as rents and salaries). Assets received in reverse repo and securities financing transactions that are held at the bank, have not been re- hypothecated, and are legally and contractually available for the bank's use can be considered as part of the stock of HQLA. In addition, assets which qualify for the stock of HQLA that have been pre-positioned or deposited with, or pledged to, the central bank or a public sector entity (PSE) but have not been used to generate liquidity may be included in the stock. (If a bank has deposited, pre-positioned or pledged Level 1, Level 2 and other assets in a collateral pool and no specific securities are assigned as collateral for any transactions, it may assume that assets are encumbered in order of increasing liquidity value in the LCR, i.e. assets ineligible for the stock of HQLA are assigned first, followed by Level 2B assets, then Level 2A and finally Level 1. This determination must be made in compliance with any requirements, such as concentration or diversification, of the central bank or PSE.)
32. A bank should exclude from the stock those assets that, although meeting the definition of “unencumbered” specified in paragraph 31 BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013, the bank would not have the operational capability to monetize to meet outflows during the stress period. Operational capability to monetize assets requires having procedures and appropriate systems in place, including providing the function identified in paragraph 33 BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013, with access to all necessary information to execute monetization of any asset at any time. Monetization of the asset must be executable, from an operational perspective, in the standard settlement period for the asset class in the relevant jurisdiction.
33. The stock should be under the control of the function charged with managing the liquidity of the bank (e.g. the treasurer), meaning the function has the continuous authority, and legal and operational capability, to monetize any asset in the stock. Control must be evidenced either by maintaining assets in a separate pool managed by the function with the sole intent for use as a source of contingent funds, or by demonstrating that the function can monetize the asset at any point in the 30-day stress period and that the proceeds of doing so are available to the function throughout the 30-day stress period without directly conflicting with a stated business or risk management strategy. For example, an asset should not be included in the stock if the sale of that asset, without replacement throughout the 30-day period, would remove a hedge that would create an open risk position in excess of internal limits.
34. A bank is permitted to hedge the market risk associated with ownership of the stock of HQLA and still include the assets in the stock. If it chooses to hedge the market risk, the bank should take into account (in the market value applied to each asset) the cash outflow that would arise if the hedge were to be closed out early (in the event of the asset being sold).
35. In accordance with Principle 9 of the Sound Principles a bank “should monitor the legal entity and physical location where collateral is held and how it may be mobilized in a timely manner”. Specifically, it should have a policy in place that identifies legal entities, geographical locations, currencies and specific custodial or bank accounts where HQLA are held. In addition, the bank should determine whether any such assets should be excluded for operational reasons and therefore, have the ability to determine the composition of its stock on a daily basis.
36. As noted in paragraphs 171 and 172, BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013, qualifying HQLA that are held to meet statutory liquidity requirements at the legal entity or sub-consolidated level (where applicable) may only be included in the stock at the consolidated level to the extent that the related risks (as measured by the legal entity’s or sub-consolidated group’s net cash outflows in the LCR) are also reflected in the consolidated LCR. Any surplus of HQLA held at the legal entity can only be included in the consolidated stock if those assets would also be freely available to the consolidated (parent) entity in times of stress.
37. In assessing whether assets are freely transferable for regulatory purposes, banks should be aware that assets may not be freely available to the consolidated entity due to regulatory, legal, tax, accounting or other impediments. Assets held in legal entities without market access should only be included to the extent that they can be freely transferred to other entities that could monetize the assets.
38. In certain jurisdictions, large, deep and active repo markets do not exist for eligible asset classes, and therefore such assets are likely to be monetized through outright sale. In these circumstances, a bank should exclude from the stock of HQLA those assets where there are impediments to sale, such as large fire-sale discounts which would cause it to breach minimum solvency requirements, or requirements to hold such assets, including, but not limited to, statutory minimum inventory requirements for market making.
39. Banks should not include in the stock of HQLA any assets, or liquidity generated from assets, they have received under right of rehypothecation, if the beneficial owner has the contractual right to withdraw those assets during the 30-day stress period. (Refer to paragraph 146 for the appropriate treatment if the contractual withdrawal of such assets would lead to a short position - e.g. because the bank had used the assets in longer-term securities financing transactions).
40. Assets received as collateral for derivatives transactions that are not segregated and are legally able to be rehypothecated may be included in the stock of HQLA provided that the bank records an appropriate outflow for the associated risks as set out in paragraph 116 BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013.
41. As stated in Principle 8 of the Sound Principles, a bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions and thus contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems. Banks and regulators should be aware that the LCR stress scenario does not cover expected or unexpected intraday liquidity needs.
42. While the LCR is expected to be met and reported in a single currency, banks are expected to be able to meet their liquidity needs in each currency and maintain HQLA consistent with the distribution of their liquidity needs by currency. The bank should be able to use the stock to generate liquidity in the currency and jurisdiction in which the net cash outflows arise. As such, the LCR by currency is expected to be monitored and reported to allow the bank and SAMA to track any potential currency mismatch issues that could arise, as outlined in Part 2. In managing foreign exchange liquidity risk, the bank should take into account the risk that its ability to swap currencies and access the relevant foreign exchange markets may erode rapidly under stressed conditions. It should be aware that sudden, adverse exchange rate movements could sharply widen existing mismatched positions and alter the effectiveness of any foreign exchange hedges in place.
43. In order to mitigate cliff effects that could arise, if an eligible liquid asset became ineligible (e.g. due to rating downgrade), a bank is permitted to keep such assets in its stock of liquid assets for an additional 30 calendar days. This would allow the bank additional time to adjust its stock as needed or replace the asset.
Diversification of the stock of HQLA44. The stock of HQLA should be well diversified within the asset classes themselves (except for sovereign debt of the bank’s home jurisdiction or from the jurisdiction in which the bank operates; central bank reserves; central bank debt securities; and cash). Although some asset classes are more likely to remain liquid irrespective of circumstances, ex-ante it is not possible to know with certainty which specific assets within each asset class might be subject to shocks ex-post. Banks should therefore have policies and limits in place in order to avoid concentration with respect to asset types, issue and issuer types, and currency (consistent with the distribution of net cash outflows by currency) within asset classes.
(Refer to Paragraph 16-44 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
2. Frequency and Timing
With regard to submission of the attached Prudential return (Amended LCR), all Banks (except foreign bank's branches) will be expected to provide their returns to SAMA on a monthly basis to be due 30 days following each month end. However, given the significant changes in the amended LCR calculations, SAMA will provide additional time for banks for their first set of Prudential returns. This is in order to introduce the necessary systems changes and enhancements. Consequently, the first submission of prudential returns for data as of 30 June 2013 should be provided by 30 September 2013 while all subsequent monthly submissions are to be provided within 30 days following each month end.
All reporting will be as per the attached Prudential Returns in SR 000’s.
3. Summary of Major Requirement and Changes in the amended LCR
3.1 Graduated approach
10. Specifically, the LCR will be introduced as planned on 1 January 2015, but the minimum requirement will be set at 60% and rise in equal annual steps to reach 100% on 1 January 2019. This graduated approach, coupled with the revisions made to the 2010 publication of the liquidity standards are designed to ensure that the LCR can be introduced without material disruption to the orderly strengthening of banking systems or the ongoing financing of economic activity.
1 January 2015 1 January 2016 1 January 2017 1 January 2018 1 January 2019 Minimum LCR 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
11.
The Basel Committee and SAMA affirms their view that, during periods of stress, it would be entirely appropriate for banks to use their stock of HQLA, thereby falling below the minimum. SAMA will subsequently assess this situation and will give guidance on usability according to circumstances.
(Refer to Paragraph 11 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
3.2 Definition of High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA)1
45. The stock of HQLA should comprise assets with the characteristics outlined in paragraphs 24-27 of LCR BCBS documentation. This section describes the type of assets that meet these characteristics and can therefore be included in the HQLA (stock).
46. There are two categories of assets that can be included in the stock. Assets to be included in each category are those that the bank is holding on the first day of the stress period, irrespective of their residual maturity. “Level 1” assets can be included without limit, while “Level 2” assets can only comprise up to 40% of the total (level 1 and level 2) stock.
47. SAMA may also choose to include within Level 2 as an additional class of assets (Level 2B assets - see paragraph 53 below). If included, these assets should comprise no more than 15% of the total stock of HQLA. They must also be included within the overall 40% cap on Level 2 assets.
48. The 40% cap on Level 2 assets and the 15% cap on Level 2B assets should be determined after the application of required haircuts, and after taking into account the unwind of short-term securities financing transactions and collateral swap transactions maturing within 30 calendar days that involve the exchange of HQLA. The details of the calculation methodology are provided in Annex 1 of BCBS document. In this context, short term transactions are transactions with a maturity date up to and including 30 calendar days.
(Refer to Paragraph 48 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Note that SAMA has disallowed Level 2B assets in all aspect to LCR computation till further notice
(i) Level 1 assets
49. Level 1 assets can comprise an unlimited share of the pool and are not subject to a haircut under the LCR (For purpose of calculating the LCR, Level 1 assets in the stock of HQLA should be measured at an amount no greater than their current market value). However, national supervisors may wish to require haircuts for Level 1 securities based on, among other things, their duration, credit and liquidity risk, and typical repo haircuts.
(Refer to footnote 11 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
In KSA, there are no requirements for haircuts to level-1 assets.
50. Level 1 assets are limited to:
(a) coins and banknotes;
(b) central bank reserves ,including required reserves, (In this context, central bank reserves would include banks’ overnight deposits with the central bank, and term deposits with the central bank that: (i) are explicitly and contractually repayable on notice from the depositing bank; or (ii) that constitute a loan against which the bank can borrow on a term basis or on an overnight but automatically renewable basis ,only where the bank has an existing deposit with the relevant central bank. Other term deposits with central banks are not eligible for the stock of HQLA; however, if the term expires within 30 days, the term deposit could be considered as an inflow per paragraph 154.) to the extent that the central bank policies allow them to be drawn down in times of stress; (Refer to footnote 12 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Note: The Murabahah facility made available to SAMA by Shariah Compliant banks fall under the category on Central Bank reserves and can be included in Level 1 assets
(c) marketable securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and European Community, or multilateral development banks (The Basel III liquidity framework follows the categorization of market participants applied in the Basel II Framework, unless otherwise specified) , and satisfying all of the following conditions:
(Refer to footnote 14 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• Assigned a 0% risk-weight under the Basel II Standardized Approach for credit risk (Paragraph 50(c) includes only marketable securities that qualify for Basel II paragraph 53. When a 0% risk-weight has been assigned at national discretion according to the provision in paragraph 54 of the Basel II Standardized Approach, the treatment should follow paragraph 50(d) or 50(e).);
(Refer to footnote 15 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• Traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration;
• Have a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets (repo or sale) even during stressed market conditions; and
• Not an obligation of a financial institution or any of its affiliated entities. (This requires that the holder of the security must not have recourse to the financial institution or any of the financial institution's affiliated entities. In practice, this means that securities, such as government- guaranteed issuance during the financial crisis, which remain liabilities of the financial institution, would not qualify for the stock of HQLA. The only exception is when the bank also qualifies as a PSE under the Basel II Framework where securities issued by the bank could qualify for Level 1 assets if all necessary conditions are satisfied.)
(Refer to footnote 16 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Note: By Reliable source of liquidity, SAMA understands that the relevant instrument, as a minimum has been eligible for Repo (without a significant increase in haircut received) either from the Central Bank or other key regulated entities even in stressful times such as those which transpired in the global financial crises from 2007, onwards.
(d) Where the sovereign has a non-0% risk weight, sovereign or central bank debt securities issued in domestic currencies by the sovereign or central bank.
(e) where the sovereign has a non-0% risk weight, domestic sovereign or central bank debt securities issued in foreign currencies are eligible up to the amount of the bank’s stressed net cash outflows in that specific foreign currency stemming from the bank’s operations in the jurisdiction where the bank’s liquidity risk is being taken.
Note: The onus is on the regulated entities to determine if all of the above conditions are satisfied whilst reporting Liquid Assets under level 1 category to SAMA. SAMA would also review adherence to the stipulated conditions through off site and onsite monitoring.
(ii) Level 2A and 2B assets
With regard to Level 2A and 2B assets2, in KSA, there is only a deep, large and active market for Saudi shares or equity. For other markets, banks must decide as to meeting the BCBS criteria.
51. Level 2 assets (comprising Level 2A assets and any Level 2B assets2 permitted by the supervisor) can be included in the stock of HQLA, subject to the requirement that they comprise no more than 40% of the overall stock after haircuts have been applied. The method for calculating the cap on Level 2 assets and the cap on Level 2B assets is set out in paragraph 48 and Annex 1 of the BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013.
52. A 15% haircut is applied to the current market value of each Level 2A asset held in the stock of HQLA.
Level 2A assets are limited to the following:
(a) Marketable securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs or multilateral development banks that satisfy all of the following conditions:
• assigned a 20% risk weight under the Basel II Standardized Approach for credit risk (Paragraphs 50(d) and (e) may overlap with paragraph 52(a) in terms of sovereign and central bank securities with a 20% risk weight. In such a case, the assets can be assigned to the Level 1 category according to Paragraph 50(d) or (e), as appropriate.); (Refer to footnote 17 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration;
• have a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets (repo or sale) even during stressed market conditions (ie maximum decline of price not exceeding 10% or increase in haircut not exceeding 10 percentage points over a 30-day period during a relevant period of significant liquidity stress);
(Refer to Paragraph 52(a) of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• not an obligation of a financial institution or any of its affiliated entities.
(b) Corporate debt securities ,including commercial paper, in this respect include only plain-vanilla assets whose valuation is readily available based on standard methods and does not depend on private knowledge, i.e. these do not include complex structured products or subordinated debt.):and covered bonds (Covered bonds are bonds issued and owned by a bank or mortgage institution and are subject by law to special public supervision designed to protect bond holders. Proceeds deriving from the issue of these bonds must be invested in conformity with the law in assets which, during the whole period of the validity of the bonds, are capable of covering claims attached to the bonds and which, in the event of the failure of the issuer, would be used on a priority basis for the reimbursement of the principal and payment of the accrued interest).that satisfy all of the following conditions:
(Refer to footnotes 19 and 20 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• In the case of corporate debt securities or covered bonds not issued by a financial institution or any of its affiliated entities;
• Either (i) have a long-term credit rating from a recognized external credit assessment institution (ECAI) of at least AA- (In the event of split ratings, the applicable rating should be determined according to the method used in Basel II’s standardized approach for credit risk. Local rating scales (rather than international ratings) of a SAMA approved ECAI that meet the eligibility criteria outlined in paragraph 91 of the Basel II Capital Framework can be recognized if corporate debt securities or covered bonds are held by a bank for local currency liquidity needs arising from its operations in that local jurisdiction. This also applies to Level 2B assets).or in the absence of a long term rating, a short-term rating equivalent in quality to the long-term rating; or (ii) do not have a credit assessment by a recognized ECAI but are internally rated as having a probability of default (PD) corresponding to a credit rating of at least AA-;
(Refer to footnote 21 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• Traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration; and
• have a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets (repo or sale) even during stressed market conditions: ie maximum decline of price or increase in haircut over a 30-day period during a relevant period of significant liquidity stress not exceeding 10%.
(Refer to Paragraph 54(a) of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Note: By relevant period of significant liquidity stress, SAMA understands these to be of similar quantum such as those which transpired in the global financial crises from 2007, onwards.
Note: The onus is on the regulated entities to determine if all of the above conditions are satisfied whilst reporting Liquid Assets under level 2A category to SAMA. SAMA would also review adherence to the stipulated conditions through off site and onsite monitoring.
(iii) Level 2B assets (additional HQLA available under amended LCR)
53. Certain additional assets (Level 2B assets)2 may be included in Level 2 at the discretion of national authorities. In choosing to include these assets in Level 2 for the purpose of the LCR, supervisors are expected to ensure that such assets fully comply with the qualifying criteria (As with all aspects of the framework, compliance with these criteria will be assessed as part of peer reviews undertaken under the Committee’s Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme). Supervisors are also expected to ensure that banks have appropriate systems and measures to monitor and control the potential risks (e.g. credit and market risks) that banks could be exposed to in holding these assets.
(Refer to footnote 22 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
54. A larger haircut is applied to the current market value of each Level 2B asset held in the stock of HQLA.
Level 2B assets are limited to the following:
(a) Residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) that satisfy all of the following conditions may be included in Level 2B, subject to a 25% haircut:
• Not issued by, and the underlying assets have not been originated by the bank itself or any of its affiliated entities;
• Have a long-term credit rating from a recognized ECAI of AA or higher, or in the absence of a long term rating, a short-term rating equivalent in quality to the long-term rating;
• Traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration;
• The underlying mortgages are “full recourse’’ loans (i.e. in the case of foreclosure the mortgage owner remains liable for any shortfall in sales proceeds from the property) and have a maximum loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 80% on average at issuance; and
(b) Corporate debt securities (Corporate debt securities (including commercial paper) in this respect include only plain-vanilla assets whose valuation is readily available based on standard methods and does not depend on private knowledge, ie these do not include complex structured products or subordinated debt.) that satisfy all of the following conditions may be included in Level 2B, subject to a 50% haircut:
• Not issued by a financial institution or any of its affiliated entities;
• Either (i) have a long-term credit rating from a recognized ECAI between A+ and BBB- or in the absence of a long term rating, a short-term rating equivalent in quality to the long-term rating; or (ii) do not have a credit assessment by a recognized ECAI and are internally rated as having a PD corresponding to a credit rating of between A+ and BBB-;
• Traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration; and
(Refer to footnote 22 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(c) Common equity shares that satisfy all of the following conditions may be included in Level 2B, subject to a 50% haircut:
• not issued by a financial institution or any of its affiliated entities;
• exchange traded and centrally cleared;
• a constituent of the major stock index in the home jurisdiction or where the liquidity risk is taken, as decided by the supervisor in the jurisdiction where the index is located;
• denominated in the domestic currency of a bank’s home jurisdiction or in the currency of the jurisdiction where a bank’s liquidity risk is taken;
• traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration; and
• have a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets (repo or sale) even during stressed market conditions, ie a maximum decline of share price not exceeding 40% or increase in haircut not exceeding 40 percentage points over a 30-day period during a relevant period of significant liquidity.
(Refer to Paragraph 52(a) of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Note: SAMA does not utilize Level 2B assets for the purpose of LCR computation, currently
3.2.1 Treatment for Jurisdictions with insufficient HQLA2
(a) Assessment of eligibility for alternative liquidity approaches (ALA)
55. Some jurisdictions may have an insufficient supply of Level 1 assets (or both Level 1 and Level 2 assets - Insufficiency in Level 2 assets alone does not qualify for the alternative treatment.) in their domestic currency to meet the aggregate demand of banks with significant exposures in this currency. To address this situation, the Committee has developed alternative treatments for holdings in the stock of HQLA, which are expected to apply to a limited number of currencies and jurisdictions, and subject to qualifying criteria set out in Annex 2 and will be determined through an independent peer review process overseen by the Committee. The purpose of this process is to ensure that the alternative treatments are only used when there is a true shortfall in HQLA in the domestic currency relative to the needs in that currency. (For member states of a monetary union with a common currency, that common currency is considered the “domestic currency”).
(Refer to footnotes 24 and 25 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
56. To qualify for the alternative treatment, a jurisdiction should be able to demonstrate that:
• There is an insufficient supply of HQLA in its domestic currency, taking into account all relevant factors affecting the supply of, and demand for, such HQLA; (The assessment of insufficiency is only required to take into account the Level 2B assets if the national authority chooses to include them within HQLA. In particular, if certain Level 2B assets are not included in the stock of HQLA in a given jurisdiction, then the assessment of insufficiency in that jurisdiction does not need to include the stock of Level 2B assets that are available in that jurisdiction) (Refer to footnote 26 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• The insufficiency is caused by long-term structural constraints that cannot be resolved within the medium term;
• It has the capacity, through any mechanism or control in place, to limit or mitigate the risk that the alternative treatment cannot work as expected; and
• It is committed to observing the obligations relating to supervisory monitoring, disclosure, and periodic self-assessment and independent peer review of its eligibility for alternative treatment.
All of the above criteria have to be met to qualify for the alternative treatment.
57. Irrespective of whether a jurisdiction seeking ALA treatment will adopt the phase-in arrangement set out in paragraph 10 for implementing the LCR, the eligibility for that jurisdiction to adopt ALA treatment will be based on a fully implemented LCR standard (i.e. 100% requirement).
(b) Potential options for alternative treatment2
58. Option 1: A jurisdiction seeking to adopt Option 1 should justify in the independent peer review that the fee is suitably set in a manner as prescribed in this paragraph. Contractual committed liquidity facilities from the relevant central bank, with a fee: For currencies that do not have sufficient HQLA, as determined by reference to the qualifying principles and criteria, Option 1 would allow banks to access contractual committed liquidity facilities provided by the relevant central bank (i.e. relevant given the currency in question) for a fee. These facilities should not be confused with regular central bank standing arrangements. In particular, these facilities are contractual arrangements between the central bank and the commercial bank with a maturity date which, at a minimum, falls outside the 30-day LCR window. Further, the contract must be irrevocable prior to maturity and involve no ex-post credit decision by the central banks. Such facilities are only permissible if there is also a fee for the facility which is charged regardless of the amount, if any, drawn down against that facility and the fee is set so that banks which claim the facility line to meet the LCR, and banks which do not, have similar financial incentives to reduce their exposure to liquidity risk. That is, the fee should be set so that the net yield on the assets used to secure the facility should not be higher than the net yield on a representative portfolio of Level 1 and Level 2 assets, after adjusting for any material differences in credit risk. A jurisdiction seeking to adopt Option 1 should justify in the independent peer review that the fee is suitably set in a manner as prescribed in this paragraph.
(Refer to Paragraph 58 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
59. Option 2 – Foreign currency HQLA to cover domestic currency liquidity needs:
To qualify for this treatment, the jurisdiction concerned should demonstrate in the independent peer review the effectiveness of its currency peg mechanism and assess the long-term prospect of keeping the peg.
For currencies that do not have sufficient HQLA, as determined by reference to the qualifying principles and criteria, Option 2 would allow supervisors to permit banks that evidence a shortfall of HQLA in the domestic currency (which would match the currency of the underlying risks) to hold HQLA in a currency that does not match the currency of the associated liquidity risk, provided that the resulting currency mismatch positions are justifiable and controlled within limits agreed by their supervisors. Supervisors should restrict such positions within levels consistent with the bank’s foreign exchange risk management capacity and needs, and ensure that such positions relate to currencies that are freely and reliably convertible, are effectively managed by the bank, and would not pose undue risk to its financial strength. In managing those positions, the bank should take into account the risks that its ability to swap currencies, and its access to the relevant foreign exchange markets, may erode rapidly under stressed conditions. It should also take into account that sudden, adverse exchange rate movements could sharply widen existing mismatch positions and alter the effectiveness of any foreign exchange hedges in place.
60. To account for foreign exchange risk associated with foreign currency HQLA used to cover liquidity needs in the domestic currency, such liquid assets should be subject to a minimum haircut of 8% for major currencies that are active in global foreign exchange markets (These refer to currencies that exhibit significant and active market turnover in the global foreign currency market (e.g. the average market turnover of the currency as a percentage of the global foreign currency market turnover over a ten-year period is not lower than 10%). For other currencies, jurisdictions should increase the haircut to an appropriate level on the basis of historical (monthly) exchange rate volatilities between the currency pair over an extended period of time. (As an illustration, the exchange rate volatility data used for deriving the FX haircut may be based on the 30-day moving FX price volatility data (mean + 3 standard deviations) of the currency pair over a ten-year period, adjusted to align with the 30-day time horizon of the LCR).If the domestic currency is formally pegged to another currency under an effective mechanism, the haircut for the pegged currency can be lowered to a level that reflects the limited exchange rate risk under the peg arrangement. To qualify for this treatment, the jurisdiction concerned should demonstrate in the independent peer review the effectiveness of its currency peg mechanism and assess the long-term prospect of keeping the peg.
(Refer to Paragraph 60 and footnotes 27 and 28 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
61. Haircuts for foreign currency HQLA used under Option 2 would apply only to HQLA in excess of a threshold specified by supervisors which is not greater than 25%. (The threshold for applying the haircut under Option 2 refers to the amount of foreign currency HQLA used to cover liquidity needs in the domestic currency as a percentage of total net cash outflows in the domestic currency. Hence under a threshold of 25%, a bank using Option 2 will only need to apply the haircut to that portion of foreign currency HQLA in excess of 25% that are used to cover liquidity needs in the domestic currency.) This is to accommodate a certain level of currency mismatch that may commonly exist among banks in their ordinary course of business.
(Refer to footnotes 29 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
62. Option 3 – Additional use of Level 2 assets with a higher haircut: This option addresses currencies for which there are insufficient Level 1 assets, as determined by reference to the qualifying principles and criteria, but where there are sufficient Level 2A assets. In this case, supervisors may choose to allow banks that evidence a shortfall of HQLA in the domestic currency (to match the currency of the liquidity risk incurred) to hold additional Level 2A assets in the stock. These additional Level 2A assets would be subject to a minimum haircut of 20%, i.e. 5% higher than the 15% haircut applicable to Level 2A assets that are included in the 40% cap. The higher haircut is used to cover any additional price and market liquidity risks arising from increased holdings of Level 2A assets beyond the 40% cap, and to provide a disincentive for banks to use this option based on yield considerations. (For example, a situation to avoid is that the opportunity cost of holding a portfolio that benefits from this option would be lower than the opportunity cost of holding a theoretical compliant portfolio of Level 1 and Level 2 assets, after adjusting for any material differences in credit risk.)
(Refer to footnotes 30 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Supervisors have the obligation to conduct an analysis to assess whether the additional haircut is sufficient for Level 2A assets in their markets, and should increase the haircut if this is warranted to achieve the purpose for which it is intended. Supervisors should explain and justify the outcome of the analysis (including the level of increase in the haircut, if applicable) during the independent peer review assessment process. Any Level 2B assets held by the bank would remain subject to the cap of 15%, regardless of the amount of other Level 2 assets held.
Note: SAMA has not utilized any of the options under the alternate treatment
(Refer to Paragraph 62 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(c) Maximum level of usage of options for alternative treatment2
63. The usage of any of the above options would be constrained by a limit specified by supervisors in jurisdictions whose currency is eligible for the alternative treatment. The limit should be expressed in terms of the maximum amount of HQLA associated with the use of the options (whether individually or in combination) that a bank is allowed to include in its LCR, as a percentage of the total amount of HQLA the bank is required to hold in the currency concerned. (The required amount of HQLA in the domestic currency includes any regulatory buffer (i.e. above the 100% LCR standard) that the supervisor may reasonably impose on the bank concerned based on its liquidity risk profile.)
(Refer to footnotes 31 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Amount of HQLA associated with the options refer to:
(i) in the case of Option 1, the amount of committed liquidity facilities granted by the relevant central bank;
(ii) in the case of Option 2, the amount of foreign currency HQLA used to cover the shortfall of HQLA in the domestic currency; and
(iii) in the case of Option 3, the amount of Level 2 assets held (including those within the 40% cap).
64. If, for example, the maximum level of usage of the options is set at 80%, it means that a bank adopting the options, either individually or in combination, would only be allowed to include HQLA associated with the options (after applying any relevant haircut) up to 80% of the required amount of HQLA in the relevant currency. (As an example, if a bank has used Option 1 and Option 3 to the extent that it has been granted an Option 1 facility of 10%, and held Level 2 assets of 55% after haircut (both in terms of the required amount of HQLA in the domestic currency), the HQLA associated with the use of these two options amount to 65% (i.e. 10%+55%), which is still within the 80% level. The total amount of alternative HQLA used is 25% (i.e. 10% + 15% (additional Level 2A assets used).Thus, at least 20% of the HQLA requirement will have to be met by Level 1 assets in the relevant currency.
(Refer to footnotes 32 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
65. The appropriateness of the maximum level of usage of the options allowed by a supervisor will be evaluated in the independent peer review process. The level set should be consistent with the projected size of the HQLA gap faced by banks subject to the LCR in the currency concerned, taking into account all relevant factors that may affect the size of the gap over time. The supervisor should explain how this level is derived, and justify why this is supported by the insufficiency of HQLA in the banking system. Where a relatively high level of usage of the options is allowed by the supervisor (eg over 80%), the suitability of this level will come under closer scrutiny in the independent peer review.
Note: SAMA has not utilized any of the options under the alternate treatment
(Refer to Paragraph 65 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(d) Supervisory obligations and requirements2
66. A jurisdiction with insufficient HQLA must, among other things, fulfil the following obligations (the detailed requirements are set out in Annex 2 ):
• Supervisory monitoring: There should be a clearly documented supervisory framework for overseeing and controlling the usage of the options by its banks, and for monitoring their compliance with the relevant requirements applicable to their use of the options;
• Disclosure framework: The jurisdiction should disclose its framework for applying the options to its banks (whether on its website or through other means). The disclosure should enable other national supervisors and stakeholders to gain a sufficient understanding of its compliance with the qualifying principles and criteria and the manner in which it supervises the use of the options by its banks;
• Periodic self-assessment of eligibility for alternative treatment: The jurisdiction should perform a self-assessment of its eligibility for alternative treatment every five years after it has adopted the options, and disclose the results to other national supervisors and stakeholders.
(Refer to Paragraph 66 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
67. The use of the options by their banks, having regard to the guiding principles set out below.
• Principle 1: Banks’ use of the options is not simply an economic choice that maximizes the profits of the bank through the selection of alternative HQLA based primarily on yield considerations.
• Principle 2: Supervisors should ensure that the use of the options is constrained, both for all banks with exposures in the relevant currency and on a bank-by-bank basis.
• banks have, to the extent practicable, taken reasonable steps to use Level 1 and Level 2 assets and reduce before the alternative treatment.
• Principle 4: Supervisors should have a mechanism for restraining the usage of the options to mitigate risks of non-performance of the alternative HQLA.
Note: SAMA has not utilized any of the options under the alternate treatment
3.4 Treatment for Shariah2
68. Shari’ah compliant banks face a religious prohibition on holding certain types of assets, such as interest-bearing debt securities. Even in jurisdictions that have a sufficient supply of HQLA, an insurmountable impediment to the ability of Shari’ah compliant banks to meet the LCR requirement may still exist. In such cases, national supervisors in jurisdictions in which Shari’ah compliant banks operate have the discretion to define Shari’ah compliant financial products (such as Sukuk) as alternative HQLA applicable to such banks only, subject to such conditions or haircuts that the supervisors may require. It should be noted that the intention of this treatment is not to allow Shari’ah compliant banks to hold fewer HQLA. The minimum LCR standard, calculated based on alternative HQLA (post-haircut) recognized as HQLA for these banks, should not be lower than the minimum LCR standard applicable to other banks in the jurisdiction concerned.
Note: SAMA has not utilized any of the options under the alternate treatment
B. Total net cash outflows
69. The term total net cash outflows (Where applicable, cash inflows and outflows should include interest that is expected to be received and paid during the 30-day time horizon).is defined as the total expected cash outflows minus total expected cash inflows in the specified stress scenario for the subsequent calendar days. Total expected cash inflows are subject to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows. Total expected cash outflows are calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of various categories or types of liabilities and off-balance sheet commitments by the rates at which they are expected to run off or be drawn down. Total expected cash inflows are calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of various categories of contractual receivables by the rates at which they are expected to flow in under the scenario up to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows.
Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days = Total expected cash outflows – Min {total expected cash inflows; 75% of total expected cash outflows}
(Refer to footnotes 33 and Paragraph 69 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Note: Saudi Arabia has no effective deposit insurance scheme. Consequently, any run-off rate subject to deposit insurance is not valid for KSA banks.
70. While most roll-off rates, draw-down rates and similar factors are harmonized across jurisdictions as outlined in this standard, a few parameters are to be determined by supervisory authorities at the national level. Where this is the case, the parameters should be transparent and made publicly available.
71. Annex 4 of BCBS LCR guidelines provide a summary of the factors that are applied to each category.
72. Banks will not be permitted to double count items, ie if an asset is included as part of the “stock of HQLA” (ie the numerator), the associated cash inflows cannot also be counted as cash inflows (ie part of the denominator). Where there is potential that an item could be counted in multiple outflow categories, (e.g. committed liquidity facilities granted to cover debt maturing within the 30 calendar day period), a bank only has to assume up to the maximum contractual outflow for that product.
(Refer to Paragraph 70-72 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
3.5 Cash Outflows
3.5.1 (i) RETAIL DEPOSIT RUN-OFF
73. Retail deposits are defined as deposits placed with a bank by a natural person, and those subject to the LCR include demand deposits and term deposits, unless otherwise excluded under the criteria set out in paragraphs 82 and 83 BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013.
74. These retail deposits are divided into “stable” and “less stable” portions of funds as described below. The run-off rates for retail deposits are minimum floors, with higher run-off rates established by individual jurisdictions as appropriate to capture depositor behavior in a period of stress in each jurisdiction.
(Refer to Paragraph 74 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(a) Stable deposits (run-off rate = 3% and higher)
75. Stable deposits, which usually receive a run-off factor of 5%, are the amount of the deposits that are fully insured (“Fully insured” means that 100% of the deposit amount, up to the deposit insurance limit, is covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. Deposit balances up to the deposit insurance limit can be treated as “fully insured” even if a depositor has a balance in excess of the deposit insurance limit. However, any amount in excess of the deposit insurance limit is to be treated as “less stable”. For example, if a depositor has a deposit of 150 that is covered by a deposit insurance scheme, which has a limit of 100, where the depositor would receive at least 100 from the deposit insurance scheme if the financial institution were unable to pay, then 100 would be considered “fully insured” and treated as stable deposits while 50 would be treated as less stable deposits. However if the deposit insurance scheme only covered a percentage of the funds from the first currency unit (e.g. 90% of the deposit amount up to a limit of 100) then the entire 150 deposit would be less stable.)
by an effective deposit insurance scheme or by a public guarantee that provides equivalent protection and where:
• The depositors have other established relationships with the bank that make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely; or
• The deposits are in transactional accounts (e.g. accounts where salaries are automatically deposited).
(Refer to footnotes 34 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
76. For the purposes of this standard, an “effective deposit insurance scheme” refers to a scheme (i) that guarantees that it has the ability to make prompt payouts, (ii) for which the coverage is clearly defined and (iii) of which public awareness is high. The deposit insurer in an effective deposit insurance scheme has formal legal powers to fulfil its mandate and is operationally independent, transparent and accountable. A jurisdiction with an explicit and legally binding sovereign deposit guarantee that effectively functions as deposit insurance can be regarded as having an effective deposit insurance scheme.
(Refer to Paragraph 76 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
77. The presence of deposit insurance alone is not sufficient to consider a deposit “stable”.
78. Jurisdictions may choose to apply a run-off rate of 3% to stable deposits in their jurisdiction, if they meet the above stable deposit criteria and the following additional criteria for deposit insurance schemes (The Financial Stability Board has asked the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), in conjunction with the Basel Committee and other relevant bodies where appropriate, to update its Core Principles and other guidance to better reflect leading practices. The criteria in this paragraph will therefore be reviewed by the Committee once the work by IADI has been completed).
(Refer to footnotes 35 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• The insurance scheme is based on a system of prefunding via the periodic collection of levies on banks with insured deposits; (The requirement for periodic collection of levies from banks does not preclude that deposit insurance schemes may, on occasion, provide for contribution holidays due to the scheme being well-funded at a given point in time.)
(Refer to footnotes 36 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
• the scheme has adequate means of ensuring ready access to additional funding in the event of a large call on its reserves, e.g. an explicit and legally binding guarantee from the government, or a standing authority to borrow from the government;
• access to insured deposits is available to depositors in a short period of time once the deposit insurance scheme is triggered. (This period of time would typically be expected to be no more than 7 business days)
Jurisdictions applying the 3% run-off rate to stable deposits with deposit insurance arrangements that meet the above criteria should be able to provide evidence of run-off rates for stable deposits within the banking system below 3% during any periods of stress experienced that are consistent with the conditions within the LCR.
Note: KSA does not currently have deposit insurance; hence the guidelines identified above, for stable deposits do not apply
(Refer to Paragraph 78 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(b) Less stable deposits (run-off rates = 10% and higher)
79. Supervisory authorities are expected to develop additional buckets with higher run-off rates as necessary to apply to buckets of potentially less stable retail deposits in their jurisdictions, with a minimum run-off rate of 10%. These jurisdiction-specific run-off rates should be clearly outlined and publicly transparent. Buckets of less stable deposits could include deposits that are not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme or sovereign deposit guarantee, high-value deposits, deposits from sophisticated or high net worth individuals, deposits that can be withdrawn quickly (e.g. internet deposits) and foreign currency deposits, as determined by each jurisdiction.
Note: In connection with the guidance provided in Para 79, above, SAMA would be undertaking a study shortly to assess if potentially higher run off rates would be applicable to the less stable deposits category.
(Refer to Paragraph 79 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
80. If a bank is not able to readily identify which retail deposits would qualify as “stable” according to the above definition (e.g. the bank cannot determine which deposits are covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme or a sovereign deposit guarantee), it should place the full amount in the “less stable” buckets as established by its supervisor.
81. Foreign currency retail deposits are deposits denominated in any other currency than the domestic currency in a jurisdiction in which the bank operates. Supervisors will determine the run-off factor that banks in their jurisdiction should use for foreign currency deposits. Foreign currency deposits will be considered as “less stable” if there is a reason to believe that such deposits are more volatile than domestic currency deposits. Factors affecting the volatility of foreign currency deposits include the type and sophistication of the depositors, and the nature of such deposits (eg whether the deposits are linked to business needs in the same currency, or whether the deposits are placed in a search for yield).
Note: In KSA, run-off rates for all currencies are as per BCBS guidelines.
Currently in KSA, there are no material factors to suggest that foreign currency deposits would be less stable in comparison to SAR denominated deposits. Its noteworthy that the USD denominated deposits are the most common category of FCY deposits with regulated entities, which is pegged to Saudi Riyal.
(Refer to Paragraph 81 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
82. Cash outflows related to retail term deposits with a residual maturity or withdrawal notice period of greater than 30 days will be excluded from total expected cash outflows if the depositor has no legal right to withdraw deposits within the 30-day horizon of the LCR. (If a portion of the term deposit can be withdrawn without incurring such a penalty, only that portion should be treated as a demand deposit. The remaining balance of the deposit should be treated as a term deposit.)
In KSA, with regard to item 82 above, Term Deposits are not to be withdrawn under exceptional circumstances as described below in items 83 and 84.
(Refer to footnote 38 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
83. If a bank allows a depositor in exceptional circumstances to withdraw such deposits without applying the corresponding penalty, or despite a clause that says the depositor has no legal right to withdraw, the entire category of these funds would then have to be treated as demand deposits (i.e. regardless of the remaining term, the deposits would be subject to the deposit run-off rates as specified in paragraphs 74-81 BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013.
84. Notwithstanding the above, SAMA may also opt to treat retail term deposits that meet the qualifications set out in paragraph 82, BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013, with a higher than 0% run-off rate, if they clearly state the treatment that applies for their jurisdiction and apply this treatment in a similar fashion across banks in their jurisdiction. Such reasons could include, but are not limited to, supervisory concerns that depositors would withdraw term deposits in a similar fashion as retail demand deposits during either normal or stress times, concern that banks may repay such deposits early in stressed times for reputational reasons, or the presence of unintended incentives on banks to impose material penalties on consumers if deposits are withdrawn early. In these cases SAMA would assess a higher run-off against all or some of such deposits.
3.5.2 (ii) Unsecured wholesale funding run-off
85. For the purposes of the LCR, "unsecured wholesale funding” is defined as those liabilities and general obligations that are raised from non-natural persons (i.e. legal entities, including sole proprietorships and partnerships) and are not collateralized by legal rights to specifically designated assets owned by the borrowing institution in the case of bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation or resolution. Obligations related to derivative contracts are explicitly excluded from this definition.
86. The wholesale funding included in the LCR is defined as all funding that is callable within the LCR’s horizon of 30 days or that has its earliest possible contractual maturity date situated within this horizon (such as maturing term deposits and unsecured debt securities) as well as funding with an undetermined maturity. This should include all funding with options that are exercisable at the investor’s discretion within the 30 calendar day horizon. For funding with options exercisable at the bank’s discretion, SAMA would take into account reputational factors that may limit a bank's ability not to exercise the option. (This could reflect a case where a bank may imply that it is under liquidity stress if it did not exercise an option on its own funding.) In particular, where the market expects certain liabilities to be redeemed before their legal final maturity date, banks and SAMA should assume such behavior for the purpose of the LCR and include these liabilities as outflows.
87. Wholesale funding that is callable (This takes into account any embedded options linked to the funds provider’s ability to call the funding before contractual maturity.) by the funds provider subject to a contractually defined and binding notice period surpassing the 30-day horizon is not included.
88. For the purposes of the LCR, unsecured wholesale funding is to be categorised as detailed below, based on the assumed sensitivity of the funds providers to the rate offered and the credit quality and solvency of the borrowing bank. This is determined by the type of funds providers and their level of sophistication, as well as their operational relationships with the bank. The runoff rates for the scenario are listed for each category.
(Refer to Paragraph 86-88 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(a) Unsecured wholesale funding provided by small business customers: 5%, 10% and higher
89. Unsecured wholesale funding provided by small business customers is treated the same way as retail deposits for the purposes of this standard, effectively distinguishing between a "stable" portion of funding provided by small business customers and different buckets of less stable funding defined by each jurisdiction. The same bucket definitions and associated run-off factors apply as for retail deposits.
90. This category consists of deposits and other extensions of funds made by nonfinancial small business customers. “Small business customers” are defined in line with the definition of loans extended to small businesses in paragraph 231 of the Basel II framework that are managed as retail exposures and are generally considered as having similar liquidity risk characteristics to retail accounts provided the total aggregated funding (“Aggregated funding” means the gross amount (i.e. not netting any form of credit extended to the legal entity) of all forms of funding (e.g. deposits or debt securities or similar derivative exposure for which the counterparty is known to be a small business customer). In addition, applying the limit on a consolidated basis means that where one or more small business customers are affiliated with each other, they may be considered as a single creditor such that the limit is applied to the total funding received by the bank from this group of customers.) raised from one small business customer is less than €1 million (on a consolidated basis where applicable).
(Refer to footnote 41 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
92. Term deposits from small business customers should be treated in accordance with the treatment for term retail deposits as outlined in paragraph 82, 83, and 84, BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013.
(b) Operational deposits generated by clearing, custody and cash management activities: 25%
93. Certain activities lead to financial and non-financial customers needing to place, or leave, deposits with a bank in order to facilitate their access and ability to use payment and settlement systems and otherwise make payments. These funds may receive a 25% run-off factor only if the customer has a substantive dependency with the bank and the deposit is required for such activities. SAMA’s approval on a case by case basis*, would have to be given to ensure that banks utilizing this treatment (para 93-104) actually are conducting these operational activities at the level indicated. SAMA may choose not to permit banks to utilise the operational deposit run-off rates in cases where, for example, a significant portion of operational deposits are provided by a small proportion of customers (i.e. concentration risk).
94. Qualifying activities in this context refer to clearing, custody or cash management activities that meet the following criteria:
• The customer is reliant on the bank to perform these services as an independent third party intermediary in order to fulfil its normal banking activities over the next 30 days. For example, this condition would not be met if the bank is aware that the customer has adequate back-up arrangements.
• These services must be provided under a legally binding agreement to institutional customers.
• The termination of such agreements shall be subject either to a notice period of at least 30 days or significant switching costs (such as those related to transaction, information technology, early termination or legal costs) to be borne by the customer if the operational deposits are moved before 30 days.
95. Qualifying operational deposits generated by such an activity are ones where:
• The deposits are by-products of the underlying services provided by the banking organization and not sought out in the wholesale market in the sole interest of offering interest income.
• The deposits are held in specifically designated accounts and priced without giving an economic incentive to the customer (not limited to paying market interest rates) to leave any excess funds on these accounts. In the case that interest rates in a jurisdiction are close to zero, it would be expected that such accounts is non-interest bearing. Banks should be particularly aware that during prolonged periods of low interest rates, excess balances (as defined below) could be significant.
96. Any excess balances that could be withdrawn and would still leave enough funds to fulfil these clearing, custody and cash management activities do not qualify for the 25% factor. In other words, only that part of the deposit balance with the service provider that is proven to serve a customer’s operational needs can qualify as stable. Excess balances should be treated in the appropriate category for non-operational deposits. If banks are unable to determine the amount of the excess balance, then the entire deposit should be assumed to be excess to requirements and, therefore, considered non-operational.
97. Banks must determine the methodology for identifying excess deposits that are excluded from this treatment. This assessment should be conducted at a sufficiently granular level to adequately assess the risk of withdrawal in an idiosyncratic stress. The methodology should take into account relevant factors such as the likelihood that wholesale customers have above average balances in advance of specific payment needs, and consider appropriate indicators (e.g. ratios of account balances to payment or settlement volumes or to assets under custody) to identify those customers that are not actively managing account balances efficiently.
98. Operational deposits would receive a 0% inflow assumption for the depositing bank given that these deposits are required for operational reasons, and are therefore not available to the depositing bank to repay other outflows.
99. Notwithstanding these operational categories, if the deposit under consideration arises out of correspondent banking or from the provision of prime brokerage services, it will be treated as if there were no operational activity for the purpose of determining run-off factors. (Correspondent banking refers to arrangements under which one bank /correspondent, holds deposits owned by other banks/ respondents and provides payment and other services in order to settle foreign currency transactions e.g. so-called nostro and vostro accounts used to settle transactions in a currency other than the domestic currency of the respondent bank for the provision of clearing and settlement of payments. Prime brokerage is a package of services offered to large active investors, particularly institutional hedge funds. These services usually include: clearing, settlement and custody; consolidated reporting; financing e.g. margin, repo or synthetic; securities lending; capital introduction; and risk analytics.)
(Refer to Paragraph 93-99 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
100. The following paragraphs describe the types of activities that may generate operational deposits. A bank should assess whether the presence of such an activity does indeed generate an operational deposit as not all such activities qualify due to differences in customer dependency, activity and practices.
101. A clearing relationship. In this context, refers to a service arrangement that enables customers to transfer funds (or securities) indirectly through direct participants in domestic settlement system to final recipients. Such services are limited to the following activities: transmission, reconciliation and confirmation of payment orders; daylight overdraft, overnight financing and maintenance of post-settlement balances; and determination of intra-day and final settlement positions.
(Refer to Paragraph 101 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
102. A custody relationship, in this context, refers to the provision of safekeeping, reporting, processing of assets or the facilitation of the operational and administrative elements of related activities on behalf of customers in the process of their transacting and retaining financial assets. Such services are limited to the settlement of securities transactions, the transfer of contractual payments, the processing of collateral, and the provision of custody related cash management services. Also included are the receipt of dividends and other income, client subscriptions and redemptions. Custodial services can furthermore extend to asset and corporate trust servicing, treasury, escrow, funds transfer, stock transfer and agency services, including payment and settlement services (excluding correspondent banking), and depository receipts.
(Refer to Paragraph 102 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
103. A cash management relationship, in this context, refers to the provision of cash management and related services to customers. Cash management services, in this context, refers to those products and services provided to a customer to manage its cash flows, assets and liabilities, and conduct financial transactions necessary to the customer’s ongoing operations. Such services are limited to payment remittance, collection and aggregation of funds, payroll administration, and control over the disbursement of funds
(Refer to Paragraph 103 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(d) Unsecured wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporates and sovereigns, central banks, multilateral development banks, and PSEs: 20% or 40%
104. The portion of the operational deposits generated by clearing, custody and cash management activities that is fully covered by deposit insurance can receive the same treatment as “stable” retail deposits.
As per SAMA circular No. (361000050640) dated 26/1/2015, SAMA's approval will be on the basis that the banks meet the requirements laid out in para 94 to 104. Consequently, effective 1 January 2015, banks are required to obtain SAMA's approval with regard to the aforementioned aspect of Operational Deposits
(c)
Treatment of deposits in institutional networks of cooperative banks: 25% or 100% 105. Treatment of deposits in institutional networks of cooperative banks: 25% or 100% - An institutional network of cooperative (or otherwise named) banks is a group of legally autonomous banks with a statutory framework of cooperation with common strategic focus and brand where specific functions are performed by central institutions or specialized service providers. A 25% run-off rate can be given to the amount of deposits of member institutions with the central institution or specialized central service providers that are placed (a) due to statutory minimum deposit requirements, which are registered at regulators or (b) in the context of common task sharing and legal, statutory or contractual arrangements so long as both the bank that has received the monies and the bank that has deposited participate in the same institutional network’s mutual protection scheme against illiquidity and insolvency of its members. As with other operational deposits, these deposits would receive a 0% inflow assumption for the depositing bank, as these funds are considered to remain with the centralized institution.
106. SAMA’s prior approval would have be required to ensure that banks utilizing this treatment actually are the central institution or a central service provider of such a cooperative (or otherwise named) network. Correspondent banking activities would not be included in this treatment and would receive a 100% outflow treatment, as would funds placed at the central institutions or specialized service providers for any other reason other than those outlined in (a) and (b) in the paragraph above, or for operational functions of clearing, custody, or cash management as outlined in paragraphs 101-103, BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013.
(d)
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporates and sovereigns, central banks, multilateral development banks, and PSEs: 20% or 40%
(Refer to Paragraph 104-106 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
107. This category comprises all deposits and other extensions of unsecured funding from non-financial corporate customers (that are not categorized as small business customers) and (both domestic and foreign) sovereign, central bank, multilateral development bank, and PSE customers that are not specifically held for operational purposes (as defined above). The run-off factor for these funds is 40%, unless the criteria in paragraph 108, BCBS LCR Guidelines, 2013, are met.
108. Unsecured wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporate customers, sovereigns, central banks, multilateral development banks, and PSEs without operational relationships can receive a 20% run-off factor if the entire amount of the deposit is fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme or by a public guarantee that provides equivalent protection.
(e)
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by other legal entity customers: 100% 109. This category consists of all deposits and other funding from other institutions (including banks, securities firms, insurance companies, etc.), fiduciaries, (Fiduciary is defined in this context as a legal entity that is authorized to manage assets on behalf of a third party. Fiduciaries include asset management entities such as pension funds and other collective investment vehicles).beneficiaries, (Beneficiary is defined in this context as a legal entity that receives, or may become eligible to receive, benefits under a will, insurance policy, retirement plan, annuity, trust, or other contract), conduits and special purpose vehicles, affiliated entities of the bank (Outflows on unsecured wholesale funding from affiliated entities of the bank are included in this category unless the funding is part of an operational relationship, a deposit in an institutional network of cooperative banks or the affiliated entity of a nonfinancial corporate) and other entities that are not specifically held for operational purposes (as defined above) and not included in the prior three categories. The run-off factor for these funds is 100%.
(Refer to footnotes 43-45 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
110. All notes, bonds and other debt securities issued by the bank are included in this category regardless of the holder, unless the bond is sold exclusively in the retail market and held in retail accounts (including small business customer accounts treated as retail per paragraphs 89-91), in which case the instruments can be treated in the appropriate retail or small business customer deposit category. To be treated in this manner, it is not sufficient that the debt instruments are specifically designed and marketed to retail or small business customers. Rather there should be limitations placed such that those instruments cannot be bought and held by parties other than retail or small business customers.
111. Customer cash balances arising from the provision of prime brokerage services, including but not limited to the cash arising from prime brokerage services as identified in paragraph 99, should be considered separate from any required segregated balances related to client protection regimes imposed by national regulations, and should not be netted against other customer exposures included in this standard. These offsetting balances held in segregated accounts are treated as inflows in paragraph 154 and should be excluded from the stock of HQLA.
(Refer to Paragraph 110-111 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(iii)
Secured funding run-off 112. For the purposes of this standard, “secured funding” is defined as those liabilities and general obligations that are collateralized by legal rights to specifically designated assets owned by the borrowing institution in the case of bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation or resolution.
113. Loss of secured funding on short-term financing transactions: In this scenario, the ability to continue to transact repurchase, reverse repurchase and other securities financing transactions is limited to transactions backed by HQLA or with the bank’s domestic sovereign, PSE or central bank.( In this context, PSEs that receive this treatment should be limited to those that are 20% risk weighted or better, and “domestic” can be defined as a jurisdiction where a bank is legally incorporated.) Collateral swaps should be treated as repurchase or reverse repurchase agreements, as should any other transaction with a similar form. Additionally, collateral lent to the bank’s customers to effect short positions (A customer short position in this context describes a transaction where a bank’s customer sells a security it does not own, and the bank subsequently obtains the same security from internal or external sources to make delivery into the sale. Internal sources include the bank’s own inventory of collateral as well as rehypothecatable collateral held in other customer margin accounts. External sources include collateral obtained through a securities borrowing, reverse repo, or like transaction.) should be treated as a form of secured funding. For the scenario, a bank should apply the following factors to all outstanding secured funding transactions with maturities within the 30 calendar day stress horizon, including customer short positions that do not have a specified contractual maturity. The amount of outflow is calculated based on the amount of funds raised through the transaction, and not the value of the underlying collateral.
114. Due to the high-quality of Level 1 assets, no reduction in funding availability against these assets is assumed to occur. Moreover, no reduction in funding availability is expected for any maturing secured funding transactions with the bank’s domestic central bank. A reduction in funding availability will be assigned to maturing transactions backed by Level 2 assets equivalent to the required haircuts. A 25% factor is applied for maturing secured funding transactions with the bank’s domestic sovereign, multilateral development banks, or domestic PSEs that have a 20% or lower risk weight, when the transactions are backed by assets other than Level 1 or Level 2A assets, in recognition that these entities are unlikely to withdraw secured funding from banks in a time of market-wide stress. This, however, gives credit only for outstanding secured funding transactions, and not for unused collateral or merely the capacity to borrow.
(Refer to Paragraph 113-114 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
(iv)
Additional requirements 116. Derivatives cash outflows: the sum of all net cash outflows should receive a 100% factor. Banks should calculate, in accordance with their existing valuation methodologies, expected contractual derivative cash inflows and outflows. Cash flows may be calculated on a net basis (i.e. inflows can offset outflows) by counterparty. Only where a valid master netting agreement exists. Banks should exclude from such calculations those liquidity requirements that would result from increased collateral needs due to market value movements or falls in value of collateral posted. (These risks are captured in paragraphs 119 and 123,of BCBS LCR guidelines). Options should be assumed to be exercised when they are ‘in the money’ to the option buyer.
(Refer to Paragraph 116 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
2.
Cash inflows 142. When considering its available cash inflows, the bank should only include contractual inflows (including interest payments) from outstanding exposures that are fully performing and for which the bank has no reason to expect a default within the 30-day time horizon. Contingent inflows are not included in total net cash inflows.
Illustrative Summary of the Amended LCRItem Factors Stock of HQLA A. Level 1 assets: • Coins and bank notes 100% • Qualifying marketable securities from sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, and multilateral development banks • Qualifying central bank reserves • Domestic sovereign or central bank debt for non-0% risk-weighted • Sovereigns B. Level 2 assets (maximum of 40% of HQLA): Level 2A assets • Sovereign, central bank, multilateral development banks, and PSE assets qualifying for 20% risk weighting 85% • Qualifying corporate debt securities rated AA-or higher • Qualifying covered bonds rated AA-or higher Level 2B assets (maximum of 15% of HQLA) • Qualifying RMBS 75% • Qualifying corporate debt securities rated between A+ and BBB- 50% • Qualifying common equity shares 50% Total value of stock of HQLA Cash Outflows A. Retail deposits: Demand deposits and term deposits (less than 30 days maturity) • Stable deposits (deposit insurance scheme meets additional criteria) 3% • Stable deposits 5% • Less stable retail deposits 10% Term deposits with residual maturity greater than 30 days 0% B. Unsecured wholesale funding: Demand and term deposits (less than 30 days maturity) provided by small business customers: • Stable deposits 5% • Less stable deposits 10% Operational deposits generated by clearing, custody and cash management activities 25% • Portion covered by deposit insurance 5% Cooperative banks in an institutional network (qualifying deposits with the centralized institution) 25% Non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks, multilateral development banks, and PSEs 40% • If the entire amount fully covered by deposit insurance scheme 20% Other legal entity customers 100% C. Secured funding: • Secured funding transactions with a central bank counterparty or 0% • backed by Level 1 assets with any counterparty. • Secured funding transactions backed by Level 2A assets, with any 15% • counterparty • Secured funding transactions backed by non-Level 1 or non-Level 2A 25% • assets, with domestic sovereigns, multilateral development banks, or • domestic PSEs as a counterparty • Backed by RMBS eligible for inclusion in Level 2B 25% • Backed by other Level 2B assets 50% • All other secured funding transactions 100% D. Additional requirements: Liquidity needs (e.g. collateral calls) related to financing transactions, derivatives and other contracts 3 notch downgrade Market valuation changes on derivatives transactions (largest absolute net 30-day collateral flows realized during the preceding 24 months) Look back approach Valuation changes on non-Level 1 posted collateral securing derivatives 20% Excess collateral held by a bank related to derivative transactions that could contractually be called at any time by its counterparty 100% Liquidity needs related to collateral contractually due from the reporting bank on derivatives transactions 100% Increased liquidity needs related to derivative transactions that allow collateral substitution to non-HQLA assets 100% ABCP, SIVs, conduits, SPVs, etc.: • Liabilities from maturing ABCP, SIVs, SPVs, etc. (applied to maturing amounts and returnable assets) 100% • Asset Backed Securities (including covered bonds) applied to maturing amounts. 100% Currently undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities provided to: • retail and small business clients 5% • non-financial corporates, sovereigns and central banks, multilateral development banks, and PSEs 10% for credit 30% for liquidity • banks subject to prudential supervision 40% • other financial institutions (include securities firms, insurance companies) 40% for credit 100% for liquidity • other legal entity customers, credit and liquidity facilities 100% Other contingent funding liabilities (such as guarantees, letters of credit, revocable credit and liquidity facilities, etc.) National discretion Trade finance 0-5% Customer short positions covered by other customers’ collateral 50% Any additional contractual outflows 100% Net derivative cash outflows 100% Any other contractual cash outflows 100% Total cash outflows Specific changes in LCR3
A. High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA)
Expand the definition of HQLA by including Level 2B assets, subject to higher haircuts and a limit
• Corporate debt securities rated A+ to BBB– with a 50% haircut
• Certain unencumbered equities subject to a 50% haircut
• Certain residential mortgage-backed securities rated AA or higher with a 25% haircut
Aggregate of Level 2B assets, after haircuts, subject to a limit of 15% of total HQLA
Rating requirement on qualifying Level 2 assets• Use of local rating scales and inclusion of qualifying commercial paper
Usability of the liquidity pool• Incorporate language related to the expectation that banks will use their pool of HQLA during periods of stress
Operational requirements• Refine and clarify the operational requirements for HQLA
Operation of the cap on Level 2 HQLA• Revise and improve the operation of the cap on Level 2 assets
Central bank reserves• Clarify language to confirm that supervisors have national discretion to include or exclude required central bank reserves (as well as overnight and certain term deposits) as HQLA as they consider appropriate.
B. Inflows and Outflows
Insured deposits• Reduce outflow on certain types of fully insured retail deposits from 5% to 3%3
Reduce outflow on fully insured non-operational deposits from non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and public sector entities (PSEs) from 40% to 20%
Non-financial corporate deposits• Reduce the outflow rate for “non-operational” deposits provided by nonfinancial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and PSEs from 75% to 40%
Committed liquidity facilities to non-financial corporates• Clarify the definition of liquidity facilities and reduce the drawdown rate on the unused portion of committed liquidity facilities to non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and PSEs from 100% to 30%
Committed but unfunded inter-financial liquidity and credit facilities• Distinguish between interbank and inter-financial credit and liquidity facilities and reduce the outflow rate on the former from 100% to 40%
Derivatives• Additional derivatives risks included in the LCR with a 100% outflow (relates to collateral substitution, and excess collateral that the bank is contractually obligated to return/provide if required by a counterparty)
• Introduce a standardized approach for liquidity risk related to market value changes in derivatives positions
• Assume net outflow of 0% for derivatives (and commitments) that are contractually secured/collateralized by HQLA
Trade finance• Include guidance to indicate that a low outflow rate (0–5%) is expected to apply
Equivalence of central bank operations• Reduce the outflow rate on maturing secured funding transactions with central banks from 25% to 0%
Client servicing brokerage• Clarify the treatment of activities related to client servicing brokerage (which generally lead to an increase in net outflows)
C. OTHERS
Rules text clarifications• A number of clarifications to the rules text to promote consistent application and reduce arbitrage opportunities (e.g. operational deposits from wholesale clients, derivatives cash flows, open maturity loans). Also incorporation of previously published FAQs.
Internationally agreed phase-in of the LCR• The minimum LCR in 2015 would be 60% and increase by 10 percentage points per year to reach 100% in 2019.
• Regulatory Guidance concerning specific items on Prudential returns refer to next page.
1 With regard to level 2B assets, banks must refer to National Discretion item # 2 contained in attachment # 5
2 Refer to Note 1 on page 3.
3 Extract of GHOS Press Release of January 2013Attachment
*The review should address the following:
1. The Banks existing liquidity management organization, policies, procedures, processes and controls are to be assessed against the Principles outlined in the document.
2. The Internal Auditor should make the following assessment against each Principle outlined in the Guidance document:
1. Fully Compliant 2. Largely Compliant 3. Adequate but improvements are needed 4. Largely Non-compliant 5. Non-compliant
3. For those principles where assessment is less than Fully Compliant, the weaknesses and gap should be identified.
4. A detailed plan should be made for each weakness/gap along with the actions to be taken and the time frame for completion of the corrective actions.
*Suggest removing, as this is not relevant anymore. SAMA’s Specific Guidance to Complete Prudential Returns Concerning Amended LCR
This section has been replaced by section 28 "Liquidity" under Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements Framework, issued by SAMA circular No (44047144), dated 04/06/1444 H, Corresponding To 27/12/2022 G.Overview:
Bank must complete the attached Prudential Returns (attachment # 3) on the basis of the following:
1. Specific Guidance Document – attachment # 2
2. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) – attachment # 4
3. SAMA’s response to National Discretion Items – attachment # 5
SPECIFIC GUIDANCE
Row Heading Description Basel III LCR standards reference A)a) Level 1 assets 6 Coins and banknotes Coins and banknotes currently held by the bank that are immediately available to meet obligations. Deposits placed at, or receivables from, other institutions should be reported in the inflows section. 50(a) 7 Total central bank reserves; of which: Total amount held in central bank reserves (including required reserves) including banks’ overnight deposits with the central bank, and term deposits with the central bank that: (i) are explicitly and contractually repayable on notice from the depositing bank; or (ii) that constitute a loan against which the bank can borrow on a term basis or on an overnight but automatically renewable basis (only where the bank has an existing deposit with the relevant central bank). Other term deposits with central banks are not eligible for the stock of HQLA; however, if the term expires within 30 days, the term deposit could be considered as an inflow (reported in line 304). 50(b), footnote 12 8 part of central bank reserves that can be drawn in times of stress Total amount held in central bank reserves and overnight and term deposits at the same central bank (as reported in line 7) which can be drawn down in times of stress. Amounts required to be installed in the central bank reserves within 30 days should be reported in line 165 of the outflows section. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 50(b), footnote 13 Securities with a 0% risk weight: 11 issued by sovereigns Marketable debt securities issued by sovereigns, receiving a 0% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraph 53). 50(c) 12 guaranteed by sovereigns Marketable debt securities guaranteed by sovereigns, receiving a 0% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraph 53). 50(c) 13 issued or guaranteed by central banks Marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by central banks, receiving a 0% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraph 53). 50(c) 14 issued or guaranteed by PSEs Marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by public sector entities, receiving a 0% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraphs 57 and 58). 50(c) 15 issued or guaranteed by BIS, IMF, ECB and European Community or MDBs Marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank (ECB) and European Community. or multilateral development banks (MDBs); receiving a 0% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraphs 56 and 59). 50(c) *Refer to SAMA Circular 440471440000, Basel III Reforms.
For non-0% risk-weighted sovereigns:
17 sovereign or central bank debt securities issued in domestic currency by the sovereign or central bank in the country in which the liquidity risk is taken or in the bank's home country
Debt securities issued by the sovereign or central bank in the domestic currency of that country that is not eligible for inclusion in line items 11 or 13 because of the non-0% risk weight of that country. Banks are only permitted to include debt issued by sovereigns or central banks of their home jurisdictions or, to the extent of the liquidity risk taken in other jurisdictions, of those jurisdictions. 50(d) 18 domestic sovereign or central bank debt securities issued in foreign currencies, up to the amount of the bank's stressed net cash outflows in that specific foreign currency stemming from the bank's operations in the jurisdiction where the bank's liquidity risk is being taken Debt securities issued by the domestic sovereign or central bank in foreign currencies (that are not eligible for inclusion in line items 11 or 13 because of the non-0% risk weight), up to the amount of the bank's stressed net cash outflows in that specific foreign currency stemming from the bank's operations in the jurisdiction where the bank's liquidity risk is being taken. 50(e) Total Level 1 assets: 19 Total stock of Level 1 assets Total outright holdings of Level 1 assets plus all borrowed securities of Level 1 assets 49 20 Adjustment to stock of Level 1 assets Adjustment to the stock of Level 1 assets for purpose of calculating the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets. Annex 1 21 Adjusted amount of Level 1 assets Adjusted amount of Level 1 assets used for the purpose of calculating the adjustment to the stock of HQLA due to the cap on Level 2 assets in line item 49 and the cap on Level 2B assets in line item 48. Annex 1 A)b) Level 2A assets Securities with a 20% risk weight: 25 issued by sovereigns Marketable debt securities issued by sovereigns, receiving a 20% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraph 53), satisfying all the conditions listed in paragraph 52(a) of the Basel III LCR standards, and not included in lines 17 or 18. 52(a) 26 guaranteed by sovereigns Marketable debt securities guaranteed by sovereigns, receiving a 20% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraph 53), satisfying all the conditions listed in paragraph 52(a) of the Basel III LCR standards. 52(a) 27 issued or guaranteed by central banks Marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by central banks, receiving a 20% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraph 53), satisfying all the conditions listed in paragraph 52(a) of the Basel III LCR standards, and not included in lines 17 or 18. 52(a) 28 issued or guaranteed by PSEs Marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by PSEs, receiving a 20% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraphs 57 and 58), satisfying all the conditions listed in paragraph 52(a) of the Basel III LCR standards. 52(a) 29 issued or guaranteed by MDBs Marketable debt securities issued or guaranteed by multilateral development banks, receiving a 20% risk weight under the standardized approach to credit risk of the *Basel II framework (paragraph 59), satisfying all the conditions listed in paragraph 52(a) of the Basel III LCR standards. 52(a) *Refer to SAMA Circular 440471440000, Basel III Reforms.
Non-financial corporate bonds:
30 rated AA-or better Non-financial corporate bonds (including commercial paper) (i) having a long-term credit assessment by a recognized ECAI of at least AA-or in the absence of a long term rating, a short term rating equivalent in quality to the long-term rating or (ii) not having a credit assessment by a recognized ECAI but are internally rated as having a probability of default (PD) corresponding to a credit rating of at least AA-, satisfying the conditions listed in paragraph 52(b) of the Basel III LCR standards. 52(b) Covered bonds (not self-issued): 31 rated AA-or better Covered bonds, not self-issued, (i) having a long-term credit assessment by a recognized ECAI of at least AA-or in the absence of a long term rating, a short-term rating equivalent in quality to the long-term rating or (ii) not having a credit assessment by a recognized ECAI but are internally rated as having a probability of default (PD) corresponding to a credit rating of at least AA-, satisfying the conditions listed in paragraph 52(b) of the Basel III LCR standards. 52(b) Total Level 2A assets: 32 Total stock of Level 2A assets Total outright holdings of Level 2A assets plus all borrowed securities of Level 2A assets, after applying haircuts 52(a),(b) 33 Adjustment to stock of Level 2A assets Adjustment to the stock of Level 2A assets for purpose of calculating the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets. Annex 1 34 Adjusted amount of Level 2A assets Adjusted amount of Level 2A assets used for the purpose of calculating the adjustment to the stock of HQLA due to the cap on Level 2 assets in line item 49 and the cap on Level 2B assets in line item 48. Annex 1 A)c) Level 2B assets
Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of items in the Level 2B assets subsection. (Note below)
In choosing to include any Level 2B assets in Level 2, national supervisors are expected to ensure that (i) such assets fully comply with the qualifying criteria set out Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 54; and (ii) banks have appropriate systems and measures to monitor and control the potential risks (e.g. credit and market risks) that banks could be exposed to in holding these assets.
37 Residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), rated AA or better RMBS that satisfy all of the conditions listed in paragraph 54(a) of the Basel III LCR standards. 54(a) 38 Non-financial corporate bonds, rated BBB- to A+ Non-financial corporate debt securities (including commercial paper) rated BBB- to A+ that satisfy all of the conditions listed in paragraph 54(b) of the Basel III LCR standards. 54(b) 39 Non-financial common equity shares Non-financial common equity shares that satisfy all of the conditions listed in paragraph 54(c) of the Basel III LCR standards. 54(c) Total Level 2B assets: 40 Total stock of Level 2B RMBS assets Total outright holdings of Level 2B RMBS assets plus all borrowed securities of Level 2B RMBS assets, after applying haircuts 54(a) 41 Adjustment to stock of Level 2B RMBS assets Adjustment to the stock of Level 2B RMBS assets for purpose of calculating the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets. Annex 1 42 Adjusted amount of Level 2B RMBS assets Adjusted amount of Level 2B RMBS assets used for the purpose of calculating the adjustment to the stock of HQLA due to the cap on Level 2 assets in line item 49 and the cap on Level 2B assets in line item 48. Annex 1 43 Total stock of Level 2B non-RMBS assets Total outright holdings of Level 2B non-RMBS assets plus all borrowed securities of Level 2B non-RMBS assets, after applying haircuts 54(b),(c) 44 Adjustment to stock of Level 2B non-RMBS assets Adjustment to the stock of Level 2B non-RMBS assets for purpose of calculating the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets. Annex 1 45 Adjusted amount of Level 2B non-RMBS assets Adjusted amount of Level 2B non-RMBS assets used for the purpose of calculating the adjustment to the stock of HQLA due to the cap on Level 2 assets in line item 49 and the cap on Level 2B assets in line item 48. Annex 1 46 Adjusted amount of Level 2B (RMBS and non-RMBS) assets Sum of adjusted amount of Level 2B RMBS assets and adjusted amount of Level 2B non-RMBS assets Annex 1 48 Adjustment to stock of HQLA due to cap on Level 2B assets Adjustment to stock of HQLA due to 15% cap on Level 2B assets. 47, Annex 1 49 49 Adjustment to stock of HQLA due to cap on Level 2 assets Adjustment to stock of HQLA due to 40% cap on Level 2 assets. 51, Annex 1 A)d) Total stock of HQLA 52 Total stock of HQLA Total stock of HQLA after taking haircuts and the adjustment for the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets into account. 56 Assets held at the entity level, but excluded from the consolidated stock of HQLA Any surplus of liquid assets held at the legal entity that is excluded (i.e. not reported in lines above) from the consolidated stock because of reasonable doubts that they would be freely available to the consolidated (parent) entity in times of stress. Eligible liquid assets that are held by a legal entity being consolidated to meet its local LCR requirements (where applicable) can be included in the consolidated LCR to the extent that such liquid assets are used to cover the total net cash outflows of that entity, notwithstanding that the assets are subject to liquidity transfer restrictions. If the liquid assets held in excess of the total net cash outflows of the legal entity are not transferable, such surplus liquidity should be excluded from the standard and reported in this line. For practical reasons, the liquidity transfer restrictions to be accounted for in the consolidated ratio are confined to existing restrictions imposed under applicable laws, regulations and supervisory requirements.
Banks should report the market value of Level 1 assets excluded in column D, the market value of Level 2A assets excluded in column E, the market value of Level 2B RMBS assets excluded in column F and the market value of Level 2B non-RMBS assets excluded in column G.
36–37, 171– 172 57 of which, can be included in the consolidated stock by the time the standard is implemented Any assets reported in row 56 but which the bank believes will, through management actions executed prior to the implementation date of the standard; meet the eligibility requirements for the stock of liquid assets. 59 Assets excluded from the stock of HQLA due to operational restrictions Level 1 and Level 2 assets held by the bank that are not included in the stock of HQLA (i.e. not reported in lines above), because of the operational restrictions noted in paragraphs 31-34 and 38-40 of the Basel III LCR standards. Banks should report the market value of Level 1 assets excluded in column D, the market value of Level 2A assets excluded in column E, the market value of Level 2B RMBS assets excluded in column F and the market value of Level 2B non-RMBS assets excluded in column G. 31–34, 38–40 60 of which, can be included in the stock by the time the standard is implemented Any assets reported in row 59 but which the bank believes will, through management actions executed prior to the implementation date of the standard; meet the eligibility requirements for the stock of liquid assets. A)e) Treatment for jurisdictions with insufficient HQLA
Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this subsection. (Note below)
Some jurisdictions may not have sufficient supply of Level 1 assets (or both Level 1 and Level 2 assets) in their domestic currency to meet the aggregate demand of banks with significant exposures in this currency (note that an insufficiency in Level 2 assets alone does not qualify for the alternative treatment). To address this situation, the Committee has developed alternative treatments for the holdings in the stock of HQLA, which are expected to apply to a limited number of currencies and jurisdictions.
Eligibility for such alternative treatment will be judged on the basis of qualifying criteria set out in Annex 2 of the Basel III LCR standards and will be determined through an independent peer review process overseen by the Committee. The purpose of this process is to ensure that the alternative treatments are only used when there is a true shortfall in HQLA in the domestic currency relative to the needs in that currency.
There are three potential options for this treatment (line items 67 to 71). If your supervisor intends to adopt this treatment, it is expected that they provide specific instructions to the banks under its supervision for reporting the relevant information under the option it intends to use. To avoid double-counting, if an asset has already been included in the eligible stock of HQLA, it should not be reported under these options.
Option 1 – Contractual committed liquidity facilities from the relevant central bank, with a fee. These facilities should not be confused with regular central bank standing arrangements. In particular, these facilities are contractual arrangements between the central bank and the commercial bank with a maturity date which, at a minimum, falls outside the 30-day LCR window. Further, the contract must be irrevocable prior to maturity and involve no ex-post credit decision by the central bank.
Such facilities are only permissible if there is also a fee for the facility which is charged regardless of the amount, if any, drawn down against that facility and the fee is set so that banks which claim the facility line to meet the LCR, and banks which do not, have similar financial incentives to reduce their exposure to liquidity risk. That is, the fee should be set so that the net yield on the assets used to secure the facility should not be higher than the net yield on a representative portfolio of Level 1 and Level 2 assets, after adjusting for any material differences in credit risk.
67 Option 1 – Contractual committed liquidity facilities from the relevant central bank Only include the portion of facility that is secured by available collateral accepted by the central bank, after haircut specified by the central bank. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. (Note below) 58 Option 2 – Foreign currency HQLA to cover domestic currency liquidity needs
For currencies that do not have sufficient HQLA, supervisors may permit banks that evidence a shortfall of HQLA in the domestic currency (which would match the currency of the underlying risks) to hold HQLA in a currency that does not match the currency of the associated liquidity risk, provided that the resulting currency mismatch positions are justifiable and controlled within limits agreed by their supervisors.
To account for foreign exchange risk associated with foreign currency HQLA used to cover liquidity needs in the domestic currency, such liquid assets should be subject to a minimum haircut of 8% for major currencies that are active in global foreign exchange markets. For other currencies, supervisors should increase the haircut to an appropriate level on the basis of historical (monthly) exchange rate volatilities between the currency pair over an extended period of time.
If the domestic currency is formally pegged to another currency under an effective mechanism, the haircut for the pegged currency can be lowered to a level that reflects the limited exchange rate risk under the peg arrangement. Haircuts for foreign currency HQLA used under Option 2 would apply only to HQLA in excess of a threshold specified by supervisors which is not greater than 25% that are used to cover liquidity needs in the domestic currency.
69 Level 1 assets Subject to the limit mentioned above, the aggregate amount of the excess of Level 1 assets in a given foreign currency or currencies that can be used to cover the associated liquidity need of the domestic currency. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 59 70 Level 2 assets Subject to the limit mentioned above, the aggregate amount of the excess of Level 2 assets in a given foreign currency or currencies that can be used to cover the associated liquidity need of the domestic currency. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 59 Option 3 – Additional use of Level 2 assets with a higher haircut
This option addresses currencies for which there are insufficient Level 1 assets, as determined by the qualifying principles and criteria, but where there are sufficient Level 2A assets. In this case, supervisors may choose to allow banks that evidence a shortfall of liquid assets in the domestic currency (to match the currency of the liquidity risk incurred) to hold additional Level 2A assets in the stock. These additional Level 2A assets should be subject to a minimum 20% – i.e. 5% higher than the 15% haircut applicable to Level 2A assets that are included in the 40% cap. Any Level 2B assets held by the bank would remain subject to the cap of 15%, regardless of the amount of other Level 2 assets held.
71 Option 3 – Additional use of Level 2 assets with a higher haircut Assets reported in lines 25 to 31 that are not counted towards the regular stock of HQLA because of the cap on Level 2 assets. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 62 72 Total usage of alternative treatment (post-haircut) before applying the cap Sum of the usage of alternative treatment should be equal to total outright holdings and all borrowed securities under different options. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 73 Cap on usage of alternative treatment Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 74 Total usage of alternative treatment (post-haircut) after applying the cap The lower of the cap and eligible alternative treatment (post haircut) before applying the cap. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. A)f) Total stock of HQLA plus usage of alternative treatment 77 Total stock of HQLA plus usage of alternative treatment Sum of stock of HQLA and usage of alternative treatment after cap. 6.1.2 Outflows, Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) (panel B1)
This section calculates the total expected cash outflows in the LCR stress scenario for the subsequent 30 calendar days. They are calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of various categories or types of liabilities and off-balance sheet commitments by the rates at which they are expected to run off or to be drawn down (Basel III LCR standards paragraph 69).
Where there is potential that an item could be reported in multiple outflow categories, (e.g. committed liquidity facilities granted to cover debt maturing within the 30 calendar day period), a bank only has to assume up to the maximum contractual outflow for that product (Basel III LCR standards paragraph 72).
a) Retail deposit run-off
Retail deposits are defined as deposits placed with a bank by a natural person. Deposits from legal entities, sole proprietorships and partnerships are captured in wholesale deposit categories. Retail deposits reported in lines 87 to 104 include demand deposits and term deposits maturing in or with a notice period up to 30 days. Term deposits with a residual contractual maturity greater than 30 days which may be withdrawn within 30 days without entailing a significant withdrawal penalty materially greater than the loss of interest, should be considered to mature within the 30-day horizon and should also be included in lines 87 to 104 as appropriate. If a portion of the term deposit can be withdrawn without incurring such a penalty, only that portion should be treated as a demand deposit. The remaining balance of the deposit should be treated as a term deposit.
Notes, bonds and other debt securities sold exclusively to the retail market and held in retail accounts can be reported in the appropriate retail deposit category (Basel III LCR standards paragraph 110). To be treated in this manner, it is not sufficient that the debt instruments are specifically designed and marketed to retail customers. Rather there should be limitations placed such that those instruments cannot be bought and held by parties other than retail customers. Per paragraph 76 of the Basel III LCR standards, an “effective deposit insurance scheme” refers to a scheme (i) that guarantees that it has the ability to make prompt payouts, (ii) for which the coverage is clearly defined and (iii) of which public awareness is high. The deposit insurer in an effective deposit insurance scheme has formal legal powers to fulfill its mandate and is operationally independent, transparent and accountable. A jurisdiction with an explicit and legally binding sovereign deposit guarantee that effectively functions as deposit insurance can be regarded as having an effective deposit insurance scheme.
83 Total retail deposits; of which Total retail deposits as defined above. 73–84 84 Insured deposits; of which: The portion of retail deposits that are fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 75–78 85 in transactional accounts; of which: Total insured retail deposits in transactional accounts (e.g. accounts where salaries are automatically credited) 75, 78 86 eligible for a 3% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured transactional retail deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to apply a 3% runoff rate given the deposits are fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 78 87 are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 86, the amount that are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 78 88 are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 86, the amount that are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 78 89 eligible for a 5% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured transactional retail deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor does not choose to apply a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 75 90 are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 89, the amount that are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 75 91 are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 89, the amount that are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 75 92 in non-transactional accounts with established relationships that make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely; of which: Total insured retail deposits in non-transactional accounts where the customer has another relationship with the bank that would make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely. 75, 78 94 are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 93, the amount that are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 78 95 are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 93, the amount that are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 78 96 eligible for a 5% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured non-transactional established relationship retail deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor does not choose to apply a 3% run-off rate. Please1 refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 75 97 are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 96, the amount that are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 75 98 are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 96, the amount that are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 75 99 in non-transactional and non-relationship accounts Insured retail deposits in non-transactional accounts where the customer does not have another relationship with the bank that would make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely. 79 100 Uninsured deposits The portion of retail deposits that are non-maturing or mature within 30 days that are not fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme (i.e. all retail deposits not reported in lines 87 to 99, excluding any deposits included in lines 102 to 104). 79 101 Additional deposit categories with higher runoff rates as specified by supervisor Other retail deposit categories, as defined by the supervisor. These amounts should not be included in the lines above. 79 102 Category 1 As defined by supervisor 79 103 Category 2 As defined by supervisor 79 104 Category 3 As defined by supervisor 79 105 Term deposits (treated as having >30 day remaining maturity); of which Retail deposits with a residual maturity or withdrawal notice period greater than 30 days where the depositor has no legal right to withdraw deposits within 30 days, or where early withdrawal results in a significant penalty that is materially greater than the loss of interest. 82–84 106 With a supervisory run-off rate As defined by supervisor 84 107 Without supervisory run-off rate All other term retail deposits treated as having > 30 day remaining maturity as defined in line 105. 82 b) Unsecured wholesale funding run-off
Unsecured wholesale funding is defined as liabilities and general obligations that are raised from non-natural persons (i.e. legal entities, including sole proprietorships and partnerships) and are not collateralized by legal rights to specifically designated assets owned by the borrowing institution in the case of bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation or resolution, excluding derivatives.
Wholesale funding included in the LCR is defined as all funding that is callable within the LCR's 30-day horizon or that has its earliest possible contractual maturity date within this horizon (such as maturing term deposits and unsecured debt securities) as well as funding with an undetermined maturity. This includes all funding with options that are exercisable at the investor's discretion within the 30-day horizon. It also includes funding with options exercisable at the bank's discretion where the bank's ability not to exercise the option is limited for reputational reasons. In particular, where the market expects certain liabilities to be redeemed before their legal final maturity date and within the 30-day horizon, such liabilities should be included in the appropriate outflows category.
Small business customers
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by small business customers consists of deposits and other extensions of funds made by non-financial small business customers. “Small business customers” are defined in line with the definition of loans extended to small businesses in paragraph 231 of the Basel II framework that are managed as retail exposures and are generally considered as having similar liquidity risk characteristics to retail accounts, provided the total aggregated funding raised from the small business customer is less than €1 million (on a consolidated basis where applicable) (Basel III LCR standards paragraph 90).
“Aggregated funding” means the gross amount (i.e. not netting any form of credit extended to the legal entity) of all forms of funding (e.g. deposits or debt securities or similar derivative exposure for which the counterparty is known to be a small business customer) (Basel III LCR standards footnote 41).
Applying the limit on a consolidated basis means that where one or more small business customers are affiliated with each other, they may be considered as a single creditor such that the limit is applied to the total funding received by the bank from this group of customers (Basel III LCR standards footnote 41).
Where a bank does not have any exposure to a small business customer that would enable it to use the definition under paragraph 231 of the Basel II Framework, the bank may include such a deposit in this category provided that the total aggregate funding raised from the customer is less than €1 million (on a consolidated basis where applicable) and the deposit is managed as a retail deposit. This means that the bank treats such deposits in its internal risk management systems consistently over time and in the same manner as other retail deposits, and that the deposits are not individually managed in a way comparable to larger corporate deposits.
Term deposits from small business customers with a residual contractual maturity of greater than 30 days which can be withdrawn within 30 days without a significant withdrawal penalty materially greater than the loss of interest should be considered to fall within the 30-day horizon and should also be included in lines 116 to 133 as appropriate. If a portion of the term deposit can be withdrawn without incurring such a penalty, only that portion should be treated as a demand deposit. The remaining balance of the deposit should be treated as a term deposit.
111 Total unsecured wholesale funding 85–111 112 Total funding provided by small business customers; of which: Total small business customer deposits as defined above. 89–92 113 Insured deposits; of which: The portion of deposits or other forms of unsecured wholesale funding which are provided by non-financial small business customers and are non-maturing or mature within 30 days that are fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 89, 75–78 114 in transactional accounts; of which: Total insured small business customer deposits in transactional accounts (e.g. accounts where salaries are paid out from). 89, 75, 78 115 eligible for a 3% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured transactional small business customer deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to apply a 3% run-off rate given the deposits are fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 89, 78 116 are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 115, the amount that are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 89, 78 117 are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 115, the amount that are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 89, 78 118 eligible for a 5% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured transactional small business customer deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor does not choose to apply a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 89, 75 119 are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 118, the amount that are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 89, 75 120 are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 118, the amount that are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 89, 75 121 in non-transactional accounts with established relationships that make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely; of which: Total insured small business customer deposits in non-transactional accounts where the customer has another relationship with the bank that would make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely. 89, 75, 78 122 eligible for a 3% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured non-transactional established relationship small business customer deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to apply a 3% runoff rate given the deposits are fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 89, 78 123 are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 122, the amount that are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 89, 78 124 are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 122, the amount that are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 89, 78 125 eligible for a 5% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured non-transactional established relationship small business customer deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor does not choose to apply a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 89, 75 126 are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 125, the amount that are in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 89, 75 127 are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction Of the deposits referenced in line 125, the amount that are not in the reporting bank's home jurisdiction. 89, 75 128 in non-transactional and non-relationship accounts Insured small business customer deposits in non-transactional accounts, where the customer does not have another relationship with the bank that would make deposit withdrawal highly unlikely. 89, 79 129 Uninsured deposits The portion of small business customer deposits that are non-maturing or mature within 30 days, that are not fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme (i.e. all small business customer deposits not reported in lines 116 to 128, excluding any reported in lines 131 to 133). 89, 79 130 Additional deposit categories with higher runoff rates as specified by supervisor Other small business customer deposits, as defined by supervisor. Amounts in these categories should not be included in the lines above. 89, 79 131 Category 1 As defined by supervisor 89, 79 132 Category 2 As defined by supervisor 89, 79 133 Category 3 As defined by supervisor 89, 79 134 Term deposits (treated as having >30 day maturity); of which: Small business customer deposits with a residual maturity or withdrawal notice period of greater than 30 days where the depositor has no legal right to withdraw deposits within 30 days, or if early withdrawal is allowed, would result in a significant penalty that is materially greater than the loss of interest. 92, 82-84 135 With a supervisory run-off rate As defined by supervisor 92, 84 136 Without supervisory run-off rate All other term small business customer deposits treated as having > 30 day remaining maturity as defined in line 134. 92, 82 Unsecured wholesale funding generated by clearing, custody and cash management activities (“operational deposits”):
Reported in lines 140 to 153 are portions of deposits and other extensions of funds from financial and non-financial wholesale customers (excluding deposits less than €1 million from small business customers which are reported in lines 116 to 136) generated out of clearing, custody and cash management activities (“operational deposits”). These funds may receive a 25% run-off factor only if the customer has a substantive dependency with the bank and the deposit is required for such activities.
Qualifying activities in this context refer to clearing, custody or cash management activities that meet the following criteria:
- The customer is reliant on the bank to perform these services as an independent third party intermediary in order to fulfill its normal banking activities over the next 30 days. For example, this condition would not be met if the bank is aware that the customer has adequate back-up arrangements.
- These services must be provided under a legally binding agreement to institutional customers.
- The termination of such agreements shall be subject either to a notice period of at least 30 days or significant switching costs (such as those related to transaction, information technology, early termination or legal costs) to be borne by the customer if the operational deposits are moved before 30 days.
Qualifying operational deposits generated by such an activity are ones where:
- The deposits are by-products of the underlying services provided by the banking organization and not sought out in the wholesale market in the sole interest of offering interest income.
- The deposits are held in specifically designated accounts and priced without giving an economic incentive to the customer (not limited to paying market interest rates) to leave any excess funds on these accounts. In the case that interest rates in a jurisdiction are close to zero, it would be expected that such accounts is non-interest bearing.
Any excess balances that could be withdrawn and would still leave enough funds to fulfill these clearing, custody and cash management activities do not qualify for the 25% factor. In other words, only that part of the deposit balance with the service provider that is proven to serve a customer's operational needs can qualify as stable. Excess balances should be treated in the appropriate category for non-operational deposits. If banks are unable to determine the amount of the excess balance, then the entire deposit should be assumed to be excess to requirements and, therefore, considered non-operational.
Deposits arising out of correspondent banking or from the provision of prime brokerage services (as defined in Basel III LCR standards footnote 42) should not be reported in these lines rather as non-operational deposits in lines 156 to 163 as appropriate (Basel III LCR standards paragraph 99) and lines 169 and 171, respectively.
A clearing relationship, in this context, refers to a service arrangement that enables customers to transfer funds (or securities) indirectly through direct participants in domestic settlement systems to final recipients. Such services are limited to the following activities: transmission, reconciliation and confirmation of payment orders; daylight overdraft, overnight financing and maintenance of post-settlement balances; and determination of intra-day and final settlement positions. (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 101)
A custody relationship, in this context, refers to the provision of safekeeping, reporting, processing of assets or the facilitation of the operational and administrative elements of related activities on behalf of customers in the process of their transacting and retaining financial assets. Such services are limited to the settlement of securities transactions, the transfer of contractual payments, the processing of collateral, and the provision of custody related cash management services. Also included are the receipt of dividends and other income, client subscriptions and redemptions. Custodial services can furthermore extend to asset and corporate trust servicing, treasury, escrow, funds transfer, stock transfer and agency services, including payment and settlement services (excluding correspondent banking), and depository receipts. (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 102)
A cash management relationship, in this context, refers to the provision of cash management and related services to customers. Cash management services, in this context, refers to those products and services provided to a customer to manage its cash flows, assets and liabilities, and conduct financial transactions necessary to the customer's ongoing operations. Such services are limited to payment remittance, collection and aggregation of funds, payroll administration, and control over the disbursement of funds. (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 103)
137 Total operational deposits; of which: The portion of unsecured operational wholesale funding generated by clearing, custody and cash management activities as defined above. 93–104 138 provided by non-financial corporates Such funds provided by non-financial corporates. Funds from small business customers that meet the requirements outlined in paragraphs 90 and 91 of the Basel III LCR standards should not be reported here but are subject to lower run-off rates in rows 116 to 129. 93–104 139 insured, with a 3% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by non-financial corporates that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards and are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to prescribe a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 140 insured, with a 5% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by non-financial corporates that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme but that are not prescribed a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 141 uninsured The portion of such funds provided by non-financial corporates that are not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 93–103 142 provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and MDBs Such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and multilateral development banks. 93–104 143 insured, with a 3% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and multilateral development banks that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards and are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to prescribe a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 144 insured, with a 5% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and multilateral development banks that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme but that are not prescribed a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 145 uninsured The portion of such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and multilateral development banks that are not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 93–103 146 provided by banks Such funds provided by banks. 93–104 147 insured, with a 3% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by banks that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards and are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to prescribe a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 148 insured, with a 5% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by banks that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme but that are not prescribed a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 149 uninsured The portion of such funds provided by banks that are not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 93–103 150 provided by other financial institutions and other legal entities Such funds provided by financial institutions (other than banks) and other legal entities. 93–104 151 insured, with a 3% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by financial institutions (other than banks) and other legal entities that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards and are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to prescribe a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 152 insured, with a 5% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by financial institutions (other than banks) and other legal entities that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme but that are not prescribed a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 153 uninsured The portion of such funds provided by financial institutions (other than banks) and other legal entities that are not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 93–103 Non-operational deposits in lines 156 to 163 include all deposits and other extensions of unsecured funding not included under operational deposits in lines 140 to 153, excluding notes, bonds and other debt securities, covered bond issuance or repo and secured funding transactions (reported below). Deposits arising out of correspondent banking or from the provision of prime brokerage services (as defined in the Basel III LCR standards, footnote 42) should not be included in these lines (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 99).
Customer cash balances arising from the provision of prime brokerage services, including but not limited to the cash arising from prime brokerage services as identified in Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 99, should be considered separate from any required segregated balances related to client protection regimes imposed by national regulations, and should not be netted against other customer exposures included in this standard. These offsetting balances held in segregated accounts are treated as inflows in Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 154 and should be excluded from the stock of HQLA (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 111).
154 Total non-operational deposits; of which The portion of unsecured wholesale funding not considered as “operational deposits” as defined above. 105–109 155 provided by non-financial corporates; of which: Total amount of such funds provided by non-financial corporates. 107–108 156 where entire amount is fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme Amount of such funds provided by non-financial corporates where the entire amount of the deposit is fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 108 157 where entire amount is not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme Amount of such funds provided by non-financial corporates where the entire amount of the deposit is not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 107 158 provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and MDBs; of which: Such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks (other than funds to be reported in line item 165), PSEs, and multilateral development banks. 107-108 159 where entire amount is fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme Amount of such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and MDBs where the entire amount of the deposit is fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 108 160 where entire amount is not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme Amount of such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and MDBs where the entire amount of the deposit is not fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme. 107 161 provided by members of institutional networks of cooperative (otherwise named) banks An institutional network of cooperative (or otherwise named) banks is a group of legally autonomous banks with a statutory framework of cooperation with common strategic focus and brand where specific functions are performed by central institutions or specialized service providers. Central institutions or specialized central service providers of such networks should report in this line the amount of deposits placed by network member institutions (that are not reported in line items 148 or 149 and that are) (a) due to statutory minimum deposit requirements which are registered at regulators or (b) in the context of common task sharing and legal, statutory or contractual arrangements so long as both the bank that has received the monies and the bank that has deposited participate in the same institutional network's mutual protection scheme against illiquidity and insolvency of its members.
Deposits from network member institutions that are neither included in line items 148 or 149, nor placed for purposes as referred to in letters (a) and (b) above, are to be reported in line items 162 or 163.
Banks that are not the central institutions or specialized central service provider of such network should report zero in this line.
105 162 provided by other banks Such funds provided by other banks, not reported in line 161. 109 163 provided by other financial institutions and other legal entities Such funds provided by financial institutions other than banks and by other legal entities not included in the categories above. Funding from fiduciaries, beneficiaries, conduits and special purpose vehicles and affiliated entities should also be reported here. 109 Notes, bonds and other debt securities issued by the bank are included in line 164 regardless of the holder, unless the bond is sold exclusively in the retail market and held in retail accounts (including small business customers treated as retail), in which case the instruments can be reported in the appropriate retail or small business customer deposit category in lines 87 to 107 or lines 116 to 136, respectively. Outflows on covered bonds should be reported in line 227. 164 Unsecured debt issuance Outflows on notes, bonds and other debt securities, excluding on bonds sold exclusively to the retail or small business customer markets and excluding outflows on covered bonds. 110 165 Additional balances required to be installed in central bank reserves Amounts to be installed in the central bank reserves within 30 days. Funds reported in this line should not be included in line 159 or 160. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. Extension of 50(b) 168 Of the non-operational deposits reported above, amounts that could be considered operational in nature but per the standards have been excluded from receiving the operational deposit treatment due to: 169 correspondent banking activity Amounts in accounts with a clearing, custody or cash management relationship but which have been excluded from the operational deposit category because the account is a correspondent banking account.
Correspondent banking refers to arrangements under which one bank (correspondent) holds deposits owned by other banks (respondents) and provides payment and other services in order to settle foreign currency transactions (e.g. so-called nostro and vostro accounts used to settle transactions in a currency other than the domestic currency of the respondent bank for the provision of clearing and settlement of payments).
99, footnote 42 171 prime brokerage services Amounts in accounts with a clearing, custody or cash management relationship but which have been excluded from the operational deposit category because the account holder is a prime brokerage client of the reporting institution.
Prime brokerage is a package of services offered to large active investors, particularly hedge funds.
99, footnote 42 173 excess balances in operational accounts that could be withdrawn and would leave enough funds to fulfil the learing, custody and cash management activities Amounts in accounts with a clearing, custody or cash management relationship but which have been excluded from the operational deposit category because these funds are excess balances and could be withdrawn and would leave enough funds to fulfil the clearing, custody and cash management activities. 96 c) Secured funding run-off
Secured funding is defined as those liabilities and general obligations that are collateralized by legal rights to specifically designated assets owned by the borrowing institution in the case of bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation or resolution. In this section any transaction in which the bank has received a collateralized loan in cash, such as repo transactions, expiring within 30 days should be reported. Collateral swaps where the bank receives a collateralized loan in the form of other assets than cash, should not be reported here, but in panel C below.
Additionally, collateral lent to the bank's customers to affect short positions should be treated as a form of secured funding. A customer short position in this context describes a transaction where a bank's customer sells a security it does not own, and the bank subsequently obtains the same security from internal or external sources to make delivery into the sale. Internal sources include the bank's own inventory of collateral as well as rehypothecatable Level 1 or Level 2 collateral held in other customer margin accounts. The contingent risk associated with non-contractual obligations where customer short positions are covered by other customers’ collateral that does not qualify as Level 1 or Level 2 should be reported in line 263. External sources include collateral obtained through a securities borrowing, reverse repo, or like transaction.
If the bank has deposited both liquid and non-liquid assets in a collateral pool and no assets are specifically assigned as collateral for the secured transaction, the bank may assume for this monitoring exercise that the assets with the lowest liquidity get assigned first: assets that are not eligible for the stock of liquid assets are assumed to be assigned first. Only once all those assets are fully assigned should Level 2B assets be assumed to be assigned, followed by Level 2A assets. Only once all Level 2 assets are assigned should Level 1 assets be assumed to be assigned.
A bank should report all outstanding secured funding transactions with remaining maturities within the 30 calendar day stress horizon, including customer short positions that do not have a specified contractual maturity. The amount of funds raised through the transaction should be reported in column D (“amount received”). The value of the underlying collateral extended in the transaction should be reported in column E (“market value of extended collateral”). Both values are needed to calculate the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets and both should be calculated at the date of reporting, not the trade or settlement date of the transaction.
Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of items related to Level 2B assets in this subsection.
177 Transactions conducted with the bank's domestic central bank; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions with the bank's domestic central bank that mature within 30 days.
In column E: The market value of the collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 178 Backed by Level 1 assets; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions with the bank's domestic central bank that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 1 assets.
In column E: The market value of the Level 1 asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 179 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 174, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 1 assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question), because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 1 asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 181 Backed by Level 2A assets; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions with the bank's domestic central bank that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2A assets.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2A asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 182 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 181, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2A assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question) because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2A asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 184 Backed by Level 2B RMBS assets; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions with the bank's domestic central bank that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2B RMBS assets. In column E: The market value of the Level 2B RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions. 114–115 185 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 184, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2B RMBS assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question) because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 187 Backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions with the bank's domestic central bank that mature within 30 days and is backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets. In column E: The market value of the Level 2B non-RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions. 114–115 188 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 187, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question) because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B non-RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 190 Backed by other assets In column D: Amount raised on secured funding or repo transactions with the bank's domestic central bank that mature within 30 days and are backed by all other assets (i.e. other than Level 1 or Level 2 assets).
In column E: The market value of the other asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 191 Transactions not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and backed by Level 1 assets; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions that are not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 1 assets. 114–115 192 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 191, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 1 assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question), because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 1 asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 194 Transactions not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and backed by Level 2A assets; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions that are not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2A assets.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2A asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 195 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 194, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2A assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question) because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2A asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 197 Transactions not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and backed by Level 2B RMBS assets; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions that are not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2B RMBS assets.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 198 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 197, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2B RMBS assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question) because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 200 Transactions not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets; of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions that are not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B non-RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 201 Counterparties are domestic sovereigns, MDBs or domestic PSEs with a 20% risk weight; of which: In column D: Secured funding transactions with domestic sovereign, multilateral development banks or domestic PSEs that are backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets.
PSEs that receive this treatment should be limited to those that are 20% or lower risk weighted.
In column E: The market value of collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 202 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 201, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question) because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B non-RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 204 Counterparties are not domestic sovereigns, MDBs or domestic PSEs with a 20% risk weight; of which: In column D: Secured funding transactions with counterparties other than domestic sovereign, multilateral development banks or domestic PSEs with a 20% risk weight that are backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets.
In column E: The market value of collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 205 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets In column D: Of the amount reported in line 204, that which is raised in secured funding or repo transactions that mature within 30 days and are backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets where these assets would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question) because:
(i) they would be held unencumbered; and
(ii) they would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B non-RMBS asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 207 Transactions not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and backed by other assets (non-HQLA); of which: In column D: Amount raised in secured funding or repo transactions that are not conducted with the bank's domestic central bank and that mature within 30 days and are backed by other assets (non-HQLA).
In column E: The market value of the other (non-HQLA) asset collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 208 Counterparties are domestic sovereigns, MDBs or domestic PSEs with a 20% risk weight; of which: In column D: Secured funding transactions with domestic sovereign, multilateral development banks or domestic PSEs that are backed by other assets (non-HQLA).
PSEs that receive this treatment should be limited to those that are 20% or lower risk weighted.
In column E: The market value of collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 209 Counterparties are not domestic sovereigns, MDBs or domestic PSEs with a 20% risk weight; of which: In column D: Secured funding transactions with counterparties other than domestic sovereign, multilateral development banks or PSEs that are backed by other assets (non-HQLA).
In column E: The market value of collateral extended on these transactions.
114–115 d) Additional requirements 213 Derivatives cash outflow Banks should calculate, in accordance with their existing valuation methodologies, expected contractual derivative cash inflows and outflows. Cash flows may be calculated on a net basis (i.e. inflows can offset outflows) by counterparty, only where a valid master netting agreement exists. The sum of all net cash outflows should be reported here. The sum of all net cash inflows should be reported in line 315.
Banks should exclude from such calculations those liquidity requirements that would result from increased collateral needs due to market value movements (to be reported in line 221) or falls in value of collateral posted (reported in line 216 and line 217). Options should be assumed to be exercised when they are ‘in the money’ to the option buyer.
Where derivative payments are collateralized by HQLA, cash outflows should be calculated net of any corresponding cash or collateral inflows that would result, all other things being equal, from contractual obligations for cash or collateral to be provided to the bank, if the bank is legally entitled and operationally capable to re-use the collateral in new cash raising transactions once the collateral is received. This is in line with the principle that banks should not double count liquidity inflows and outflows.
Note that cash flows do not equal the marked-to-market value, since the marked-to-market value also includes estimates for contingent inflows and outflows and may include cash flows that occur beyond the 30-day horizon.
It is generally expected that a positive amount would be provided for both this line item and line 315 for institutions engaged in derivatives transactions.
116, 117 214 Increased liquidity needs related to downgrade triggers in derivatives and other financing transactions (100% of the amount of collateral that would be posted for, or contractual cash outflows associated with, any downgrade up to and including a 3-notch downgrade). Often, contracts governing derivatives and other transactions have clauses that require the posting of additional collateral, drawdown of contingent facilities, or early repayment of existing liabilities upon the bank's downgrade by a recognized credit rating organization. The scenario therefore requires that for each contract in which “downgrade triggers” exist, the bank assumes that 100% of this additional collateral or cash outflow will have to be posted for any downgrade up to and including a 3-notch downgrade of the bank's long-term credit rating. Triggers linked to a bank's short-term rating should be assumed to be triggered at the corresponding long-term rating in accordance with published ratings criteria. The impact of the downgrade should consider impacts on all types of margin collateral and contractual triggers which change rehypothecation rights for non-segregated collateral.
118 215 Increased liquidity needs related to the potential for valuation changes on posted collateral securing derivative and other transactions: Increased liquidity needs related to the potential for valuation changes on posted collateral securing derivative and other transactions: (20% of the value of non-Level 1 posted collateral).
Observation of market practices indicates that most counterparties to derivatives transactions typically are required to secure the mark-to-market valuation of their positions and that this is predominantly done using cash or sovereign, central bank, multilateral development banks, or PSE debt securities with a 0% risk weight under the *Basel II 62 standardized approach. When these Level 1 liquid asset securities are posted as collateral, the framework will not require that an additional stock of HQLA be maintained for potential valuation changes. If however, counterparties are securing mark-to-market exposures with other forms of collateral, to cover the potential loss of market value on those securities, 20% of the value of all such posted collateral, net of collateral received on a counterparty basis (provided that the collateral received is not subject to restrictions on reuse or rehypothecation) will be added to the stock of required HQLA by the bank posting such collateral. This 20% will be calculated based on the notional amount required to be posted as collateral after any other haircuts have been applied that may be applicable to the collateral category. Any collateral that is in a segregated margin account can only be used to offset outflows that are associated with payments that are eligible to be offset from that same account.
*Refer to SAMA Circular 440471440000, Basel III Reforms.
119 216 Cash and Level 1 assets Current market value of relevant collateral posted as margin for derivatives and other transactions that, if they had been unencumbered, would have been eligible for inclusion in line items 6 to 18. 217 For other collateral (i.e. all non-Level 1 collateral) Current market value of relevant collateral posted as margin for derivatives and other transactions other than those included in line item 216 (all non-Level 1 collateral). This amount should be calculated net of collateral received on a counterparty basis (provided that the collateral received is not subject to restrictions on reuse or rehypothecation). Any collateral that is in a segregated margin account can only be used to offset outflows that are associated with payments that are eligible to be offset from that same account. 218 Increased liquidity needs related to excess nonsegregated collateral held by the bank that could contractually be called at any time by the counterparty The amount of non-segregated collateral that the reporting institution currently has received from counterparties but could under legal documentation be recalled because the collateral is in excess of that counterparty's current collateral requirements. 120 219 Increased liquidity needs related to contractually required collateral on transactions for which the counterparty has not yet demanded the collateral be posted The amount of collateral that is contractually due from the reporting institution, but for which the counterparty has not yet demanded the posting of such collateral. 121 220 Increased liquidity needs related to contracts that allow collateral substitution to non-HQLA assets The amount of HQLA collateral that can be substituted for non-HQLA without the bank's consent that has been received to secure transactions and that has not been segregated (e.g. otherwise included in HQLAs, as secured funding collateral or in other bank operations). 122 221 Increased liquidity needs related to market valuation changes on derivative or other transactions Any potential liquidity needs deriving from collateralization of mark-to-market exposures on derivative and other transactions. Unless its national supervisor has provided other instructions (i.e. according flexibility as per circumstances), banks should calculate any outflow generated by increased needs related to market valuation changes by identifying the largest absolute net 30-day collateral flow realized during the preceding 24 months, where the absolute net collateral flow is based on both realized outflows and inflows. Inflows and outflows of transactions executed under the same master netting agreement can be treated on a net basis. 123 222 Loss of funding on ABS and other structured financing instruments issued by the bank, excluding covered bonds Loss of funding on asset-backed securities (To the extent that sponsored conduits/SPVs are required to be consolidated under liquidity requirements, their assets and liabilities will be taken into account. Supervisors need to be aware of other possible sources of liquidity risk beyond that arising from debt maturing within 30 days.) covered bonds and other structured financing instruments: The scenario assumes the outflow of 100% of the funding transaction maturing within the 30-day period, when these instruments are issued by the bank itself (as this assumes that the re-financing market will not exist).
124 223 Loss of funding on ABCP, conduits, SIVs and other such financing activities; of which: All funding on asset-backed commercial paper, conduits, securities investment vehicles and other such financing facilities maturing or returnable within 30 days. Banks having structured financing facilities that include the issuance of short-term debt instruments, such as asset backed commercial paper, should report the potential liquidity outflows from these structures. These include, but are not limited to, (i) the inability to refinance maturing debt, and (ii) the existence of derivatives or derivative-like components contractually written into the documentation associated with the structure that would allow the “return” of assets in a financing arrangement, or that require the original asset transferor to provide liquidity, effectively ending the financing arrangement ("liquidity puts") within the 30-day period. Where the structured financing activities are conducted through a special purpose entity (such as a special purpose vehicle, conduit or SIV), the bank should, in determining the HQLA requirements, look through to the maturity of the debt instruments issued by the entity and any embedded options in financing arrangements that may potentially trigger the “return” of assets or the need for liquidity, irrespective of whether or not the SPV is consolidated.
Note; A special purpose entity (SPE) is defined in the Basel II Framework (paragraph 552) as a corporation, trust, or other entity organized for a specific purpose, the activities of which are limited to those appropriate to accomplish the purpose of the SPE, and the structure of which is intended to isolate the SPE from the credit risk of an originator or seller of exposures. SPEs are commonly used as financing vehicles in which exposures are sold to a trust or similar entity in exchange for cash or other assets funded by debt issued by the trust.
125 224 debt maturing ≤ 30 days Portion of the funding specified in line 223 maturing within 30 days. 125 225 with embedded options in financing arrangements Portion of the funding specified in line 223 not maturing within 30 days but with embedded options that could reduce the effective maturity of the debt to 30 days or less. 125 226 other potential loss of such funding Portion of the funding specified in line 223 that is not included in line 224 or 225. 125 227 Loss of funding on covered bonds issued by the bank Balances of covered bonds, issued by the bank that mature in 30 days or less. 124 Credit and liquidity facilities are defined as explicit contractual agreements or obligations to extend funds at a future date to retail or wholesale counterparties. For the purpose of the standard, these facilities only include contractually irrevocable (“committed”) or conditionally revocable agreements to extend funds in the future (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 126). These off-balance sheet facilities or funding commitments can have long or short-term maturities, with short-term facilities frequently renewing or automatically rolling-over. In a stressed environment, it will likely be difficult for customers drawing on facilities of any maturity, even short-term maturities, to be able to quickly pay back the borrowings. Therefore, for purposes of this standard, all facilities that are assumed to be drawn (as outlined in the paragraphs below) will remain outstanding at the amounts assigned throughout the duration of the test, regardless of maturity.
Unconditionally revocable facilities that are unconditionally cancellable by the bank (in particular, those without a precondition of a material change in the credit condition of the borrower) are excluded from this section and should be reported in lines 249 to 261, as appropriate (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 126).
The currently undrawn portion of these facilities should be reported. The reported amount may be net of any HQLAs eligible for the stock of HQLAs, if the HQLAs have already been posted as collateral by the counterparty to secure the facilities or that are contractually obliged to be posted when the counterparty will draw down the facility (e.g. a liquidity facility structured as a repo facility), if the bank is legally entitled and operationally capable to re-use the collateral in new cash raising transactions once the facility is drawn, and there is no undue correlation between the probability of drawing the facility and the market value of the collateral. The collateral can be netted against the outstanding amount of the facility to the extent that this collateral is not already counted in the stock of HQLAs (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 127).
A liquidity facility is defined as any committed, undrawn back-up facility that would be utilized to refinance the debt obligations of a customer in situations where such a customer is unable to rollover that debt in financial markets (e.g. pursuant to a commercial paper programme, secured financing transactions, obligations to redeem units, etc.).
The amount of a commitment to be treated as a liquidity facility is the amount of the currently outstanding debt issued by the customer (or proportionate share, if a syndicated facility) maturing within a 30 day period that is backstopped by the facility. The portion of a liquidity facility that is backing debt that does not mature within the 30-day window is excluded from the scope of the definition of a facility. Any additional capacity of the facility (i.e. the remaining commitment) would be treated as a committed credit facility and should be reported as such.
General working capital facilities for corporate entities (e.g. revolving credit facilities in place for general corporate and/or working capital purposes) will not be classified as liquidity facilities, but as credit facilities.
Notwithstanding the above, any facilities provided to hedge funds, money market funds and special purpose funding vehicles, for example SPEs (as defined in the Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 125) or conduits, or other vehicles used to finance the banks own assets, should be captured in their entirety as a liquidity facility and reported in line 238.
For that portion of financing programs that are captured in the Basel III LCR standards, paragraphs 124 and 125 (i.e. are maturing or have liquidity puts that may be exercised in the 30-day horizon); banks that are providers of associated liquidity facilities do not need to double count the maturing financing instrument and the liquidity facility for consolidated programs.
228 Undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities to retail and small business customers Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
Balances of undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities extended by the bank to natural persons and small business customers, as defined above. Banks should assume a 5% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these facilities.
131(a) 229 non-financial corporates Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
Balances of undrawn committed credit facilities extended by the bank to non-financial institution corporations (excluding small business customers). The amount reported in this line should also include any ‘additional capacity’ of liquidity facilities (as defined above) provided to non-financial corporates. Banks should assume a 10% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these credit facilities.
131(b) 231 sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and MDBs Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
Balances of undrawn committed credit facilities extended by the bank to sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, multilateral development banks and any other entity not included in other drawdown categories. The amount reported in this line should also include any ‘additional capacity’ of liquidity facilities (as defined above) provided to sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, multilateral development banks. Banks should assume a 10% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these credit facilities.
131(b) 232 Undrawn committed liquidity facilities to 233 non-financial corporates Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
The amount of undrawn committed liquidity facilities should be the amount of currently outstanding debt (or proportionate share if a syndicated facility) issued by non-financial institution corporations (excluding small business customers) maturing within a 30 day period that is backstopped by the facility.
Any ‘additional capacity’ of liquidity facilities (as defined above) provided to non-financial corporates should not be reported here, rather should be reported in line 230. Banks should assume a 30% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these liquidity facilities.
131(c) 234 sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and MDBs Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
The amount of undrawn committed liquidity facilities should be the amount of currently outstanding debt (or proportionate share if a syndicated facility) issued by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, or multilateral development banks maturing within a 30 day period that is backstopped by the facility.
Any ‘additional capacity’ of liquidity facilities (as defined above) provided to sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, or multilateral development banks should not be reported here, rather should be reported in line 231. Banks should assume a 30% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these liquidity facilities.
131(c) 235 Undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities provided to banks subject to prudential supervision Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
Balances of undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities extended to banks that are subject to prudential supervision. Banks should assume a 40% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these facilities.
131(d) 236 Undrawn committed credit facilities provided to other FIs Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
Balances of undrawn committed credit facilities extended by the bank to other financial institutions (including securities firms, insurance companies, fiduciaries and beneficiaries). The amount reported in this line should also include any ‘additional capacity’ of liquidity facilities (as defined above) provided to other financial institutions (including securities firms, insurance companies, fiduciaries and beneficiaries). Banks should assume a 100% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these liquidity facilities.
Note
Fiduciary is defined in this context as a legal entity that is authorized to manage assets on behalf of a third party.
Fiduciaries include asset management entities such as pension funds and other collective investment vehicles.
Beneficiary is defined in this context as a legal entity that receives, or may become eligible to receive, benefits under a will, insurance policy, retirement plan, annuity, trust, or other contract.
(Refer to Paragraph 131(f) and footnotes 43 and 44 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
131(e) 237 Undrawn committed liquidity facilities provided to other FIs Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
The amount of undrawn committed liquidity facilities should be the amount of currently outstanding debt (or proportionate share if a syndicated facility) issued by to other financial institutions (including securities firms, insurance companies, fiduciaries and beneficiaries) maturing within a 30 day period that is backstopped by the facility.
Any ‘additional capacity’ of liquidity facilities (as defined above) provided to other financial institutions (including securities firms, insurance companies, fiduciaries and beneficiaries) should not be reported here, rather should be reported in line 236.
Note:
Banks should assume a 100% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these liquidity facilities.
Note: Definition of other financial institutions include, leasing, house finance/mortgage companies
Fiduciary is defined in this context as a legal entity that is authorized to manage assets on behalf of a third party. Fiduciaries include asset management entities such as pension funds and other collective investment vehicles.
Beneficiary is defined in this context as a legal entity that receives, or may become eligible to receive, benefits under a will, insurance policy, retirement plan, annuity, trust, or other contract.
(Refer to Paragraph 131(f) footnotes 43 and 44 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
131(f) 238 Undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities to other legal entities Any contractual loan drawdowns from committed facilities (Committed facilities refer to those which are irrevocable) and estimated drawdowns from revocable facilities within the 30-day period should be fully reflected as outflows:
Balances of undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities extended to other legal entities, including hedge funds, money market funds and special purpose funding vehicles,( The potential liquidity risks associated with the bank's own structured financing facilities should be treated according to paragraphs 124 and 125 of this document (100% of maturing amount and 100% of returnable assets are included as outflows). for example SPEs (as defined in the Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 125) or conduits, or other vehicles used to finance the banks own assets (not included in lines 228 to 237). Banks should assume a 100% drawdown of the undrawn portion of these facilities.
131(g) Other contractual obligations to extend funds (within a 30 day period 240 Other contractual obligations to extend funds to: Any contractual lending obligations not captured elsewhere in the standard should be captured here at a 100% outflow rate. 132-133 241 financial institutions Any contractual lending obligations to financial institutions not captured elsewhere. 132 For Rows 242-246, the following is applicable:
If the total of all contractual obligations to extend funds to retail and non-financial corporate clients within the next 30 calendar days (not captured in the prior categories) exceeds 50% of the total contractual inflows due in the next 30 calendar days from these clients, the difference should be reported as a 100% outflow.
242 retail clients The full amount of contractual obligations to extend funds to retail clients within the next 30 calendar days (not netted for the assumed roll-over on the inflows in line 301). 133 243 small business customers The full amount of contractual obligations to extend funds to small business customers within the next 30 calendar days (not netted for the assumed roll-over on the inflows in line 302). 133 244 non-financial corporates The full amount of contractual obligations to extend funds to non-financial corporate clients within the next 30 calendar days (not netted for the assumed roll-over on the inflows in line 303). 133 245 other clients The full amount of contractual obligations to extend funds to other clients within the next 30 calendar days (not netted for the assumed roll-over on the inflows in line 309). 133 246 retail, small business customers, non-financials and other clients The amounts of contractual obligations to extend funds to retail, small business customers, non-financial corporate and other clients within the next 30 calendar days (lines 242 to 245) are added up in this line. The roll-over of funds that is implicitly assumed in the inflow section (lines 301, 302, 303 and 309) are then subtracted. If the result is positive, it is included here as an outflow in column H. Otherwise, the outflow included here is zero. 133 Other contingent funding obligations (treatment determined by national supervisor) These contingent funding obligations may be either contractual or non-contractual and are not lending commitments.
Non-contractual contingent funding obligations include associations with, or sponsorship of, products sold or services provided that may require the support or extension of funds in the future under stressed conditions. Non-contractual obligations may be embedded in financial products and instruments sold, sponsored, or originated by the institution that can give rise to unplanned balance sheet growth arising from support given for reputational risk considerations (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 135). These include products and instruments for which the customer or holder has specific expectations regarding the liquidity and marketability of the product or instrument and for which failure to satisfy customer expectations in a commercially reasonable manner would likely cause material reputational damage to the institution or otherwise impair on-going viability.
SAMA will continue to work with supervised institutions in its jurisdictions to determine the liquidity risk impact of these contingent liabilities and the resulting stock of HQLA that should accordingly be maintained. SAMA has already disclosed the run-off rates they assign to each category publicly and will continue to intimate, in case of revisions made.
Note: In order to refine the cash outflow estimates in connection with trade and non trade related Letter of Credit and Guarantees, SAMA would undertake a study shortly, on account of which information would be solicited from the banking industry
Some of these contingent funding obligations are explicitly contingent upon a credit or other event that is not always related to the liquidity events simulated in the stress scenario, but may nevertheless have the potential to cause significant liquidity drains in times of stress. For this standard, SAMA and bank should consider which of these “other contingent funding obligations” may materialize under the assumed stress events. The potential liquidity exposures to these contingent funding obligations are to be treated as a nationally determined behavioral assumption where it is up to the SAMA to determine whether and to what extent these contingent outflows are to be included in the LCR. All identified contractual and non-contractual contingent liabilities and their assumptions should be reported, along with their related triggers. Supervisors and banks should, at a minimum, use historical behavior in determining appropriate outflows.
253 Non-contractual obligations related to potential liquidity draws from joint ventures or minority investments in entities Non contractual contingent funding obligations related to potential liquidity draws from joint ventures or minority investments in entities, which are not consolidated per paragraph 164 of the Basel III LCR standards, where there is the expectation that the bank will be the main liquidity provider when the entity is in need of liquidity. The amount included should be calculated in accordance with the methodology agreed by the bank's supervisor. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 137 254 Unconditionally revocable “uncommitted” credit and liquidity facilities Balances of undrawn credit and liquidity facilities where the bank has the right to unconditionally revoke the undrawn portion of these facilities. 140 255 Trade-finance related obligations (including guarantees and letters of credit) Trade finance instruments consist of trade-related obligations directly underpinned by the movement of goods or the provision of services. Amounts to be reported here include items such as:
- outstanding documentary trade letters of credit, documentary and clean collection, import bills, and export bills; and
- outstanding guarantees directly related to trade finance obligations, such as shipping guarantees.
Lending commitments, such as direct import or export financing for non-financial corporate firms, are excluded from this treatment and reported in lines 228 to 238.
138, 139 256 Guarantees and letters of credit unrelated to trade finance obligations The outstanding amount of letters of credit issued by the bank and guarantees unrelated to trade finance obligations described in line 255. 140 257 Non-contractual obligations: 258 Debt-buy back requests (incl related conduits) Potential requests for debt repurchases of the bank's own debt or that of related conduits, securities investment vehicles and other such financing facilities. In case debt amounts qualify for both line 258 and line 262, please enter them in just one of these lines. 140 259 Structured products Structured products where customers anticipate ready marketability, such as adjustable rate notes and variable rate demand notes (VRDNs). 140 260 Managed funds Managed funds that are marketed with the objective of maintaining a stable value such as money market mutual funds or other types of stable value collective investment funds etc. 140 261 Other non-contractual obligations Any other non-contractual obligation not entered above. 140 262 Outstanding debt securities with remaining maturity > 30 days For issuers with an affiliated dealer or market maker, there may be a need to include an amount of the outstanding debt securities (unsecured and secured, term as well as short term) having maturities greater than 30 calendar days, to cover the potential repurchase of such outstanding securities. In case debt amounts qualify for both line 258 and line 262, please enter them in just one of these lines. 140 263 Non contractual obligations where customer short positions are covered by other customers’ collateral Amount of contingent obligations related to instances where banks have internally matched client assets against other clients’ short positions where the collateral does not qualify as Level 1 or Level 2, and the bank may be obligated to find additional sources of funding for these positions in the event of client withdrawals. Instances where the collateral qualifies as Level 1 or Level 2 should be reported in the appropriate line of the secured funding section (lines 191 to 205). 140 264 Bank outright short positions covered by a collateralized securities financing transaction Amount of the bank's outright short positions that are being covered by collateralized securities financing transactions. Such short positions are assumed to be maintained throughout the 30-day period and receive a 0% outflow. The corresponding collateralized securities financing transactions that are covering such short positions should be reported in lines 290 to 295 or 405 to 429.
Further guidance please refer para 147 of Basel III LCR standards reference:
In the case of a bank's short positions, if the short position is being covered by an unsecured security borrowing, the bank should assume the unsecured security borrowing of collateral from financial market participants would run-off in full, leading to a 100% outflow of either cash or HQLA to secure the borrowing, or cash to close out the short position by buying back the security. This should be recorded as a 100% other contractual outflow according to paragraph 141. If, however, the bank's short position is being covered by a collateralized securities financing transaction, the bank should assume the short position will be maintained throughout the 30-day period and receive a 0% outflow
147 265 Other contractual cash outflows (including those related to unsecured collateral borrowings and uncovered short positions) Any other contractual cash outflows within the next 30 calendar days should be captured in this standard, such as such as outflows to cover unsecured collateral borrowings, uncovered short positions, dividends or contractual interest payments, with explanation given in an accompanying note to your supervisor as to what comprises the amounts included in this line. This amount should exclude outflows related to operating costs. 141, 147 Secured lending, including reverse repos and securities borrowing Despite the roll-over assumptions in paragraphs 145 and 146, a bank should manage its collateral such that it is able to fulfil obligations to return collateral whenever the counterparty decides not to roll-over any reverse repo or securities lending transaction.( s is in line with Principle 9 of the Sound Principles.) This is especially the case for non-HQLA collateral, since such outflows are not captured in the LCR framework. SAMA would be monitoring individual banks collateral management as part of their onsite inspection.
148 Cash Inflow – Committed Facilities
Committed facilities
No credit facilities, liquidity facilities or other contingent funding facilities that the bank holds at other institutions for its own purposes are assumed to be able to be drawn. Such facilities receive a 0% inflow rate, meaning that this scenario does not consider inflows from committed credit or liquidity facilities. This is to reduce the contagion risk of liquidity shortages at one bank causing shortages at other banks and to reflect the risk that other banks may not be in a position to honor credit facilities, or may decide to incur the legal and reputational risk involved in not honoring the commitment, in order to conserve their own liquidity or reduce their exposure to that bank.
6.1.3 Inflows, Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) (panel B2)
Total expected contractual cash inflows are calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of various categories of contractual receivables by the rates at which they are expected to flow in under the scenario up to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 69).
Items must not be double counted – if an asset is included as part of the “stock of HQLA” (i.e. the numerator), the associated cash inflows cannot also be counted as cash inflows (i.e. part of the denominator) (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 72).
When considering its available cash inflows, the bank should only include contractual inflows (including interest payments) from outstanding exposures that are fully performing and for which the bank has no reason to expect a default within the 30-day time horizon (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 142). Pre-payments on loans (not due within 30 days) should not be included in the inflows.
Contingent inflows are not included in total net cash outflows (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 142).
Banks and SAMA need to monitor the concentration of expected inflows across wholesale counterparties in the context of banks’ liquidity management in order to ensure that their liquidity position is not overly dependent on the arrival of expected inflows from one or a limited number of wholesale counterparties. SAMA in connection with the aforementioned cover the same through liquidity monitoring tools and onsite inspections.
a) Secured lending including reverse repos and securities borrowing
Secured lending is defined as those loans that the bank has extended and are collateralized by legal rights to specifically designated assets owned by the borrowing institution, which the bank use or rehypothecate for the duration of the loan, and for which the bank can claim ownership to in the case of default by the borrower. In this section any transaction in which the bank has extended a collateralized loan in cash, such as reverse repo transactions, expiring within 30 days should be reported. Collateral swaps where the bank has extended a collateralized loan in the form of other assets than cash, should not be reported here, but in panel C below.
A bank should report all outstanding secured lending transactions with remaining maturities within the 30 calendar day stress horizon. The amount of funds extended through the transaction should be reported in column D (“amount extended”). The value of the underlying collateral received in the transactions should be reported in column E (“market value of received collateral”). Both values are needed to calculate the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets and both should be calculated at the date of reporting, not the date of the transaction. Note that if the collateral received in the form of Level 1 or Level 2 assets is not rehypothecated and is legally and contractually available for the bank's use it should be reported in the appropriate lines of the stock of HQLA section (lines 11 to 39) and not here (see paragraph 31 of the Basel III LCR standards).
Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of items related to Level 2B assets in this subsection.
273 Reverse repo and other secured lending or securities borrowing transactions maturing ≤ 30 days All reverse repo or securities borrowing transactions maturing within 30 days, in which the bank has extended cash and obtained collateral. 145–146 274 Of which collateral is not reused (i.e. is not rehypothecated) to cover the reporting institution's outright short positions Such transactions in which the collateral obtained is not reused (i.e. is not rehypothecated) to cover the reporting institution's outright short positions. If the collateral is re-used, the transactions should be reported in lines 290 to 295. 145–146 275 Transactions backed by Level 1 assets All such transactions in which the bank has obtained collateral in the form of Level 1 assets. These transactions are assumed to roll-over in full, not giving rise to any cash inflows.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 1 collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 276 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions backed by Level 1 assets, those where the collateral obtained is reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 1 collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 278 Transactions backed by Level 2A assets; of which: All such transactions in which the bank has obtained collateral in the form of Level 2A assets. These are assumed to lead to a 15% cash inflow due to the reduction of funds extended against the collateral.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2A collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 279 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions backed by Level 2A assets, those where the collateral obtained is reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2A collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 281 Transactions backed by Level 2B RMBS assets; of which: All such transactions in which the bank has obtained collateral in the form of Level 2B RMBS assets. These are assumed to lead to a 25% cash inflow due to the reduction of funds extended against the collateral.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B RMBS collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 282 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions backed by Level 2B RMBS assets, those where the collateral obtained is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B RMBS collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 284 Transactions backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets; of which: All such transactions in which the bank has obtained collateral in the form of Level 2B non-RMBS assets. These are assumed to lead to a 50% cash inflow due to the reduction of funds extended against the collateral.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 285 Transactions involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets, those where the collateral obtained is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 287 Margin lending backed by non-Level 1 or non-Level 2 collateral Collateralized loans extended to customers for the purpose of taking leveraged trading positions (“margin loans”) made against non-HQLA collateral. These are assumed to lead to a 50% cash inflow.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 288 Transactions backed by other collateral All such transactions (other than those reported in line 287) in which the bank has obtained collateral in another form than Level 1 or Level 2 assets. These are assumed not to roll over and therefore lead to a 100% cash inflow.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 289 Of which collateral is re-used (i.e. is rehypothecated) to cover the reporting institution's outright short positions If the collateral obtained in these transactions is re-used (i.e. rehypothecated) to cover the reporting institution's outright short positions that could be extended beyond 30 days, it should be assumed that the transactions will be rolled-over and will not give rise to any cash inflows. This reflects the need to continue to cover the short position or to repurchase the relevant securities. Institutions should only report reverse repo amounts in these cells where it itself is short the collateral.
If the collateral is not re-used, the transaction should be reported in lines 274 to 288.
145–146 290 Transactions backed by Level 1 assets All such transactions in which the bank has obtained collateral in the form of Level 1 assets.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 1 collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 291 Transactions backed by Level 2A assets All such transactions in which the bank has obtained collateral in the form of Level 2A assets.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2A collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 292 Transactions backed by Level 2B RMBS assets All such transactions in which the bank has obtained collateral in the form of Level 2B RMBS assets.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B RMBS collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 293 Transactions backed by Level 2B non-RMBS assets All such transactions in which the bank has obtained collateral in the form of Level 2B non-RMBS assets.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 294 Margin lending backed by non-Level 1 or non-Level 2 collateral Collateralized loans extended to customers for the purpose of taking leveraged trading positions (“margin loans”) made against non-HQLA collateral.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of the collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 295 Transactions backed by other collateral All such transactions (other than those reported in line 294) in which the bank has obtained collateral in another form than Level 1 or Level 2 assets.
In column D: The amounts extended in these transactions.
In column E: The market value of collateral received in these transactions.
145–146 b) Other inflows by counterparty
Contractual inflows (including interest payments and installments) due in ≤ 30 days from fully performing loans, not reported in lines 275 to 295. These include maturing loans that have already been agreed to roll over. The agreed rollover should also be reported in lines 241 to 245 as appropriate.
For all other types of transactions, either secured or unsecured, the inflow rate will be determined by counterparty. In order to reflect the need for a bank to conduct ongoing loan origination/roll-over with different types of counterparties, even during a time of stress, a set of limits on contractual inflows by counterparty type is applied.
When considering loan payments, the bank should only include inflows from fully performing loans. Inflows should only be taken at the latest possible date, based on the contractual rights available to counterparties. For revolving credit facilities, this assumes that the existing loan is rolled over and that any remaining balances are treated in the same way as a committed facility according to Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 131.
Inflows from loans that have no specific maturity (i.e. have non-defined or open maturity) should not be included; therefore, no assumptions should be applied as to when maturity of such loans would occur. An exception to this, as noted below, would be minimum payments of principal, fee or interest associated with an open maturity loan, provided that such payments are contractually due within 30 days. These minimum payment amounts should be captured as inflows at the rates prescribed in paragraphs 153 and 154. of LCR Basel III guidelines
301 Retail customers All payments (including interest payments and installments) from retail customers on fully performing loans not reported in lines 275 to 295 that are contractually due within the 30-day horizon. Only contractual payments due should be reported, e.g. required minimum payments of principal, fee or interest, and not total loan balances of undefined or open maturity.
Note: At the same time, however, banks are assumed to continue to extend loans to retail and small business customers, at a rate of 50% of contractual inflows. This results in a net inflow number of 50% of the contractual amount.
153 302 Small business customers All payments (including interest payments and installments) from small business customers on fully performing loans not reported in lines 275 to 295 that are contractually due within the 30-day horizon. Only contractual payments due should be reported, e.g. required minimum payments of principal, fee or interest, and not total loan balances of undefined or open maturity.
Note: At the same time, however, banks are assumed to continue to extend loans to retail and small business customers, at a rate of 50% of contractual inflows. This results in a net inflow number of 50% of the contractual amount.
153 303 Non-financial corporates All payments (including interest payments and installments) from non-financial corporates on fully performing loans not reported in lines 275 to 295 that are contractually due within the 30-day horizon. Only contractual payments due should be reported, e.g. required minimum payments of principal, fee or interest, and not total loan balances of undefined or open maturity.
Note:
Banks are assumed to continue to extend loans to wholesale clients, at a rate of 0% of inflows for financial institutions and central banks, and 50% for all others, including non-financial corporates, sovereigns, multilateral development banks, and PSEs. This will result in an inflow percentage of 100% for financial institution and central bank counterparties; and 50% for non-financial wholesale counterparties
154 304 Central banks All payments (including interest payments and installments) from central banks on fully performing loans. Central bank reserves (including required reserves) including banks’ overnight deposits with the central bank, and term deposits with the central bank that: (i) are explicitly and contractually repayable on notice from the depositing bank; or (ii) that constitute a loan against which the bank can borrow on a term basis or on an overnight but automatically renewable basis (only where the bank has an existing deposit with the relevant central bank), should be reported in lines 7 or 8 and not here. If the term of other deposits (not included in lines 7 or 8) expires within 30 days, it should be included in this line.
Note:
Banks are assumed to continue to extend loans to wholesale clients, at a rate of 0% of inflows for financial institutions and central banks, and 50% for all others, including non-financial corporates, sovereigns, multilateral development banks, and PSEs. This will result in an inflow percentage of 100% for financial institution and central bank counterparties; and 50% for non-financial wholesale counterparties
154 305 Financial institutions, of which All payments (including interest payments and installments) from financial institutions on fully performing loans not reported in lines 275 to 295 that are contractually due within the 30-day horizon. Only contractual payments due should be reported, e.g. required minimum payments of principal, fee or interest, and not total loan balances of undefined or open maturity. 154 306 operational deposits All deposits held at other financial institutions for operational activities, as outlined in the Basel III LCR standards, paragraphs 93 to 104, such as for clearing, custody, and cash management activities.
Note:
Deposits held at other financial institutions for operational purposes are assumed to stay at those institutions, and no inflows can be counted for these funds
156 307 deposits at the centralized institution of an institutional network that receive 25% run-off For banks that belong to a cooperative network as described in paragraphs 105 and 106 of the Basel III LCR standards, this item includes all (portions of) deposits (not included in line item 306) held at the centralized institution in the cooperative banking network that are placed (a) due to statutory minimum deposit requirements which are registered at regulators, or (b) in the context of common task sharing and legal, statutory or contractual arrangements. These deposits receive a 25% runoff at the centralized institution.
Further, the depositing bank should not count any inflow for these funds – i.e. they will receive a 0% inflow rate.
157 308 all payments on other loans and deposits due in ≤ 30 days All payments (including interest payments and installments) from financial institutions on fully performing unsecured and secured loans, that are contractually due within the 30-day horizon, and the amount of deposits held at financial institutions that is or becomes available within 30 days, and that are not included in lines 306 or 307.
Banks may also recognize in this category inflows from the release of balances held in segregated accounts in accordance with regulatory requirements for the protection of customer trading assets, provided that these segregated balances are maintained in Level 1 or Level 2 assets. This inflow should be calculated in line with the treatment of other related outflows and inflows covered in this standard.
154 309 Other entities All payments (including interest payments and installments) from other entities (including sovereigns, multilateral development banks, and PSEs) on fully performing loans that are contractually due within 30 days, not included in lines 301 to 308. 154 c) Other cash inflows 315 Derivatives cash inflow Banks should calculate, in accordance with their existing valuation methodologies, expected contractual derivative cash inflows and outflows. Cash flows may be calculated on a net basis (i.e. inflows can offset outflows) by counterparty, only where a valid master netting agreement exists. The sum of all net cash inflows should be reported here. The sum of all net cash outflows should be reported in line 213. Banks should exclude from such calculations those liquidity requirements that would result from increased collateral needs due to market value movements (to be reported in line 221) or falls in value of collateral posted (reported in line 216 and line 217). Options should be assumed to be exercised when they are ‘in the money’ to the option buyer. Where derivatives are collateralized by HQLA, cash inflows should be calculated net of any corresponding cash or contractual collateral outflows that would result, all other things being equal, from contractual obligations for cash or collateral to be posted by the bank, given these contractual obligations would reduce the stock of HQLA. This is in line with the principle that banks should not double count liquidity inflows and outflows.
Note that cash flows do not equal the marked-to-market value, since the marked-to-market value also includes estimates for contingent inflows and outflows and may include cash flows that occur beyond the 30-day horizon.
It is generally expected that a positive amount would be provided for both this line item and line 213 for institutions engaged in derivatives transactions.
158, 159 316 Contractual inflows from securities maturing ≤ 30 days and not included anywhere above Contractual inflows from securities, including certificates of deposit, maturing ≤ 30 days that are not already included in any other item of the LCR framework, provided that they are fully performing (i.e. no default expected). Level 1 and Level 2 securities maturing within 30 days should be included in the stock of liquid assets in panel A, provided that they meet all operational and definitional requirements outlined in the Basel III LCR standards.
Note:
Inflows from securities maturing within 30 days not included in the stock of HQLA are treated in the same category as inflows from financial institutions (i.e. 100% inflow). Banks may also recognize in this category inflows from the release of balances held in segregated accounts in accordance with regulatory requirements for the protection of customer trading assets, provided that these segregated balances are maintained in HQLA. This inflow should be calculated in line with the treatment of other related outflows and inflows covered in this standard.
155 317 Other contractual cash inflows Any other contractual cash inflows to be received ≤ 30 days that are not already included in any other item of the LCR framework. Inflow percentages should be determined as appropriate for each type of inflow by supervisors in each jurisdiction. Cash inflows related to non-financial revenues are not to be included, since they are not taken into account in the calculation of LCR. Any non-contractual contingent inflows should not be reported, as they are not included in the LCR. Please provide your supervisor with an explanatory note on any amounts included in this line. 160 Cap on cash inflows
In order to prevent banks from relying solely on anticipated inflows to meet their liquidity requirement, and also to ensure a minimum level of HQLA holdings, the amount of inflows that can offset outflows is capped at 75% of total expected cash outflows as calculated in the standard. This requires that a bank must maintain a minimum amount of stock of HQLA equal to 25% of the total net cash outflows (Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 144).
323 Cap on cash inflows The cap on cash inflows is equal to 75% of total cash outflows. 69, 144 324 Total cash inflows after applying the cap The amount of total cash inflows after applying the cap is the lower of the total cash inflows before applying the cap and the level of the cap.
This requires that a bank must maintain a minimum amount of stock of HQLA equal to 25% of the total cash outflows.
69, 144 6.1.4 Collateral swaps (panel C)
Any transaction maturing within 30 days in which non-cash assets are swapped for other noncash assets should be reported in this panel. “Level 1 assets” in this section refers to Level 1 assets other than cash. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of items related to Level 2B assets in this subsection.
329 Collateral swaps maturing ≤ 30 days Any transaction maturing within 30 days in which non-cash assets are swapped for other non-cash assets. 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 330 Of which the borrowed assets are not re-used (i.e. are not rehypothecated) to cover short positions Such transactions in which the collateral obtained is not reused (i.e. is not rehypothecated) in transactions to cover short positions.
If the collateral is re-used, the transaction should be reported in lines 405 to 429.
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 331 Level 1 assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for other Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 332 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 1 assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 1 collateral borrowed is reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E332), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 1 collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D332), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 334 Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 335 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2A collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E335), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 1 collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D335), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 337 Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 338 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E338), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 1 collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D338), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 340 Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 341 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E341), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 1 collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D341), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 343 Level 1 assets are lent and other assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 344 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 1 assets are lent and other assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 1 collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (value to be reported in D344), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards); and
(ii) the collateral borrowed is non-Level 1 and non-Level 2 assets (which is the value that should be reported in E344).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 346 Level 2A assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 347 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2A assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 1 collateral borrowed is reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E347), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2A collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D347), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 349 Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for other Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 350 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2A collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E350), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2A collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D350), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 352 Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 353 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E353), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2A collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D353), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 355 Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for other Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 356 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E356), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2A collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D356), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 358 Level 2A assets are lent and other assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 359 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2A assets are lent and other assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2A collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D359), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards); and
(ii) the collateral borrowed is non-Level 1 and non-Level 2 assets (which is the value that should be reported in E359).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 361 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 362 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 1 collateral borrowed is reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E362), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2B RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D362), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 364 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 365 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2A collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E365), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2B RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D365), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 367 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 368 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E368), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2B RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D368), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 370 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for other Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 371 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E371), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2B RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D371), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 373 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and other assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 374 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and other assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D374), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards); and
(ii) the collateral borrowed is non-Level 1 and non-Level 2 assets (which is the value that should be reported in E374).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 376 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 377 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 1 collateral borrowed is reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E377), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D377), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 379 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 380 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2A collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E380), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D380), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 382 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 383 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E383), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D383), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 385 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for other Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 386 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E386), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D386), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 388 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and other assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 389 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and other assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral lent would otherwise qualify to be reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which is the value that should be reported in D389), if they were not already securing the particular transaction in question (i.e. would be unencumbered and would meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards); and
(ii) the collateral borrowed is non-Level 1 and non-Level 2 assets (which is the value that should be reported in E389).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 391 Other assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 392 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where other assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 1 collateral borrowed is reported in panel Aa of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E392), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the collateral lent is non-Level 1 and non-Level 2 assets (which is the value that should be reported in D392).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 394 Other assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 395 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where other assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2A collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ab of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E395), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the collateral lent is non-Level 1 and non-Level 2 assets (which is the value that should be reported in D395).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 397 Other assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 398 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where other assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E398), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the collateral lent is non-Level 1 and non-Level 2 assets (which is the value that should be reported in D398).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 400 Other assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed; of which: Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 401 Involving eligible liquid assets Of the transactions where other assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed, those where:
(i) the Level 2B non-RMBS collateral borrowed is reported in panel Ac of the “LCR” worksheet (which should also be reported in E401), as the assets meet the operational requirements for HQLA as specified in paragraphs 28 to 40 of the Basel III LCR standards; and
(ii) the collateral lent is non-Level 1 and non-Level 2 assets (which is the value that should be reported in D401).
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 403 Other assets are lent and other assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 404 Of which the borrowed assets are re-used (i.e. are rehypothecated) in transactions to cover short positions If the collateral obtained in these transactions is re-used (i.e. rehypothecated) to cover short positions that could be extended beyond 30 days, it should be assumed that the transactions will be rolled-over and will not give rise to any cash inflows. This reflects the need to continue to cover the short position or to repurchase the relevant securities.
If the collateral is not re-used, the transaction should be reported in lines 331 to 403.
48, 113, 146, Annex 1 405 level 1 assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for other Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 406 Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 407 Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 408 Level 1 assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 409 Level 1 assets are lent and other assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 1 assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 410 Level 2A assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 411 Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for other Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 412 Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 413 Level 2A assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 414 Level 2A assets are lent and other assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2A assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 415 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 416 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 417 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for other Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 418 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 419 Level 2B RMBS assets are lent and other assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B RMBS assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 420 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 421 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 422 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 423 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for other Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 424 Level 2B non-RMBS assets are lent and other assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped Level 2B non-RMBS assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 425 Other assets are lent and Level 1 assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for Level 1 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 426 Other assets are lent and Level 2A assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for Level 2A assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 427 Other assets are lent and Level 2B RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for Level 2B RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 428 Other assets are lent and Level 2B non-RMBS assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for Level 2B non-RMBS assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 429 Other assets are lent and other assets are borrowed Such transactions in which the bank has swapped other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (lent) for other assets than Level 1 or Level 2 assets (borrowed). 48, 113, 146, Annex 1 III. Application issues for the LCR – SAMA’s General Guidance, Attachment 2 A161. This section outlines a number of issues related to the application of the LCR. These issues include the frequency with which banks calculate and report the LCR, the scope of application of the LCR (whether they apply at group or entity level and to foreign bank branches) and the aggregation of currencies within the LCR.
A. Frequency of calculation and reporting162. The LCR should be used on an ongoing basis to help monitor and control liquidity risk. The LCR should be reported to supervisors at least monthly, with the operational capacity to increase the frequency to weekly or even daily in stressed situations at the discretion of the supervisor. The time lag in reporting should be as short as feasible and ideally should not surpass two weeks.
163. Banks are expected to inform supervisors of their LCR and their liquidity profile on an ongoing basis. Banks should also notify supervisors immediately if their LCR has fallen, or is expected to fall, below 100%.
B. Scope of application164. *The application of the requirements in this document follow the existing scope of application set out in Part I (Scope of Application) of the Basel II Framework.( See BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version, June 2006 (“Basel II Framework”). The LCR standard and monitoring tools should be applied to all internationally active banks on a consolidated basis, but may be used for other banks and on any subset of entities of internationally active banks as well to ensure greater consistency and a level playing field between domestic and cross-border banks. The LCR standard and monitoring tools should be applied consistently wherever they are applied.
*Please refer to SAMA Circular 440471440000, Basel III Reforms, Scope of Application.
Note: SAMA requires the LCR standards to apply to all commercial banks/ regulated entities in KSA, with the exception of foreign bank branches
165. SAMA shall determine which investments in banking, securities and financial entities of a banking group that are not consolidated per paragraph 164 should be considered significant, taking into account the liquidity impact of such investments on the group under the LCR standard. Normally, a non-controlling investment (e.g. a joint-venture or minority-owned entity) can be regarded as significant if the banking group will be the main liquidity provider of such investment in times of stress (for example, when the other shareholders are non-banks or where the bank is operationally involved in the day-to-day management and monitoring of the entity’s liquidity risk). SAMA will agree with each relevant bank on a case-by-case basis on an appropriate methodology for how to quantify such potential liquidity draws, in particular, those arising from the need to support the investment in times of stress out of reputational concerns for the purpose of calculating the LCR standard. To the extent that such liquidity draws are not included elsewhere, they should be treated under “Other contingent funding obligations”, as described in paragraph 137.
Note: SAMA would consider on a case by case basis if significant investment in an insurance entity would warrant its inclusion in the LCR Ratio.
166. Regardless of the scope of application of the LCR, in keeping with Principle 6 as outlined in the Sound Principles, a bank should actively monitor and control liquidity risk exposures and funding needs at the level of individual legal entities, foreign branches and subsidiaries, and the group as a whole, taking into account legal, regulatory and operational limitations to the transferability of liquidity.
167. To ensure consistency in applying the consolidated LCR across jurisdictions, further information is provided below on two application issues.
1. Differences in home / host liquidity requirements
168. While most of the parameters in the LCR are internationally “harmonized”, national differences in liquidity treatment may occur in those items subject to national discretion (e.g. deposit run-off rates, contingent funding obligations, market valuation changes on derivative transactions, etc.) and where more stringent parameters are adopted by some supervisors.
169. When calculating the LCR on a consolidated basis, a cross-border banking group should apply the liquidity parameters adopted in the home jurisdiction to all legal entities being consolidated except for the treatment of retail / small business deposits that should follow the relevant parameters adopted in host jurisdictions in which the entities (branch or subsidiary) operate. This approach will enable the stressed liquidity needs of legal entities of the group (including branches of those entities) operating in host jurisdictions to be more suitably reflected, given that deposit run-off rates in host jurisdictions are more influenced by jurisdiction specific factors such as the type and effectiveness of deposit insurance schemes in place and the behavior of local depositors.
170. Home requirements for retail and small business deposits should apply to the relevant legal entities (including branches of those entities) operating in host jurisdictions if: (i) there are no host requirements for retail and small business deposits in the particular jurisdictions; (ii) those entities operate in host jurisdictions that have not implemented the LCR; or (iii) the home supervisor decides that home requirements should be used that are stricter than the host requirements.
Note: With reference to paragraphs 168-170, above, SAMA may at its discretion require more stringent measures for deposit run-off rates, contingent funding obligations, market valuation changes on derivative transactions, etc. if considered necessary in future.
2. Treatment of liquidity transfer restrictions
171. As noted in paragraph 36, as a general principle, no excess liquidity should be recognized by a cross-border banking group in its consolidated LCR if there is reasonable doubt about the availability of such liquidity. Liquidity transfer restrictions (e.g. ring-fencing measures, non-convertibility of local currency, foreign exchange controls, etc.) in jurisdictions in which a banking group operates will affect the availability of liquidity by inhibiting the transfer of HQLA and fund flows within the group. The consolidated LCR should reflect such restrictions in a manner consistent with paragraph 36. For example, the eligible HQLA that are held by a legal entity being consolidated to meet its local LCR requirements (where applicable) can be included in the consolidated LCR to the extent that such HQLA are used to cover the total net cash outflows of that entity, notwithstanding that the assets are subject to liquidity transfer restrictions. If the HQLA held in excess of the total net cash outflows are not transferable, such surplus liquidity should be excluded from the standard.
172. For practical reasons, the liquidity transfer restrictions to be accounted for in the consolidated ratio are confined to existing restrictions imposed under applicable laws, regulations and supervisory requirements. (There are a number of factors that can impede cross-border liquidity flows of a banking group, many of which are beyond the control of the group and some of these restrictions may not be clearly incorporated into law or may become visible only in times of stress.) A banking group should have processes in place to capture all liquidity transfer restrictions to the extent practicable, and to monitor the rules and regulations in the jurisdictions in which the group operates and assess their liquidity implications for the group as a whole.
Note: as per SAMA circular No. (361000126260), SAMA has issued a circular dated 8 July 2015 regarding a change in repo facility for level 1 HQLA assets from 75% to 100%. This means that Banks in the KSA can now access liquidity from SAMA for up to 100 % of their investment in Saudi Government Bonds and SAMA Bills. SAMA is aware that Saudi banks with overseas branches and subsidiaries have to meet LCR requirements of their host jurisdictions. However, these requirements concerning haircuts on level 1 HQLA or related repo facility may not be totally in sync with SAMA requirements. Consequently, in view of the scope of application of paragraphs 164 to 172, SAMA would like Saudi banks to apply the more conservative treatment of the rules of SAMA or host jurisdiction for level 1 HQLA and its repo facility for the purpose of consolidated LCR calculation.
C. Currencies
173. As outlined in paragraph 42, while the LCR is expected to be met on a consolidated basis and reported in a common currency, supervisors and banks should also be aware of the liquidity needs in each significant currency. As indicated in the LCR, the currencies of the stock of HQLA should be similar in composition to the operational needs of the bank. Banks and supervisors cannot assume that currencies will remain transferable and convertible in a stress period, even for currencies that in normal times are freely transferable and highly convertible.
(Refer to Paragraph 161-173 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Part 2: Monitoring tools – SAMA’s General Guidance, Attachment 2 B174. In addition to the LCR outlined in Part 1 to be used as a standard, this section outlines metrics to be used as consistent monitoring tools. These metrics capture specific information related to a bank’s cash flows, balance sheet structure, available unencumbered collateral and certain market indicators.
175. These metrics, together with the LCR standard, provide the cornerstone of information that aid supervisors in assessing the liquidity risk of a bank. In addition, supervisors may need to supplement this framework by using additional tools and metrics tailored to help capture elements of liquidity risk specific to their jurisdictions. In utilizing these metrics, supervisors should take action when potential liquidity difficulties are signaled through a negative trend in the metrics, or when a deteriorating liquidity position is identified, or when the absolute result of the metric identifies a current or potential liquidity problem. Examples of actions that supervisors can take are outlined in the Committee’s Sound Principles (paragraphs 141-143).
176. The metrics discussed in this section include the following:
I. Contractual maturity mismatch;
II. Concentration of funding;
III. Available unencumbered assets;
IV. LCR by significant currency; and
V. Market-related monitoring tools
I. Contractual maturity mismatchA. Objective
177. The contractual maturity mismatch profile identifies the gaps between the contractual inflows and outflows of liquidity for defined time bands. These maturity gaps indicate how much liquidity a bank would potentially need to raise in each of these time bands if all outflows occurred at the earliest possible date. This metric provides insight into the extent to which the bank relies on maturity transformation under its current contracts.
B. Definition and practical application of the metricContractual cash and security inflows and outflows from all on- and off-balance sheet items, mapped to defined time bands based on their respective maturities.
178. A bank should report contractual cash and security flows in the relevant time bands based on their residual contractual maturity. Supervisors in each jurisdiction will determine the specific template, including required time bands, by which data must be reported. Supervisors should define the time buckets so as to be able to understand the bank’s cash flow position. Possibilities include requesting the cash flow mismatch to be constructed for the overnight, 7 day, 14 day, 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9 months, 1, 2, 3, 5 and beyond 5 years buckets. Instruments that have no specific maturity (non-defined or open maturity) should be reported separately, with details on the instruments, and with no assumptions applied as to when maturity occurs. Information on possible cash flows arising from derivatives such as interest rate swaps and options should also be included to the extent that their contractual maturities are relevant to the understanding of the cash flows.
179. At a minimum, the data collected from the contractual maturity mismatch should provide data on the categories outlined in the LCR. Some additional accounting (non-dated) information such as capital or non-performing loans may need to be reported separately.
1. Contractual cash flow assumptions
180. No rollover of existing liabilities is assumed to take place. For assets, the bank is assumed not to enter into any new contracts.
181. Contingent liability exposures that would require a change in the state of the world (such as contracts with triggers based on a change in prices of financial instruments or a downgrade in the bank's credit rating) need to be detailed, grouped by what would trigger the liability, with the respective exposures clearly identified.
182. A bank should record all securities flows. This will allow supervisors to monitor securities movements that mirror corresponding cash flows as well as the contractual maturity of collateral swaps and any uncollateralized stock lending/borrowing where stock movements occur without any corresponding cash flows.
183. A bank should report separately the customer collateral received that the bank is permitted to rehypothecate as well as the amount of such collateral that is rehypothecated at each reporting date. This also will highlight instances when the bank is generating mismatches in the borrowing and lending of customer collateral.
C. Utilization of the metric184. Banks will provide the raw data to the supervisors, with no assumptions included in the data. Standardized contractual data submission by banks enables supervisors to build a market-wide view and identify market outlier’s vis-à-vis liquidity.
185. Given that the metric is based solely on contractual maturities with no behavioral assumptions, the data will not reflect actual future forecasted flows under the current, or future, strategy or plans, i.e., under a going-concern view. Also, contractual maturity mismatches do not capture outflows that a bank may make in order to protect its franchise, even where contractually there is no obligation to do so. For analysis, supervisors can apply their own assumptions to reflect alternative behavioral responses in reviewing maturity gaps.
186. As outlined in the Sound Principles, banks should also conduct their own maturity mismatch analyses, based on going-concern behavioral assumptions of the inflows and outflows of funds in both normal situations and under stress. These analyses should be based on strategic and business plans and should be shared and discussed with supervisors, and the data provided in the contractual maturity mismatch should be utilized as a basis of comparison. When firms are contemplating material changes to their business models, it is crucial for supervisors to request projected mismatch reports as part of an assessment of impact of such changes to prudential supervision. Examples of such changes include potential major acquisitions or mergers or the launch of new products that have not yet been contractually entered into. In assessing such data supervisors need to be mindful of assumptions underpinning the projected mismatches and whether they are prudent.
187. A bank should be able to indicate how it plans to bridge any identified gaps in its internally generated maturity mismatches and explain why the assumptions applied differ from the contractual terms. The supervisor should challenge these explanations and assess the feasibility of the bank’s funding plans.
II. Concentration of fundingA. Objective188. This metric is meant to identify those sources of wholesale funding that are of such significance that withdrawal of this funding could trigger liquidity problems. The metric thus encourages the diversification of funding sources recommended in the Committee’s Sound Principles.
B. Definition and practical application of the metricA. Funding liabilities sourced from each significant counterparty as a % of total liabilities
B. Funding liabilities sourced from each significant product/instrument as a % of total liabilities
C. List of asset and liability amounts by significant currency
1. Calculation of the metric189. The numerator for A and B is determined by examining funding concentrations by counterparty or type of instrument/product. Banks and supervisors should monitor both the absolute percentage of the funding exposure, as well as significant increases in concentrations.
(i) Significant counterparties190. The numerator for counterparties is calculated by aggregating the total of all types of liabilities to a single counterparty or group of connected or affiliated counterparties, as well as all other direct borrowings, both secured and unsecured, which the bank can determine arise from the same counterparty58 (such as for overnight commercial paper / certificate of deposit (CP/CD) funding).
191. A “significant counterparty” is defined as a single counterparty or group of connected or affiliated counterparties accounting in aggregate for more than 1% of the bank's total balance sheet, although in some cases there may be other defining characteristics based on the funding profile of the bank. A group of connected counterparties is, in this context, defined in the same way as in the “Large Exposure” regulation of the host country in the case of consolidated reporting for solvency purposes. Intra-group deposits and deposits from related parties should be identified specifically under this metric, regardless of whether the metric is being calculated at a legal entity or group level, due to the potential limitations to intra-group transactions in stressed conditions.
(ii) Significant instruments / products192. The numerator for type of instrument/product should be calculated for each individually significant funding instrument/product, as well as by calculating groups of similar types of instruments/products.
193. A “significant instrument/product” is defined as a single instrument/product or group of similar instruments/products that in aggregate amount to more than 1% of the bank's total balance sheet.
(iii) Significant currencies194. In order to capture the amount of structural currency mismatch in a bank’s assets and liabilities, banks are required to provide a list of the amount of assets and liabilities in each significant currency.
195. A currency is considered “significant” if the aggregate liabilities denominated in that currency amount to 5% or more of the bank's total liabilities.
(iv) Time buckets196. The above metrics should be reported separately for the time horizons of less than one month, 1-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months, and for longer than 12 months.
C. Utilization of the metric197. In utilizing this metric to determine the extent of funding concentration to a certain counterparty, both the bank and supervisors must recognize that currently it is not possible to identify the actual funding counterparty for many types of debt.59 The actual concentration of funding sources, therefore, could likely be higher than this metric indicates. The list of significant counterparties could change frequently, particularly during a crisis. Supervisors should consider the potential for herding behavior on the part of funding counterparties in the case of an institution-specific problem. In addition, under market-wide stress, multiple funding counterparties and the bank itself may experience concurrent liquidity pressures, making it difficult to sustain funding, even if sources appear well diversified.
198. In interpreting this metric, one must recognize that the existence of bilateral funding transactions may affect the strength of commercial ties and the amount of the net outflow.60
199. These metrics do not indicate how difficult it would be to replace funding from any given source.
200. To capture potential foreign exchange risks, the comparison of the amount of assets and liabilities by currency will provide supervisors with a baseline for discussions with the banks about how they manage any currency mismatches through swaps, forwards, etc. It is meant to provide a base for further discussions with the bank rather than to provide a snapshot view of the potential risk.
III. Available unencumbered assetsA. Objective201. These metrics provide supervisors with data on the quantity and key characteristics, including currency denomination and location, of banks’ available unencumbered assets. These assets have the potential to be used as collateral to raise additional HQLA or secured funding in secondary markets or are eligible at central banks and as such may potentially be additional sources of liquidity for the bank.
B. Definition and practical application of the metricAvailable unencumbered assets that are marketable as collateral in secondary markets and Available unencumbered assets that are eligible for central banks’ standing facilities202. A bank is to report the amount, type and location of available unencumbered assets that could serve as collateral for secured borrowing in secondary markets at prearranged or current haircuts at reasonable costs.
203. Likewise, a bank should report the amount, type and location of available unencumbered assets that are eligible for secured financing with relevant central banks at prearranged (if available) or current haircuts at reasonable costs, for standing facilities only (i.e. excluding emergency assistance arrangements). This would include collateral that has already been accepted at the central bank but remains unused. For assets to be counted in this metric, the bank must have already put in place the operational procedures that would be needed to monetize the collateral.
204. A bank should report separately the customer collateral received that the bank is permitted to deliver or re-pledge, as well as the part of such collateral that it is delivering or re-pledging at each reporting date.
205. In addition to providing the total amounts available, a bank should report these items categorized by significant currency. A currency is considered “significant” if the aggregate stock of available unencumbered collateral denominated in that currency amounts 5% or more of the associated total amount of available unencumbered collateral (for secondary markets or central banks).
206. In addition, a bank must report the estimated haircut that the secondary market or relevant central bank would require for each asset. In the case of the latter, a bank would be expected to reference, under business as usual, the haircut required by the central bank that it would normally access (which likely involves matching funding currency – e.g. ECB for eurodenominated funding, Bank of Japan for yen funding, etc.).
207. As a second step after reporting the relevant haircuts, a bank should report the expected monetized value of the collateral (rather than the notional amount) and where the assets are actually held, in terms of the location of the assets and what business lines have access to those assets
C. Utilization of the metric208. These metrics are useful for examining the potential for a bank to generate an additional source of HQLA or secured funding. They will provide a standardized measure of the extent to which the LCR can be quickly replenished after a liquidity shock either via raising funds in private markets or utilizing central bank standing facilities. The metrics do not, however, capture potential changes in counterparties’ haircuts and lending policies that could occur under either a systemic or idiosyncratic event and could provide false comfort that the estimated monetized value of available unencumbered collateral is greater than it would be when it is most needed. Supervisors should keep in mind that these metrics do not compare available unencumbered assets to the amount of outstanding secured funding or any other balance sheet scaling factor. To gain a more complete picture, the information generated by these metrics should be complemented with the maturity mismatch metric and other balance sheet data
IV. LCR by significant currencyA. Objective209. While the LCR is required to be met in one single currency, in order to better capture potential currency mismatches, banks and supervisors should also monitor the LCR in significant currencies. This will allow the bank and the supervisor to track potential currency mismatch issues that could arise.
B. Definition and practical application of the metricForeign Currency LCR =
Stock of HQLA in each significant currency / Total net cash outflows over a 30-day time period in each significant currency
(Note: Amount of total net foreign exchange cash outflows should be net of foreign exchange hedges)
210. The definition of the stock of high-quality foreign exchange assets and total net foreign exchange cash outflows should mirror those of the LCR for common currencies.61
211. A currency is considered “significant” if the aggregate liabilities denominated in that currency amount to 5% or more of the bank's total liabilities.
212. As the foreign currency LCR is not a standard but a monitoring tool, it does not have an internationally defined minimum required threshold. Nonetheless, supervisors in each jurisdiction could set minimum monitoring ratios for the foreign exchange LCR, below which a supervisor should be alerted. In this case, the ratio at which supervisors should be alerted would depend on the stress assumption. Supervisors should evaluate banks’ ability to raise funds in foreign currency markets and the ability to transfer a liquidity surplus from one currency to another and across jurisdictions and legal entities. Therefore, the ratio should be higher for currencies in which the supervisors evaluate a bank’s ability to raise funds in foreign currency markets or the ability to transfer a liquidity surplus from one currency to another and across jurisdictions and legal entities to be limited.
C. Utilization of the metric213. This metric is meant to allow the bank and supervisor to track potential currency mismatch issues that could arise in a time of stress.
V Market-related monitoring toolsA. Objective214. High frequency market data with little or no time lag can be used as early warning indicators in monitoring potential liquidity difficulties at banks.
B. Definition and practical application of the metric215. While there are many types of data available in the market, supervisors can monitor data at the following levels to focus on potential liquidity difficulties:
1. Market-wide information
2. Information on the financial sector
3. Bank-specific information
1. Market-wide information216. Supervisors can monitor information both on the absolute level and direction of major markets and consider their potential impact on the financial sector and the specific bank. Market-wide information is also crucial when evaluating assumptions behind a bank’s funding plan.
217. Valuable market information to monitor includes, but is not limited to, equity prices (i.e. overall stock markets and sub-indices in various jurisdictions relevant to the activities of the supervised banks), debt markets (money markets, medium-term notes, long term debt, derivatives, government bond markets, credit default spread indices, etc.); foreign exchange markets, commodities markets, and indices related to specific products, such as for certain securitized products (e.g. the ABX).
2. Information on the financial sector218. To track whether the financial sector as a whole is mirroring broader market movements or is experiencing difficulties, information to be monitored includes equity and debt market information for the financial sector broadly and for specific subsets of the financial sector, including indices.
3. Bank-specific information219. To monitor whether the market is losing confidence in a particular institution or has identified risks at an institution, it is useful to collect information on equity prices, CDS spreads, money-market trading prices, the situation of roll-overs and prices for various lengths of funding, the price/yield of bank debenture or subordinated debt in the secondary market.
C. Utilization of the metric/data
220. Information such as equity prices and credit spreads are readily available. However, the accurate interpretation of such information is important. For instance, the same CDS spread in numerical terms may not necessarily imply the same risk across markets due to market-specific conditions such as low market liquidity. Also, when considering the liquidity impact of changes in certain data points, the reaction of other market participants to such information can be different, as various liquidity providers may emphasize different types of data.
(Refer to Paragraphs 174 to 220 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Annex 1 – SAMA’s General Guidance 2CCalculation of the cap on Level 2 assets with regard to short-term securities financing transactions1. This annex seeks to clarify the appropriate method for the calculation of the cap on Level 2 (including Level 2B) assets with regard to short-term securities financing transactions.
2. As stated in paragraph 36, the calculation of the 40% cap on Level 2 assets should take into account the impact on the stock of HQLA of the amounts of Level 1 and Level 2 assets involved in secured funding, (See definition in paragraph 112 of BCBS LCR documentation, 2013) secured lending (See definition in paragraph 145 of BCBS LCR documentation, 2013) and collateral swap transactions maturing within 30 calendar days. The maximum amount of adjusted Level 2 assets in the stock of HQLA is equal to two-thirds of the adjusted amount of Level 1 assets after haircuts have been applied. The calculation of the 40% cap on Level 2 assets will take into account any reduction in eligible Level 2B assets on account of the 15% cap on Level 2B assets. (When determining the calculation of the 15% and 40% caps, supervisors may, as an additional requirement, separately consider the size of the pool of Level 2 and Level 2B assets on an unadjusted basis.)
3. Further, the calculation of the 15% cap on Level 2B assets should take into account the impact on the stock of HQLA of the amounts of HQLA assets involved in secured funding, secured lending and collateral swap transactions maturing within 30 calendar days. The maximum amount of adjusted Level 2B assets in the stock of HQLA is equal to 15/85 of the sum of the adjusted amounts of Level 1 and Level 2 assets, or, in cases where the 40% cap is binding, up to a maximum of 1/4 of the adjusted amount of Level 1 assets, both after haircuts have been applied.
4. The adjusted amount of Level 1 assets is defined as the amount of Level 1 assets that would result after unwinding those short-term secured funding, secured lending and collateral swap transactions involving the exchange of any HQLA for any Level 1 assets (including cash) that meet, or would meet if held unencumbered, the operational requirements for HQLA set out in paragraphs 28 to 40. The adjusted amount of Level 2A assets is defined as the amount of Level 2A assets that would result after unwinding those short-term secured funding, secured lending and collateral swap transactions involving the exchange of any HQLA for any Level 2A assets that meet, or would meet if held unencumbered, the operational requirements for HQLA set out in paragraphs 28 to 40. The adjusted amount of Level 2B assets is defined as the amount of Level 2B assets that would result after unwinding those short-term secured funding, secured lending and collateral swap transactions involving the exchange of any HQLA for any Level 2B assets that meet, or would meet if held unencumbered, the operational requirements for HQLA set out in paragraphs 28 to 40. In this context, short-term transactions are transactions with a maturity date up to and including 30 calendar days. Relevant haircuts would be applied prior to calculation of the respective caps.
5. The formula for the calculation of the stock of HQLA is as follows:
Stock of HQLA = Level 1 + Level 2A + Level 2B – Adjustment for 15% cap – Adjustment for 40% cap
Where:
Adjustment for 15% cap = Max (Adjusted Level 2B – 15/85*(Adjusted Level 1 + Adjusted Level 2A), Adjusted Level 2B - 15/60*Adjusted Level 1, 0)
Adjustment for 40% cap = Max ((Adjusted Level 2A + Adjusted Level 2B – Adjustment for 15% cap) - 2/3*Adjusted Level 1 assets, 0)
6. Alternatively, the formula can be expressed as:
Stock of HQLA = Level 1 + Level 2A + Level 2B – Max ((Adjusted Level 2A+Adjusted Level 2B) – 2/3*Adjusted Level 1, Adjusted Level 2B – 15/85*(Adjusted Level 1 + Adjusted Level 2A), 0)
Note: Currently, SAMA does not allow the recognition of Level 2B Assets for the purpose of computing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(Refer to Annex 1 of Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools – Jan 2013)
Package of Prudential Return Concerning Amended LCR
This section has been updated by section 28 "Liquidity" under Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements Framework, issued by SAMA circular No (44047144), dated 04/06/1444 H, Corresponding To 27/12/2022 G.SAMA's Comments Concerning Amended LCR - FAQs
Comment # 1
Coins and Bank Notes – Level 1 Assets (para 50 a) – treatment of reverse repos and current accounts with SAMA
We note that in Level 1 assets the term “Cash” under previous liquidity standards has been revised to “Coins and Bank Notes”. Kindly confirm if current account with SAMA and reverse repo placements can continue to be classified in this category. Kindly advise.
Response: Yes. Bank reverse repo placements and Bank current account with SAMA are to be classified as Level-1 Assets. (Para 50 B) (Footnote 12)
Comment # 2
Non-inclusion of Sovereign exposures (rated BBB+ to BBB-) – Level 2B1 Assets (para 54 (b))
The newly defined Level 2B assets include Corporate Debt Securities which have an external rating between A+ to BBB-. However it does not include Sovereign Debt.
Under the existing rules Sovereign Debt are only eligible for inclusion in High Quality Liquid Assets (Level 1 and Level 2) if their risk weights are 0% (corresponding to external rating better than AA-) or 20% (corresponding to external rating better than A-).
We recommend that in the revised rules since lower rated corporate debt is included as Level 2B assets, Sovereign Debt with external rating between BBB+ to BBB- should also be considered for inclusion in Level 2B assets.
Response: Revised BCBS rules as provided are final with regard to amended LCR. Currently, this is not allowed.
Comment # 32
Common Equity Shares – Level 2B Assets (para 54 (c))2
Kindly confirm our understanding that all shares other than those issued by financial institutions which are traded on the Saudi Stock Exchange would meet the eligibility criteria given in para 54 (c).
Response: Yes. Shares issued in KSA exclusive of those issued by Financial Institutions meet the six (6) eligibility requirements as provided in Para 54 (c). Level 2 B Assets are not currently allowed for LCR computation purposes.
Comment # 42
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities – Level 2B Assets (para 54 (a))
Since Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) issued by US Agencies -Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac are guaranteed by the agencies and the underlying pools are effectively considered as collateral these are considered as general obligation bonds issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Accordingly we would continue classifying them as Level 2 assets (external rating of AAA). Accordingly these would not be reported as Level 2B assets. Kindly confirm our treatment of these bonds.
Response: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (external rating of AAA) are to be reported as Level 2b assets. This is because these are Mortgage Backed Securities and do not meet Level 2a asset requirements of para 52 (a). Level 2 B Assets are not currently allowed for LCR computation purposes.
Comments # 5
General Comments on the Template
■ We note that in some places the ≥ signs have been replaced with question marks (?) this may create some confusion in interpreting the intent of the required input.
Response: This will be corrected in SAMA Finalized Prudential Returns Package.
Comments # 6
SAMA to provide to the banking industry the classification criteria for the statutory bodies/government owned agencies/government owned companies that qualify as PSE for the purpose of Level 1 assets.
Response: Currently, there are no PSE’s in KSA that qualify for Level 1 assets.
Comment # 7
As a number of issuers for the fixed income/sukuk owned by the bank is limited, can the bank be allowed to use the external data as the proxy to develop the internal rating system?
Response: Yes. This is permitted so long the external data relates to similar bank investments and other BCBS Basel II requirements for using external data are met. Further, SAMA will review the robustness of such internal systems relating to credit and market risk that the bank could be exposed to.
Comments # 82
Is trading in a large, deep and active market compulsory criteria for Level 2B asset?
Response: Criteria in Para 54 (a) are a BCBS requirements. KSA has a large, deep and active exchange traded share market. In addition, note that Level 2 B Assets are not currently allowed for LCR computation purposes.
Comments # 9
As the run-off for the deposits have been reduced further from 5% to 3% to indicate Basel Committee’s preference to implement the Deposit Insurance Scheme, it is suggested that SAMA explores the feasibility and viability of implementing the Deposit Insurance Scheme in Saudi Arabia.
Response: Currently, there is no effective Deposit Insurance Scheme in Saudi Arabia.
Comment # 10
We understand that correct document is titled as “Instructions for Basel III monitoring” rather than "Basle III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring". Kindly confirm
Response: SAMA will amend the current document title to “Instruction for Basel III Monitoring”.
Comment # 11
BIS has allowed banks to include unrated corporate bonds as part of level 2B2 assets based on banks internal rating. Is this permission applicable to non-IRB banks in KSA?
Response: No. This is not permitted and banks can use this own Internal Rating systems subject to their validation and approval by SAMA. Note that currently, level 2 B assets are not currently allowed for LCR computation purposes.
Comment # 131
Comment # 12
Operational requirements are discussed in BIS document “Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools” however these are not included in captioned document. In our opinion same should be incorporated in the captioned document as well.
Response: Yes. The Operational Requirements of Para 28 to 43 will be provided in the SAMA Finalized Package.
Comment # 13
Page 37 – Row 179 (Description)
line 174 in prudential returns is non-inputable field. Correct reference is line 178.
Response: This will be in the SAMA’s Finalized Prudential Return Package.
Comment # 14
A new level of HQLA has been introduced in this document (Level 2B Assets).These assets can comprise a maximum of 15% of the total HQLA. We believe, an Islamic bank, can include its investments in Common Equity here at 50% hair-cut, since these assets satisfy all the required features of Level 2B HQLA. We seek your further guidance and direction in this context for consideration.
Response: Bank investments in Level 2b Assets include common shares which are subject to Para 54 (c) rules. Currently, Level 2 B Assets are not currently allowed for LCR computation purposes.
Comment # 15
In the light of Sovereign rating of KSA (KSA being rated at A-), we request SAMA to clarify the treatment of Sukuk in the final regulatory document to be issued by the end of April 2013.
Response: Sukuks issued by KSA can qualify Level 2A assets of HQLA depending on their rating and other requirements of 52 (a) respectively.
Saudi Arabia does not have a large deep and active cash market in Sukuks.
Comment # 16
Term Deposit: The definition and criteria outlined in the subject consultative document may not be practical for the KSA banking industry and hence the entire KSA banking Industry’s term deposits may be classified as demand deposits. We request SAMA to outline exceptional circumstances that would qualify as hardship, under which the exceptional term deposit could be withdrawn by the depositor without changing the treatment of the entire pool of deposits.” We seek your further guidance and direction regarding the definition along with associated terms related to exceptional circumstances.
Response:
The response given to you earlier was incorrect. SAMA position is that retail term deposits cannot be withdrawn before maturity.
Comment # 17
Unsecured wholesale funding from SME Customers: It is treated the same way as the retail deposits – 10% hair-cut. The aggregated funding raised by a Small Business customer is less than Euro 1.0 million. In the light of this, we assume the SAR equivalent of Euro for the local KSA banking industry. Request confirmation from SAMA.
Response: Yes. A similar definition can be used at Euro 1 million for SME’s funds provided to a Bank.
Comment # 18
Like earlier occasions, it would be highly helpful to all KSA Banks, if SAMA can provide the FAQs on this consultative document and the prudential returns as well.
Response: Yes. This FAQ will be circulated to all Banks.
Comment # 192
Level 2B assets – One of the conditions that need to be satisfied by common equity shares for inclusion is that it should be a constituent of the major stock index in the home jurisdiction or where the liquidity risk is taken, as decided by the supervisor in the jurisdiction where the index is located. For KSA, we would expect that the TASI represents the major stock index. In other jurisdictions, there are multiple major stock indices. For example, the US market has the S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial, Nasdaq and Indian market has the Sensex and Nifty Indices. In this regard, is there any regulatory or supervisory guidance on the qualifying major stock index/ indices for the various jurisdictions?
Response: Bank should look into the liquidity profile and decide on a deep and a well traded market. Currently, Level 2 B Assets are not currently allowed for LCR computation purposes.
Comment # 20
In the Prudential Returns, all formulas used in calculating the Weighted Amounts and data quality checks have been removed and that renders the template unusable for reporting purposes. Will SAMA be sending any revised template with the formulas intact? In this template, certain cells have also been shaded in green color. What do these green cells represent?
Response: Ignore all colors and complete the appropriate cells.
Comment # 21
As per para 50 of the guidance note, how do we ascertain that the marketable securities qualifying for level 1 assets is:
■ Traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterized by a low level of concentration. What constitutes this criteria?
■ Has a proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets (repo or sale) even during stressed market conditions?
Response: Refer to comment # 19.
Comment # 22
The claims guaranteed by the sovereigns, central banks, PSEs or multilateral development banks—does ‘guarantee only explicit’ guarantee or implied guarantee is also included.
Response: Only explicit guarantees are applicable.
Comment # 23
For level 2A assets, the ECAI of AA- should be lowered to reflect the average ratings corporates and covered bonds (if applicable) issuers representing the region.
Response: This is not possible. BCBS document final.
Comment # 24
How do we define ‘low level of concentration’ for traded corporate debt securities?
Response: Refer to comment # 20.
Comment # 25
As per para 50 of the guidance note, if the local jurisdiction demonstrates the effectiveness of its currency peg mechanism and assess the long term prospect of keeping the peg, will LCR in USD be required as distinct for LCR in SAR.
Response: No. The LCR will continue to be in SAR.
1 Note 1: All references to level 2B assets in this document should be read in conjunction with SAMA’s National Discretion (item # 2) in attachment # 5.
2 Refer to Note 1 on page 1.National Discretion Items Concerning Amended LCR
Issue # 1
Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item.
8 part of central bank reserves that can be drawn in times of stress Total amount held in central bank reserves and overnight and term deposits at the same central bank (as reported in line 7) which can be drawn down in times of stress. Amounts required to be installed in the central bank reserves within 30 days should be reported in line 165 of the outflows section. 50(b), footnote 13 SAMA Recommendation
• Saudi bank can include as level 1 assets, all amounts held in central bank reserves and overnight and term deposits as these can be utilized in term of stress within a period of 30 days.
Issue # 2
A)c) Level 2B assets
Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of items in the Level 2B assets subsection.
In choosing to include any Level 2B assets in Level 2, national supervisors are expected to ensure that (i) such assets fully comply with the qualifying criteria set out Basel III LCR standards, paragraph 54; and (ii) banks have appropriate systems and measures to monitor and control the potential risks (eg credit and market risks) that banks could be exposed to in holding these assets. 37 Residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), rated AA or better RMBS that satisfy all of the conditions listed in paragraph 54(a) of the Basel III LCR standards. 54(a 38 Non-financial corporate bonds, rated BBB- to A+ Non-financial corporate debt securities (including commercial paper) rated BBB- to A+ that satisfy all of the conditions listed in paragraph 54(b) of the Basel III LCR standards. 54(b) 39 Non-financial common equity shares Non-financial common equity shares that satisfy all of the conditions listed in paragraph 54(c) of the Basel III LCR standards. 54(c) Total Level 2B assets: 40 Total stock of Level 2B RMBS assets Total outright holdings of Level 2B RMBS assets plus all borrowed securities of Level 2B RMBS assets, after applying haircuts 54(a) 41 Adjustment to stock of Level 2B RMBS assets Adjustment to the stock of Level 2B RMBS assets for purpose of calculating the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets. Annex 1 42 Adjusted amount of Level 2B RMBS assets Adjusted amount of Level 2B RMBS assets used for the purpose of calculating the adjustment to the stock of HQLA due to the cap on Level 2 assets in line item 49 and the cap on Level 2B assets in line item 48. Annex 1 43 Total stock of Level 2B non- RMBS assets Total outright holdings of Level 2B non-RMBS assets plus all borrowed securities of Level 2B non-RMBS assets, after applying haircuts 54(b),(c) 44 Adjustment to stock of Level 2B non-RMBS assets Adjustment to the stock of Level 2B non-RMBS assets for purpose of calculating the caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets. Annex 1 45 Adjusted amount of Level 2B non-RMBS assets Adjusted amount of Level 2B non-RMBS assets used for the purpose of calculating the adjustment to the stock of HQLA due to the cap on Level 2 assets in line item 49 and the cap on Level 2B assets in line item 48. Annex 1 46 Adjusted amount of Level 2B (RMBS and non-RMBS) assets Sum of adjusted amount of Level 2B RMBS assets and adjusted amount of Level 2B non-RMBS assets Annex 1 48 Adjustment to stock of HQLA due to cap on Level 2B assets Adjustment to stock of HQLA due to 15% cap on Level 2B assets. 47, Annex 1 49 49 Adjustment to stock of HQLA due to cap on Level 2 assets Adjustment to stock of HQLA due to 40% cap on Level 2 assets. 51, Annex 1 SAMA Recommendation
At this point in time, SAMA has decided not to allow any level 2B assets to be included as level 2 assets. However, SAMA will initiate some research with Saudi banks to make a quantitative assessment to determine the impact of including or not including these in the LCR. Also, a Working Group meeting on liquidity will be scheduled before the end of July 2013 where this item will be further discussed.
Issue # 3
A)e) Treatment for jurisdictions with insufficient HQLA
Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this subsection.
Some jurisdictions may not have sufficient supply of Level 1 assets (or both Level 1 and Level 2 assets) in their domestic currency to meet the aggregate demand of banks with significant exposures in this currency (note that an insufficiency in Level 2 assets alone does not qualify for the alternative treatment). To address this situation, the Committee has developed alternative treatments for the holdings in the stock of HQLA, which are expected to apply to a limited number of currencies and jurisdictions.
Eligibility for such alternative treatment will be judged on the basis of qualifying criteria set out in Annex 2 of the Basel III LCR standards and will be determined through an independent peer review process overseen by the Committee. The purpose of this process is to ensure that the alternative treatments are only used when there is a true shortfall in HQLA in the domestic currency relative to the needs in that currency. SAMA Recommendation
• Currently, SAMA is not going to adopt Alternative Approaches because of the sufficiency of HQLA.
Issue # 4
There are three potential options for this treatment (line items 67 to 71). If your supervisor intends to adopt this treatment, it is expected that they provide specific instructions to the banks under its supervision for reporting the relevant information under the option it intends to use. To avoid double-counting, if an asset has already been included in the eligible stock of HQLA, it should not be reported under these options.
Option 1 – Contractual committed liquidity facilities from the relevant central bank, with a fee These facilities should not be confused with regular central bank standing arrangements. In particular, these facilities are contractual arrangements between the central bank and the commercial bank with a maturity date which, at a minimum, falls outside the 30-day LCR window. Further, the contract must be irrevocable prior to maturity and involve no ex-post credit decision by the central bank.
Such facilities are only permissible if there is also a fee for the facility which is charged regardless of the amount, if any, drawn down against that facility and the fee is set so that banks which claim the facility line to meet the LCR, and banks which do not, have similar financial incentives to reduce their exposure to liquidity risk. That is, the fee should be set so that the net yield on the assets used to secure the facility should not be higher than the net yield on a representative portfolio of Level 1 and Level 2 assets, after adjusting for any material differences in credit risk.
SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 3.
Issue # 5
67 Option 1 – Contractual committed liquidity facilities from the relevant central bank Only include the portion of facility that is secured by available collateral accepted by the central bank, after haircut specified by the central bank. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 58 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 3.
Issue # 6
Option 2 – Foreign currency HQLA to cover domestic currency liquidity needs For currencies that do not have sufficient HQLA, supervisors may permit banks that evidence a shortfall of HQLA in the domestic currency (which would match the currency of the underlying risks) to hold HQLA in a currency that does not match the currency of the associated liquidity risk, provided that the resulting currency mismatch positions are justifiable and controlled within limits agreed by their supervisors.
To account for foreign exchange risk associated with foreign currency HQLA used to cover liquidity needs in the domestic currency, such liquid assets should be subject to a minimum haircut of 8% for major currencies that are active in global foreign exchange markets. For other currencies, supervisors should increase the haircut to an appropriate level on the basis of historical (monthly) exchange rate volatilities between the currency pair over an extended period of time.
If the domestic currency is formally pegged to another currency under an effective mechanism, the haircut for the pegged currency can be lowered to a level that reflects the limited exchange rate risk under the peg arrangement.
Haircuts for foreign currency HQLA used under Option 2 would apply only to HQLA in excess of a threshold specified by supervisors which is not greater than 25% that are used to cover liquidity needs in the domestic currency.
69 Level 1 assets Subject to the limit mentioned above, the aggregate amount of the excess of Level 1 assets in a given foreign currency or currencies that can be used to cover the associated liquidity need of the domestic currency. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 59 70 Level 2 assets Subject to the limit mentioned above, the aggregate amount of the excess of Level 2 assets in a given foreign currency or currencies that can be used to cover the associated liquidity need of the domestic currency. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 59 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 3.
Issue # 7
71 Option 3 – Additional use of Level 2 assets with a higher haircut for Level 1 asset Assets reported in lines 25 to 31 that are not counted towards the regular stock of HQLA because of the cap on Level 2 assets.
Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item.62 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 3.
Issue # 8
86 eligible for a 3% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured transactional retail deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to apply a 3% runoff rate given the deposits are fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 78 SAMA Recommendation
There is no effective deposit insurance schemes in KSA.
Issue # 9 89 eligible for a 5% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured transactional retail deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor does not choose to apply a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 75 SAMA Recommendation
• The referenced conditions are not applicable to Saudi banks.
Issue # 10
96 eligible for a 5% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured non-transactional established relationship retail deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor does not choose to apply a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 75 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9
Issue # 11
115 eligible for a 3% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured transactional small business customer deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to apply a 3% run-off rate given the deposits are fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 89, 78 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 12
122 eligible for a 3% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured non-transactional established relationship small business customer deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to apply a 3% runoff rate given the deposits are fully insured by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 89, 78 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 13
125 eligible for a 5% run-off rate; of which: The amount of insured non-transactional established relationship small business customer deposits that are in jurisdictions where the supervisor does not choose to apply a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 89, 75 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 14
139 insured, with a 3% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by non-financial corporates that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards and are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to prescribe a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 15
140 insured, with a 5% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by non-financial corporates that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme but that are not prescribed a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 16
143 insured, with a 3% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and multilateral development banks that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards and are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to prescribe a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 17
144 insured, with a 5% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs and multilateral development banks that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme but that are not prescribed a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 18
147 insured, with a 3% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by banks that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards and are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to prescribe a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 19
148 insured, with a 5% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by banks that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme but that are not prescribed a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 20
151 insured, with a 3% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by financial institutions (other than banks) and other legal entities that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme that meets the conditions outlined in paragraph 78 of the Basel III LCR standards and are in jurisdictions where the supervisor chooses to prescribe a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 21
152 insured, with a 5% run-off rate The portion of such funds provided by financial institutions (other than banks) and other legal entities that are fully covered by an effective deposit insurance scheme but that are not prescribed a 3% run-off rate. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of these items. 104 SAMA Recommendation
• Refer to response of issue # 9.
Issue # 22
165 Additional balances required to be installed in central bank reserves Amounts to be installed in the central bank reserves within 30 days. Funds reported in this line should not be included in line 159 or 160. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. Extension of 50(b) SAMA Recommendation
• Agreed. Funds include in line 159 or 160 should not be included in line 165.
Issue # 23
253 Non-contractual obligations related to potential liquidity draws from joint ventures or minority investments in entities Non contractual contingent funding obligations related to potential liquidity draws from joint ventures or minority investments in entities, which are not consolidated per paragraph 164 of the Basel III LCR standards, where there is the expectation that the bank will be the main liquidity provider when the entity is in need of liquidity. The amount included should be calculated in accordance with the methodology agreed by the bank’s supervisor. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of this item. 137 SAMA Recommendation
• Such cases should be referred to SAMA and each case will be dealt with individually.
Issue # 24
317 Other contractual cash inflows Any other contractual cash inflows to be received ≤ 30 days that are not already included in any other item of the LCR framework. Inflow percentages should be determined as appropriate for each type of inflow by supervisors in each jurisdiction. Cash inflows related to non-financial revenues are not to be included, since they are not taken into account in the calculation of LCR. Any non-contractual contingent inflows should not be reported, as they are not included in the LCR. Please provide your supervisor with an explanatory note on any amounts included in this line. 160 SAMA Recommendation
• For the time being, SAMA is not adding any item to LCR.
Issue # 26
6.1.4 Collateral swaps (panel C)
Any transaction maturing within 30 days in which non-cash assets are swapped for other noncash assets, should be reported in this panel. “Level 1 assets” in this section refers to Level 1 assets other than cash. Please refer to the instructions from your supervisor for the specification of items related to Level 2B assets in this subsection.48, 113, 146, annex SAMA Recommendation
• Banks should comply with the BCBS guidance provided on page 52 to 61 and paras 48, 113, 146, annex of the BCBS document of January 2013.
• Level 2B assets are related the alternative treatment which SAMA at the present has not adopted – refer to SAMA’s response to isssue # 3.
Loans to Deposits Ratio Guidelines
No: 44071146 Date(g): 27/3/2023 | Date(h): 6/9/1444 Status: In-Force Based on the Central Bank Law issued by Royal Decree No. (M/36) dated 11/04/1442 H and the Banking Control Law issued by Royal Decree No. (M/5) dated 22/02/1386 H. With reference to Central Bank Circular No. (392) dated 01/07/1427 H. and supplementary Circular No. (391000072844) dated 06/25/1439 H., including the Guidelines for Calculating the Loan-to-Deposit Ratio.
Please find the updated loan-to-deposit ratio guidelines which replaces the above-mentioned loan-to-deposit ratio guidelines. They aim to promote the diversification of banks' funding sources and support lending.
For your information and action accordingly as of June 1, 2023 G.
1. Introduction
In line with SAMA’s continuous efforts to maintain the quality and soundness of banks' regulatory ratios and to support banks in managing their liquidity, SAMA has reviewed the existing Loans to Deposits Ratio (LDR) guidelines to comprehensively capture banks' funding base.
These guidelines are issued by SAMA in exercise of the authority vested in SAMA under the Central Bank Law issued via Royal Decree No. M/36 dated 11/04/1442H, and the Banking Control Law issued 01/01/1386H.
These guidelines supersede the Loans to Deposits Ratio Guidelines circular No B.C.S 392 dated 01/07/1427H and subsequent guidelines for calculating Loans to Deposits Ratio (LDR) issued via SAMA circular No 391000072844 dated 25/06/1439H.
2. Implementation Timeline
These guidelines will be effective as of 1St of June 2023.
3. Reporting Requirements
Banks are required to report the Loan to Deposit ratio (LDR) to SAMA on consolidated basis using the updated LDR returns on monthly basis. The ratio should include local and foreign currency transactions of resident and non-resident entities of the bank.
4. General Requirements
4.1 The Loans to Deposits Ratio is defined as net loans divided by deposits after applying weights:
4.2 Net Loan (The numerator) for the purpose of these guidelines, includes Loans and advances after deducting the following :
• Provisions for loan losses;
• Unearned commissions income;
• Commission in suspense.
4.3 Deposits (The denominator) for the purpose of these guidelines, includes the following components:
a. Deposits and Repos.
b. Long Term Debts:
• Sukuks/ Bonds;
• Syndicated debts;
• Subordinated debts;
• Other Debts (any other long term debts not classified above).
4.4 For avoidance of doubt, interbank transactions and transactions with SAMA should not be included in the LDR calculation, unless specifically stated by SAMA.
4.5 SAMA expects banks to maintain total LDR below 90%, Subject to numerator not exceeding unweighted denominator.
5. Weighted Denominator Calculation
5.1 Banks will apply the weights below to the denominator components (as applicable) in order to compute the weighted amount:
Demand/over night Less than 1M (1-30 D) 1-3 M (31-90D) 3-4 M (91-120 D) 4-6 M (121-180 D) 6-8 M (181-240 D) 8 M - 1Y (241-365 D) Over 1 Y to 2 Y Over 2 Y to 5 Y Over 5 Y 100% 105% 110% 115% 120% 130% 140% 150% 170% 190%
Table (1): *D= Days / M= Months / Y= Years
5.2 Original maturities should be used for new transactions while outstanding transactions should be based on residual maturities.
5.3 For callable sukuks/bonds, residual maturity is calculated based on the first callable date of the sukuks/bonds to determine the applicable weight in the table (1).
5.4 For perpetual sukuks/bonds, banks should apply 190% weights unless the sukuks/bonds have a callable date then the sukuks/bonds weight will be applied based on the sukuks/bonds callable date.
Guidance Document Concerning Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) - Based on BCBS Document of October 2014
No: 449670000041 Date(g): 26/6/2018 | Date(h): 13/10/1439 Status: In-Force Further to SAMA's instructions regarding the percentage of net stable funding ratio issued by SAMA Circular No. 361000036260 dated 8/11/1436 H, and Circular No. 391000059160 dated 22/5/1439 H containing the update to the instructions.
We inform you to make updates to these instructions (attached) to comply with international best practices, and SAMA confirms that all banks must abide by these updated instructions as of its date.
1. Overview
No: 449670000041 Date(g): 26/6/2018 | Date(h): 13/10/1439 Status: In-Force This document presents SAMA's guidance document concerning the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), to promote a more resilient Saudi banking sector and is based on the BCBS document entitled "Basel Ill: The Net Stable Funding Ratio" of October 2014. The NSFR requires banks to maintain a stable funding profile in relation to the composition of their assets and off-balance sheet activities in order to reduce the likelihood that disruptions to a bank's regular sources of funding will erode its liquidity position in a way that would increase the risk of its failure and potentially lead to broader systemic stress. The NSFR limits overreliance on short-term wholesale funding, encourages better assessment of funding risk across all on- and off-balance sheet items, and promotes funding stability. This SAMA document sets out the NSFR standard and timeline for its implementation.
Maturity transformation performed by banks is a crucial part of financial intermediation that contributes to efficient resource allocation and credit creation. However, private incentives to limit excessive reliance on unstable funding of core (often illiquid) assets are weak. Just as banks may have private incentives to increase leverage, incentives arise for banks to expand their balance sheets, often very quickly, relying on relatively cheap and abundant short-term wholesale funding. Rapid balance sheet growth can weaken the ability of individual banks to respond to liquidity (and solvency) shocks when they occur, and can have systemic implications when banks fail to internalize the costs associated with large funding gaps. A highly interconnected financial system tends to exacerbate these spill overs.
During the early liquidity phase of the financial crisis starting in 2007, many banks - despite meeting the existing capital requirements - experienced difficulties because they did not prudently manage their liquidity. The crisis drove home the importance of liquidity to the proper functioning of financial markets and the banking sector. Prior to the crisis, asset markets were buoyant and funding was readily and cheaply available. The rapid reversal in market conditions showed how quickly liquidity can dry up and also how long it can take to come back. The banking system came under severe stress, which forced central banks to take action in support of both the functioning of money markets and, in some cases, individual institutions.
The difficulties experienced by some banks arose from failures to observe the basic principles of liquidity risk management. In response, SAMA in 2008 published Circular no. BCS 771 dated 5 December 2008 as the foundation of its liquidity framework 1. The Circular offers detailed guidance on the risk. management and supervision of funding liquidity risk and should help promote better risk management in this critical area, provided that they are fully implemented by banks and supervisors. SAMA will accordingly continue to monitor the implementation of these fundamental principles to ensure that banks in adhere to them.
SAMA has participated in BCBS work to further strengthen its liquidity framework by developing two minimum standards for funding and liquidity. These standards are designed to achieve two separate but complementary objectives. The first is to promote the short-term resilience of a bank's liquidity risk profile by ensuring that it has sufficient high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to survive a significant stress scenario lasting for 30 days, known as the liquidity overage ratio (LCR). To that end, SAMA has implemented the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR).2 The second objective is to reduce funding risk over a longer time horizon by requiring banks to fund their activities with sufficiently stable sources of funding in order to mitigate the risk of future funding stress, known as the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), which SAMA has also implemented.
In addition to the LCR and NSFR standards, the minimum quantitative standards that banks must comply with, SAMA, as a BCBS member, has participated in developing a set of liquidity risk monitoring tools to measure other dimensions of a bank's liquidity and funding risk profile. These tools promote global consistency in supervising ongoing liquidity and funding risk exposures of banks, and in communicating these exposures to home and host supervisors. Although currently defined in the following SAMA guidelines .Circular No: 341000107020 Date: 1434/09/02H (10 July 2013G). Subject: SAMA 's Finalized Guidance and Prudential Returns Concerning Amended Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) based on BCBS Amendments of January 2013 and Circular No.: 351000147086 Dated: 24 September 2014. Subject: SAMA's Implementation of Monitoring Tools in Conjunction with the Amended LCR, these tools are supplementary to both the LCR and the NSFR. In this regard, the contractual maturity mismatch metric, particularly the elements that take into account assets and liabilities with residual maturity of more than one year, should be considered as a valuable monitoring tool to complement the NSFR.
In 2010, BCBS members agreed to review the development of the NSFR over an observation period. The focus of this review was on addressing any unintended consequences for financial market functioning and the economy, and on improving its design with respect to several key issues, notably: (i) the impact on retail business activities; (ii) the treatment of short-term matched funding of assets and liabilities; and (iii) analysis of sub-one year buckets for both assets and liabilities.
In line with the timeline specified in the Circular #361000141528 dated 24 August 2015 3, the NSFR has become a minimum standard on 1 January 2016.
1 The circular No. BCS 771, 5 December 2008G is available at sama.gov.sa
2 See SAMA's Finalized Guidance and Prudential Returns Concerning Amended Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) based on BCBS Amendments, January 2013, issued vide SAMA guidelines, Circular No: 341000107020 Date: 1434/09/02H (10 July 2013G)
3 See circular No.361000141528, 24 August,2015, sama.gov.sa
2. Frequency of Calculation and Reporting
Banks are expected to meet the NSFR requirement on an ongoing basis. The NSFR should be reported at least quarterly. The time lag in reporting should not surpass the allowable time lag under the Basel capital standards.
3. Scope of Application
The application of the NSFR requirement in this document follows the scope of application set out in Regulation No. 1 Circular No: BCS 290 Date: 12 June, 2006, Title "Basel II - SAMA's Detailed Guidance Document relating to Pillar 1, June 2006 "Subsection: 2. Scope of Application of Basel II and Other Significant Items and SAMA Basel II Prudential Returns - circular # BCS 180 dated 22 March 2007* 4.The NSFR should be applied to all internationally active banks on a consolidated basis, but may be used for other banks and on any subset of entities of internationally active banks as well to ensure greater consistency and a level playing field between domestic and cross-border banks.
Regardless of the scope of application of the NSFR, in line with Principle 6 as outlined in Circular #BCS 771 dated 5 December 2008, a bank should actively monitor and control liquidity risk exposures and funding needs at the level of individual legal entities, foreign branches and subsidiaries, and the group as a whole, taking into account legal, regulatory and operational limitations to the transferability of liquidity.
* The application of the NSFR requirement in this document follows the scope of application set out in Circular No: 440471440000 dated Dec, 2022, Titled "Recent Basel Reforms "Subsection: Application of the Framework on Banking Groups in Saudi Arabia and Reporting Requirements. Local banks must comply with SAMA’s Basel Framework at both standalone and consolidated level.
4 See circular No. BCS 290 Title"Basel II-SAMA's Detailed Guidance Document relating to Pillar 1, June 2006, sama.gov.sa and SAMA Basel II Prudential Returns-circular No. BCS 180 dated 22 March 2007.
4. Minimum Requirements and Other Guidance
The NSFR is defined as the amount of available stable funding relative to the amount of required stable funding. This ratio should be equal to at least 100% on an ongoing basis. "Available stable funding" is defined as the portion of capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over the time horizon considered by the NSFR, which extends to one year. The amount of such stable funding required ("Required stable funding") of a specific institution is a function of the liquidity characteristics and residual maturities of the various assets held by that institution as well as those of its off-balance sheet (OBS) exposures.
Available amount of stable funding ≥100% Required amount of stable funding
The NSFR consists primarily of internationally agreed-upon definitions and calibrations. Some elements, however, remain subject to national discretion to reflect jurisdiction-specific conditions. In these cases, SAMA has explicitly and clearly outlined these in the regulation.
As a key component of the SAMA supervisory approach to funding risk, the NSFR will be supplemented by supervisory assessment work. SAMA may require an individual bank to adopt more stringent standards to reflect its funding risk profile and the SAMA assessment of its compliance with the Sound Principles.
The amounts of available and required stable funding specified in the standard are calibrated to reflect the presumed degree of stability of liabilities and liquidity of assets.
The calibration reflects the stability of liabilities across two dimensions: (a) Funding tenor - The NSFR is generally calibrated such that longer-term liabilities are assumed to be more stable than short-term liabilities. (b) Funding type and counterparty - The NSFR is calibrated under the assumption that short-term (maturing in less than one year) deposits provided by retail customers and funding provided by small business customers are behaviourally more stable than wholesale funding of the same maturity from other counterparties.
In determining the appropriate amounts of required stable funding for various assets, the following criteria were taken into consideration, recognizing the potential trade-offs between these criteria: (a) Resilient credit creation - The NSFR requires stable funding for some proportion of lending to the real economy in order to ensure the continuity of this type of intermediation. (b) Bank behaviour - The NSFR is calibrated under the assumption that banks may seek to roll over a significant proportion of maturing loans to preserve customer relationships. (c) Asset tenor - The NSFR assumes that some short-dated assets (maturing in less than one year) require a smaller proportion of stable funding because banks would be able to allow some proportion of those assets to mature instead of rolling them over. (d) Asset quality and liquidity value - The NSFR assumes that unencumbered, high-quality assets that can be securitized or traded, and thus can be readily used as collateral to secure additional funding or sold in the market, do not need to be wholly financed with stable funding.
Additional stable funding sources are also required to support at least a small portion of the potential calls on liquidity arising from OBS commitments and contingent funding obligations (Prudential Returns - 3).
NSFR definitions mirror those outlined in the LCR, unless otherwise specified. All references to LCR definitions or Paras/ text of LCR in this NSFR guidelines, refer to the definitions and Paras/ text in the LCR guidelines published by SAMA. If SAMA chooses to implement a more stringent definition in the LCR rules than those set out in the Basel Committee LCR standard, SAMA will inform banks whether to apply this stricter definition for the purposes of implementing the NSFR requirements in their jurisdiction.
5. General Guidance
A. Definition of Available Stable Funding
The amount of available stable funding (ASF) is measured based on the broad characteristics of the relative stability of an institution's funding sources, including the contractual maturity of its liabilities and the differences in the propensity of different types of funding providers to withdraw their funding. The amount of ASF is calculated by first assigning the carrying value of an institution's capital and liabilities to one of five categories as presented below. The amount assigned to each category is then multiplied by an ASF factor, and the total ASF is the sum of the weighted amounts. Carrying value represents the amount at which a liability or equity instrument is recorded before the application of any regulatory deductions, filters or other adjustments.
When determining the maturity of an equity or liability instrument, investors are assumed to redeem a call option at the earliest possible date. For funding with options exercisable at the bank's discretion, SAMA will take into account reputational factors that may limit a bank's ability not to exercise the option 5. In particular, where the market expects certain liabilities (e.g. Tier 2 sub debt) to be redeemed before their legal final maturity date, banks and SAMA will assume such behaviour for the purpose of the NSFR and include these liabilities in the corresponding ASF category. For long-dated liabilities, only the portion of cash flows falling at or beyond the six-month and one-year time horizons should be treated as having an effective residual maturity of six months or more and one year or more, respectively.
Calculation of derivative liability amounts
Derivative liabilities are calculated first based on the replacement cost for derivative contracts (obtained by marking to market) where the contract has a negative value. When an eligible bilateral netting contract is in place that meets the conditions as specified in Paragraph 20 of Circular No. 351000133367 dated 25th August 2014 . 6 the replacement cost for the set of derivative exposures covered by the contract will be the net replacement cost.
In calculating NSFR derivative liabilities, collateral posted in the form of variation margin in connection with derivative contracts, regardless of the asset type, must be deducted from the negative replacement cost amount.7,8
6 See circular No.351000133367, August 2014, sama.gov.sa7 NSFR derivative liabilities = (derivative liabilities) - (total collateral posted as variation margin on derivative liabilities).
8 To the extent that the bank's accounting framework reflects on balance sheet, in connection with a derivative contract, an asset associated with collateral posted as variation margin that is deducted from the replacement cost amount for purposes of the NSFR, that asset should not be included in the calculation of a bank's required stable Funding (RSF) to avoid any double-counting.B. Definition of Required Stable Funding for Assets and Off-Balance Sheet Exposures
The amount of required stable funding is measured based on the broad characteristics of the liquidity risk profile of an institution's assets and OBS exposures. The amount of required stable funding is calculated by first assigning the carrying value of an institution's assets to the categories listed. The amount assigned to each category is then multiplied by its associated required stable funding (RSF) factor, and the total RSF is the sum of the weighted amounts added to the amount of OBS activity (or potential liquidity exposure) multiplied by its associated RSF factor. Definitions mirror those outlined in the LCR, unless otherwise specified.9
The RSF factors assigned to various types of assets are intended to approximate the amount of a particular asset that would have to be funded, either because it will be rolled over, or because it could not be monetized through sale or used as collateral in a secured borrowing transaction over the course of one year without significant expense. Under the standard, such amounts are expected to be supported by stable funding.
Assets should be allocated to the appropriate RSF factor based on their residual maturity or liquidity value. When determining the maturity of an instrument, investors should be assumed to exercise any option to extend maturity. SAMA and banks will assume such behaviour for the purpose of the NSFR and include these assets in the corresponding RSF category. For assets with options exercisable at the bank's discretion, SAMA will take into account reputational factors that may limit a bank's ability not to exercise the option.10 For amortizing loans, the portion that comes due within the one-year horizon can be treated in the less-than-one-year residual maturity category.
For purposes of determining its required stable funding, an institution should (i) include financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities for which a purchase order has been executed, and (ii) exclude financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities for which a sales order has been executed, even if such transactions have not been reflected in the balance sheet under a settlement-date accounting model, provided that (i) such transactions are not reflected as derivatives or secured financing transactions in the institution's balance sheet, and (ii) the effects of such transactions will be reflected in the institution's balance sheet when settled.
Encumbered assets
Assets on the balance sheet that are encumbered11 for one year or more receive a 100% RSF factor. Assets encumbered for a period of between six months and less than one year that would, if unencumbered, receive an RSF factor lower than or equal to 50% receive a 50% RSF factor. Assets encumbered for between six months and less than one year that would, if unencumbered, receive an RSF factor higher than 50% retain that higher RSF factor. Where assets have less than six months remaining in the encumbrance period, those assets may receive the same RSF factor as an equivalent asset that is unencumbered. In addition, for the purposes of calculating the NSFR, assets that are encumbered for exceptional12 central bank liquidity operations may receive a reduced RSF factor. Please refer to the relevant FAQ13 issued by SAMA on RSF factor for assets encumbered under exceptional central bank liquidity operations.
Secured financing transactions
For secured funding arrangements, use of balance sheet and accounting treatments should generally result in banks excluding, from their assets, securities which they have borrowed in securities financing transactions (such as reverse repos and collateral swaps) where they do not have beneficial ownership. In contrast, banks should include securities they have lent in securities financing transactions where they retain beneficial ownership. Banks should also not include any securities they have received through collateral swaps if those securities do not appear on their balance sheets. Where banks have encumbered securities in repos or other securities financing transactions, but have retained beneficial ownership and those assets remain on the bank's balance sheet, the bank should allocate such securities to the appropriate RSF category.
Securities financing transactions with a single counterparty may be measured net when calculating the NSFR, provided that the netting conditions set out in Paragraph 32 of the Circular No. 351000133367, titled "Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Document regarding Basel Ill Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements based on BCBS document regarding Basel Ill Leverage Ratio framework issued on 12 January 2014" , dated 25th August 2014 document are met.
Calculation of derivative asset amounts
Derivative assets are calculated first based on the replacement cost for derivative contracts (obtained by marking to market) where the contract has a positive value. When an eligible bilateral netting contract is in place that meets the conditions as specified in paragraphs 20 of the Circular No. 351000133367*, titled "Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Document regarding Basel Ill Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements based on BCBS document regarding Basel Ill Leverage Ratio framework issued on 12 January 2014", dated 25th August 2014, the replacement cost for the set of derivative exposures covered by the contract will be the net replacement cost.
In calculating NSFR derivative assets, collateral received in connection with derivative contracts may not offset the positive replacement cost amount, regardless of whether or not netting is permitted under the bank's operative accounting or risk-based framework, unless it is received in the form of cash variation margin and meets the conditions as specified in paragraph 24 of the Circular No. 351000133367*, titled "Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Document regarding Basel Ill Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements based on BCBS document regarding Basel Ill Leverage Ratio framework issued on 12 January 2014", dated 25th August 2014.14 Any remaining balance sheet liability associated with (a) variation margin received that does not meet the criteria above or (b) initial margin received may not offset derivative assets and should be assigned a 0% ASF factor.
9 For the purposes of calculating the NSFR. HQLA are defined as all HQLA without regard to LCR operational requirements and LCR caps on Level 2 and Level 2B assets that may otherwise limit the ability of some HQLA to be included as eligible HQLA in calculation of the LCR. HQLA are defined in LCR paragraphs 24-68. Operational requirements are specified in LCR paragraphs 28-43. - Refer SAMA's Revised Amended Liquidity Coverage Ratio Regulations and Guidance Documents.- Attachment # 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR.
10 This could reflect a case where a bank may imply that it would be subject to funding risk if it did not exercise an option on its own assets.
11 Encumbered assets include but are not limited to assets backing securities or covered bonds and assets pledged in securities financing transactions or collateral swaps. "Unencumbered" is defined in LCR paragraph 31. Refer SAMA's Revised Amended Liquidity Coverage Ratio Regulations and Guidance Documents.- Attachment# 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR.
12 In general, exceptional central bank liquidity operations are considered to be non-standard, temporary operations conducted by the central bank in order to achieve its mandate in a period of market-wide financial stress and/or exceptional macroeconomic challenges.
13 Please refer to the FAQ issued by SAMA.
14 NSFR derivative assets= (derivative assets) - (cash collateral received as variation margin on derivative assets).
* Reference to that circular is no longer relevant. This Circular has been superseded by Leverage Ratio Framework under the Basel III Reforms, (44047144), dated 04/06/1444 H.
6. Specific Guidance - Liabilities and Capital
Liabilities and capital instruments receiving a 100% ASF factor comprise: (a) the total amount of regulatory capital, before the application of capital deductions, as defined in chapter A "Regulatory Capital Under Basel III", in Section A - Finalized guidance document concerning the implementation of Basel Ill, 2012 (also reproduced in Appendix - A for the convenience of the reader),15 excluding the proportion of Tier 2 instruments with residual maturity of less than one year; (b) the total amount of any capital instrument not included in (a) that has an effective residual maturity of one year or more, but excluding any instruments with explicit or embedded options that, if exercised, would reduce the expected maturity to less than one year; and (c) The total amount of secured and unsecured borrowings and liabilities (including term deposits) with effective residual maturities of one year or more. Cash flows falling below the one-year horizon but arising from liabilities with a final maturity greater than one year do not qualify for the 100% ASF factor.
Liabilities receiving a 95% ASF factor comprise "stable" (as defined in the LCR in paragraphs 75-78 - Attachment# 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR.) non-maturity (demand) deposits and/or term deposits with residual maturities of less than one year provided by retail and small business customers.16
Liabilities receiving a 90% ASF factor comprise "less stable" (as defined in the LCR in paragraphs 79-81 - Attachment # 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR.) non-maturity (demand) deposits and/or term deposits with residual maturities of less than one year provided by retail and small business customers.
Liabilities receiving a 50% ASF factor comprise: (a) funding (secured and unsecured) with a residual maturity of less than one year provided by non-financial corporate customers; (b) operational deposits (as defined in LCR paragraphs 93-104, Attachment# 1,SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR ): (c) funding with residual maturity of less than one year from sovereigns, public sector entities (PSEs), and multilateral and national development banks; and (d) other funding (secured and unsecured) not included in the categories above with residual maturity between six months to less than one year, including funding from central banks and financial institutions.
Liabilities receiving a 0% ASF factor comprise: (a) all other liabilities and equity categories not included in the above categories, including other funding with residual maturity of less than six months from central banks and financial institutions;17 (b) Other liabilities without a stated maturity. This category may include short positions and open maturity positions. Two exceptions can be recognized for liabilities without a stated maturity: • first, deferred tax liabilities, which should be treated according to the nearest possible date on which such liabilities could be realized;
• Second, minority interest, which should be treated according to the term of the instrument, usually in perpetuity.
These liabilities would then be assigned either a 100% ASF factor if the effective maturity is one year or greater, or 50%, if the effective maturity is between six months and less than one year;
(c) NSFR derivative liabilities as calculated according to item # 5 of this document titled "General Guidance Section A: Definition of Available Stable Funding", and Net of NSFR derivative assets as calculated according to item# 5 of this document Section B definition of "Required Stable Funding" paragraphs entitled "Calculations of Derivative assets amount, if NSFR derivative liabilities are greater than NSFR derivative assets;18 and (d) "trade date" payables arising from purchases of financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities that (i) are expected to settle within the standard settlement cycle or period that is customary for the relevant exchange or type of transaction, or (ii) have failed to, but are still expected to, settle.
Note: Prudential return 1 (refer prudential return section of this document) summarises the components of each of the ASF categories and the associated maximum ASF factor to be applied in calculating an institution's total amount of available stable funding under the standard.
15 Capital instruments reported here should meet all requirements outlined in Section A - Finalized guidance document concerning the implementation of Basel Ill, 2012, and should only include amounts after transitional arrangements have expired under fully implemented Basel III standards (i.e. as in 2022).
16 Retail deposits are defined in LCR paragraph 73. Small business customers are defined in LCR paragraph 90 and 91. Refer Attachment# 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR.
17 SAMA has not adopted the discretion specified by the Basel Committee in terms of certain deposits i.e. deposits between banks within the same cooperative network can be excluded from liabilities receiving a 0% ASF provided they are either (a) required by law In some jurisdictions to be placed at the central organization and are legally constrained within the cooperative bank network as minimum deposit requirements, or (b) in the context of common task sharing and legal, statutory or contractual arrangements, so long as the bank that has received the monies and the bank that has deposited participate in the same institutional network's mutual protection scheme against illiquidity and Insolvency of its members. Such deposits can be assigned an ASF up to the RSF factor assigned by regulation for the same deposits to the depositing bank, not to exceed 85%.
18 ASF = 0% x MAX ((NSFR derivative liabilities - NSFR derivative assets), 0).7. Specific Guidance Notes – Assets
Assets assigned a 0% RSF factor comprise:
(a) coins and banknotes immediately available to meet obligations; (b) all central bank reserves (including required reserves and excess reserves);19 (c) all claims on central banks with residual maturities of less than six months; and (d) "trade date" receivables arising from sales of financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities that (i) are expected to settle within the standard settlement cycle or period that is customary for the relevant exchange or type of transaction, or (ii) have failed to, but are still expected to, settle.
Assets assigned a 5% RSF factor comprise unencumbered Level 1 assets as defined in LCR paragraph 50, Attachment # 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR, excluding assets receiving a 0% RSF as specified above, and including:
• marketable securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Community, or multilateral development banks that are assigned a 0% risk weight under the Basel II standardized approach for credit risk - Basel II - SAMA's Detailed Guidance Document relating to Pillar 1, June 2006 and as specified by BCBS and SAMA in future; and
• Certain non-0% risk-weighted sovereign or central bank debt securities as specified in the LCR.
Assets assigned a 10% RSF factor compromise unencumbered loans to financial institutions with residual maturities of less than six months, where the loan is secured against Level 1 assets as defined in LCR paragraph 50, Attachment # 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR, and where the bank has the ability to freely re-hypothecate the received collateral for the life of the loan.
Assets assigned a 15% RSF factor comprise:
(a) unencumbered Level 2A assets as defined in LCR paragraph 52, Attachment# 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR, including: • marketable securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs or multilateral development banks that are assigned *a 20% risk weight under the Basel II standardized approach for credit risk Basel II - SAMA's Detailed Guidance Document relating to Pillar 1, June 2006; and • corporate debt securities (including commercial paper) and covered bonds with a credit rating equal or equivalent to at least AA-;
(b) All other unencumbered loans to financial institutions with residual maturities of less than six months not included in "Assets assigned a 10% FSF factor" in the previous page.
Assets assigned a 50% RSF factor comprise:
(a) unencumbered Level 28 assets as defined and subject to the conditions set forth in LCR paragraph 54, Attachment # 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR, including:
• residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) with a credit rating of at least AA;
• corporate debt securities (including commercial paper) with a credit rating of between A+ and BBB-; and
• exchange-traded common equity shares not issued by financial institutions or their affiliates;
Note: Level 2B Assets have not been adopted for NSFR purposes and hence any securities that do not qualify for Level 1 or Level 2A Assets under LCR guidelines issued by SAMA - need to be classified under securities that do not meet the definition of HQLA and therefore no securities should be classified under Level 2B HQLA, whilst computing NSFR or disclosing the same.
(b) any HQLA as defined in the LCR that are encumbered for a period of between six months and less than one year; (c) all loans to financial institutions and central banks with residual maturity of between six months and less than one year; and (d) deposits held at other financial institutions for operational purposes, as outlined in LCR paragraphs 93-104. Attachment # 1, SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR. that are subject to the 50% ASF factor of this document; and (e) all other non-HQLA not included in the above categories that have a residual maturity of less than one year, including loans to non-financial corporate clients, loans to retail customers (i.e. natural persons) and small business customers, and loans to sovereigns and PSEs.
Assets assigned a 65% RSF factor comprise: (a) unencumbered residential mortgages with a residual maturity of one year or more that would qualify for a 35% or lower risk weight under the Basel II standardized approach for credit risk - Currently SAMA does not allow at RWA of 35% or less for residential mortgage; and (b) other unencumbered loans not included in the above categories, excluding loans to financial institutions, with a residual maturity of one year or more that would qualify for *a 35% or lower risk weight under the Basel II standardized approach for credit risk - Basel II- SAMA's Detailed Guidance Document relating to Pillar 1. June 2006.
Assets assigned an 85% RSF factor comprise: (a) Cash, securities or other assets posted as initial margin for derivative contracts20 and cash or other assets provided to contribute to the default fund of a central counterparty (CCP). Where securities or other assets posted as initial margin for derivative contracts would otherwise receive a higher RSF factor, they should retain that higher factor. (b) other unencumbered performing loans21 that do not qualify for the *35% or lower risk weight under the Basel II standardized approach (Basel II - SAMA's Detailed Guidance Document relating to Pillar 1. June 2006) for credit risk and have residual maturities of one year or more, excluding loans to financial institutions; (c) unencumbered securities with a remaining maturity of one year or more and exchange-traded equities, that are not in default and do not qualify as HQLA according to the LCR; and (d) Physical traded commodities, including gold.
Assets assigned a 100% RSF factor comprise: (a) All assets that are encumbered for a period of one year or more; (b) NSFR derivative assets as calculated according item# 5 of this document Section B definition of "Required Stable Funding" paragraphs entitled "Calculations of Derivative assets amount, Net of NSFR derivative liabilities as calculated according to Item # 5 titled "General Guidance Section A: Definition of Available Stable Funding", if NSFR derivative assets are greater than NSFR derivative liabilities;22 (c) all other assets not included in the above categories, including nonperforming loans, loans to financial institutions with a residual maturity of one year or more, non-exchange-traded equities, fixed assets, items deducted from regulatory capital, retained interest, insurance assets, subsidiary interests and defaulted securities; and (d) 20% of derivative liabilities (i.e. negative replacement cost amounts) as calculated according to General Guidance Section A "Definition of Available Stable Funding" (item # 5), (before deducting variation margin posted).
Note: Prudential return 2 (refer prudential return section of this document) summarises the specific types of assets to be assigned to each asset category and their associated RSF factor.
The NSFR assigns a 20% "required stable funding" factor to derivative liabilities. Although the Basel Committee has agreed that, at national discretion, jurisdictions may lower the value of this factor, with a floor of 5%, SAMA has decided not to exercise this discretion.
19 It should be noted that no central bank reserves mandated by SAMA (either required reserves or excess reserves) require RSF factor greater than 0%.
20 Initial margin posted on behalf of a customer, where the bank does not guarantee performance of the third party, would be exempt from this requirement.
21 Performing loans are considered to be those that are not past due for more than 90 days in accordance with *page 23 and 24 of the Basel II standardized approach (Basel II - SAMA's Detailed Guidance Document relating to Pillar 1, June 2006. Conversely, non-performing loans are considered to be loans that are more than 90 days past due.
22 RSF = 100% x MAX ((NSFR derivative assets - NSFR derivative liabilities), 0).* Reference to that circular is no longer relevant. This Circular has been superseded by Basel III Reforms, (44047144), dated 04/06/1444 H.
8. Interdependent Assets and Liabilities
With regard to this section, SAMA in consultation with Banks through multilateral and bilateral meetings will provide the necessary Required Stable Funding factor.
SAMA may, in limited circumstances, determine whether certain asset and liability items, on the basis of contractual arrangements, are interdependent such that the liability cannot fall due while the asset remains on the balance sheet, the principal payment flows from the asset cannot be used for something other than repaying the liability, and the liability cannot be used to fund other assets. For interdependent items, SAMA may adjust RSF and ASF factors so that they are both 0%, subject to the following criteria: • The individual interdependent asset and liability items must be clearly identifiable. • The maturity and principal amount of both the liability and its interdependent asset should be the same. • The bank is acting solely as a pass-through unit to channel the funding received (the interdependent liability) into the corresponding interdependent asset. • The counterparties for each pair of interdependent liabilities and assets should not be the same.
Before exercising this discretion, SAMA will consider whether perverse incentives or unintended consequences are being created.
Please note that based on assessment, SAMA has decided not to exercise its discretion to apply any exceptional treatment to interdependent assets and liabilities.
9. Off-Balance Sheet Exposures
Many potential OBS liquidity exposures require little direct or immediate funding but can lead to significant liquidity drains over a longer time horizon. The NSFR assigns an RSF factor to various OBS activities in order to ensure that institutions hold stable funding for the portion of OBS exposures that may be expected to require funding within a one-year horizon.
Consistent with the LCR, the NSFR identifies OBS exposure categories based broadly on whether the commitment is a credit or liquidity facility or some other contingent funding obligation. Table 3 identifies the specific types of OBS exposures to be assigned to each OBS category and their associated RSF factor.
Net Stable Funding Ratio Prudential Returns
Prudential Returns - 1 Summary of Liability Categories and Associated ASF Factors
Table 1 below summarizes the components of each of the ASF categories and the associated maximum ASF factor to be applied in calculating an institution's total amount of available stable funding under the standard.
Table 1
Components of ASF category ASF factor RAW Amount Amount of Available Stable Funding 1 Total regulatory capital (excluding Tier 2 instruments with residual maturity of less than one year) 100% 2 Other capital instruments and liabilities with effective residual maturity of one year or more 100% 3 Stable non-maturity (demand) deposits and term deposits with residual maturity of less than one year provided by retail and small business customers 95% 4 Less stable non-maturity deposits and term deposits with residual maturity of less than one year provided by retail and small business customers 90% 5 Funding with residual maturity of less than one year provided by non-financial corporate customers 50% 6 Operational deposits 50% 7 Funding with residual maturity of less than one year from sovereigns, PSEs, and multilateral and national development Banks 50% 8 Other funding with residual maturity between six months and less than one year not included in the above categories, including funding provided by central banks and financial institutions 50% 9 All other liabilities and equity not included in the above categories, including liabilities without a stated maturity (with a specific treatment for deferred tax liabilities and minority interests) 0% 10 NSFR derivative liabilities net of NSFR derivative assets if NSFR derivative liabilities are greater than NSFR derivative assets 0% 11 "Trade date" payables arising from purchases of financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities 0% Total Amount of Available Stable Funding XXX Prudential Returns - 2 Summary of Assets Categories and Associated ASF Factors
Table 2 summarizes the specific types of assets to be assigned to each asset category and their associated RSF factor.
Table 2
Components of RSF category RSF factor RAW Amount Required Stable Funding Amount 1. Coins and banknotes 0% 2. All central bank reserves 0% 3. All claims on central banks with residual maturities of less than six months 0% 4. "Trade date" receivables arising from sales of financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities. 0% 5. Unencumbered Level 1 assets, excluding coins, banknotes and central bank reserves. 5% 6. Unencumbered loans to financial institutions with residual maturities of less than six months, where the loan is secured against Level 1 assets as defined In LCR paragraph 50, (Attachment# 1. SAMA's General Guidance concerning Amended LCR.) and where the bank has the ability to freely rehypothecate the received collateral for the life of the loan 10% 7. All other unencumbered loans to financial institutions with residual maturities of less than six months not included in the above categories 15% 8. Unencumbered Level 2A assets 15% 9. Unencumbered Level 28 assets (Note: Level 28 Assets have not been adopted for NSFR purposes and hence any securities that do not qualify for Level 1 or Level 2A Assets under LCR guidelines issued by SAMA - need to be classified under securities that do not meet the definition of HQLA and therefore no securities should be classified under Level 28 HQLA, whilst computing NSFR or disclosing the same.) 50% 10. HQLA encumbered for a period of six months or more and less than one year. 50% 11. Loans to financial Institutions and central banks with residual maturities between six months and less than one year 50% 12. Deposits held at other financial institutions for operational purposes 50% 13. All other assets not Included In the above categories with residual maturity of less than one year, including loans to non-financial corporate clients, loans to retail and small business customers, and loans to sovereigns and PSEs 50% 14. Unencumbered residential mortgages with a residual maturity of one year or more and with a risk weight of less than or equal to 35% under the Standardized Approach 65% 15. Other unencumbered loans not included in the above categories, excluding loans to financial institutions, with a residual maturity of one year or more and with a risk weight of less than or equal to 35% under the standardized approach 65% 16. Cash, securities or other assets posted as initial margin for derivative contracts and cash or other assets provided to contribute to the default fund of a CCP 85% 17. Other unencumbered performing loans with risk weights greater than 35% under the standardized approach and residual maturities of one year or more, excluding loans to financial institutions 85% 18. Unencumbered securities that are not in default and do not qualify as HQLA with a remaining maturity of one year or more and exchange-traded equities 85% 19. Physical traded commodities, including gold 85% 20. All assets that are encumbered for a period of one year or more 100% 21. NSFR derivative assets net of NSFR derivative liabilities if NSFR derivative assets are greater than NSFR derivative liabilities. 100% 22. 20% of derivative liabilities as calculated according to "Calculation of derivative liability amounts'' of this guidelines, Page 6 and 7 100% 23. All other assets not included in the above categories, including non- performing loans, loans to financial institutions with a residual maturity of one year or more, non-exchange-traded equities, fixed assets, items deducted from regulatory capital, retained interest, insurance assets, subsidiary interests and· defaulted securities 100% Total Amount of Required Stable Funding XXX Prudential Returns - 3 Summary of Off-Balance Sheet Categories and Associated RSF Factors
Table 3
RSF category RSF factor RAW Amount Amount of Required Stable Funding Irrevocable and conditionally revocable credit and liquidity facilities to any client 5% of the currently undrawn portion Other contingent funding obligations, including products and instruments such as: SAMA has set the RSF factor AT 0% based on current national circumstances.19 • Unconditionally revocable credit and liquidity facilities • Trade finance-related obligations (including guarantees and letters of credit) • Guarantees and letters of credit unrelated to trade finance obligations • Non-contractual obligations such as: - potential requests for debt repurchases of the bank's own debt or that of related conduits, securities investment vehicles and other such financing facilities - structured products where customers anticipate ready marketability, such as adjustable rate notes and variable rate demand notes (VRDNs) - managed funds that are marketed with the objective of maintaining a stable value Total Amount of Required Stable Funding Xxx 19 SAMA in consultation with banks will provide the appropriate RSF factors.
Prudential Template – 4
The NSFR is defined as the amount of available stable funding relative to the amount of required stable funding. This ratio should be equal to at least 100% on an ongoing basis. "Available stable funding'' is defined as the portion of capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over the time horizon considered by the NSFR, which extends to one year. The amount of such stable funding required ("Required stable funding") of a specific institution is a function of the liquidity characteristics and residual maturities of the various assets held by that institution as well as those of its off-balance sheet (OBS) exposures.
Available amount of stable funding ≥100% Available amount of stable funding Framework on Monitoring Tools for Intraday Liquidity Management
Background
The Basel framework on monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management introduces a new reporting framework that will enable banking supervisors to better monitor a bank's management of intraday liquidity risk and its ability to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis along with providing supervisors with a better understanding of banks' payment and settlement behaviour. This framework includes:
• the detailed design of the monitoring tools for a bank's intraday liquidity risk; • stress scenarios; • key application issues; and • the reporting regime.
SAMA has conducted a consultation process with the Saudi Banks in the development of this final regulation, which is attached in the annexures containing:
• Annexure 1: Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management (available on BIS website (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs248.pdf). • *Annexure 2: SAMA's position on National Discretion • *Annexure 3: Intraday liquidity template • *Annexure 4: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and answers
Implementation date
These rules are applicable from 1 January 2017 as specified in the Basel document.
*Annexure 2,3 and 4 are not available, please ask SAMA for the attachments. Operational Risk Management
The Management of Operational Risk Through Appropriate Insurance Schemes
Status: In-Force 1. Overview on Operational Risk
All banks are subject to financial and operational risks. While most bankers are acutely aware of the potential impact of financial risks such as, interest rate shifts, exchange rate movements, etc. the area of operational risk is often less well understood. Operational risk - as distinct from financial risk -represents pure risk. A pure risk is one in which there are only two possible outcomes - loss or no loss. Whereas financial risks may lead to financial rewards, operational risks involve no opportunity for gain; as non-occurrence of an operational loss means only maintenance of the status quo. In addition, unlike financial risks, operational risks are purely human in nature and are a function of an organization being a bank. Crime, Losses, litigations, and adverse regulations are purely human in origin and may have no direct relationship with conditions in global financial markets.
The purpose of this guide is to assist directors and senior management in understanding the nature of operational risk and the management techniques which may be used to manage this risk. Since one of the most effective forms of minimizing a bank's exposure to operational risks through the implementation of a strong program of internal controls, this Guide is designed to be used in conjunction with SAMA's Internal Contrail Guidelines for Commercial Banks Operating in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1989), Disaster Recovery Planning Guideline for the Saudi Banks (1993) and the Guidelines on Physical Security for Saudi Banks (1995). This is essential for developing an integrated program of operational risk control and management. While much of the material in this Guide is oriented towards conventional insurance, its ultimate purpose is to address the issues of identification and analysis of the full spectrum of operational risks encountered by a bank and to discuss the various methods both internal and external - which may be used to finance these risks.
In order for operational risk to be effectively managed and financed it is necessary that banks accomplish three functions.
1.1 Identify and Analyze Risks: Only those risks which have been identified may be successfully controlled. The components of operational risks are deeply embedded in an institution's business structure. These are often difficult to isolate and identify, and constantly change as the bank's business and the policies, systems and procedures which support it change. It is ironic that banks have evolved stringent policies and standards as well as complex analytical models for the analysis of financial and market risk but often ignore the operational risk exposure inherent in their day to day operations. Therefore, it is critical that senior management ensures that a formal program of operational risk analysis is in place within the bank at least equal in management visibility and rigour with that used for analyzing and controlling financial and market risk exposure.
1.2 Select and Implement Risk Management Techniques: Operational risks are most effectively controlled through integration of various risk control methods. The incidence of fraud may be controlled through rigorous training of personnel, fraud prevention and detection program, effective operational management, and internal auditing and, finally, through the Bankers Blanket Bond (BBB) and Financial Institution Bond (FIB). Litigation risks associated with professional liability may be dealt with through careful product risk analysis and training of personnel prior to implementation of sale or marketing programs, close attention to contractual indemnities with customers and, finally through a program of Professional Indemnity Insurance.
All of these strategies involve the careful analysis, selection, integration, and management of risk assumption, risk avoidance, control and transfer tools (including insurance) based on a thorough knowledge of the bank's business lines and operational risk exposures.
1.3 Managing and Evaluating Operational Risk Management: The management of operational risk is one of the major functions of the Board of Directors of any bank. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Board to ensure that operational risks are being properly identified, analyzed, controlled, and managed. This should be done by the Board through a periodic review of the performance of operational risk management within the bank in much the same manner as it reviews the effectiveness of financial and market risk management activities. On an annual basis the Board of Directors, or the Audit Committee, should receive the results of an internal review of the Risk Management Function. Furthermore at least once every 5 years, or more frequently if appropriate, an independent review of risk management activity must be conducted, and reported to the Board.
2. Elements of Operational Risk
2.1 Criminal Risk
Historically, the single largest area of operational risk within the Saudi banks has been that associated with criminal activities. In a survey conducted by the Agency covering all the claims filed by Saudi Bank with insurers there for financial losses attributable to fraud end other criminal activities either on the part of employees or third-parties. These represent 100% of all operational losses claimed under existing insurance coverage.
2.1.1 Fraud
In 1993, the accounting firm KPMG conducted a fraud survey of six countries-the United States, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Bermuda. This study found that, on average, approximately 80% of all frauds committed were perpetrated by employees, 60% by non-managerial personnel and 20% by managers. In all of the countries surveyed, misappropriation of cash was the most common form of employee fraud. This would appear to fit the situation currently being encountered by Saudi banks, since most employee fraud losses have come from the theft of cash and or travelers checks from. branches and ATMs. Consistent with international trends Fraud currently represents the single largest area of operational loss within the Kingdom's banking system. During the past five years, approximately 85% of all operational losses sustained by banks in the Kingdom involved employee dishonesty.
Recovery of funds lost due to fraud (particularly cash) is, at best, difficult and in many cases simply impossible. This highlights the fact that programs designed to prevent fraud are significantly more effective and less expensive than are attempts to recover the funds once stolen.
2.1.2 Forgery
During the period 1988-1993, in the Kingdom, forgery (including check fraud) was the second largest area of operational loss, accounting for approximately 12% of total reported losses. This is entirely consistent with the results of the KPMG study in which losses in this area averaged between 10% and 18% for the six countries surveyed. Within the Kingdom the majority of crimes in this area appear to represent either simple check forgery or the forgery of negotiable instruments such as letters of credit and generally involved the failure of bank employees to adequately verify the authenticity of the documents before negotiation.
From a cash-based system, the Kingdom is rapidly moving into electronic-banking thus minimizing the intermediate state represented by the paper check. These actions have the long term potential of reducing the incidence of the relatively simple forgeries currently being encountered. However, document technology such as optical scanners, color laser printers, and powerful desktop publishing software now allows the creation of forgeries which are virtually undetectable except by highly sophisticated technical means. Therefore, while the number of simple document forgeries will probably decrease in the future, the level of technical sophistication and monetary value of forgeries may be expected to increase significantly.
With the increasing use of electronic imaging used in verification of signatures in many banking transactions, transfers etc. banks' risk management policies and procedures should include preventation of forgery through electronic means. This will become even more important with further advances in payment cards and payment systems technologies.
2.1.3 Counterfeit Currency
Counterfeit currency does not currently appear to be a major area of potential loss to Saudi banks. However, two current trends should be noted:
1- Technology - As with forgers, the counterfeiters of both currency and negotiable securities are also the beneficiary of new document processing technology. A recent incident involving the counterfeiting of a major international currency using color laser printers was of such a magnitude as to cause the Central Bank to redesign the currency to incorporate various anticounterfeiting measures into the new currency. However, it is expected that despite advances in design and manufacture of currencies, counterfeiting activities will continue to increase. Consequently banks must remain vigilant to these trends.
2- State Supported Counterfeiting - State supported counterfeiting is assuming importance specifically for the US Dollars. US Government estimates the amount of this currency-$20, $50, and $100 notes at approximately US$ 1 billion. This bogus currency is of extremely high quality, virtually undetectable by even experienced personnel, and is primarily circulated outside the United States.
2.1.4 Robbery and Burglary
Although a highly "cash rich" society, robbery and burglary do not currently represent a significant source of operational risk in Saudi Arabia. This can be attributed to the deterrent effect of physical security measures taken by banks and law enforcement agencies, the severity of judicial punishment, and cultural factors within Saudi society, and the lack of significant illegal drug problem within the Kingdom. Studies in other countries have shown that the majority of robberies and burglaries directed against bank branches and ATMs are drug related. Therefore, barring significant social or political changes within the Kingdom, it seems unlikely that robbery or burglary will present a major operational exposure to Saudi banks within the foreseeable future. In recognition of these trends the Agency has issued detailed rules in 1995 entitled "Minimum Physical Security Standards".
2.1.5 Electronic Crime
Although no different except for mode of execution than any other form of criminal activity, electronic crime represents the fastest growing form of criminal activity currently facing both the international and Saudi banks. This presents itself in four major areas as given below
ATMs - While major shifts are taking place, Saudi Arabia is still a highly cash oriented society. This, in turn, drives the exposure to operational loss presented by ATMs. High daily cash withdrawal limits or no limits at all mean that ATMs routinely are stocked with far more cash than that normally found in other developed countries. This presents both a lucrative and tempting target for either employee fraud or third-party burglary. In addition, these high cash withdrawal limits also expose banks to potentially higher losses from customer fraud. As banks add additional functionality’s to ATMs (foreign currency, travellers checks, airline tickets, etc.) and connect their ATMs internationally through shared network such as CIRRUS, new opportunities for fraud against Saudi banks both from within and outside the Kingdom increase significantly.
Credit Cards - Based on experience both within the Kingdom and outside, credit cards represent a major and a rapidly growing' operational risk. This risk may be divided into two areas:
Internal Fraud - As with most other types of fraud, credit card fraud involving employees (either working along or in collusion with outsiders) is the most common and most costly. All credit card issuers are subject to internal fraud risks associated with application generation /approval, account setup / activation, card embossing, and statement preparation / distribution.
External Fraud - Although far less common than internal fraud, external credit card fraud is growing rapidly as a result of large scale international trafficking in stolen cards and obtaining valid cards through fraudulent applications.
Point of Sale (POS) - As the use and acceptance of POS grows within the Kingdom, so too will merchant fraud in number, level of sophistication, and monetary value. This type of criminal activity may range from an employee of the merchant generating fraudulent transactions (generally in collusion with a third party) to large scale and highly organized activities by the merchant himself. Therefore, prevention and detection of this type of criminal activity by banks will become increasingly more complex and costly.
Commercial Services - The extension of electronic payment and trade services to commercial customers represents a major source of fee for service income. This is income which represents virtually no credit risk. However, these systems and products may represent a major exposure to costly and embarrassing losses to corporate customers. Two areas present especially high potential exposures to third party fraud.
Cash Management Services - While providing both a greatly enhanced financial management tool to corporate customers and a significant source of both cost savings and fee for service income to the banks, electronic cash management services also represent a major source of operational risk from both third party penetration and customer fraud. By their very nature these services allow the conduct of transactions with the bank in which the only security present is that provided by technical means such as encryption, message authentication, and logical access checking of passwords and user ID's. While powerful, these technical controls are not infallible. Therefore, given the high monetary value represented by corporate cash management transactions, the potential for a "long tailed risk" (i.e. low probability of occurrence with extremely high monetary value) presents the potential for both a catastrophic financial loss as well as severe damage to reputation and credibility of the bank.
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) - As both banks and corporate customers move toward the use of electronic communications to replace paper based trade documents (i.e. invoices, receiving reports, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, etc.), traditional forms of controlling these transactions will no longer apply. EDI systems have generally been designed with less stringent levels of both access control and authentication of transactions. This has been based on the assumption that since these transactions were "non-monetary" in nature they present less exposure. While this may be technically correct, the non-monetary aspect of an EDI transaction - a receiving report. bill of lading, or warehouse receipt - ultimately generates a payment (electronic or manual) to settle the transaction. Therefore, these systems also present the potential for. "long-tailed" risks from both third parties and employees of either the customer or the vendor of good and services.
2.1.6 Retail Electronic Banking
As with a bank's commercial customer base, electronic banking is also penetrating the retail market. Services such as telephone bill payments, PC based home banking, and the use of "smart" telephones combining the features of both a conventional telephone and a microcomputers present significant opportunities for enhancing both the level of customer service and revenue in the highly competitive retail sector. However, at the same time, these new electronic products open new avenues of exposure to both third party and employee fraud as well as potential areas of professional liability exposure. In future this will become an increasingly important risk exposure area for the banks. The increased use of telephone services that permit computer access to banks' systems also provide an increasing opportunity to "hackers” and other criminals. These require improvements in security measures and additional risk management techniques to minimize losses.
2.2. Professional Risk
Exposures directly related to the provision of financial products and services currently constitute both the single largest and most rapidly growing form of operational risk globally within the financial industry.
2.2.1 Professional Errors and Ommissions
All banks are subject to operational losses associated with professional errors and omission by employees. These include losses through errors committed by staff such as unauthorized trading, erroneous transfer of funds to wrong accounts. errors in booking or recording securities transaction, etc. In the event where such losses are for the account of the bank itself i.e. for trades on the bank's own account, these type of losses are completely uninsurable and must be controlled by means of traditional methods such as strong internal controls, quality assurance programs, rigorous staff training programs and strong and active management
2.2.2 Professional liability risk
On the other hand if professional errors and omissions result in losses for the client, such events are insurable. In order to effectively assess risks in this area, it is necessary to understand the difference between professional liability risks which may affect the Board of Directors and Officer (D&O) and those professional liability risks which affect the bank itself.
Directors and Officer liability
This coverage is for the directors and officer of a hank, and not for the bank itself. One of the most complex problems facing any business is the liability of its directors and officers (executive or non-executive). The personal assets of directors and senior officers may be at risk for losses arising out of the alleged negligent or imprudent acts or omissions of such individuals. The D&O coverage provides payment to the bank as it is the bank which purchases the policy to indemnify its directors and officers..
In addition, the D&O policy will reimburse directors and officers for losses for which the bank was unable to indemnify them for legal, regulatory, or financial reasons.
Professional Indemnity
This coverage is designed to indemnify the bank itself against litigation by customers, and other third parties alleging errors, omissions, misstatement or imprudence committed by directors, officers and employees in the performance of their service.
These two areas encompass professional liability, and there is some overlap between the insurance coverages designed to address them. However, although D&O is narrower in scope in terms of the individuals covered, it is significantly broader in terms of the wrongful acts which it covers generally covering all wrongful acts not specifically excluded. On the other hand, PI covers only specific professional services provided by the bank - trust, brokerage, investment advisory etc. D&O policies may specifically exclude such services from coverage.
Professional liability is created by the relationship between various parties including clients, regulators, shareholders, employees, vendors, joint venture partners and the banks. The relationship is based on the legal system in which the bank's activities take place. In addition, the same act may result in a liability situation for both the bank (through the actions of employees) as well as the Board of Directors. Thus acts of negligence or misconduct by employees, inappropriate or prohibited investments in a customer portfolio, errors in securities processing, failure to execute contractual obligations with a client may result in a liability for the bank However, the legal system may also involve allegations of mismanagement by the Board of Directors, regulatory non-compliance, product fraud, insider trading, bad loans which materially effect share price. In this case the liability may also extend to the Directors both singly and severally. Professional liability arise from a number of sources.
Shareholder Actions - Globally, the largest single source of professional liability exposure arises from shareholder actions against management, officers and employees for negligence and misconduct.
Client Services - The most rapidly growing area of professional indemnity liability exposure is in the area of the provision of client services. Trust, custodian relationships, buy/sell agreements, and investment advisory services all provide a large and growing exposure for both directors and officers and the bank itself.
Employment Practices - Employment actions represent the second largest source of D&O liability globally. D&O claims arise from employees during major business transactions i.e. mergers, acquisitions, implementation of new technology, downsizing, as well as from hiring, promotion, transfer, and termination practices.
Environmental Claims - The growth of environmental liability has coincided with the trend to impose personal liability on directors and officers who, in the performance of their duties, become subject to civil or criminal penalties for violation of environmental tows.
Lender Liability Claims - Lender liability places directors and officers at risk both as defendants in the first instance or as indemnitors when their bank have been held liable. The range of lenders' liabilities includes contractual liability, product liability, personal injury, property damage, fraud, duress, and emotional distress.
During the initial negotiations with the borrower, lender can be held liable for revoking a loan commitment where no commitment was intended, charging the terms of the commitment, or fraudulently inducing a borrower to borrow. Once a loan is made, additional liability exposure may arise in situations when the lender refuses to advance funds or restructure debt, threatens to invoke covenants in the loan agreement, accelerates the loan, responds to credit inquiries, or institutes foreclosure proceedings. Should a loan go bad the bank will typically step into a more aggressive role in its relationship with the borrower. This more aggressive posture combined with a generally more strained relationship between lender and borrower creates a fertile environment for lender liability.
Lenders may face an assortment of exposures including workout negotiations, collateral liquidations, assets seizure, and actually taking control of the management of the borrower's business. In an increasingly more competitive global business environment, it is only reasonable to expect that the business of lending both within and outside the Kingdom will become more complex. This increased level of complexity will inevitably lead to a higher exposure to lender liability issues.
Since these exposures are entirely driven by the social, legal and business environment in which business operations occur, it is important to address these exposures not only as they relate to operations within Saudi Arabia, but also outside the Kingdom.
Within Saudi Arabia - Under Saudi Company Law (Royal Decree M/6 of 1385)* Articles 66 to 82, members of Boards of Directors are jointly responsible for compensating the company, the shareholders or others for damages resulting from their management of the company or contravention of provisions of company law. This seems to differ little from the provisions of the proposed European Community Fifth Company Law Directive and other European countries. Therefore, Saudi Company Law differs little from that of other developed countries with respect to the legal obligations of corporate directors and officers; and a substantial exposure to professional liability, particularly Directors and Officers liability, currently exists for banks within the Kingdom.
Outside Saudi Arabia - The third party legal liability situation outside Saudi Arabia is far more grave than that found within the Kingdom. Any Saudi bank operating in another sovereign jurisdictions will be subject to the laws, business practices, political and social conditions of that area. Thus any Saudi bank operating in the United States, the United Kingdom, or western Europe runs a significant risk of being sued for alleged illegalities and/or mismanagement in connection with the bank's activities in these areas.
Another area of exposure which Saudi banks must recognize is the exposure created by their outside directors, such as directors and officers of Saudi banks serving on the boards of joint venture companies or partnerships or other non-Saudi corporations. Outside or independent directors are now routinely threatened with potential liability and are sued along with the rest of the board. In the past, outside directors were not expected to be involved in a bank's day to day affairs. How, today the trend is for outside directors to be knowledgeable oven experts in bank's issues and are being looked upon by courts, regulators and litigants as the "watchdogs" of board activities.
Professional liability represent a fast growing and potentially damaging area of operational risk for activities outside Saudi Arabia. Thus it is essential that Saudi banks develop policies and procedures to carefully assess product and services risks in this area and take measures to manage these risks.
* The Saudi Company Law (Royal Decree M/6 of 1385) has been replaced by the Companies Law (Royal Decree M/132), dated 01/12/1443H.
2.2.3 Contingent Client - Related Liability Risks
One of the fastest growing and most intractable areas of operational loss exposure is that presented by contingent client-related liability. This relates to indirect responsibility for a client's business operations and products. Since major liability losses may bankrupt a client, plaintiffs will seek anyone connected with the client possessing sufficient funds to secure a financial settlement. Unfortunately, this is often a bank with whom the client had or has a relationship. These types of contingent liabilities may arise from a number of situations including.
1. Environmental Liability: Banks may incur substantial environmental liability when they become responsible for environmental damage or hazardous waste cleanup (i.e. an oil spill from a tanker for which the bank was a lender). This type of liability exposure is expanding globally at a tremendous rate as countries continue to enact ever more punitive environmental laws and regulations.
2. Product Liability: Product liability may occur when a client in which the bank has an equity position or financing interest is sued alleging negligence (i.e., class action suits against a pharmaceutical manufacturer).
3. Death and Bodily Injury : This liability may arise from an event involving a bank owned asset that is leased to or operated by others (i.e. commercial aircraft) or from an event involving a repossessed asset (i.e., fire at bank owned or controlled hotel).
Therefore, as global environmental and product liability laws and regulations becomes more stringent and tort liability becomes more widespread, all Saudi banks will become increasingly more exposed to this type of operational risk both inside and outside the Kingdom.
2.3 Other Risks
2.3.1 Statutory and Regulatory Liability
Globally, banking laws and regulations are becoming more complex, compliance more costly and time consuming, and the consequences of non-compliance (financial, legal, and reputation) more severe. In addition, some countries are increasingly applying criminal statuses to such essentially non-criminal areas as investment operations and cash management services. These liabilities may take three forms:
1. Financial Penalties : Within the Kingdom, violation of SAMA circulars and directives may result in substantial financial penalties being levied. Saudi banks operating outside the Kingdom are also subject to not only fines imposed by regulatory agencies, but may also find themselves responding to both civil and/or criminal charges which may carry financial penalties of such a magnitude as to cause a substantial impact on the balance sheet.
2. Restriction or Termination of Operations: Within Saudi Arabia, violation of SAMA rules and directives may lead to censure by the regulators and, in extreme cases, restriction of certain banking activities or total revocation of banking privileges within the Kingdom. This exposure is even more severe for Saudi banks operating outside the Kingdom. Even relatively minor technical violations of banking regulations may lead to the closure of major overseas branches.
3. Risk to Reputation: All banks fundamentally operate on the basis of trust. Therefore, publicity associated with statutory and regulatory infractions may act to undermine this trust with both customers and shareholders. While banks may be able to absorb both financial penalties and regulatory sanctions, they cannot absorb a major loss of customer and investor confidence.
Therefore the maintenance of aggressive and highly pro-active compliance program by banks is becoming increasingly more critical as a major component in controlling the operational risks associated with regulatory and legal non-compliance.
2.3.2 Political Risks
All banks operating within the Gulf Region are subject to certain distinct geo-political risks. However, if viewed in a broader perspective, these risks are certainly no more severe than those faced by banks operating in other areas. Therefore, of far more concern from an operational risk perspective is the prospect of new and more restrictive banking and securities regulations in other countries in which Saudi banks operate. Within the Kingdom, the prospect of punitive and highly restrictive regulation must be viewed as remote. However, in those oversees areas in which Saudi banks have significant business interests that some restrictive regulations may be expected.
Given the major social and political changes taking place in the industrialized countries and developing world, all markets now possess a significant degree of political instability for international banking operations. Therefore, it is imperative that all Saudi banks operating outside the Kingdom or significantly involved with international trade, develop management systems and procedures for actively monitoring operational risk associated with the political and regulatory environments in which they conduct their business operations. Such systems should include appropriate "red flag" and warning indicators, and effective alternative strategies and action plans to prevent or mitigate losses.
3. Management of Operational Risk Through Insurance Schemes
The successful management of operational risks is central to the long-term profitability and . survival of a bank. All banks are exposed to a variety of such risks and must develop an integrated management approach for their effective control. Management response must include a strong organizational structure, an affective system of internal controls' segregation of duties, ; internal and external audits, physical security procedures, etc.
Another important method to limit operational risk includes the purchase of insurance. The various forms of insurance schemes include self insurance, regular insurance and other insurance alternatives, encompassing retention groups, group captives, risk sharing pools, etc. Insurance is a method to fund a loss exposure as opposed to managing or controlling risks. Other effective i mechanisms to limit the impact of losses arising from operational risk include the finite risk insurance approach. This approach involve risk transfer through regular insurance and self insurance, and generally has an upper limit to its liability, hence finite insurance.
3.1 Self Insurance
The financing of operational risk is based upon the premise that any organization of a certain size will pay for its operational losses either by purchasing insurance or by totally self-insuring. Eventually insurance costs will adjust to pay for actual incurred losses. There is a clear and direct relationship between insurance premiums and actual losses which may be tracked over a period of time (generally three to ten years). Consequently, some organizations decide to underwrite the risk themselves by not insuring with external parties. The exception to this theory is the random catastrophic loss (or "long tailed risk") which occurs rarely, if ever. Even in self insured programs, insurance is purchased or should be purchased to cover these "long tailed risks" The retention of risk is most appropriate for low cost/high frequency losses. Some unsophisticated buyers purchase insurance only for smaller losses. This is both an extremely uneconomical method of financing small losses and exposes the organization to potentially catastrophic losses. Once management realizes that the organisation will ultimately pay for its own losses, risk identification and risk control will become paramount in managing risk.
Even in "insured" programs there is a strong element of self insurance. This becomes more predominant for those risks whose costs becomes higher as the size of the organization increases i.e. where insurance cover is generally reserved for catastrophic risks. Therefore, as the nature and the size of banks within the Kingdom changes, so too does the need to address the issue of self insurance.
Self insurance has three major advantages:
- Improved loss control as a result of increased risk awareness.
- Improved claims control.
- Cash flow benefits.
However, it also has two significant disadvantages:
- Financial instability in cases of poor budgeting/reserving.
- A need for increased management oversight and administration.
There are various forms of self insurance as given below:
3.1.1 Through Contracts
A bank may transfer its financial responsibility through purchase of insurance or it may transfer its liability through a contractual arrangement (hold harmless agreement).
Self insurance may be obtained through a contractual agreement. As a practical matter, the ability to transfer risk contractually depends on whether one party or the other to the contract is in a better bargaining position. As one cannot always arrange to have a contract drawn in one's favour, there should be a review of all contracts before they are signed to make sure what liabilities are being accepted.
Even when the bank is in the position of being able to dictate terms of contract, every effort should be made to ensure that the provisions for the transfer of risk are both reasonable and equitable to both parties. In recent years, many countries have enacted legislation which has acted to significantly restrict the use of "hold harmless" language in contracts. When transferring risk through any form of hold-harmless agreement, it is essential that a number of points be reviewed by competent legal counsel:
Reasonable of Provisions - Harsh and restrictive language may serve to both antagonize customers .and may be invalidated in court as being contrary to both law end public policy. 1t is essential that the bank clearly understand precisely what contractual limitations of liability are legally acceptable in the jurisdiction in which the contract is to be enforced.
Clarity of Language - Unclear or ambiguous language will usually be construed against the maker of the contract. Therefore, it is critical that all contracts be written clearly and that unnecessary legal 'jargon' is avoided since much of the traditional legal language has been invalidated by recent changes in statute in many countries.
Disclosure of Obligations - All contracts should clearly disclose the obligations of all parties to the contract. Failure to adequately disclose obligations may make the contract un-enforceable.
Financial Soundness - The bank should always ensure that the counter-parties are financially to meet their contractual commitments. It is often useful to obtain an irrevocable financial guarantee from the counter-party
3.1.2 Unfunded Retention
The most common method of unfunded retention is the deductible. Also refer to section 3.2.3 entitled Deductible. Generally deductibles should be used to eliminate coverage for losses that are apt to occur regularly. For example deductible levels of employee dishonesty should be sufficiently high to eliminate low level theft of cash by Tellers and ATM Machines.
3.1.3 Funded Retention
Although more rare than unfunded programs, self insurance also includes programs where funds are actually set aside to pay incurred losses These have several significant benefits including the following:
1. Liability Accounting - By using a funded approach, the funding process goes hand in hand with an accounting system which establishes the amount of the liabilities. It is extremely useful to have an accurate measurement of year-by-year costs of operational losses - particularly as these risks grow relative to the bank’s size. This assessment ensures that significant unfunded and unrecognized liabilities are not accumulating under the self-insurance program. Furthermore, it is crucial that actuarial analysis is used for projecting losses and in determining loss reserves to avoid significant unfunded or unrecognized liabilities.
2. Service and Product Pricing - An accurate accounting and assessment of costs associated with operational losses can be important in both pricing the institution's products and services and in determining those business areas which are profitable and those which are not.
3. Investment of Funds - A funded program allows specific investment income to be earned on the funds comprising the funded loss pool. This, in turn, offsets the cost of the losses themselves.
3.1.4 Setting up own Insurance Companies
When a banks actually establishes its own insurance company it is also called "single parent captive". Such insurance companies actually act as a re-insurers, using the services of a licensed insurance company to issue policies and handle claims. This licensed insurance company is often referred to as the "fronting" insurer. Under this arrangement, the fronting insurer does the insurer's claims handling and loss control services, satisfies various legal and regulatory requirements concerning policy issuance, and may also satisfy creditors shareholders, regulators, and other interested parties The "fronting" insurance company actually assumes the primary legal obligation for the payment of claims. Thus, if professional indemnity is insured in the captive but the bank becomes insolvent, the "fronting" insurer issuing the professional Indemnity Policy is ultimately responsible for the payment of all incurred claims, regardless of whether it is able to collect from the captive or the bank. Therefore, while the use of single parent captives may provide a potentially viable vehicle for managing operational risk within a single bank, its use must be carefully evaluated in relation to legal implications within the Kingdom.
3.2 Regular Insurance
The most common method of risk transfer is through the purchase of insurance whereby the insured exchanges the possibility of incurring an unknown large loss for a comparatively smaller premium payment.
3.2.1 Relations with the Market
Unfortunately, some banks treat the purchase of insurance essentially as "commodity', transaction being driven entirely by price. Consequently, it is routine for banks to place their insurance programs out on an annual tender offer basis, and place little emphasis on developing stable and long-term relationships with both brokers and underwriters. All financial markets reward stability and consistency and the bank insurance market is no exception. The effect of this instability and fragmentation in the some of the insurance market has been two-fold.
Quality of underlying re-insurance - When account relationship is perceived by the both underwriters and brokers to be totally price driven, it is often impossible to re-insure the risk with the most reputable and stable re-insurers. This means that brokers must often place the risk with .re-insurers of lesser quality and stability. This, in turn, frequently leads to difficulties in claims settlement and other coverage issues, as weaker re-insurers are often reluctant to settle even the most valid of-claims. In addition, brokers also tend to charge a premium for these types of placements - meaning that brokerage commissions are higher as a percentage of overall cost and it is often difficult (if not possible) to find out the exact extent of these charges or to get full visibility into who the re-insurers are on the cover.
Lack of Enhanced Coverages and "Value Added" Services - Brokers and underwriters reward stable long-term relationships with the provision of "value added" services and enhanced coverage. Both brokers and underwriters add value to relationships through such vehicles as underwriter/broker financed risk management, audits and consulting services, assistance in structuring risk financing programs (such as captives, pooling arrangements, and finite programs), and other forms of expert operational risk management support. Long-term and stable relationships also invariably bring with them an increased willingness by underwriters to enhance coverage within existing premiums and deductible levels, to provide more favourable policy wording, and to continue to renew coverage even in the face of loss. Banks should consider the possibility of multiple year insurance contracts and also negotiating broker services based on fees as opposed to commissions.
3.2.2 Type of Coverage
Although globally over fifty different types of insurance coverages are available specifically for banks, six types are of primary concern.
The Bankers Blanket Bond/Financial Institution Bond (BBB/FIB)- This coverage generally consists of six basic insuring agreements: employee dishonesty, loss of property on premises, loss of property in transit, forgery, forged securities, and counterfeit money. The BBB/FIB has traditionally provided the cornerstone for any bank insurance program. Although, most banks world-wide purchase this coverage, which is mostly a function of management's perception of operational risk exposures as well as generally accepted business customs. Further, there are no rules either formal or informal for establishing bond limits. Only in some jurisdicticus there are legal or regulatory requirements that a financial institution purchase a BBB/FIB
Electronic and Computes Crime (ECC) Coverage -The ECC may either be a separate or stand-alone policy or appended to the BBB/FIB. It is designed to respond to financial loss from third-party fraud or mysterious and unexplained disappearance relating to the insured computer or telecommunications systems. It is for this reason that ECC coverage may not be written without a BBB/FIB being present. The ECC (in its London form) currently consists of eleven insuring agreements i.e Computer Systems, Insured Service Bureau Operations, Electronic Computer Instructions, Electronic Data and Media, Computer Virus, Electronic Communications, Electronic Transmissions, Electronic Securities, Forged Tele facsimile, and Voice Initiated Transfers. Generally, the ECC is purchased in the same limit as the BBB/FIB since it is truly a companion piece to the BBB/FIB.
Directors and Officers (D&O) Coverage - D&O coverage indemnifies directors and officers of the bank against liability claims arising from alleged negligence, wrongful acts, errors and omissions. The wording and insuring agreements of directors and officers policies are specific to the jurisdiction in which the coverage is being written. On a global basis, D&O coverage is rapidly overtaking the BBB/FIB as a institution's most important and expensive form of transferring operational risk through insurance.
Professional Indemnity (PI) Coverage - Unlike Directors and Officers liability insurance, banks professional indemnity coverage is intended to provide insurance to the bank itself against claims arising from alleged errors or omissions committed by bank's employees and officers in the performance of their professional duties(fiduciary and operations), investment advisory activities, private banking, etc. This is driven by the shift in emphasis away from lending income into income streams generated by fee for service.
Payment Card Coverage - Coverage for losses incurred by banks as the result of counterfeit, forged and or altered payment cards is currently available through most international payment card organizations such as VISA and MASTERCARD. This coverage is designed to address counterfeiting, forgery and or alteration of both the embossed plastic as well as magnetic encoding on the card. In addition, specialised coverage for merchants, banks, processors, and independent service organizations against fraudulent and/or excessive charge baclcs by participating merchants has recently been introduced. Underwriters view the loss, theft, or misuse of cards as a completely uninsurable risk. Therefore, no coverage for this exposure is available in the market.
Given the potential profitability of payment card operations, growing consumer demand for these services, and the potential for enhanced sharing of credit data between Saudi banks, it is inevitable that the number of payment cards in circulation within the Kingdom will increase dramatically in the near term. It is also inevitable that given global trends in payment card, fraud losses to banks will increase substantially. To address this growing operational risk, banks within the Kingdom will need to take a hybrid approach consisting of loss prevention, and regular and self insurance of risk.
Loss Prevention - The payment card industry has found that the most effective way of dealing with card fraud and abuse is prevention. Careful screening of both cardholders and participating merchants, on-line monitoring and analysis of account activity, anti counterfeiting measures, sharing of fraud information among institutions. and aggressive investigation and persecution of abuse has significantly reduced losses on a global basis. As Saudi banks increase their participation in the payment card market, it will be essential that they establish with the assistance of organizations such as VISA International and MASTERCARD International viable and effective loss prevention programs in this area.
Internal Risk Financing - All banks involved in payment card operations must understand that a certain level of loss to fraud is simply a cost of doing business. While loss prevention programs may keep this amount within manageable limits, each institution must establish self insurance mechanisms - funded retention, loss allocation, contractual transfer of risk to address these losses.
External Risk Financing - Due to the relatively high cost and coverage restrictions of conventional insurance, Saudi banks should explore the possibility of using alternative forms of external risk transfer including risk retention groups, risk pooling, and group captives to address the financing of their exposures.
Political Risk Insurance - First written in the early l96o’s, political risk insurance is designed to facilitate stability in international trade and investment by indemnifying certain operational risk associated with political and regulatory activities in the counterparty country. This type of coverage is written by commercial underwriters in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe. In addition, it is also available through the facilities of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank. Political risk insurance may be written to cover a number or areas:
Confiscation, Nationalization, Expropriation, and Deprivation (CNE&D) This is most commonly purchased form of political coverage. These policies are generally used by organizations with assets permanently located in another country and respond when these assets are taken over by government action.
Contract Frustration - This entails the nonperformance or frustration of a contract with a overseas customer through an invalid action by that customer. This invalid action wrongfully invalidates an overseas transaction in such a manner that the bank is unable to obtain payment for its services or recoup its assets.
Currency Inconvertibility - This type of loss occurs when payment occurs in local currency and the local government is unable or unwilling to exchange the currency at prevailing market rates. This has traditionally been a problem in many developing countries.
Trade Disruption - This types of losses are associated with interruption of trading activities due to war, strike, change in government, or change in law or regulation in the counterparty country. Trade disruption coverage can provide protection not only for the direct loss of revenue associated with the disrupted transactions, but also potential loss of earnings, extra expense, loss of profits, and loss of market.
3.2.3 Deductibles
One of the major "revolutions" which has taken place in the bank insurance industry globally has been in the area of retention find deductible levels. Many banks have realized that retaining and financing significant portions of their operational risk exposure simply makes good business sense. No longer can insurance be used as a substitute for sound management and loss control. Generally deductibles should be used to eliminate coverage for, losses that are apt to occur with some degree of regularity. For example, when purchasing employee infidelity coverage under the BBB/FIB, the deductible level for employee dishonesty should be set sufficiently high to eliminate low level theft of cash by tellers and ATM technicians which occur rather frequently.
There are two primary types of deductibles:
Straight Deductible - This is a flat amount that is subtracted from each loss. The sum insured is then paid over and above this amount of retention.
Aggregate Deductible - These types of deductible protect against a series of losses which, in total, may exceed the amount which can be safely assumed by the bank. Often written in conjunction with a straight deductible, this "stop loss" protection limits the total amount of losses to be absorbed to a specific amounts An aggregate deductible may apply annually or during a specified policy period, may limit the amount to be retained by the accumulation of a number of deductibles, or it may require that claims in total exceed specified amount before coverage is afforded.
While many approaches have been devised by both insurers and insiders to determine the "correct" level of deductible, the most commonly used method is to calculate the deductible as a percent of total assets. The rationale behind this approach being that the larger the institution in terms of asset base, the better its capability to absorb losses without resorting to insurance. Currently. the factor used by many underwriters in determining the minimum deductible level is approximately .0005% of total assets. Thus, using this factor as a guide, a bank with assets greater than SR 60 billion should, as a minimum, be retaining approximately SR 3 million loss as its deductible for BBB/FIB, EEC, D&O, and PI coverages, with a negotiated deductible of SR 5 million as being optimal from the insurers standpoint.
3.2.4 Managing Losses
One of the significant methods for measuring the effectiveness of banks in managing their operational risks is the evaluation of the losses. In evaluating levels of loss several factors should be kept in mind:
Recurring Vs Catastrophic Losses - In general, routine recurring losses (small teller frauds, thefts of cash from ATMs, low value check forgery, etc.) should not exceed the banks deductible level. Although, all banks should attempt to control and reduce these losses to the lowest practical level, some losses must be expected as a cost of doing business. In fact, implementing a true "zero loss" environment would probably be far more costly than simply observing an acceptable level of small losses. Insurance should be viewed as catastrophe cover and should only be used to assist the institution in dealing with the consequences of "low probability and high cost" risks. Again, insurance should not be used as a substitute for sound and effective management of operational risks.
Frequency, of Claims Payment - If deductible levels have been established properly underwriters expect to pay a loss on an account every 7 to 10 years. However, with a loss frequency of more than 1 per 5 years indicates both a deductible level which is too low and problems with the bank's internal controls
Allocation of Losses
In an organisation, such as a bank which consists of many different departments and subsidiaries. it is good risk management to charge a unit directly for its losses However, it may be very difficult for smaller units to handle their self-insurance as self-insurance levels may be handled more easily by large units or subsidiaries. Therefore, in order that all units be allocated their fair share of premiums and loss costs, it is often necessary to establish an internal pooling or loss allocation system. Banks may add to the credibility and create accurate allocating systems by using acturial methodology and techniques. Such a system allows for the direct allocation of loss in some cases and the sharing of loss in others. This can make a system of higher deductibles practical.
For example, consider a bank with fifty branches and other non bank subsidiaries. A SR 5 million loss spread among the fifty units in one time period would amount to SR 0.1 million on the average. If an appropriate deductible is charged to the unit that actually suffered the loss and loss-sharing levels of the other units are adjusted relative to their size, a relatively large loss may be absorbed relatively painless. Further, very large losses could be amortized over a period of years. However, there are two important issues to consider in constructing such a system.
Penalize Frequency; Accommodate Severity -Allocation system should penalize frequency and be more forgiving of severity. This is based on the fact that severe or the high cost low probability risks" are far more difficult to control than incidents which to occur frequently and that if many incidents are allowed to occur frequently, it is inevitable that one or more will be severe. For this reason, charging units directly for loss costs can significantly improve loss controls, but the size of the penalty should be appropriate to the size of the operation.
The System Must be Accurate and Understandable - Allocation systems must be both accurate and clearly understandable to unit managers. Many allocation systems have failed because they became very complex in an attempt to create a degree of accuracy that may serve no useful purpose. The following example may serve to illustrate the point:
In this bank, a deductible of SR 1 million is set for Head Office and other wholesale nondepository subsidiaries (i.e trust company, the private bank, etc) while deductible as low as SR 50,000 are set for the small branches - a total of 35 units. Each unit pays 100% of its deductible for losses occurring in its units, and 50% of the loss in excess of the deductible up to an amount no greater than 150% of the stated deductible amount. Thus, a unit with a SR 50.000 deductable would pay the first SR 50,000 of the loss plus 25,000 of the next 50,000 loss for a total possible deductible of Sr 75,000. All units then share equally an excess losses up to the institution's aggregate of SR 1,000,000 deductible. Therefore, the largest loss which could be shared is SR 925,000 which when divided by 35 units is SR 26,428 per unit. If this is still too large a burden for the smaller units, the risk sharing percentages may be adjusted or a cap set on the maximum loss to be borne by smaller units, with the remainder shared corporate-wide.
3.2.5 Premium levels
In evaluating the level of premiums paid by banks for their insurance coverage it is useful to use the standard insurance industry metric of “Rate on Line”_ This is simply the . ratio of premium charged to sum insured (i.e. premium charge/sum insured = "Rate on. Line"). Globally, the spread for Rate on Line runs between 1% - 2% for highly preferred risks with excellent loss records and high retention to approximately 10 % for low quality risks with high loss records and low retention.
Therefore, as may be readily seen insurance pricing is designed to insure that underwriters will recapture the cost of all but the most catastrophic (and lowest probability) losses through the premium structure The premiums of conventional insurance programs may be structured in a number of ways:
Guaranteed Cost Programs - The standard approach for determining a bank's insurance premiums is by means of a guaranteed cost rating. most Saudi banks currently use these types of insurance programs. The guaranteed cost plan is intended to pre-fund all losses that are expected to occur during the policy period. This approach applies predetermined rates to an exposure base to determine premiums. The premium is guaranteed in the sense that it will not vary. However, depending on actual loss incurred during the policy period, premiums may be adjusted at renewal to reflect actual exposures which existed during the rating period. Therefore, reserves for losses that have been Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) or paid remain with the insurer and investment income accrues to the insurer and the insured receives no benefit from them. However, if the insured has poor loss experience during the policy period, the insurer has no recourse for these which could far exceed earnings generated from the reserves.
Retrospective Rating Programs - Retrospective rating programs are based on the risk management ability and performance of the bank. For these arrangements which offer the insured the opportunity for substantial cost savings over a guaranteed cost plan if the loss record is good. Consequently, if the loss record is poor, the insured may end up paying more premium to the insurer than under self-insurance. Retrospective rating programs offer a system of rewards and punishments depending upon the effectiveness with which the bank manages its risk. Retrospective programs may involve a variety of methods.
No Claims Bonus - The simplest of the retrospective rating programs is the no claims bonus. Under this type of policy a percentage of the premium is returned to the insured at the end of the policy period if no claims are filed with the insurer.
Incurred Loss Retro- Here, an initial premium is paid at policy inception and is adjusted during subsequent years as actual incurred losses become known - with deposit premium being adjusted upward or downward based on loss experience. Generally, premium adjustments are computed annually and a minimum is established for the protection of the insurer. It is adjusted on the basis of losses that have actually been paid, as opposed to losses that have actually occured which may be more than losses that have been paid. This eases the insured's cash flow problem and allows the use of the loss reserves. The difference Between the standard premium and the amount paid by the insured is normally secured by a Letter of Credit or other acceptable financial guarantee.
Loss Multiplier Plans - Since all retro methods are essentially cost-plus contracts, a simple way to compare retros is by comparing the amount of "load" for non-loss costs on a percentage basis. Dividing the premium by the incurred losses gives an index known as the Effective Loss Multiplier (ELM) - thus a plan with an ELM of l30% is less expensive than plan with an ELM of 150%. Some plans utilize this-concept for determining the premium by simply multiplying the incurred losses by a stated loss multiplier subject to agreed upon minimum and maximum premium levels. This greatly simplifies the calculation process for both insured and insurer.
Present Value Discount Plans- Under these plans, losses are forecasted and then discounted back to present value at some agreed upon interest rate. Insurer expenses are added and a flat premium is charged. This premium is intended to be adequate to cover losses and to avoid the need for adjustments. However, most plans include provisions for eventually adjustment if actual losses are substantially higher or lower than expected.
Fixed_ Cost Participating Dividend Plans - This type of program is really a hybrid between retrospective and guaranteed costs policies as it gives the insurer an option to return a portion or all of the under-writing profits to the participant if it chooses, but generally does no allow the insurer to charge an additional premium for worse than expected losses. While the potential savings are not as great as under a pure retrospective program, the insured is in a no loss position. This is because maximum premium which may be charged is equal to the guaranteed cost premium less any applicable "dividend" discounts granted by the insurer.
Multiline Aggregate Program - Becoming increasingly more attractive as operational risk exposures rise, multi-line aggregate programs use a single insurance policy to cover all of the institution's exposures subject to an aggregate deductible applied to all covered losses. Once the aggregate deductible is satisfied by the payment of one or more claims, the policy would respond to any additional losses upto the aggregate limit. The theory is that by combining the various types of insurable exposures the overall predictability of loss costs is enhanced. An insured may then pay directly for planned and budged loss costs and rely on the multi-line aggregate policy to cover unplanned "high value low probability risk".
3.2.6 Claims
Banks which have strong internal audit and investigative functions and are able to properly document losses, generally experience little difficulty in getting claims paid in a prompt and satisfactory manner.
As a very general measure, insurers typically pay about 75% of the claimed value for about 90% of the items for which legitimate claims are submitted. Therefore, if an insured submitted ten legitimate claims totaling SR 1 million in a year, they could reasonably expect to receive between SR 600,000 and SR 800,000 in compensation less deductibles. It is extremely important that the bank clearly understand what is covered and more importantly what is not covered under the insurance contract. The filing of frivolous claims for which no coverage was contemplated in the policy not only creates extra work for the banks but also serves to antagonize both brokers and underwriters. However, it should be noted that claim payment is almost entirely a function of the quality of claims. Fully documented paid in full by underwriters, while poorly documented claims are, at best settled for a negotiated amount below that claimed or denied completely. In addition the quality of claims documentation and processing by both the bank and its broker directly effects the speed with which claims are settled. If underwriters must repeatedly request additional documentation in order to reach a settlement decision, claims processing becomes a drawn out and cumbersome process. In addition, if a bank has inadequate audit trails and investigative documentation procedures it will be necessary to secure the services of outside accountants, attorneys' or loss surveyors to conduct a proper investigation and generate claim documentation which will be acceptable to the underwriter. This process is both costly and time consuming and materially erodes whatever financial settlement is ultimately reached with the insurer.
It should also be noted that nowhere in any BBB/FIB or ECC contract a condition precedent to liability exists which requires a court judgment against a perpetrator to prove a claim. In fact, no condition precedent to liability exists in the insurance contract that incidents of either internal or external fraud be reported to the police.
Although this may be a legal/regulatory requirement and is certainly a prudent action on the part of the bank.
3.3. Other Insurance Alternatives
In addition to conventional insurance programs, a number of alternative techniques have developed in recent years to facilitate the external financing of operational risk.
3.3.1 Risk Retention Groups. Group Captives,. and Risk Sharing Pools
Although they are established as insurance companies, they are more properly viewed as self-insurance mechanisms. Risk retention groups, group captives and risk sharing pools are simply cooperative risk funding vehicles designed to write insurance to cover risks. They maybe formed to reduce insurance costs within a specific group of participants, increase limits of coverage and secure more favourable terms of coverage, or to spread the risk as compared to going without insurance entirely.
Pools are developed by group captives and self insureds that wish to transfer some of the risk they have agreed to assume. Pooling arrangements frequently occur when group captives cannot find adequate reinsurance or the cost of such reinsurance is excessively high relative to the risk. Thus, participants in a risk retention group, group captive or pool should understand that they are participating in self-insurance. Viewing the captive or pool in this manner is important for two reasons:
Paying for Loss - With the exception of reinsurance for potential catastrophic losses, the group will pay for virtually all of its own losses.
Pooling the Risk - Experience indicates that the "average premium" theories that underline traditional insurance industry thinking are valid only if good risks are willing to stay in the pool with the bad risks.
3.3.2 Agency Captives
These are captive insurance companies formed by brokers or agents to provide coverage for their insured. These types of captives increase the probability that brokers will have a market into which to place their insured and therefore may allow them to offer broader levels of coverage than that offered by risk retention groups or group captives.
3.3.3 Rent-a-Captive
A highly specialized form of captive operation. These companies are designed for firms that do not want to own a captive but want to obtain some of its advantages. A rent-a-captive is formed by investors and is operated as an income producing business. An insured pays a premium and usually pays a deposit or posts a letter of credit to back up its business. The operators of rent-a-captives handled the operations and claims for the insured and place the reinsurance. .At the end of the policy period the insured is paid a dividend based on incurred losses, operating expenses, and cost of reinsurance.
3.4 Finite Risk Insurance - A Combined Approach
It is a hybrid involving risk transfer through an insurance contract and internal financing of risk. Finite risk insurance and financial reinsurance both involve risks which are limited by an aggregate limit across the policy so that the insurer has a limited liability (hence the term "finite"). They both attempt to "smooth" the peaks and valleys of losses for the insured and the insurer by redistributing these losses over a period or a series of fiscal periods. Finite risk products are tailored for each bank and reflect its own unique risk transfer needs. Therefore, no two programs are alike. Indeed, even definitions of what constitutes "finite risk" differ based on the proposed use of the techniques involved. However, finite risk contracts do share several common features.
3.4.1 Loss Severity and Frequency
Finite risk works best in situations where a severe loss is possible. A typical finite risk prospect is an organization which has a high severity/low frequency loss situation (i.e an "upstream" professional liability loss from overseas derivative trading) for which inadequate insurance coverage is available in the conventional market or the cost of the coverage is prohibitive.
Frequently, a bank will use a single-parent captive to front a finite program to fill the middle layer of operational risk - above the self-insurance used for smaller recurring losses and below commercial insurance used for catastrophe cover - although some insurers have used finite insurance on top of self insurance and handled the upper layer of risk through a captive.
An example of how a finite risk program can handle a high severity/low frequency situation might be that of an investment banking firm which has developed a new series of global derivative trading products. To fully exploit the potential market the firm wishes to spin off this function as a separate operating subsidiary through an Initial Public Offering (IPO). However, investors are concerned that, given current liability issues involving derivative trading products, the proposed firms professional liability exposures are inadequately covered, since they fear that a professional liability loss in the first year of the IPO would drive insurance premiums to a prohibitive level and/or severely deplete capital. To address this issue, a program is structured utilizing both finite and conventional insurance. The finite portion consists of a five year program with a guaranteed premium for the underlying primary finite layer. For coverage in excess of this primary finite layer, commercial insurance is used since premium rates in the excess layers are less than using the finite market. This program gives the firm precisely what it needs during the critical IPO phase - maximum transfer of risk with a guaranteed premium level for five years. In addition, if there are no significant losses over the period of the finite contract, the firm will receive a return of premium at the end of that time.
3.4.2. Multi-Year Duration
One of the primary attributes of any finite insurance program is the ability to address the financing of liabilities over a multi-year period, thereby minimizing the impact of a severe loss in a single year. In addition, finite programs also minimize the "financial costs" of insurance - the cost of going into the market year after year to renew policies and being subject to market cycles. It also help building and strengthening long-term relationships with insurer. Since going into the market on an annual basis is highly inefficient, finite programs are designed to maximize the allocation of premiums to loss payments and minimize their use for transaction costs and overheads. '
3.4.3 Profit Sharing
One of the most attractive aspects of finite insurance programs is the possibility of premium reduction through the return premium mechanism. In return for limitation of liability through an aggregate cap and for a guarantee of premiums over a specific period of time, the insurer agrees to share underwriting profits with the insured in the event of favourable loss performance.
3.4.4 Disadvantages
As with all approaches to managing operational risk. finite risk insurance has certain drawbacks:
Risk Management Expertise - To effectively blend the internal and external financing elements necessary in a successful finite risk program, it is necessary that management clearly understands the nature and magnitude of the bank loss exposures and is willing to pav for a significant portion of these exposures through self-insurance. Banks' must have a very clear view of the financial resources they will need for these programs. Since these programs are multi-year in nature, a bank must be certain about its future period cash flows and how much cash it wants to devote to the program. Otherwise finite risk management programs simply will not work more effectively with structuring the program than will normal conventional insurance.
Cost - Since finite programs are typically structured for three to five years, they may represent a higher initial cost both in terms of guaranteed premiums and costs associated with structuring the program than will conventions insurance. They are certainly more expensive than self insurance. In addition, failure to control losses over the period of the contract may result in no return of premium one of the primary advantages of finite programs,
4. Risk Management Evaluation Questionnaire
This Operational Risk Management Evaluation Questionnaire is designed to provide a tool to assist Banks within the Kingdom in assessing and quantifying the adequacy of their programs for managing and financing operational risk This is not a detailed questionnaire, but covers the main areas of importance in the implementation and management of an effective program of operational risk management within the bank.
For this assessment to be both accurate and objective, the questions should be completed by staff who have an appreciation of overall operational risk management and the implications of the questions with respect to the banks operations and financial planning but who do not have day-to-day responsibility for either major operational areas or for the institution's insurance program. Involvement of Internal Audit personnel may provide both technical assistance in assessing operational risk and controls as well as helping to insure objectivity in the survey process.
There is no "pass" or "fail" score for this Questionnaire. Primary questions are designed to elicit a "yes" or "no" answer. A written response or comment to all questions may be given when the institution uses a different approach than that stated to address the issue or if it is felt that there are or other considerations which should be brought to management's attention. Accordingly, this questionnaire is divided into:
(1) Management oversight
(2) Risk Assessment
(3) Operational Risk Reduction and Control
(4) Insurance Options
The scope of all answers should include both domestic and foreign operations i.e inside and outside Saudi Arabia.
Management Oversight
1. YES
No
COMMENTS
- Has the Bank developed an Operational Risk Management Plan outlining objectives, policies, and standards ?
1.1 If yes to 1, has this plan been: * Formally approved in writing by the Board of Directors?
* Disseminated in writing by senior management ?
* Reviewed on at least an annual basis ?
- Have annual Operational Risk Management Program Goals been established in terms of measurable organizational objectives where possible (i.e., a 50% reduction in branch fraud, a 15% reduction in credit card losses, etc.) ?
2.2 Is the Plan; formally evaluated against these Goals on at least an annual basis by the Board of Directors ?
- Has an Operational Risk Manager been appointed to address overall operational risk management and financing issues within the bank ?
3.1 If yes to 3, is this a full-time position ? 3.2 If yes to 3, does this individual: * Have clear and specific responsibility for operational risk assessment, risk management, and risk financing activities within the bank ?
* Have a written position description ?
- Has an Operational Risk Management Committee been formed to assist the Operational Risk Management in assessing, planning, and managing operational risk management activities?
4.1 If yes to 4, are all major operational and staff areas of the bank represented on the committee to include: Specify such areas represented i.e. Internal Audit, Treasury Operations, Credit Card / ATM's etc.
4.2 If yes to 4, does the Committee meet on at least a quarterly basis? 4.3 If yes to 4, does the Committee report to the Chief Operating Officer ? 4.4 If yes to 4, does the operational scope of the Committee include consideration of: * Fraud, forgery, and other criminal risks ?
* Professional and client related liability exposures ?
* Risk associated with legal and regulatory
non-compliance ?
* Political risk ?
Risk Assessment
2. YES
NO
COMMENTS
- Is there any inventory of the institution's tangible and nontangible resources which may be subject to operational risks. These may include the following:
- Physical Assets (i.e. physical plant, systems, real estate, etc)
- Financial Assets (i.e. cash, securities, negotiable instruments, etc.)
- Human Assets (i.e. employees, officers, directors, customers, shareholders, vendors and contractors, etc.)
- Intangible Assets (i.e. reputation, good will; etc.)
- Are operational risks with respect to new acquisitions, divestitures, expansions, or downsizing been identified. These may include the following:
- Physical Assets (i.e. physical plant, systems, real estate, etc.)
- Financial Assets (i.e. cash securities, negotiable instruments, etc.)
- Human Assets (i.e. employees, officers, customers, share holders, vendors and contractors, etc.)
- Intangible Assets (i.e., reputation, goodwill, etc.)
- Can the bank identify actual and potential loss exposures and risk events for all products and services currently being offered or proposed for implementation. Such risks may include the following:
Criminal acts including fraud, forgery, robbery, burglary and counterfeiting ? Direct loss of injury to or sickness of personnel ? * Loss or compromise of information / data ? * Direct loss of or damage to physical property ? * Consequential loss and or loss of use ? * Customer Contractual Liability ? * Tort and Product Liability ? * Statutory and Regulatory Liability (Legal and Regulatory Compliance ) ? * Political risk and regulatory instability ? - On at least an annual basis, are formal qualitative and quantitative analyses conducted to measure the level of current operational risk?
Does this analyses include.
* Judgmental risk estimates by senior staff and operational managers based on probable and maximum severity costs of a single occurance and / or aggregate losses in a single year ? * Assessment of risk event probabilities by senior managers and operational personnel ? * Review of available loss data from other banks institutions both within the Kingdom and internationally ? * Maintenance of a data base of incident reports and exposure and loss history for both insured and uninsured losses ? * Comparison of past losses and loss ratios to the premium and exposure bases ? * Analysis of trends, reporting, and payment patterns for past losses ? * Decision and event tree analysis ? * Scenario development (including "worse case" analyses) ? * Frequency and severity analyses and projections ? * Preventive measures in place ? Operational Risk Reduction and Control
3. YES
NO
COMMENTS
1. Have formal written programs of operational risk and loss control including risk assessment and control matrices been developed for all operational and staff areas ?
If yes 1, do these programs include:
* Proprietary and confidential data ? * Physical security of the bank's premises ? * Branch fraud prevention and awareness ? * Credit card, ATM, trading, and payment systems fraud ? * Software piracy and patent / copyright infringement ? * Information Systems Security ? * Product and service quality assurance ? * A dherence to customer contractual obligations ? * Compliance with regulatory and statutory requirements within Saudi Arabia ? * Others as applicable ? 2. Does the Operational Risk Management function provide central direction and coordination for operational risk management and loss control and risk financing programs within the institution ? Does its scope include: * Timely reporting of losses to senior management, SAMA, insurance carriers, and law enforcement (when appropriate) ? * Complete investigation of losses in conjunction with internal audit, bank's security department, insurance carriers and law enforcement (when appropriate) ? * Written claims handling procedures for line and staff personnel as well as both in-house claims personnel and external claims handling services ? * Review of claims files and investigative procedures ? * Coordination of claims and periodic qualitative evaluation of the overall claims handling process ? * Follow-up on all open claims and periodic qualitative evaluation of the overall claims handling process? 3. Has the institution developed penalty/reward systems ? Do these systems include: * Regular scheduled comparative evaluation of loss records of various units. * Monetary and non-monetary incentives 4. Has a formal program of operational risk control training been established which emphasizes responsibility and accountability for the control of operational losses ? Insurance Policies
4. YES
NO
COMMENTS
- Is there a written corporate risk financing policy which defines the methods to be used by the bank for insuring itself by considering all the methods available i.e. conventional insurance, loss retention guidelines, parent captive, risk retention group, finite insurance etc.
1.1 Has this plan been approved by the Board of Directors 1.2 Does this policy address loss retention guidelines by addressing the following: * Effect of risk financing options on earnings, budgets and balance sheet ? * Risk aversion (loss tolerance) by management and the Board of Directors ? * Relative cost of risk funding options in the existing market ? * Projection of expected operational losses and possible variance from expected levels ? * Statutory, regulatory, or contractual limitations on risk retention ? - Are all corporate risk financing policies and guidelines formally reviewed by the Board of Directors on at least an annual basis ?
- Are internal risk financing options (self insurance) used which are commensurate with the financial resources of the institution, dispersion (or aggregation) of risk, and established policy ? Do these options include:
* Contractual transfer of risk ?
* Unfunded retention
- Straight deductibles ?
- Aggregate deductibles
- Allocation of small/high frequency losses directly to responsble units ?
- Absorb large and/or random losses at the
corporate level ?
* Funded retention ?
* Single parent captives ?
4. Are conventional insurance options analysed Do these options include ? * Conventional insurance
- Banker's Blanket Bond ?
- Electronic and Computer Crime coverage
- Directors and Officers (D&O) Liablity Coverage?
- Professional Indemnity Coverage ?
- Environmental Liability ?
* Risk retention groups, group captives and risk sharing pools?
* Agency Captives ?
* Rent-a-captive ?
* Finite risk financing ?
5. Do formal policies and procedures exist to coordinate conventional insurance, group captives, risk pooling, finite risk etc., with internal financing options i.e deductibles, losses and deductible sharing within the groups etc. 6. On at least an annual basis is a formal market review of conventional insurance done. Does this review include: * Market capacity ?
* Terms, conditions, and flexibility of coverage ?
* Cost ?
7. Are the results of this, review formally reported to the Operational Risk Management Committee and the Board of Directors ? 8. On at least an annual basis is a formal review of the insurance program conducted to evaluate the performance of both Underwriters and Brokers ? If yes, does this review include:
* Financial stability ?
* Claims payment record ?
* Responsiveness to the institution’s coverage needs ?
* Premium structure and pricing ?
* Quality of program administration ?
* Professional competence and value added ?
* Fee for service/negotiated commission ?
* Performance parameters established by written
agreement ?
* Arunual review of performance against contractual obligations?
* Quarterly progress reports / review sessions ?
* Claims handling records ?
* Quality of program administration ?
9. Does bank maintain a direct relationship with its Underwriters (both primary insurers and reinsurers) ?
- 10. On at least an annual basis does the bank review its exposure to catastrophic risk (i.e "long tail risks" which exceed existing risk financing measures and cause significant impact to the balance sheet and / or share price ) ?
- Are these findings reviewed by both senior management and the Board of Directors ?
- Are appropriate measures. taken to secure protection for catastrophic losses ? Do these measures include:
* Use of highly qualified and specific indemnities (i.e customer
contractual, governmental, etc) ?
* Use of global insurance markets to secure specific catastrophe coverage in excess of primary limits ?
* Plan for post-funding potential losses in excess of
purchased protection ?
* Pre-loss reserving and finite insurance programs ?
5. Glossary of Terms
External Risk Financing Options - This represents the transfer of risk to a third party and may include: conventional insurance, risk retention groups, group captives, risk sharing pools, rent-a-captives, agency captives, and finite risk insurance.
Internal Risk Financing Options - This represents self insurance and may involve a number of techniques including: unfunded retention, single parent captives, contractual transfer of risk, and funded retention.
Lone Retention Guidelines - Formal guidelines established as a part of the Operational Risk Management Plans as to how much risk may be retained by the institution in the form. of self insurance.
Operational Risk - The risk of loss - either financial or non-financial inherent in the bank Operations. Operational risk is pure risk i.e there is no opportunity for gain as in financial risk. Operational risk either result in loss or no loss. Examples of operational risk are: losses due to criminal activity (fraud, counterfeiting, forgery, etc.,) loss of revenue due to system outages or destruction, professional liability losses (shareholder suits, fines for regulatory non-compliance, suits by customers) intangible losses such as damage to reputation and credibility, etc.
Operational Risk Manager - The senior manager within the bank responsible for the development of the bank's Operational Risk Management Plan and implementation and management of the Operational Risk Management Program. The Operational Risk Manager should report directly to the .managing Director/General Manager.
Operational Risk Management Committee - An operational committee of the bank reporting directly to the Operational Risk Manager. this committee should be composed of members of all major operational and staff departments within the bank; to include, but not be limited;: to Internal Audit, Treasury Operations, Credit Card/ATM, Data Processing / Telecommunications, Insurance, Domestic Branch Operations, Overseas Branch/Subsidiary Operations, Private Banking, and Compliance. The Operational Risk Management Committee shall be responsible for assisting the Operational Risk Manager in developing Risk Assessment and Control Matrices for each functional area within the bank. and developing and implementing the Operational Risk Management Plan.
Operational Risk Management Plan - The strategic plan developed by the Operational Risk Manager and the Operational Risk
Management Committee and formally approved by the Board of Directors for addressing the management of operational risks within the institution. This plan should define how the institution proposes to handle each category of operational risk (i.e. crime, professional liability, regulatory/legal non-compliance, political risk, etc. ) and the methods to be used in their control (internal controls, internal retention of risk, risk transfer through conventional insurance, finite risk management programs, etc.). This plan should be reviewed and approved by the Board of Directors on at least an annual basis.
Penalty / Reward System - In the context of operational risk management, Penalty/Reward Systems should be used to create a system of incentives for the effective management of operational risk at the level of the operational department or unit. For example, branches which reduce losses below a target amounting receive bonuses equal to half of the amount saved.
Risk Assessment and Control Matrices - These matrices should be developed by each functional area and reviewed by both the Operational Risk Manager and the Internal Auditor. They should identify each area of operational risk to which the department / unit is subject, the level of potential loss (either financial or non-financial), and all internal and external methods to be used to either control or finance risk.
Risk Financing Policy - Formal guidelines established as apart of the Operational Risk Management Plan defining the methods to be used by the institution (i.e. conventional insurance, single parent captive, risk retention group, finite insurance. etc.) for the financing of operational risk.
Risk Management for Shariah Compliant Banking
Risk Management Framework for Shari’ah Compliant Banking
No: 43038156 Date(g): 2/12/2021 | Date(h): 27/4/1443 Status: In-Force Based on the powers granted to the Central Bank under Saudi Central Bank Law issued by Royal Decree No. (M/36) dated 11/04/1442 H and related regulations. Referring to the Central Bank Circular No. 41042498 dated18/06/1441 H on the Shariah Governance Framework for Local banks Operating in Saudi Arabia, which is considered the first stage of establishing a supervisory framework for banks and banks practicing Islamic banking.
And as a complement to the Central Bank's issuance in this regard, and in order to enhance the environment of compliance with the provisions and principles of Shariah, we inform you of the issuance of the “Risk Management Framework for Banks Practicing Islamic Banking”, which aims to set minimum principles for risk management, market risk and operational risk.
For your information, and action accordingly as from May 1, 2022 G.
1. Introduction
This Risk Management Framework for shari’ah compliant Banking is issued by SAMA in exercise of the powers vested upon it under its charter issued by the Royal Decree No. M/36 on 11-04-1442H (26 Nov 2020G) and the Banking Control Law issued by the Royal Decree No. M/5 on 22-02-1386H (26 June 1966G) and the rules for Enforcing its Provisions issued by Ministerial Decision No 3/2149 on 14-10-1406H.
In February 2020, SAMA has issued Shari’ah Governance Framework for enhancing governance, risk management and compliance practices of Banks conducting Shari'ah compliant Banking. The Risk Management Framework for Shari'ah compliant Banking provides 2 set of rules for establishing and implementing effective risk management in Banks offering Shari'ah compliant product and services. The Risk Management Framework for Shari'ah compliant Banking will further complement and enhance the current Risk Management regime by identifying and suggesting techniques to manage various types of risks unique to Shari’ah compliant Banking. The Risk Management Framework for Shari'ah Compliant Banking should be considered in addition to the various risk management regulations and guidelines issued by SAMA from time to time and Banks will be required to comply with all sets of rules and guidelines. Shari ‘ah compliant Banking products and services are also exposed to various types of risks including the following major categories of risks:
• Credit risk
• Equity investment risk
• Market risk
• Liquidity risk
• Rate of return risk
• Operational risk
SAMA will roll out the Risk Management Framework for Shari’ah Compliant Banking in phases. This will allow a reasonable timespan for Banks to implement various rules stipulated in each phase of the framework. In the first phase, this circular specifies rules regarding overall management of the risks by Banks conducting Shari'ah compliant Banking as well as 2 minimum set of regulatory requirements for managing market risk and operational risk relating to Shari’ah compliant Banking.
2. Definitions
The following terms and phrases used in this document shall have the corresponding meanings unless otherwise stated:
SAMA: Saudi Central Bank.
Rules: Principles and regulations mentioned in the Risk Management Framework for Shari'ah compliant Banking.
Bank: For the purpose of these rules, the Bank means 2 Bank conducting Shari'ah compliant Banking either as a full fledged Islamic Bank or through an Islamic window.
Full Fledged Islamic Bank: A Bank that conducts only Shari 'ah compliant Banking.
Islamic Window: That part of a conventional Bank (which may be a branch or a dedicated unit of that Bank) that provides Shari’ah compliant finance and investment services both for assets and liabilities products.
Fiduciary Risk: The risk that arises from a Bank’s failure to perform in accordance with explicit and implicit standards applicable to their fiduciary responsibilities.
Salam: The sale of a specified commodity that is of a known type, quantity and attributes for a known price paid at the time of signing the contract for its delivery in the future in one or several batches.
Parallel Salam: A second Salam contract with a third party to acquire for a specified price a commodity of known type, quantity and attributes, which corresponds to the specifications of the commodity in the first Salam contract without the presence of any links between the two contracts.
Sukuk: Certificates that represent a proportional undivided ownership right intangible assets, or a pool of tangible assets, receivables and other types of assets. These assets could be in a specific project or specific investment activity that is Shari'ah compliant.
Murabahah: A sale contract whereby the bank sells to a customer a specified asset, where the selling price is the sum of the cost price and an agreed profit margin. The Murabahah contract can be preceded by a promise to purchase from the customer.
Commodity Murabahah (Tawarruq): A Murābahah transaction based on the purchase of a commodity from a seller or a broker and its resale to the customer on the basis of deferred Murābahah, followed by the sale of the commodity by the customer for a spot price to 2 third party for the purpose of obtaining liquidity, provided that there are no links between the two contracts.
Ijarah: A contract made to lease the usufruct of a specified asset for an agreed period against a specified rental. It could be preceded by a unilateral binding promise from one of the contracting parties. As for the Ijarah contract, it is binding on both contracting parties.
Ijarah Mawsufah fial-Dhimmah (Forward Lease): A contract where the lessor leases the usufruct of a specific future asset, which will be delivered by the lessor to the lessee for the latter to acquire the usufruct on a specific date in the future. This usufruct can be of an asset (manfa‘at‘ayn) or 0 service (manfa ‘at khidmah).
Ijarah Muntahia Bi Al Tamilk: A lease contract combined with a separate promise from the giving the lessee a binding promise to own the asset at the end of the end lease period either by purchase of the asset through a token consideration, or by the payment of an agreed upon price or the payment of its market value. This can be done through a promise to sell, a promise to donate, or a contract of conditional donation.
Istisna: The sale of a specified asset, with an obligation on the part of the seller to manufacture/construct it using his own materials and to deliver it on a specific date in return for a specific price to be paid in one lump sum or instalments.
Parallel Istisna: A second Istisna contract whereby a third party commits to manufacture/construct a specified asset, which corresponds to the specifications of the asset in the first Istisna contract without the presence of any links between the two contracts.
Wakalah: An agency contract where the customer (principal) appoints an institution as agent (wakīl) to carry out the business on his behalf. The contract can be for a fee or without a fee.
Musharakah: A partnership contract in which the partners agree to contribute capital to an enterprise, whether existing or new. Profits generated by that enterprise are shared in accordance with the percentage specified in the Musharakah contract, while losses are shared in proportion to each partner’s share of capital.
Mudarabah: A partnership contract between the capital provider (rabb al-māl) and an entrepreneur (mudārib) whereby the capital provider would contribute capital to an enterprise or activity that is to be managed by the entrepreneur. Profits generated by that enterprise or activity are shared in accordance with the percentage specified in the contract, while losses are to be borne solely by the capital provider unless the losses are due to misconduct, negligence or breach of contracted terms.
Market risk: The risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions arising from movement in market price, i.e. fluctuations in market values in tradable, marketable or leaseable assets (including Sukuk) and in off-balance sheet individual portfolios.
Operational risk: The risk of losses resulting from inadequacy or failure of interna l processes, people and systems, or from external events, which includes, but is not limited to, legal risk, Shari'ah non-compliance risk and the failure in conducting fiduciary responsibilities.
Shari’ah non-compliance risk: The risk that arises from a Bank’s failure to comply with the shari’ah rules and principles prescribed by Shari'ah Committee of the Bank.
The Board: The Board of Directors appointed by the shareholders in line with applicable laws and regulations.
Senior Management: the Senior Management consists of a key group of individuals responsible for overseeing the day-to-day management of the Bank and they shall be accountable in this respect. These individuals should have the necessary experience, competence and integrity to manage the business under the Board’s supervision. The Board shall have appropriate controls applicable to these individuals.
The definitions of Shari’ah compliant products mentioned above are extracted from the set of definitions proposed by Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). These definitions do not limit offering the Shari’ah compliant products and services that are approved by the respective Shari’ah Committee of each Bank.
3. Scope and Level, of Application
Risk Management Framework for Shari'ah Compliant Banking shall be applicable to the following institutions:
i. All locally incorporated Banks that are licensed and operating in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and are conducting Shari'ah compliant Banking.
ii. Where a locally incorporated Bank has 2 majority owned subsidiary(ies) licensed and operating outside Saudi Arabia and/or has branch operations in any foreign jurisdiction that conduct Shari'ah compliant Banking shall follow these rules provided that there is no inconsistency with the legal and regulatory requirements of host country.
4. General Principle
4.1 Principle 1.0: Banks conducting Shari'ah compliant Banking shall have in place a comprehensive risk management and reporting processes, including appropriate board and senior management oversight, to identify, measure, monitor, report and control all relevant categories of risks. The process shall take into account appropriate steps to comply with Shari'ah rules and principles.
Board of Directors (BOD) oversight;
4.2 The Board of Directors is responsible for establishing a robust and effective risk management framework for the Bank.
4.3 As there are specific risks associated with Shari'ah compliant Banking, the risk management activities of Banks conducting Shari'ah Compliant Banking require active oversight by the Board of Directors and Senior Management. The Board of Directors or the related committee of the Board shall approve the risk management objectives, strategies and policies that are consistent with the risk profile, risk appetite and risk tolerance for the Bank.
4.4 The Board of Directors or the related committee of Board shall ensure the existence of an effective risk management structure for conducting activities including adequate systems for measuring, monitoring, reporting and controlling risk exposures commensurate with the scope, size and complexity of the Bank’s business and operations.
4.5 The Board of Directors or the related committee of Board shall review the effectiveness of the risk management activities periodically and make appropriate changes as and when necessary.
Senior Management oversight:
4.6 The senior management shall develop and implement well defined procedures for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling risks in line with the risk management objectives, strategies and policies approved by the Board of Directors or the related committee of Board.
4.7 Senior Management shall execute the strategic direction set by the Board of Directors or the related committee of Board on an ongoing basis and set clear lines of authority and responsibility for managing, monitoring and reporting risks. The Senior Management shall ensure that the financing and investment activities are within the approved appetite and risk tolerance limits.
4.8 Senior Management shall ensure that the risk management function should be separated from risk taking function and is reporting directly to the Chief Executive officer/General Manager. In addition, the Chief Risk Officer shall have independent access to the related committee of the Board ultimately responsible for establishing the risk management in the Bank. The risk management function shall define the policies, establish procedures and monitor compliance with the established limits and report to the related committee of the Board and Senior Management on risk matters accordingly.
Risk Management Process:
4.9 The Bank shall have a sound process for executing all elements of risk management including risk identification, measurement, mitigation, monitoring, reporting and control. This process requires the implementation of appropriate policies, limits, procedures and effective management information systems (MIS) for internal risk reporting and decision making that are commensurate with the scope, complexity and nature of the Banks’ activities.
4.10 The Bank shall ensure that an adequate system of controls with appropriate checks and balances is set in place. The controls shall (a) comply with the shari’sah rules and principles; (b) comply with applicable regulatory and internal policies and procedures; and (c) take into account the integrity of risk management processes.
4.11 The Bank shall make appropriate and timely disclosure of information to depositors having deposits on Profit and Loss Sharing basis (also known as Profit-sharing Investment Accounts, PSIAs) so that they are able to assess the potential risks and rewards of their deposits and protect their own interests in their decision making process.
4.12 In addition to the above, the following general requirements shall also be taken into account by Banks:
i. Application of Emergency and Contingency Plan: The Senior Management shall draw up an emergency and contingency plan, approved by the Business Continuity Committee as required under the Business Continuity Management Framework issued by SAMA in February 2017 or the updated version as applicable in order to be able to deal with risks and problems which may arise from unforeseen events.
ii. Integration of Risk Management: While assessing and managing risk, the management should have an overall view of risks the Bank is exposed to. This requires having a structure in place to look at risk interrelationships across the Bank. Such a setup could be in the form of a separate department or Bank’s Risk Management Committee could perform such a function. The structure should be such that ensures effective monitoring and control over risks being taken.
iii. Risk Measurement: For each category of risk, the Bank is encouraged to establish systems/models that quantify its risk profile. The results of these models should be assessed and validated by an independent function within or outside the Bank.
iv. Utilization: The Bank should develop a mechanism which should, to the highest possible extent, monitor that funds provided by the depositors and investors were utilized for the purpose these were advanced.
v. Role of Risk Administration Department: It should be separated from the department originating the risk. It should be among the responsibilities of Risk Administration Department to monitor that the documents are obtained according to the requirements as specified in the product. For example, the dates play a very important role in Murabahah transactions and any transaction can be rendered invalid if the sequencing of obtaining documents is changed.
vi. Management Information System: The Bank should specify control reports to be prepared by the independent risk management department that should be periodically (at least quarterly) submitted to the related committee of Board and the Senior Management.
vii. Human Resources: The Bank shall ensure that the board members, senior management and staff working on related Shari’ah compliant products and processes have been adequately trained regarding Shari'ah principles and procedures.
4.13 The risk management approaches and methodologies must be able to distinguish the different nature and combination of risks that are associated with various types of Shari'ah compliant contracts used to structure financial products. A robust and dynamic risk assessment approach is required for products that involve different types of Shari’ah compliant contracts throughout the life of the product.
5. Market Risk
5.1 Principle 2.0: Banks shall have in place an appropriate framework for market risk management (including reporting) in respect of all assets held, including those that do not have 2 ready market and/or are exposed to high price volatility.
5.2 Banks shall develop a market risk strategy including the level of acceptable market risk appetite taking into account contractual agreements with fund providers, types of risk- taking activities and target markets in order to maximize returns while keeping exposures at or below the pre-determined levels. The strategy should be reviewed periodically by the Bank, communicated to relevant staff and disclosed to fund providers.
5.3 Banks shall establish a sound and comprehensive market risk management process and information system which (among others) comprise:
• a conceptual framework to assist in identifying underlying market risks;
• appropriate frameworks for pricing, valuation and income recognition;
• a strong MIS for controlling, monitoring and reporting market risk exposure and performance to appropriate levels of senior management.
Given that all the required measures are in place (e.g. pricing, valuation and income recognition frameworks, strong MIS for managing exposures etc.), the applicability of any market risk management framework that has been developed should be assessed taking into account of consequential business and reputation risks.
5.4 Banks should be able to quantify market risk exposures and assess exposure to the probability of future losses in their net open asset positions.
5.5 The risk exposures in the investment securities are similar to the risks faced by conventional financial intermediaries, namely market price, liquidity and foreign exchange rates. In this regard, Banks shall ensure that their strategy includes the definition of their risk appetite for these tradable assets.
5.6 In the valuation of assets where no direct market prices are available, Banks shall incorporate in their own product program a detailed approach to valuing their market risk positions. Banks may employ appropriate forecasting techniques to assess the potential value of these assets.
5.7 Where available valuation methodologies are deficient, Banks shall assess the need (a) to allocate funds to cover risks resulting from illiquidity, new assets and uncertainty in assumptions underlying valuation and realization; and (b) to establish a contractual agreement with the counterparty specifying the methods to be used in valuing the assets.
5.8 The policies and related procedures for market risk management shall also account for the risks associated to the following Shari’ah compliant products:
• The risks that relate to the current and future volatility of market values of specific assets (for example, the commodity price of a Salam asset, the market value of a Sukuk, the market value of Murabahah assets purchased to be delivered over 2 specific period) and of foreign exchange rates.
• In salam, Banks can be exposed to counterparty credit risk on a long position and commodity price fluctuations while holding the subject matter until it is disposed of. In the case of Parallel salam, there is also the risk that a failure of delivery of the subject matter would leave the Banks exposed to commodity price risk as a result of the need to purchase a similar asset in the spot market in order to honor the Parallel Salam contract.
5.9 When Banks are involved in buying assets that are not actively traded with the intention of selling them, it is important to analyze and assess the factors attributable to changes in liquidity of the markets in which the assets are traded and which give rise to greater market risk. Assets traded in illiquid markets may not be realizable at prices quoted in other more active markets.
5.10 Banks are also exposed to foreign exchange fluctuations arising from general FX spot rate changes in both cross-border transactions and the resultant foreign currency receivables and payables. These exposures may be hedged using Shari'ah compliant methods.
5.11 In addition to the above, there should be a middle office or an independent function to perform market risk management function and to independently monitor, measure and analyze risks inherent in the treasury operations of a Shari'ah compliant Banking. In addition, the unit should also prepare control reports indicating deviations for the information of senior management.
6. Operational Risk
6.1 Principle 3.0: Banks shall have in place adequate systems and controls, including Shari'ah Committee, Shari’ah Compliance and Shari’ah Audit to ensure compliance with Shari'ah rules and principles.
6.2 Operational risk is inherent in all activities, products and services of Banks and can transverse multiple activities and business lines within Banks. Operational risk may result in direct financial losses as well as indirect financial losses (e.g. loss of business and market share) due to reputational damage.
6.3 In addition to the usual form of operational risks, the Shari'ah compliant Banks and Islamic Windows are exposed to risks relating to Shari'ah non-compliance and risks associated with the Banks’ fiduciary responsibilities towards different fund providers. These risks expose Banks to fund providers’ withdrawals, loss of income or voiding of contracts leading to an impairment of reputation and/or the limitation of business opportunities.
6.4 Banks shall consider the full range of material operational risks affecting their operations, including the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. Banks shall also incorporate possible causes of loss resulting from Shari'ah non-compliance and the failure in their fiduciary responsibilities.
Shari'ah Non-Compliance Risk:
6.5 Principle 4.0: Banks shall ensure that the policies and related procedures shall be in place to measure, mitigate and monitor the Shari'ah non-compliance risk. Shari'ah compliance is critical to a Bank’s operations and such compliance requirements must be communicated throughout the Bank and their products and activities.
6.6 In Shari’ah compliant Banking, a majority of the fund providers use Shari’ah compliant Banking services. As a matter of principle, their perception regarding the Bank’s compliance with Shari’ah rules and principles is of great importance to the sustainability of the Bank. In this regard, the Bank must consider Shari'ah compliance as falling within a higher priority category in relation to other identified risks.
6.7 Banks are also exposed to reputational risk arising from failures in governance, business strategy and process. Negative publicity about a Shari'ah compliant Banking business practices, particularly relating to Shari'ah non-compliance in their products and services, could have an impact upon their market position, profitability and liquidity.
6.8 Banks shall ensure that they comply at all times with the Shari'ah rules and principles as approved/instructed by the Banks’ Shari'ah Committee with respect to its products and activities. This means that Shari'ah compliance considerations are taken into account whenever the Banks accept deposits and investment funds, provide finance and carry out investment services for their customers.
6.9 Banks shall ensure that their contract documentation complies with Shari'ah rules and principles - with regard to formation, termination and elements possibly affecting contract performance such as fraud, misrepresentation, duress or any other rights and obligations.
6.10 Banks shall undertake a Shari'ah compliance review at least annually, performed either by a separate a Shari'ah audit department or as part of the existing internal audit function by persons having the required knowledge and expertise for the purpose. The objective is to ensure that (a) the nature of the Banks’ financing and equity investment and (b) the operations relating to all Shari'ah compliant products and services are executed in adherence to the applicable Shari'ah rules and principles, policies and procedures approved by the Bank’s Shari'ah Committee.
6.11 Banks shall keep track of income not recognized arising out of Shari’ah non-compliance and assess the probability of similar cases arising in the future. Based on historical reviews and potential areas of Shari'ah non-compliance. Banks may assess potential profits that cannot be recognized as eligible Banks’ profits, the Bank shall seek its Shari’ah Committee ruling and direction with regard to the appropriate cleansing and disposal of Non-Shari’ah Compliant income.
Fiduciary risk:
6.12 Principle 5.0: Banks shall have in place appropriate mechanisms to safeguard the interests of all fund providers. Where Profit & Loss Sharing depositors’ funds are comingled with the Banks’ own funds, Banks shall ensure that the bases for the asset, revenue, expenses and profit allocations are established, applied and reported in a manner consistent with the Banks’ fiduciary responsibilities.
6.13 Banks failure to perform in accordance with their fiduciary responsibilities could result losses in investments, the Bank may become insolvent and therefore unable to (a) meet the demands of current account holders for repayment of their funds; and (b) safeguard the interests of their Profit & Loss Sharing deposit holders. The Bank may fail to act with due care when managing investments resulting in the risk of possible forgone profits to Profit & Loss Sharing deposit holders.
6.14 Banks shall establish and implement a clear and formal policy for undertaking their different and potentially conflicting roles in respect to managing different types of investment accounts. The policy relating to safeguarding the interests of their Profit & Loss Sharing deposit holders may include the following:
i. Identification of investing activities that contribute to investment returns and taking reasonable steps to carry on those activities in accordance with the Banks' fiduciary and agency duties and to treat all their fund providers appropriately and in accordance with the terms and conditions of their investment agreements, if any;
ii. Allocation of assets and profits between Banks and their Profit and Loss Sharing deposit holders will be managed and applied appropriately to Profit & Loss Sharing deposit holders having funds invested over different investment periods; and
iii. Limiting the risk transmission between current and investment accounts.
6.15 A reliable IT system is necessary for profit & loss sharing mechanism, failure of which may lead to Shari'ah non-compliance risk. The Bank should identify key risk indicators and should place key control activities like Code of Conduct, Delegation of authority, segregation of duties, succession planning, mandatory leave, staff compensation, recruitment and training, dealing with customers, compliant handling, record keeping, MIS, physical controls etc.
6.16 Banks shall adequately disclose information on a timely basis to their Profit & Loss Sharing deposit holders and markets in order to provide a reliable basis for assessing their risk profiles and investment performance.
7. Effective Date
These Rules shall come into force in 1 May 2022.