Book traversal links for I. Objective of the LCR and Use of HQLA
I. Objective of the LCR and Use of HQLA
16. This standard aims to ensure that a bank has an adequate stock of unencumbered HQLA that consists of cash or assets that can be converted into cash at little or no loss of value in private markets, to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. At a minimum, the stock of unencumbered HQLA should enable the bank to survive until Day 30 of the stress scenario, by which time it is assumed that appropriate corrective actions can be taken by management and supervisors, or that the bank can be resolved in an orderly way. Furthermore, it gives the central bank additional time to take appropriate measures, should they be regarded as necessary. As noted in the Sound Principles, given the uncertain timing of outflows and inflows, banks are also expected to be aware of any potential mismatches within the 30-day period and ensure that sufficient HQLA are available to meet any cash flow gaps throughout the period. | ||
17. The LCR builds on traditional liquidity “coverage ratio” methodologies used internally by banks to assess exposure to contingent liquidity events. The total net cash outflows for the scenario are to be calculated for 30 calendar days into the future. The standard requires that, absent a situation of financial stress, the value of the ratio be no lower than 100%4 (ie the stock of HQLA should at least equal total net cash outflows) on an ongoing basis because the stock of unencumbered HQLA is intended to serve as a defence against the potential onset of liquidity stress. During a period of financial stress, however, banks may use their stock of HQLA, thereby falling below 100%, as maintaining the LCR at 100% under such circumstances could produce undue negative effects on the bank and other market participants. Supervisors will subsequently assess this situation and will adjust their response flexibly according to the circumstances. | ||
18. In particular, supervisory decisions regarding a bank’s use of its HQLA should be guided by consideration of the core objective and definition of the LCR. Supervisors should exercise judgement in their assessment and account not only for prevailing macro financial conditions, but also consider forward-looking assessments of macroeconomic and financial conditions. In determining a response, supervisors should be aware that some actions could be procyclical if applied in circumstances of market-wide stress. Supervisors should seek to take these considerations into account on a consistent basis across jurisdictions. | ||
(a) | Supervisors should assess conditions at an early stage, and take actions if deemed necessary, to address potential liquidity risk. | |
(b) | Supervisors should allow for differentiated responses to a reported LCR below 100%. Any potential supervisory response should be proportionate with the drivers, magnitude, duration and frequency of the reported shortfall. | |
(c) | Supervisors should assess a number of firm- and market-specific factors in determining the appropriate response as well as other considerations related to both domestic and global frameworks and conditions. Potential considerations include, but are not limited to: | |
(i) | The reason(s) that the LCR fell below 100%. This includes use of the stock of HQLA, an inability to roll over funding or large unexpected draws on contingent obligations. In addition, the reasons may relate to overall credit, funding and market conditions, including liquidity in credit, asset and funding markets, affecting individual banks or all institutions, regardless of their own condition; | |
(ii) | The extent to which the reported decline in the LCR is due to a firm-specific or market-wide shock; | |
(iii) | A bank’s overall health and risk profile, including activities, positions with respect to other supervisory requirements, internal risk systems, controls and other management processes, among others; | |
(iv) | The magnitude, duration and frequency of the reported decline of HQLA; | |
(v) | The potential for contagion to the financial system and additional restricted flow of credit or reduced market liquidity due to actions to maintain an LCR of 100%; | |
(vi) | The availability of other sources of contingent funding such as central bank funding,5 or other actions by prudential authorities. | |
(d) | Supervisors should have a range of tools at their disposal to address a reported LCR below 100%. Banks may use their stock of HQLA in both idiosyncratic and systemic stress events, although the supervisory response may differ between the two. | |
(i) | At a minimum, a bank should present an assessment of its liquidity position, including the factors that contributed to its LCR falling below 100%, the measures that have been and will be taken and the expectations on the potential length of the situation. Enhanced reporting to supervisors should be commensurate with the duration of the shortfall. | |
(ii) | If appropriate, supervisors could also require actions by a bank to reduce its exposure to liquidity risk, strengthen its overall liquidity risk management, or improve its contingency funding plan. | |
(iii) | However, in a situation of sufficiently severe system-wide stress, effects on the entire financial system should be considered. Potential measures to restore liquidity levels should be discussed, and should be executed over a period of time considered appropriate to prevent additional stress on the bank and on the financial system as a whole. | |
(e) | Supervisors’ responses should be consistent with the overall approach to the prudential framework. |
4 The 100% threshold is the minimum requirement absent a period of financial stress, and after the phase-in arrangements are complete. References to 100% may be adjusted for any phase-in arrangements in force.
5 The Sound Principles require that a bank develop a Contingency Funding Plan (CFP) that clearly sets out strategies for addressing liquidity shortfalls, both firm-specific and market-wide situations of stress. A CFP should, among other things, “reflect central bank lending programmes and collateral requirements, including facilities that form part of normal liquidity management operations (eg the availability of seasonal credit).”