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  • 2 Background

    More and more governments, national agencies and regulators consider the protection of their national or sector-wide critical infrastructure as a high priority on their national cyber security agenda. In order to test the cyber resilience of the critical infrastructure, governments, agencies and regulators are increasingly embracing red teaming approaches. These red teaming approaches are generally underpinned by a framework which outlines how red teaming tests should be conducted, how to identify the organizations which should be considered part of the key or core infrastructure and the periodicity or frequency of these tests.

    In a red teaming test, an organization performs a ‘simulation' of a realistic cyber-attack. The Red Teaming Provider, consisting of certified and experienced ethical hackers, will execute / simulate cyber-attacks based on available threat intelligence and attack scenarios, which aims to test the cyber resilience of an organization.

    The cyber security attacks are cautiously modelled and tested, and will simulate a malicious attacker - using their attack approach - from the reconnaissance activities up to the actual compromise of the critical information asset(s). The simulation of these (attack) steps are executed and tested during a red teaming test and will provide vital insights into the organization's resilience against cyber-attacks.

    • 2.1 Stakeholders

      The stakeholders within the red teaming exercises have different roles and corresponding responsibilities. Irrespective of role, it is important that everyone is aware that any form of testing is performed in a controlled manner, and that a communication protocol is agreed regarding the sharing of information among the stakeholders. The relevant stakeholders are: 

      1. SAMA IT Risk of Financial Sector Supervision department - The authority that has primary responsibility for overseeing the Red Teaming exercise.
      2. The Member Organization - Each Financial Organization within the Financial Sector of Saudi Arabia and regulated by SAMA.
      3. The Security Operations Centre - The SOC positioned within the Member Organization, which will be subject to the red teaming test.
      4. The Red Teaming Provider - An external certified party, which has been selected to perform the red teaming exercise and provide required national or sector threat intelligence to define scenarios.
      5. Available Member Organization committees (e.g. Banking Committee for Information Security - BCIS) - Relevant results of executed red teaming tests, lessons learned, and threat Intelligence might be shared within this committee, in an appropriately sanitized form using the agreed communication protocol, to support the increase of the overall cyber resilience of the (financial) sector.
    • 2.2 Required Teams

      For the execution of the red teaming exercise, the following teams should be established:

      Green Team

      SAMA IT Risk of Financial Sector Supervision department provides the Green Team. The Green Team appoints the Test Manager for each red teaming test. The Test Manager is responsible for guiding and supporting the White Team through the red teaming exercise. The Green Team approves the selection of Red Teaming Provider and provides - when applicable - additional or specific threat intelligence for the Financial Sector.

      White Team

      Within the Member Organization, the White Team should be appointed (including a White Team Leader), who will be responsible for the controlled execution of the red teaming exercise. The White Team consist of a limited number of security and business experts which are the only staff members that are aware of the red teaming test and who are the single-point-of-contacts (SPOCs), e.g. CISO. They will monitor the test and intervene when needed, e.g. when the test or results of the test are likely to, or have, caused a critical impact, compromise or service disruption.

      The overall number of staff members that should be involved in the engagement, should be limited to maximum five (5) people, to avoid a too wide disclosure of the intended cyber-attack simulation and - as a result - that the effectiveness of the exercise is limited or flawed.

      Blue Team

      The cyber security monitoring team of the Member Organization (e.g. SOC) which monitors and analyses the generated security alerts and events to identify security breaches or flaws. It is the task of the Blue Team to detect the malicious activities (of the Red Team) and to follow the agreed incident response procedures the moment an incident is detected. The Blue Team should never be informed about the test and are expected to follow their standard operating procedures, in order to simulate a realistic attack.

      Red Team

      The Red Team, a selected third party that executes the attack scenarios and consists of certified and experienced specialists. The Red Team will work with the Green Team and White Team to develop the potential threats and attack scenarios. The Red Teaming Provider is also responsible for providing the latest threat intelligence related to the Financial Sector in order to achieve a certain level of assurance that the Member Organization is tested against the latest known (sophisticated) cyber-attacks.

      Please refer to Appendix A-Requirements for Red Teaming provider, for more details on Red Teaming provider requirements.

    • 2.3 Penetration Testing Versus Red Teaming

      There is a significant difference between red teaming exercise and penetration testing. Red teaming focusses on testing the cyber resilience of an organization. In a penetration test, the scope is often limited to an application or system, with the intent to comprehensively test the security of that limited scope application or system. 
       
      The overall objective of a red teaming exercise is different from the objective of a penetration test. In a red teaming exercise, the objective is to (independently) test the overall cyber resilience of a Member Organization. This is achieved by testing the implemented cyber security controls, along with the detection and response capabilities. 
       
      A secondary objective is to share the lessons learned with the Member Organizations within the Financial Sector, to further improve the overall cyber resilience within the sector. 
       
      Penetration testingversusRed Teaming
      Gain oversight of vulnerabilitiesGoalTest the resilience against realistic attacks
      Predefined subsetScopeRealistic access paths
      Focus on preventive controlsTested controlsFocus on detection and response
      Focus on efficiencyTest methodFocus on realistic simulation
      Mapping, scanning and exploitingTest techniquesTactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)
      Very limitedPost-exploitationExtensive focus on critical assets or functions
      Parts of development lifecycleRecurrencePeriodical exercise
       
      Figure 1 Difference between penetration testing and red teaming 
       
    • 2.4 The Cyber Kill Chain Methodology

      The Cyber Kill Chain1 provides a conceptual model to describe an attack. The term “chain” reflects the end-to-end process adopted by an attacker. 
       
      The Cyber Kill Chain provides a good insight into how an attack works and where the different tools and methods employed at each stage. To lower the risk of a successful attack, defensive measures (e.g. preventive, detective and responsive and corrective) should be considered and taken for each of the steps of the kill chain to reduce the probability of being compromised and improve the resilience of the Member Organization. 
       
      The following seven (7) stages characterize an advanced cyber-attack in the cyber kill chain: 
       
       
       
      Figure 2 Seven stages of a cyber-attack, with the red team and blue teams main tasks 
       
      1. Reconnaissance: 
         The first stage is about selecting a target and gathering information about the target to determine attack methods. This happens before the attack is executed. Examples of useful information can be: names, phone numbers, email addresses, functions, private or professional areas of interest of employees on the internet and published information about the software that an organization is using. 
         
      2. Weaponize: 
         The attacker creates the malicious payload/file for a specific target based upon information retrieved during the reconnaissance stage. The attack can come in many different formats and is based upon the creativity of the attacker, the available set of defenses and the possible vulnerabilities. 
         
      3. Delivery: 
         The transmission of the crafted attack to the victims by the use of different means, such as: email (attachments), phishing, websites, physical devices or social engineering. 
         
      4. Exploitation: 
         Triggering or activating the malicious payload/file (i.e. malware) will result in a successful penetration of the target's system and network. A staged malware attack limits the possibility of detection. The malware will communicate back to the malicious attacker over a secure channel, which limits the chance of detection. Attackers usually use popular methods and file formats to deliver the malware executables (e.g. Microsoft office files, pdf files, malicious websites, phishing emails and removable media). 
         
      5. Installation: 
         The actual installation of malicious payload/file or software that supports the malicious attacker. In order to make the malware and backdoor(s) persistent, the attackers could install additional malware or malicious software tools to ensure that the attack can continue if the initial compromised system or active malware is disabled. 
         
      6. Command and Control: 
         A compromised system will usually connect back to the attacker, to establish a so-called command-and- control channel, which allows remote control of the malware. Especially in advanced persistent threat (APT) malware, the attacker will control the malware and explore the network by using this type of remote access. 
         
      7. Actions on Objective: 
         After the attacker completed his malicious actions or achieved his goals, the attacker will try to cover his digital tracks and traces by using different techniques, like data exfiltration, or will use the compromised system as starting point to ‘hop on' to other systems in the network (i.e. lateral movement), to search for other high value assets or targets. 
         

      1 Computer scientists at Lockheed-Martin corporation developed and described the "intrusion kill chain" framework to defend computer networks in 2011. 
       
    • 2.5 Threat intelligence

      The Red Teaming Provider(s) will maintain and deliver the threat intelligence landscape relevant for Saudi Arabian Financial Sector or specific Member Organization. This can be enriched using the provided input from SAMA (i.e. the IT Risk of Financial Sector Supervision department, or the Green Team), the White Team and, various governmental agencies. The Red Teaming Providers should provide the latest threat intelligence related to the Financial Sector in order to achieve a certain level of assurance that the Member Organization is tested against the latest known (sophisticated) cyber-attacks.

    • 2.6 Overview of the Phases

      The Saudi Arabian Financial Entities Ethical Red Teaming Framework consists of four phases. In the corresponding chapters of this framework, each phase is described in detail. 
       
       
       
      Please refer to Appendix C-Glossary for more details and definitions regarding this Framework.